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Mobility problems increasingly become complex, and in 
order to respond to them, the decision-making processes 
and proposed solutions must also become more complex; 
they should by no means ignore this complexity by creating 
standard solutions. Solutions are often strongly viewed and 
formulated from the infrastructural-technical (hardware) 
and technological and user-oriented (software) angle, while 
an appropriate organization or “orgware” to be able to 
cope with such complexity is lacking. Yet, mobility is much 
more than just the construction of infrastructure or the 
development of new vehicle technology; it is influenced by 
so many other policy areas and evolutions, and by individual 
and collective customs. Each of us can be held responsible 
in the mobility transition. There is general acceptance that, 
in order to initiate a mobility transition, our behaviour – the 
way we act and govern – must also change.
In this dissertation we reveal a necessary orgware agenda, 
based on real-world complex case studies that provide 
insight into some recent, important orgware innovations 
in mobility: developing a regional cooperation for mobility, 
the transport regions, and dealing with complexity in large 
infrastructure projects. By visualising the mobility orgware, 
we try to materialise the use and the added value of the 
orgware approach. We focus on mapping the actors and 
the institutional context and we analyse how these two 
influence each other. In order to play with complexity and 
progress towards a more sustainable mobility, we propose 
an orgware agenda that aims to structurally connect  
a variety of actors across the various related policy areas. 
Therefore, the necessary conditions or institutional changes 
should be introduced as well, so that there are no obstacles 
to the new partnerships. This research is a plea for  
a co-evolutionary orgware approach to mobility to 
complement the conventional hardware and software 
approaches.
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7Dankwoord
Eerder slaakte ik een zucht van opluchting bij het finaliseren van mijn masterproef: 
zoiets hoefde ik immers niet meer te schrijven. Niets was echter minder waar… Dit 
proefschrift is het levend bewijs. De avond nadat ik mijn masterproef bij professor 
Lauwers succesvol had verdedigd, kreeg ik een mailtje van professor Boelens of 
ik niet wilde starten als doctoraatsbursaal op een project over de governance van 
een duurzame mobiliteit. Daar kon ik toch moeilijk voor passen? Voor ik het goed 
en wel besefte bleef ik niet alleen student, maar werd ik nu ook medewerker bij de 
UGent, meer bepaald de Afdeling Mobiliteit en Ruimtelijke Planning (AMRP). Naast 
een studentenkaart kreeg ik ook nog een personeelskaart op zak. Enter Academia. 
Onder de academische vleugels van Luuk en Dirk, mijn promotoren, en de praktische 
vleugels van Els (ofte ‘Els-Els’) nam mijn doctoraat een vliegende start. De AMRP op 
de Vrijdagmarkt was mijn nieuwe thuis. De overstap van student naar doctoraats-
student leek simpel: prof. Boelens werd ‘Luuk’, prof. Lauwers werd ‘Dirk’. Eerlijk? 
Zonder Luuk of Dirk had ik dit veelzijdige avontuur nooit mogen meemaken, ik ben 
hen dankbaar voor het vertrouwen dat ze in me stelden, de kansen die ze me gaven 
en hun leerrijke feedback op om het even welk uur van de dag. 
Hoewel het lokaal waarin ik begon op AMRP eigenlijk voorbehouden was voor de 
MRB, de onderzoeksgroep Milieu en Ruimtebeheer of iets dergelijks – niemand die 
het nog weet, installeerde ik me al snel tussen Jonas, Joke en Samuel (ofte ‘Amule’). 
Bij mijn eerste blik door het lokaal bleven mijn ogen rusten op een blad papier  
dat op de ingemaakte kast gekleefd was, getiteld: “How to fail a PhD”; de ironisch- 
satirische signatuur van Jonas leverde veel interessante gesprekken op, maar 
evenzeer geklets en gezever. Gezelligheid troef! Ook de buren brachten leven in 
de brouwerij. De vele lachsalvo’s of telefoongesprekken van Barbara waarvan de 
decibels dwars door de muren gingen, de gouden raad en stipte lunchverzoekjes van 
Els, de energieke tred van Thomas door de gang en de gezellige babbel na de lunch – 
hij was meestal wat laat met lunchen, of de vele nieuwtjes van Karel ontgingen me  
niet. Het was een amusant verdiep daarboven op +5 en het leek wel altijd vrijdag of 
markt daar op de Vrijdagmarkt. Merci, jullie allemaal! 
De maanden vlogen voorbij. Ik kreeg de kans om studenten te begeleiden, verschil-
lende congressen en dus ook Europese steden aan te doen, en talloze interessante 
persoonlijkheden te ontmoeten. Ik wil ook zeker de enthousiastelingen bedanken 
die ik bij het voeren van mijn onderzoek in binnen en buitenland tegenkwam of 
mocht interviewen. De verschillende casestudies en interviews of vergaderingen 
vormden de perfecte afwisselingen voor het bij momenten eenzame bureauwerk 
en gaven me telkens weer nieuwe energie om door te gaan. In het bijzonder wil ik 
het Ringland team bedanken voor hun gastvrijheid en gulle medewerking, maar ook 
voor de boeiende wending die zij wisten te forceren in het Oosterweeldossier, een 
case die ik graag opnam in mijn onderzoek. Huib, bedankt dat ik in de marge mocht 
meewerken aan het CurieuzeNeuzen onderzoek, het leverde me alvast een relatief 
vlotte tweede ‘A1’ op. 
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Naast de theorie van Academia, kwam gelukkig ook op tijd en stond de bezigheid van 
de vrije grafiek, in de academie voor beeldende kunsten te Gent. Wanneer ik mezelf 
vast reed in de literatuur over duurzame mobiliteit, governance of complexity, liet ik 
mijn gedachten de vrije loop tijdens het snijden in hout of linoleum en het krassen in 
koper of in pvc in het grafiek atelier, waar ik door Vladimir, Marnix, Liesbeth en mijn  
vele medestudenten ondergedompeld werd in de wondere wereld van de vrije grafiek. 
Langzaamaan, zoals het een succesvolle onderzoeksgroep betaamt, werden 
doctoraten afgerond, verhuisden collega’s van boven (pre-docs) naar beneden 
(post-docs), of bewandelden ze nieuwe wegen. Er waren tijden van komen en  
gaan. Toen eerst Joke, daarna Samuel, en uiteindelijk ook Jonas elk op hun  
beurt vertrokken waren, was ik plots de ‘ancien’. Raar. Gelukkig namen Hwachyi, 
Linda, Jiajia, Isabelle en tijdelijk ook Thomas hun intrek in mijn lokaal. Maja 
nam intussen het roer over van ‘Els-Els’ en werd mijn dagelijkse fietsgenoot en 
blijmoedige bijna-buurvrouw in Ledeberg. Nog later kwamen Beitske, Peter,  
Chloé en Annelies. Tom en Amir sloten de gelederen. Het samen optrekken voor  
een lunch naar Resto De Brug was altijd een lichtpunt tijdens mijn laatste loodjes. 
Zelfs de jarenlang aangekondigde, maar steeds uitgestelde verhuis van AMRP 
mocht ik nog meemaken, van de Vrijdagmarkt naar Blok B van Technicum in de 
Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat. Maar ook mijn tijd was bijna verstreken; de noodzakelijke 
publicaties (twee A1’s) behaald…
Het lokaal hing steeds meer samen met het afronden van mijn doctoraat. Het begon 
te lijken op een academische escape room. Voor de niet-kenner: een escape room 
is een kamer, of beter nog, een rariteitenkabinet waaruit je binnen een bepaalde 
tijdspanne moet proberen ontsnappen door creatief raadseltjes op te lossen. Wel,  
mijn lokaal werd af en toe ook zo’n escape room waarin ik mezelf meermaals tegen- 
kwam, maar waaruit vele van mijn voorgangers klaarblijkelijk al wisten te ontsnappen.
Eigenlijk is de metafoor van de escaperoom nog niet zo gek. In zo’n escaperoom ligt 
de tijd ook vast. Hoewel je daarin vaak slechts één uur de tijd krijgt, gaat het bij een 
doctoraat om een luttele vier jaar. Toch zijn er gelijkenissen. In het begin is er tijd 
genoeg en lijkt alles mogelijk of haalbaar – the sky is the limit. In het midden van 
het spel twijfel je weleens. Ben je eigenlijk wel goed bezig? Zou je geen tips vragen? 
Hoeveel tijd is er nog? Naar het einde toe wordt het zwaar menens. Geraak je wel 
op tijd rond met alle raadsels? Geraak je wel buiten? Of blijf je zitten in de kleine 
kamer? Ook dat is vergelijkbaar met het schrijven van een doctoraat, waarbij je af en 
toe, gekluisterd aan je bureau, veroordeeld bent tot het schrijven van je doctoraat. 
Hoewel je steeds beter weet waar je naartoe wil, wordt het een gevecht tegen de 
tijd. Schrijven, schrijven, schrijven. Els, Barbara en Thomas, mijn excuses dat ik niet 
altijd op de meest galante uren de afrondingsperikelen weer bij jullie naar boven 
bracht; jullie betekenen heel veel voor mij! Maja, bedankt om de laatste beslomme-
ringen en formaliteiten hier en daar voor me in orde te brengen, en altijd klaar te 
staan voor een extra hart onder de riem; “Keep Calm & Keep Writing”, het kaartje dat 
je stiekem in mijn brievenbus dropte prijkt nog steeds op de schoorsteen. Chloé, ook 
jou kon ik à la limite nog inschakelen om de nog her en der resterende Nederlands-
talige sporen in de tekst uit te wissen, ik sta bij je in het krijt! Dankzij al jullie 
duwtjes in de rug kon ik eindelijk indienen. 
9Na het indienen was het aan de examencommissie om te beslissen of ik de kamer 
mocht verlaten. Bij deze wil ik dan ook mijn juryleden in het bijzonder bedanken voor 
hun interessante feedback en vertrouwen. Het zijn zij die voor mij de deur naar de 
vrijheid weer openden. 
Wanneer het allemaal even te veel werd, was er gelukkig ook nog mijn familie en 
vriendenkring. Altijd stonden zij klaar en gelukkig konden zij het vaak toch net iets 
beter relativeren. Eigenlijk reden zij in alle stilte mijn hele doctoraatsparcours 
mee, zorgden ze voor de bevoorrading op de belangrijke en moeilijke momenten en 
brachten ze leven in de brouwerij en verstrooiing wanneer ik dat goed kon gebruiken. 
Daarvoor ben ik hen oprecht dankbaar; mama en papa voor jullie onvermoeibare 
steun, eeuwige anticipeervermogen en gouden raad bij dagdagelijkse beslomme-
ringen; Zus en Irven voor de letterlijke en figuurlijke nabijheid als bovenstebeste-
buren – #burenforever; Marijn om zo liefdevol en geduldig te zijn en te blijven ook 
al had ik soms mijn dagje(s) niet en stond mijn gezicht op onweer. Ach, jou maak ik 
met mijn doctoraat gelukkig zo gauw nog niet nerveus; die dolle huizenjacht was een 
ander paar mouwen zeker? 
Stilaan groeide de goesting om de planningspraktijk in te duiken; een pad dat door 
enkele van mijn oud-collega’s reeds met glans werd bewandeld. Dat de opdrachten 
“kortlopender” en praktischer mochten zijn, daar was ik wel uit. Dat het Atelier 
Romain zou worden, wist ik eigenlijk al nadat ik er als jobstudent in de vakantie van 
2013 gewerkt had. Mijn intrede in de praktijk was dan iets drukker dan gepland, 
gelukkig werd ik ook bij Romain warm onthaald en stond ‘de GIS-cel’ steeds klaar 
om me te helpen bij de brute overgang van ArcGIS naar QGIS en nog zoveel meer. 
Dankzij al jullie steun geraakte ook ik tijdig uit die escape room. Terwijl de volgende 
lichting AMRP’ers zich opmaakt om de room te betreden, maak ik me klaar voor de 
nieuwe mobiliteits- en planningsuitdagingen; maar vooral om er weer eens met jullie 
op uit te trekken #YOLO– maar duurzaam en veilig graag!
Suzanne
juni 2018, Gent
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Samenvatting
Het oplossen van de huidige mobiliteitsproblemen of het sturen van mobiliteit lijkt 
een lastige zaak vandaag de dag. De huidige mobiliteitsplanningsbenaderingen  
zitten nog diepgeworteld in een zeer technocratisch discours, waarbij oplossingen 
worden gezocht in hardware en software interventies. Hiermee wordt bedoeld dat 
de infrastructurele en technische kant (hardware) en het gebruik ervan (software) 
het onderwerp zijn van innovatie. Dit terwijl de afstemming ertussen of de 
organisatie meer algemeen, onderbelicht blijft. We gebruiken het woord orgware, 
om deze organisatie aan te duiden, omdat het nauw aansluit bij de termen hardware 
en software, waarmee we meer vertrouwd zijn. Die organisatie zorgt ervoor dat 
de interventies elkaar kunnen versterken en een effectieve mobiliteitstransitie 
kunnen ontketenen. Enerzijds mist het huidige mobiliteitsplanningsklimaat interne 
afstemming met andere beleidskaders, anderzijds mist het ook afstemming met 
nieuwe of externe actoren. Het actorenveld wordt immers steeds groter terwijl 
de processen zich vaak nog afspelen tussen de “usual suspects”. Zo verworden 
mobiliteitsproblemen tot “wicked problems”, waarvoor de geformuleerde 
oplossingen steeds weer andere problemen genereren. In dit onderzoek richten we 
ons op dat orgware hiaat in mobiliteit, meer specifiek bij het besturen van mobiliteit 
in Vlaanderen. Het moet gezegd dat die orgware agenda recent steeds prominenter 
naar voor komt, maar die is nog pril. In dit proefschrift is de centrale onderzoeks-
vraag dan ook als volgt: 
Wat kan een orgware agenda toevoegen aan de heersende hardware en 
software benaderingen in de mobiliteitstransitie?
Stapsgewijs wordt deze hoofdvraag uiteengerafeld in verschillende deelvragen, 
die doorheen de verschillende hoofdstukken een antwoord krijgen. Hoofdstuk 1 
schetst de aanleiding voor dit onderzoek, de probleemstelling en de vraagstelling. 
Ook positioneert het zich ten opzichte van recente mobiliteitsdiscoursen. We stellen 
ons de vraag waarom huidige mobiliteitsproblemen “wicked” zijn en waarom we de 
complexiteit van mobiliteit maar beter au sérieux nemen. 
Om te begrijpen hoe we adequaat kunnen omgaan met de complexe mobiliteits-
vraagstukken, die inherent zijn aan een complexe realiteit, starten we onze 
zoektocht doorheen de wetenschappelijke literatuur in hoofdstuk 2 bij de complexi-
teitstheorie. Het hanteren van een complexiteitsperspectief vergt een aanzienlijke 
mentaliteitsverandering, omdat zekerheid en voorspelbaarheid worden ingeruild 
voor emergentie en niet-lineariteit. Als zodanig levert de planner zijn controle 
over het planningsproces van input naar output in, ten voordele van de autonomie 
van het proces zelf (throughput). Verder gaan complexiteitstheorieën uit van een 
systemisch denken: het geheel wordt gezien als een dynamisch samenspel tussen 
verschillende onderdelen die met elkaar interageren en die elkaar (in)directe 
beïnvloeden. Problemen die zich in een bepaald deel van het systeem manifesteren, 
kunnen niet zomaar worden opgelost met een kant-en-klare oplossing, aangezien 
de problemen zelf door het kluwen van interacties een veelheid aan onverwachte 
reacties in verschillende andere systemen kan uitlokken. Vandaar krijgen tijds- en 
plaatsgebonden benaderingen meer aandacht dan generieke (De Roo 2012, Jessop 
1997). Om de complexe realiteit te begrijpen, moeten we ons bewust zijn van het 
grotere plaatje, we moeten met andere woorden meer zicht krijgen op de verschil-
lende delen en hun onderlinge relaties. Het concept van het complex adaptief 
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systeem (CAS) vindt in toenemende mate zijn weg van de biologiediscipline naar de 
sociale wetenschappen, en reikt de systemische inzichten aan waarnaar we op zoek 
zijn. De complexiteitstheorie hanteert een specifiek vocabularium. De dynamieken 
die binnen deze systemen vanzelf ontstaan worden processen van “zelforganisatie” 
genoemd, terwijl de onderlinge wisselwerking met andere systemen of delen van het 
systeem het label “co-evolutie” krijgt opgeplakt.  
In paragraaf 2.2 staan de onderdelen van zo’n systeem centraal. Hoe krijgen 
processen vorm, hoe ontstaan als ze zich niet zomaar laten voorspellen of sturen?  
In de eerste plaats gaan we uit van de actoren zelf die vorm geven aan het systeem. 
We hanteren een actor-georiënteerd perspectief, dat voortbouwt op de actor- 
netwerktheorie (ANT) en de actor-relationele benadering (ARA). De ANT-theorie 
gaat ervan uit dat actoren gezien moeten worden als onderdeel van associaties, 
of letterlijk actornetwerken. ANT is gebaseerd op de idee dat actoren continu 
netwerken, of dus actornetwerken, waardoor ze zichzelf betekenis geven en 
ze door hun relaties ook betekenis krijgen. Alles moet beschouwd worden als 
actornetwerk; focussen op de actoren of op het netwerk is slechts een kwestie van 
in- of uitzoomen. Volgens ANT bestaat er immers niets anders dan het actornetwerk. 
In de zoektocht naar het verwezenlijken van hun doelstellingen vormen actoren 
dynamische allianties met andere actoren die dezelfde idealen, plannen, doelstel-
lingen, enz. nastreven; er ontstaan actornetwerken. Het in beeld brengen van de 
actoren of de actornetwerken vormt dus een eerste uitdaging voor de orgware 
agenda. 
Aangezien actoren niet zomaar netwerken, maar ook uiteindelijk hun stempel willen 
drukken op datgene dat ze nastreven en mee willen doorwegen in het beslissings-
proces (institutionalisering), is het nodig om ook even stil te staan bij de manier 
waarop actoren hun omgeving en de  institutionele context beïnvloeden. Onder 
de institutionele context verstaan we zowel de formele (wetten, regels, normen, 
plannen, etc.) als de informele (gedrag, waarden, etc. ) instituties. We bespreken 
enkele theoretische institutionele perspectieven die inzicht verschaffen in de 
kansen en voorwaarden voor een institutionele verandering: de pad-afhankelijke 
benadering, de sociologische benadering, en de stromenbenadering die “windows of 
opportunity” identificeert. Uit dit overzicht onthouden we dat de voorgeschiedenis 
een belangrijke invloed heeft op de toekomstige mogelijkheden en op de institu-
tionele context, maar ook dat geschiedenis niet alles bepaalt. De institutionele 
context kan veranderen, als de actoren er werk van maken. Niet alle veranderingen 
leveren echter een effectiever resultaat op, actoren hebben slechts een beperkte 
kennis en inzicht in hun situatie en ook culturele betekenis en gewoonten spelen 
een rol. 
Na te hebben ingezoomd op zowel de actoren als de institutionele context, 
bekijken we het dynamische samenspel van beide, dat gedefinieerd kan worden als 
governance. In paragraaf 2.3 komen verschillende governance definities en perspec-
tieven met betrekking tot de invulling van ‘governance’ en de rol van de overheid 
aan bod. Die rol varieerde in de afgelopen decennia van een sterk hiërarchische 
benadering, gekenmerkt door een gecentraliseerd en top-down overheidsapparaat  
dat de controle in de hand nam, naar een meer vrije-marktgeoriënteerde 
benadering, waarin de overheid zijn taak meer en meer delegeerde. In de jaren die 
erop volgden zocht men echter heil in een combinatie van beide, de markt corrigeert 
immers niet voor alles: de vele nefaste neveneffecten of milieu- en gezondheids-
impact van onze handelingen, sociale inclusie, etc. 
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Om daarvoor te corrigeren en de handelspatronen van actoren meer de gewenste 
richting uit te sturen lijkt de rol van de overheid allerminst uitgespeeld. Initiatieven 
die van onderuit groeien, krijgen hierbij de kans om zich te ontwikkelen en worden 
tegemoetgekomen door initiatief van bovenuit. Co-productie werd het sleutelwoord 
waarmee de governance benadering verder ging. 
Maar de sterke focus op het plannen voor de middellange of lange termijn leek 
moeilijk verenigbaar met het complexiteitsdenken waarin onvoorspelbare zelf- 
organiserende processen en co-evolutie centraal staan. Om een meer complexe 
lezing van de toekomst toe te laten, ging men althans in het onderzoeksveld van 
de bestuurskunde op zoek naar een governance benadering die verder ging dan 
co-productie; de ‘reflexive governance’, de transitiemanagement benadering en 
de evolutionaire governance theorieën werden ontwikkeld. Al deze governance 
strategieën hebben hun eigen specificiteiten en zijn inzetbaar in andere situaties. 
Ze kunnen in een matrix van vier “uiterste” governance strategieën bijeen worden 
gezet. Maar in het geval dat zowel de institutionele context als het actorenveld 
dynamisch is, wordt de voorkeur gegeven aan een co-evolutionaire strategie. Die  
zal dan ook verder vorm geven aan de orgware agenda voor mobiliteit.
In paragraaf 2.4 lieten we de theoretische inzichten in de complexiteit, de actoren 
of actornetwerken, en de institutionele context versmelten met een perspectief op 
mobiliteit dat het complexe karakter beter weerspiegelt: mobiliteit als een complex 
adaptief systeem (CAS). Een mobiliteitssysteem kan worden beschouwd als een 
CAS, binnen het grotere maatschappelijke/milieusysteem, maar ook op microniveau. 
Het bestaat uit verschillende dynamische onderdelen die elkaar voortdurend 
beïnvloeden: socio-demografische factoren, macro- en micro-economische trends, 
sociaal-culturele trends, de pluralisering van levens- en dus mobiliteitsstijlen, de 
impact op vervuiling en gezondheid, technologische en logistieke innovaties, en de 
impact van dit alles op het beleid. Het onderzoek naar mobiliteit is daarom steeds 
complexer geworden. Voor die vertaalslag namen we het mobiliteitsmarktenmodel 
als uitgangspunt. Dat model heeft immers oog voor alle actoren en factoren die 
van invloed zijn op mobiliteitskeuzes en reispatronen. Bovendien integreert het de 
mobiliteit in een breder maatschappelijk en milieusysteem en houdt het rekening 
met zowel de vraag- als de aanbodzijde van mobiliteit in. Passen we dit model toe 
dan bestaat het complex adaptief mobiliteitssysteem uit een verplaatsingsmarkt, 
een vervoersmarkt en een verkeersmarkt. Die markten organiseren zich echter niet 
in een leemte, maar zijn afhankelijk van middelen (energie, financiële middelen, 
etc.) en hebben een zekere impact op het bredere socio-technische (hyper)systeem 
(vb. congestie, luchtvervuiling). Elk van deze “markten” bestaat uit associaties 
van dynamische actorvelden die hun voorwaarden en omgeving vormgeven en 
erdoor worden vormgegeven. De orgware of de organisatie van zo’n complex 
adaptief mobiliteitssysteem, die naast hard- en software moet bijdragen aan een 
mobiliteitstransitie, staat voor een tweeledige uitdaging. In de eerste plaats moet 
de benadering van binnenuit proberen ingrijpen in de subsystemen en de netwerken 
van actoren zodat structurele koppelingen (structural couplings) ontstaan en 
allianties kunnen worden gevormd die de verschillende deelsystemen met elkaar 
verbinden. Ten tweede kan governance ook de voorwaarden scheppen die nodig zijn 
om deze structurele koppelingen mogelijk te maken. 
De complexiteitstheorie aanvaardt geen generieke oplossingen maar zoekt naar 
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diepgaande, situationele kennis. Het verwondert daarom wellicht niet dat we voor 
ons onderzoek naar de orgware agenda van mobiliteit een casestudie methodo-
logie toepassen om het antwoord op onze centrale onderzoeksvraag op te bouwen 
(cf. hoofdstuk 3). Vanuit een meervoudige casestudie analyse proberen we te 
achterhalen waar mobiliteitsgovernance vandaag de dag staat. We gaan in op de 
specifieke actornetwerken die vorm geven aan de governance van mobiliteit en 
welke governance benaderingen de voorkeur genieten. De casestudies worden 
geselecteerd uit twee belangrijke mobiliteitsgovernance innovaties of evoluties 
die zich de afgelopen tien jaar hebben ontwikkeld of voltrokken: de opkomst van 
de regionale of interbestuurlijke samenwerking voor mobiliteit en het plannen en 
uitvoeren van grote en complexe infrastructuurprojecten. Meer concreet, krijgt het 
ontstaansproces en de voorgeschiedenis van de vervoerregio’s een plaats in dit 
proefschrift. Waarbij ook De Verkeersonderneming in Rotterdam en zijn Mobility 
as a Service toepassingen meegenomen worden voor analyse. Anderzijds leveren 
het reeds langlopende infrastructuurproject van de Oosterweelverbinding en de 
opkomst van georganiseerde burgerbewegingen als Ringland binnen dit debat 
tevens input voor de mobiliteitsgovernance in verandering. Vooraleer in te gaan op 
deze casestudies worden in Hoofdstuk 4 de recente evoluties geschetst van het 
institutionele kader dat vorm geeft aan de mobiliteitsplanning en de ruimtelijke 
planning in Vlaanderen. Dit luik schept tevens de context waarbinnen men de cases 
kan situeren.
Uit de casestudies die besproken worden in Hoofdstuk 5 t.e.m. 7, blijkt dat de 
governance van mobiliteit nog steeds hoofdzakelijk gericht is op het formuleren 
van hardware en software oplossingen vanuit een benadering gedomineerd 
door een infrastructuurdenken. Waarbij voornamelijk de gevestigde actoren uit 
de verkeersmarkt, zoals de infrastructuuragentschappen, de lokale en hogere 
overheden, en de traditionele openbare vervoermaatschappijen het heft in handen 
houden. De orgware benadering krijgt te weinig aandacht, de noodzakelijke 
oplossingsruimte door synergieën tussen de verschillende mobiliteitsmarkten 
blijft dan ook vaak klein; nieuwe actoren betrekken blijft een lastige onderneming. 
Nochtans tonen de casestudies aan dat waar men wel tot die synergieën komt, en 
actornetwerken elkaar vinden, de oplossingen veel breder gedragen zijn en dus 
robuuster. Hierbij kan de invloed van burgerbewegingen anno 2018 en de verande-
rende rol, of de veelheid aan rollen die zij op zich nemen, niet worden onderschat. 
Vanuit die bevindingen formuleren we een orgware agenda voor mobiliteit. 
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt gekeken naar hoe een citizen science project het mobiliteits-
gedrag mogelijks kan veranderen. Nog belangrijker focust dit hoofdstuk op de 
veranderende rol van burgerbewegingen van oppositievoerders in de marge naar 
protagonisten in strategische partnerschappen met overheden, kennisinstellingen 
en private partners. De resultaten van het CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project 
van de Ringland Academie vormen hiervoor de input. 
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Ter samenvatting kan gesteld worden dat dit onderzoek ernaar streefde aan de 
hand van casestudies de huidige mobiliteitsorgware te ontrafelen, of beter nog, te 
materialiseren, om een orgware agenda naar voor te schuiven die mogelijkheden  
aanreikt voor de mobilteitstransitie. Waar het besturen of de governance van 
mobiliteit vandaag de dag nog te vaak vervalt in het infrastructuurdenken of in 
tracédiscussies, zijn er recent wel lichtpunten die sporen bevatten van een meer 
co-evolutionaire governance aanpak. De cases wezen uit dat de tweeledige aanpak 
voor een co-evolutionaire governance van mobiliteit relevant is en een houvast biedt 
voor de orgware agenda.
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Summary
This dissertation starts from the observation that solving mobility issues and 
governing mobility remain troublesome. The prevailing mobility governance 
approaches are still entrenched in a technocratic oriented discourse, that is 
strongly oriented towards hardware (i.e. infrastructural and technical) and software 
solutions (i.e. related to use). Those approaches, however, do not prove effective to 
launch the mobility transition, as they miss alignment, and either face an increasing 
opposition by an ever growing and empowered actor field, or, their solutions have 
generated undesired side-effects, that in turn developed new problems. Because 
of this, mobility issues, increasingly become wicked problems. Only more recently, 
orgware interventions, focusing on the organisational aspects (the actors, the 
institutions, and the conditions) are becoming part of the mobility governance 
scope. With orgware we mean the organisational black box that is behind mobility; 
behind our individual displacement patterns, behind mobility planning and decision-
making, etc. 
In this research, we address the orgware hiatus, by elaborating on a more systemic 
and complex conceptualisation of mobility. Because the current governance 
strategies do not fit the encountered complexity, we unravel the mobility orgware 
into its basic components and interrelations to propose an additional orgware 
agenda for mobility. 
To understand how to adequately respond to the wicked mobility issues, that 
are inherent to a complex reality, our venture starts from the complexity theory 
literature in Chapter 2. Adopting the complexity perspective implies a considerable 
change of mind, as certainty and predictability are replaced by emergence and 
a-linearity. In this case, the emphasis in planning shifts from ad-hoc planning 
based on the here and now (“being”), towards planning for an undefined becoming 
(Boelens and De Roo 2014). The wicked problems generated by those dynamic 
interrelated parts and subsystems cannot be answered by generic formulas. Hence, 
situational approaches gain attention over generic ones (De Roo 2012, Jessop 1997). 
Thus, to grasp the complex reality, a more systemic conception of the matter is 
necessary; a concept that enables revealing the connections and feedback loops 
between parts of the system. The complex adaptive system (CAS) concept increas-
ingly finds its way from the biology discipline towards the social sciences, and 
provides the systemic insights that we are looking for. A CAS is defined as a complex 
system that comprises many subsystems and hyper-systems or environments at 
multiple (scale) levels, which are all continuously self-organising in the interaction 
with each other and with their setting. When zooming out, to see the bigger picture, 
the detail of the parts dissolves and the subsystems they shape become visible. 
From this perspective we can observe the co-evolution processes, as the aggregate 
of the self-organising actor networks. 
In Section 2.2, we discuss what this means for a system, regarding its components. 
How do mobility patterns arise? Who or what is at the basis of those patterns? 
First, we take an actor-centred perspective, that builds on the actor network 
theory (ANT) and the actor relational approach (ARA). The ANT theory presumes 
that actors should be perceived as parts of associations or actor networks. ANT 
is founded on the ideas that actors are continuously networking, and by doing so 
acquiring meaning (within their network). Everything has to be considered as an 
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actor network; focusing on either the actors or the network is a matter of zooming 
in or out. There is nothing but the actor network. In the quest to survive, actors form 
dynamic alliances with other actors that strive the same ideals, plans, objectives, 
etc. Actor network associations emerge from those continuous interactions 
 (“self-organising” processes). ANT and ARA identify four phases in this actor 
networking, the “translations”: problematisation, interessement, enrolment, 
and mobilisation of allies or institutionalisation. The ARA approach, specifically 
addresses the role of spatial planners in this translation. ARA, therefore refines 
those four steps into seven, and even formulates a step towards the future beyond 
the plan; developing a regime and shaping an associative democracy. ARA further 
stresses the importance of a mixed actor network association in which strategic 
partnerships between the civil, public, business and knowledge sector are strived 
for. As actors eventually want to get their views or actions institutionalised, i.e. 
adopted and facilitated by formal and informal sets of rules, plans, etc. we conduct 
a brief inspection of the institutional theory perspectives.
Second, the institutional layer is elaborated. Everything has meaning within and 
thanks to its specific context, decisions are never taken in a vacuum, and history 
matters. Institutions are defined as ‘collections of rights, rules, principles, and 
decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the 
participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the participants’ 
(Young 2017: 27). We discuss several institutional theories or perspectives that 
concentrate on opportunities and conditions for institutional change: the path 
dependent, the sociological, and the institutional change perspective conceptu-
alising windows of opportunities. From this brief review, we extract that history 
matters for the future course of institutions, but that history does not determine 
everything. Institutions can change, if the actors decide so. However, not all 
change necessarily implies a more effective outcome, as people only have bounded 
rationality, and cultural significance and habitual behaviour play a role as well. What 
remains, after having discussed how to perceive the actors and the institutions,  is 
the elaboration of their dynamic interplay, that is called ‘governance’. 
In Section 2.3 We discuss prevailing perspectives on the interpretation of 
“governance”, and the role of the government in it. The public administration 
paradigm, the new public management, and the new public governance form the 
starting point. 
Past governance approaches ranged from a strongly top-down centred government 
in the public administration paradigm (70’s and 80’s), to a free market oriented 
new management paradigm (90’s). From 2000 onwards, hopes were pinned on a 
combination of both in the new public governance paradigm. Since the top-down 
approach did not always deliver the desired results, governing inclined towards the 
other extreme; the free market principle. The associated co-production concept 
was seized as an opportunity for PPS. But, the predominant co-production concept 
of that era soon eroded to managerial contracting practices, and became a shadow 
of the strategic partnership between public and private it once had envisioned. As 
mentioned, in response, the new public governance paradigm emerged, combining 
elements of both previous paradigms. The interpretation and reputation of 
co-production was restored. However, as this approach appeared very time- 
consuming, it soon drifted off from real co-production to only involving the vested 
actors. Besides, those governance approaches still focus on working towards a fixed 
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goal, though oriented on the longer term. That fixed goal is something difficult to 
accept when acknowledging the complex nature of the real world. Striving for a fixed 
goal does not account for self-organising processes by actor networking associa-
tions. Those processes lay at the basis of how actor networks come into existence, 
and how actors influence and are influenced by their environment and institu-
tional setting (cf. Section 2.2). As an answer, affected by complexity theories, the 
reflexive governance, transition management, and evolutionary governance theory 
were developed, adding co-evolutionary aspects to governance. They conceptu-
alised how governance arrangements could change or (co-)evolve over time. When 
combining those former perspectives with the new one, one can come up with a 
matrix of four governance approaches. They can be differentiated according to the 
way they perceive the actor field and setting cf. in Figure 95. It is this co-evolu-
tionary approach that we focus on, for our complexity embracing orgware agenda for 
mobility. 
In Section 2.4 we merge the theoretical insights regarding complexity, actors or 
actor networks, and institutions with a complex adaptive system’s makeover of 
mobility. The multi-market mobility model serves as the starting point for that 
fundamental orgware approach. The model has an eye for all aspects influencing 
mobility choices and travel patterns, and it embeds mobility in a broader societal 
and environmental system. By integrating both the supply and demand side of 
mobility, the model fits within the “new realism” paradigm in mobility planning. 
The mobility system or CAS of mobility comprises a travel market, a transport 
market, and a traffic market. Those markets do not act in a void, but are depending 
on resources and exert a certain impact on the broader socio-technical (hyper-)
system. Each of those ‘markets’ consist of dynamic actor network associations 
shaping and being shaped by their conditions. A mobility system can be regarded as 
a CAS, within the greater societal/environmental system, but also on micro-level. It 
consists of various dynamic features influencing each other continuously: socio-de-
mographic factors, macro- and micro-economic trends, socio-cultural trends, 
the pluralisation of life- and subsequently mobility styles, the impact on pollution 
and health, technological and logistic innovations, and the respective policies. 
Researching mobility has therefore become increasingly complex.
In a CAS context, a co-evolutionary governance aims at realising or facilitating two 
main objectives. First, from an inside perspective, governance should intervene in 
the subsystems and its actor networks, so that structural couplings and alliances 
can be forged. Second, from an outside perspective, governance can shape the 
necessary conditions to allow these structural couplings to happen. We are not 
only interested in the actors or the conditions, but also in their interactions. Those 
interactions relate to the actor’s or subsystem’s governance paths. The co-evolu-
tionary governance framework we propose is twofold. First, governance answers 
to mobility issues are screened and examined with respect to the rise of structural 
couplings within the actor network translation phases (if? How?). Second, the 
conditions or the object of planning is analysed to identify where windows of 
opportunities have opened up. 
As a complexity framework strongly encourages in–depth, situational knowledge, 
it might not come as a surprise that the we conduct a multiple case study analysis 
to find the answer to our research question (cf. Chapter 3). A multiple case study 
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analysis is carried out, to see where mobility governance stands today, on the 
subject of acknowledging complexity and adapting the orgware. Evidence is 
gathered from mostly Flemish mobility governance case studies. The cases are 
selected from two major developing governance processes over the last decade: 
regional intergovernmental mobility cooperation, and the planning and implemen-
tation of large infrastructure projects. 
The cases, discussed in Chapter 5 to 7, show that the present mobility governance 
still mainly focuses on hardware and software solutions from an infrastructure 
oriented perspective; the traffic market rules the game. The main players in the 
traffic market, such as infrastructure agencies, local and regional authorities, 
and the traditional public transport companies, take the lead. Looking at mobility 
in a more systemic way, extending the scope for solutions from the traffic to the 
transport and the travel market, while leaving room for new actors, is rare and 
deserves more attention. The case studies show that where the scope for solutions 
or the complex adaptive mobility system is fully taken into account, and where 
structural couplings are established between the actor fields and the mobility 
markets, the formulated mobility solutions are more robust and more broadly 
supported. The role of citizens movements and the changing role or multitude of 
roles they assume cannot be underestimated. On the basis of these findings, we 
formulate an orgware agenda for mobility. 
Chapter 8 elaborates on how a citizen science project can stimulate or trigger a 
behavioural change, not only with respect to their modal choices, but also regarding 
their attitude towards certain mobility policy measures. More importantly, the  
chapter focuses on the changing role of citizen movements from mere activist 
groups in the margin towards protagonists in strategic partnerships with 
governments, knowledge institutions and private actors. The results of the 
CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project by the Ringland Academy delivers the input 
for this chapter. 
In summary, this research aims to unravel the current mobility orgware on the basis 
of several case studies in order to come to an orgware agenda necessary to move 
forward in the mobility transition in an effective and efficient way. Whereas mobility 
governance still too often lapses into mere infrastructure thinking or into route 
discussions, more recently, traces of a more co-evolutionary approach could be 
cautiously spotted. The cases showed that the dual approach for a co-evolutionary 
mobility governance is able to identify the bottlenecks in the current mobility 
planning and enables us to formulate an orgware agenda. The dual challenge that 
is at the heart of such co-evolutionary approach is not only to achieve structural 
couplings between the actors and the mobility markets, but also to align the institu-
tional setting to support and initiate these couplings. Governance should be devoted 
to a two-tiers approach: forging structural couplings between the actor networks 
and subsystems, and intervening in the conditions to facilitate such couplings. This 
approach aligns with the new realism in mobility and offers insights in the gaps of 
current policy interventions. It traces the basic building blocks: the mobility actors 
and their actor networks. It re-associates the diverse markets and policy fields 
spatial planning and mobility. It addresses both demand and supply side of mobility, 
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and this within all three mobility markets; it addresses their associated conditions, 
thereby acknowledging the interplay between those markets. 
In summary, this research aimed to unravel, or even materialise, the current mobility 
orgware by means of case studies, in order to assemble an orgware agenda that 
highlights the challenges and offers possibilities in the transition towards a more 
sustainable mobility. Whereas the governance of mobility often still lapses into 
infrastructure-oriented thinking, recently, traces of a co-evolutionary governance 
approach could be identified. The dual approach for a co-evolutionary governance of 
mobility proved relevant and practical as the basis for an orgware agenda. 
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governance,
please?
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The thesis’ title “the art of governing in the complex mobility transition” speaks for 
itself. Several main theoretical themes can be distilled. First, the art of governing, 
hence governance, will be examined. By presenting it as an art, the fragility is 
suggested of the governance ambitions and the tailor-made products resulting 
from that. Nowadays, governance has increasingly become a common concept 
and is used in ambiguous ways. Often, in business contexts, it refers to corporate 
governance, as “the framework of rules and practices by which a board of directors 
ensures accountability, fairness, and transparency in a company’s relationship with 
its all stakeholders (financiers, customers, management, employees, government, 
and the community)”1. However, in this contribution we specifically intend the 
institutional governance concept that captures the steering of multiple actors, 
institutions, and systems, that are structurally coupled and that exert a mutual 
influence (Jessop 1997: 111). It comprises “steering collective behaviour toward 
desired outcomes and away from undesirable outcomes” (Young 2017: 26). Second, 
the title acknowledges the complexity of the real world, in which absolute steering 
is a delusion. But what do we mean by complexity, a complex system, or even a 
complex mobility system? Do complex systems allow to be steered at all? And in 
which direction? Are transitions possible? The quote below illustrates that the  
need for looking into the governance hiatus has been proclaimed by Jessop many 
years ago. 
Further steps on a research agenda might include questions about  
institutional embeddedness or about institutional governance, i.e., the 
governing of institutions and inter-institutional relations and their systemic 
environments. (Jessop 2001: 1221)
1.1
Mobility issues are “wicked” problems
[…] every plan, every treatment of a wicked problem is a venture, if not an 
adventure. (Rittel 1972: 395)
More and more, social transitions, and thus also mobility transitions, have become 
wicked issues as the result of an increasingly dynamic and complex real world 
(Kemp and Loorbach 2006), correspondingly they require more complex governance 
mechanisms and decision-making processes than was previously the case. But why 
are mobility problems wicked, and why is governing mobility often complex? 
According to the Oxford dictionary “wicked” means (1) evil or morally wrong, (2) 
intended to or capable of harming someone or something, and (3) (informal) extremely 
unpleasant. Sometimes, in informal way, it can also be used as a synonym for 
“excellent”. The last more informal meaning is interesting in combination with the 
word “problem”, because the outcome then becomes an excellent problem.
1 Description from http://www.businessdictionary.com
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We use the term ‘wicked’ in a meaning akin to that of ‘malignant’ (in 
contrast to ‘benign’) or ‘vicious’ (like a circle) or ‘tricky’ (like a leprechaun2) 
or “aggressive” (like a lion, in contrast to the docility of a lamb). We do not 
mean to personify these properties of social systems by implying malicious 
intent. But then, you  may agree that it becomes morally objectionable for 
the planner to treat a wicked problem as though it were a tame one, or to 
tame a wicked problem prematurely, or to refuse to recognize the inherent 
wickedness of social problems. (Rittel and Webber 1973: 160)
Thus, wicked problems are persisting; they can be defined as problems that 
generate new problems, while trying to solve the first ones. Those problems are 
2 ‘(in Irish folklore) a small, mischievous sprite’ (cf. Oxford Dictionary,  
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/leprechaun).
Figure 1  Headlines demonstrating that current (spatial or mobility) planning projects in Flanders 
are a wicked endless Calvary, left: Oosterweel Link Project (http://www.ademloos.be); upper 
right: setback of Uplace project (http://deredactie.be); bottom right: opinion on various complex 
projects (Draulans 2016).
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multifaceted and are subject to a continuously changing (and uncertain) setting of 
which conditions frequently change and sometimes become contradictory (Rittel 
and Webber 1973, Kenis and Provan 2008). 
Some mobility or transport problems are wicked problems. For instance when roads 
are congested, a possible and often considered solution is to provide more lanes to 
these roads. After a while, the roads become congested again, or other roads will 
become, as people start filling the gaps (the added infrastructure capacity). That 
phenomenon is referred to as the law of peak hour congestion or induced traffic as 
posed by Downs (1962) and documented by, amongst others, Duranton and Turner 
(2011) and Litman and Colman (2001). As such, the solution to the problem has 
generated other problems in turn. 
As policy-makers struggle to find effective solutions, mobility issues can be 
regarded as wicked: the solution(s) involve various actors and policy fields, and 
have to fit ever-changing conditions. Over the years, mobility – and especially 
car-mobility – traffic flows have increased and intensified (Geerlings 2012, 
Akerman, Banister et al. 2000, Chapman 2007). The foundation of the intensive 
mobility, transport, and communication patterns that we experience today are the 
result of the complex network society we live in. Mobility can be mainly considered 
as a derived demand, since it is or often has become a necessary medium to 
participate in economic and social life. But regarding this mobility, it seems that 
we have been locked into a “system of auto mobility” from which it is particularly 
hard to break free (Urry 2004). As a result, the daily mobility infarct on the principle 
road network remains a structural problem. The necessary transport-related 
emission reduction levels to mitigate climate change and ensure environmental 
health are still out of reach. Although there has been put effort in the adoption and 
implementation of clean vehicle technologies being responsible for a relatively 
small decrease of emissions, the continuing rise of car use and travelled kilometres 
per person is wiping out this effect (Chapman 2007, Dray, Schäfer, and Ben-Akiva 
2012). Additional to structural congestion, air quality and noise quality standards 
are exceeded frequently as well, especially in and around cities (Geerlings 2012: 12, 
Bertolini 2012, Chapman 2007). 
When planning for infrastructure or mobility projects, governments and project 
developers become increasingly entangled in wicked problems. They often 
become headache portfolios for politicians (cf. Figure 1). As a result of a strong 
fragmentation over the years, it is not only a challenge to align the governmental 
departments and branches at multiple scale levels, and resist or adapt to internal 
pressures during the planning process. But also from the outside, pressure is 
exerted; due to globalisation and ongoing empowerment, an increasing number of 
citizens and new stakeholders arrive at the (mobility) planning scene. Consequently, 
the role, expectations from, and position of the government in steering mobility is 
exposed to internal and external pressure. Furthermore, decisions and innovations 
in other policy and socio-technical domains influence the wickedness as well. 
Mobility is often a derived demand and is to be situated in a broader socio-economic 
system (Banister 2008). Planning mobility should thus logically integrate these 
highly interrelated domains of the socio-economic fields (Banister 2008, Nykvist 
and Whitmarsh 2008, Rajan 2006, Bertolini 2012). At the one hand, the continuing 
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growth of mobility patterns serves our economic welfare, but at the other hand 
exerts major negative impact on local and global environments, quality of life, 
and paradoxically on the economic prosperity of cities and regions (e.g. due to 
congestion) (Geerlings 2012, Banister 2008). Nevertheless, an integrated approach 
spanning at least the fields of spatial planning and mobility, has not yet seen the 
light. It is not a coincidence that we address mobility issue here, from a (spatial) 
planner’s perspective. Since spatial planning can be considered a natural site to 
integrate various (often sectoral) policies that are impacting an area (Van Assche 
and Verschraegen 2008). 
In summary, the ongoing increase of mobility patterns cannot be reversed quickly. 
The hardware and software solutions dealing with it, proved to be insufficient. 
Furthermore, the consequences of the intensification go beyond the field of mobility 
alone: a more systemic approach of mobility is needed.
In the transition literature in particular, various systemic frameworks have been 
discussing the governance concept. In such frameworks, transitions or innovations 
are conceptualised as a multi-layered socio-technical system in motion, consisting 
of multiple interconnected parts (human and non-human, or respectively social and 
technical) and feedback loops. Various concepts elaborate on how such systems 
can change or develop over time. For instance, the reflexive governance concept 
focuses on how governance arrangements themselves can evolve and adapt over 
time to fit the dynamic actor field and complex setting. The transition management 
research, with its multilevel perspective, relates to this reflexive governance and 
focuses on attaining the necessary change by zooming in on the multiple layers and 
their roles. Furthermore, there is the Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT), linking 
notions of change in social systems theory and institutional theories to governance 
paths, therewith also referring to the notion of path dependency and interdepen-
dence. These concepts and theories start from the ever-growing conviction that 
sustainability issues are systemic and complex in nature. Consequently, they 
produce wicked problems, for which a solution has to be sought in different and 
multiple directions. As this systemic conception is central to our view on mobility, 
we will pay attention to complexity theories and systems theories further on as well.
 
1.2
Towards new perspectives in mobility planning
The planning approaches that prevailed hitherto in the mobility practice are 
predominantly hardware and software oriented, often considering the supply side of 
mobility. Hardware interventions relate to changes made regarding the solid matter, 
the equipment, the technical part of mobility. Software measures intervene in the 
use of that solid matter (e.g. smart traffic light programs, ITS, mobility apps, and 
GPS systems) (Dobrov 1979).  
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However, an additional orgware3 approach is still missing; an organisational 
approach or thus governance that attunes the different hardware and software 
initiatives, so that mobility initiatives, institutions, etc. in various fields do not 
counteract but strengthen each other. 
People began to speak of mobility instead of transport or infrastructure planning, 
as mobility not only involves more than the infrastructural layer, but also more than 
transport. While transport is defined as “a system or means of conveying people or 
goods from place to place” (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com), mobility includes 
more. Mobility refers to “the ability to move or be moved freely and easily”  
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com). This places the mobility consumers or actors 
more centrally and implies certain preconditions. 
In this light, managing the demand side became part of mobility planning as well. 
This is often referred to as the “new realism” in mobility planning. The idea arose 
that it was necessary to curb the travel need by measures oriented to attain a 
behavioural change by location policy initiatives (integration of mobility patterns 
with urban planning), by offering more comfortable and often economic options to 
commuters, and by increased use of ICT (Nykvist and Whitmarsh 2008, Rajan 2006, 
Schwanen, Banister, and Anable 2012). 
Hard and software solutions are introduced in both the supply and the demand side 
of mobility. A hardware solution on the supply side is for instance the installation of 
smart traffic lights, or the provision of an extra lane (to increase the capacity of the 
road. The traffic lights, can be seen as a software measure as well as they have an 
influence on the use of the infrastructure (or the hardware). On the other hand, we 
can take the parking policy and parking tariffs of a city as an example of a hardware 
intervention targeting the demand side, as it gives the incentive to park further away 
from the city centre or to choose alternative transport modes. Other examples that 
are sometimes simultaneously both hard- and software are the high occupancy 
vehicle (HOV) lanes that are reserved for carpooling people. The low emission zone 
(LEZ), which restricts/permits the accessibility to a certain city area according to 
the emission standards of the user’s car is also an example of a measure that is 
both hard and software, and rather oriented towards the demand side of mobility. 
But still, there was no sign of an additional and engaged orgware approach, aligning 
all those initiatives or ideas.
Instigated by the Brundtland report in 1989, launching the sustainable development 
concept (cf. Brundtland report, 1989), the sustainability banner was rapidly adopted 
by many research and policy fields, no different for mobility. A sustainable mobility 
definition was derived from that general sustainable development concept. 
3 We define ‘orgware’ as the organisational aspects, as a set of organisational arrangements
integrating actors or initiatives, and institutions to support the appropriate interactions. We based 
this definition on the work of Dobrov, but translated it from its rather technological background 
to a social one (based on Dobrov 1979: 79,81). “To achieve success in putting each modern 
technological system into operation a specially designed organization is of great importance. This 
organization has to provide the necessary conditions for the utilization of decision makers’ skills 
and the interaction of this system with other systems of different natures. We named this system 
Orgware” (Dobrov 1979: 81).
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Accordingly, sustainable mobility delivers on the following aspects:
(1) allows the basic needs and development of individuals, companies and 
societies to be met safely and in a manner consistent with human and 
ecosystem health, and promotes equity within and between generations;  
(2) is affordable, operates efficiently, offers choice of transport mode,  
and supports a vibrant economy, and regional development; and (3) limits  
emissions and waste within the planet’s ability to absorb them, uses 
renewable resources at or below their rates of generation, and, uses 
non-renewable resources at or below the rates of development of renewable 
substitutes and minimizes the use of land and the generation of noise. 
(European Commission Joint Expert Group on Transport and Environment 
2000, as in Hull 2008: 95)
A sustainable mobility paradigm was developed, offering a new perspective, 
opposing the conventional (and car-centred) mobility paradigm. Meanwhile, a few 
other mobility paradigms such as “smart mobility” and place-making approaches 
were steadily developing, but all in a quite separate fashion. 
Traditionally, in the conventional mobility paradigm, more attention is paid to 
predominantly hardware, and software measures (endorsed by the rapidly booming 
multimedia and ICT developments). In case of traffic congestion, the lacking 
capacity could be calculated or predicted and provided (predict-and-provide). That 
is why the conventional approach has often been compared with a technocratic 
or an engineering approach, (Bertolini, le Clercq, and Straatemeier 2008: 69, 
Hull 2008: 94). The approach relies on ideas of manipulability, forecasting, and 
modelling future mobility scenarios to provide the solution to mobility issues. 
Though in the more technological field of applied systems and management, it 
has been argued that one needs the interplay of hardware, software, and orgware 
components to facilitate an innovation or transition (Dobrov 1979), we had to wait 
for the sustainable mobility paradigm to detect a first trace of an orgware agenda in 
mobility planning. The switch away from the outpaced, technocratic conventional 
mobility paradigm was called the “new realism” in transport planning (Hull 2008, 
Urry 2004). It casted the (theoretical) shift from mainly supply-side towards 
demand-side oriented; the first steps of a behavioural change agenda could even be 
identified.
The sustainable mobility paradigm, introduced by Banister (2008), proposes such a 
(theoretical) new realist response to the conventional mobility approach, since the 
latter has not enabled a more sustainable mobility pattern (Marshall and Banister 
2000). As a response, Banister conceptualises a comprehensive paradigm to get 
to a more sustainable mobility. That paradigm focuses on four pillars: (1) reducing 
the travel need, (2) aiming for a modal shift, (3) reducing the distances by land-use 
policy measures, and (4) technological innovation for an efficiency increase and a 
reduction of the environmental impact. Cities are considered the most sustainable 
urban form of development, as they combine well-designed, diverse, and dense 
urban environments, so that the accessibility and the availability of an efficient and 
high quality public transport can be guaranteed (Banister 2005). The third pillar, 
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reducing the distances, refers to the aim of the sustainable paradigm to narrow 
the current disconnect between spatial planning and mobility planning. Interes-
tingly, Banister argues that there are already enough options and policy measures 
to acquire a more sustainable transport pattern. The necessary conditions for 
change, however, are still lacking. In addition to the importance of a high-quality 
implementation of innovative schemes, he thus emphasises “the need to gain public 
confidence and acceptability to support these measures through active involvement 
and action” (Banister 2008: 73). 
Apart from the focus on public support and social aspects, environmental, health, 
and quality of life aspects formed the focal points of the paradigm (cf. emission 
reduction and associated strategies, LEZ, congestion charges, etc.)(Banister 2008). 
The economic aspects of mobility, such as the negative externalities and impact of 
traffic on the environment, are taken into account as well. Though the sustainability 
banner was often used in the mobility planning practice, the paradigm somewhat 
eroded and became mainly associated with the environmental impact of transport, 
dominated by the decarbonisation agenda of transport (van Lier and Macharis 2015). 
The social aspects were gradually dropped (Jeekel 2017).
‘smart cities’ is a term denoting the effective integration of physical, digital 
and human systems in the built environment to deliver a sustainable, 
prosperous and inclusive future for its citizens. (BSI 2014: 3) 
Not much later, the sustainable agenda became complemented by the smart 
mobility concept, in which salvation was sought in technological innovations for 
cars and in infrastructure management (optimizing cost- and time-efficiency of 
the infrastructural capacity). The idea appealed that, for instance, the necessary 
carbon reduction could be achieved with a minimal effort and interference to the 
personal (modal) choices, and thus without upsetting current practices of mobility 
(cfr. Marsden, Mullen et al. 2014: 74). Note that the decarbonisation agenda was 
still concentrated on. Smart mobility, was a rather vague concept, that was often 
linked to the smart cities concept. Although it has not been widely introduced in the 
academic literature, the term “smart” soon became inserted in the mobility planning 
vocabulary and was adopted by the mobility planning practice4. Jeekel (2017: 4297) 
argued that the concept embraced a more active5 perspective on mobility issues 
and solutions, and that it was therefore received with great enthusiasm in business 
and public circles. Although sustainability and multimodality were often claimed 
important by decision-makers, car-mobility improvements have been favoured at 
the expense of other modes (Litman 2013, Papa and Lauwers 2015, Joss 2016).
 
[…] a significant motivation for looking to technological development and its 
adoption was the idea that in this way carbon reduction can be achieved with 
minimal interference to the range of choices available to people and without 
upsetting current practices of mobility. (Marsden, Mullen et al. 2014: 74)
4  We therefore we chose to talk about it as a concept, rather than a paradigm
5  We use the term active to refer to the pragmatic character of the smart mobility approach, 
and to the action-driven perspective; it seems to offer concrete solutions (often data- and 
technological driven).
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The initial conceptualisation of the smart cities or smart mobility paradigm 
included more than only the data and technology part enhancing network capacity 
and management, as shown by the BSI definition on smart cities (see quote). But 
in practice it often did not reflect more than the faith in the technological fix. 
Consequently, the smart city paradigm was criticised for the lack of the human 
side to the story. The critiques reflected the missed opportunity to link the smart 
technologies with the sustainable and place-making approaches in which quality of 
life aspects and spatial planning are much more central. The smart city paradigm 
was even said to be not more than “an evocative slogan lacking some fundamental 
connection with other central aspects of mobility planning and governance” 
(Papa and Lauwers 2015: 543). Yet, some argued that the smart concept had been 
wholeheartedly embraced by politicians and became “a catch-phrase bereft of 
much precise conceptual meaning and, thus, susceptible to diverse interpreta-
tions and superficial practice” (Joss 2016: 1). It must be noted however, that in 
the meantime, many cities have broadened or supplemented the smart approach 
to some extent with elements of the other approaches as well, accounting for 
sustainability and aspects regarding quality of life.
Besides, the implementation of new technological developments (cleaner vehicles, 
electric vehicles, etc.) often requires considerable investments in new infrastruc-
tures as well, and, growing evidence shows that even the most optimistic future 
scenarios of technological implementation will need additional efforts and 
behavioural change to achieve emission reduction goals (Anable, Brand et al. 2012: 
130, Banister 2008, Chapman 2007, Dray, Schäfer, and Ben-Akiva 2012, Geerlings 
2012, Schwanen 2016). Furthermore, focusing the approach on providing for 
additional infrastructure is not always desirable, as apart from the scarcity of open 
space, this extra capacity can even induce more traffic, as said before (Litman 2007, 
Gorham 2009, Litman and Colman 2001, Downs 1962). Besides, if some of us were 
still clinging to the conviction that technology would fix it all, the recent diesel gate6 
provided an abrupt wake-up call. 
Since the 1990s, amongst many social science disciplines, planning gained interest 
in place-making approaches (Friedmann 2010). The place in place-making “provides 
the conditions of possibility for creative social practice. Place in this sense becomes 
an event rather than a secure ontological place rooted in notions of the authentic. 
Place as an event is marked by openness and change rather than boundedness 
and permanence” (Cresswell 2004: 39). The renewed interest in the “city as a 
place” refers to previous evolutions in the field and practice of urban design. This 
paradigm re-engaged with the smaller scale, with the local ecologies or networks; 
the diversity of the neighbourhoods and the complex dynamics behind it (Papa 
and Lauwers 2015). It offered a bottom-up, collaborative design approach that 
exhibited an admiration for the functioning of the old city as a system of organised 
complexity, that opposed the modernist urbanist agenda. Public safety, spatial 
quality, and diversity of the of urban (public) places were especially addressed 
(Jacobs 1961: 60-61). 
6  Large-scale emission scandal in the auto construction world
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Many scholars, however, kept following and elaborating the sustainable mobility 
concept and placed hopes in the transition management approaches (Nykvist and 
Whitmarsh 2008, Schwanen, Banister, and Anable 2012). While more recently critical 
voices raised a renewed interest in the social dimensions of mobility (Macharis and 
Keseru 2018), and the re-embedding of mobility and its socio-spatial context and 
planning (Kębłowski and Bassens 2017). The behavioural change agenda in mobility 
could also be situated in that re-engagement with the social dimension. It engaged 
with the various individual and habitual factors that influence mobility and modal 
behaviour. The recent comprehensive efforts to measure the influence of lifestyles 
on travel behaviour proves this. For instance, when targeting specific mobility 
consumer groups, such research provides useful information for policy making 
and evaluation (Van Acker, Goodwin, and Witlox 2016, Van Acker 2015, Van Acker, 
Mokhtarian, and Witlox 2014, Jones, Pykett, and Whitehead 2013). 
Yet, despite an increased knowledge and evolving mobility planning paradigms and 
concepts, not much of the necessary mobility transition has been realised. Urry 
would even state that we have ended up in the system of “auto-mobility”. But he 
sees opportunities to evolve onto a “post-car system” by adopting approaches that 
try to consider mobility in a systemic whole of material and immaterial aspects, 
modes and their development, institutions and attitudes, rules and regulation, 
policies and politics (Urry 2004). 
How do you change the paradigm that has locked public administrations into 
catering for public expectations of car penetration and speed of access in the 
belief that new road infrastructure and improved economic performance are 
somehow connected? (Hull 2008: 96)
The government was traditionally expected to take the front-runner position in 
launching the mobility transition (Hull 2008). Its role was investing in technology and 
curbing the travel demand to safeguard quality of life and economic prosperity, to 
reduce (transport-related) air and noise pollution levels and to maintain and update 
the infrastructures to the present needs. But mobility policy in general, and Flemish 
mobility policy in particular, lacked a clear and coherent discourse on how to attain 
the stated policy objectives for 2020 and beyond (Rajan 2006, Schwanen, Banister, 
and Anable 2012, Boussauw and Vanoutrive 2017). Though mobility planning can 
show some success stories, in general, mobility problems seem to aggravate and 
are subject to challenges from the in- and outside (Nykvist and Whitmarsh 2008, 
Schwanen, Banister, and Anable 2012, Rajan 2006, Gössling and Cohen 2014, 
Marsden, Mullen et al. 2014). Take Uber for instance, the initiative that is competing 
with the highly formalised taxi-sectors worldwide; Or the numerous upcoming 
bike-, car-, trip- and park-sharing initiatives; not to mention the driverless cars with 
their legal implications. Who is responsible in case of an accident? Are the systems 
reliable? Furthermore, the mobility planning scene comes across civic groups that 
are challenging traditional path dependencies with an increasing civil support base. 
To overcome these diverse challenges of the growing actor field, from the in-and 
outside, there is a need for new dynamics in the field of mobility. Those dynamics 
are not only to be expected from governments, but also other actors such as citizen 
movements or business actors have to take their responsibilities. In that respect 
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bottom-up or outside-in initiatives can be regarded as the key to real change. In our 
opinion without a severe look into the orgware of mobility, aligning the efforts of 
those multiple actors in the field of hardware, and software, will not break the (car)
mobility deadlock. 
1.3
Outline and research questions
The previous section shows that orgware aspects of mobility governance have 
remained underexposed. Solutions to the wicked mobility problems were sought 
in hardware (infrastructural, technical, solid matter) and software (regarding use) 
interventions. But those “quick fixes” in turn generated new problems, as our 
mobility patterns (and behaviour) were not that predictable as we had expected. 
Accordingly, a fundamental orgware approach must be faced. In this research, we 
elaborate on the conceptualisation of mobility as a system consisting of various 
components. We intend to unravel the mobility orgware to answer the central 
research question: What can an orgware agenda add to hard- and software 
solutions tackling de complex mobility transition? 
Figure 2  Dissertation outline
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To answer that central research question, a research framework was devised 
with several subquestions, relating to the different chapters or sections of this 
dissertation. Step by step, by answering those subquestions, we build our answer 
to the central research question. We elaborate and propose a conceptualisation 
of mobility to overcome the problems and gaps that confront and upset present 
mobility governance strategies. Afterwards, we apply the new conceptualisation 
to the real world mobility planning practice, by conducting a multiple case study 
research. The outline of the dissertation is illustrated in Figure 2, and described in 
detail below. 
Chapter 2 takes us through the literature. Section 2.1 introduces wicked problems in 
relation to complexity and the complexity theories, and proposes a way to conceive 
mobility in a more systemic way, so that we can visualise and unravel the orgware. 
The chapter answers the questions what it means to embrace complexity. What 
does it imply if we considered mobility issues as wicked problems with an inherently 
complex nature? The complex adaptive system concept inspired us to answer this 
question.
 a Why are mobility problems wicked, and why is the mobility transition  
  complex? 
Section 2.2 unravels the mobility orgware in its components: the actors and the 
setting or the conditions. We want to take an actor-centred perspective and 
therefore dig into the actor network theories and the actor relational approach 
(ARA). Furthermore, we develop a notion on how the setting is both shaping and 
shaped by those actors. Hence we let institutional theories shed light on path 
dependent processes, but show possibilities for institutional change. Questions 
that are addressed in deal with the perception of mobility orgware and its decisive, 
underlying elements. Who or what are the actors – or players of the game? What 
does the structure – or rules of the game– looks like?
 b Who is at the basis of a transition in mobility? 
Section 2.3 deals with governance and how governance arrangements can change 
over time. After having explored many definitions, we define our interpretation 
of the concept. We continue with a reflection on the evolving perspective on 
governance in the recent past. Furthermore, we look for concepts or theories 
that have been developed specifically to allow thinking of changing governance 
mechanisms over time. The reflexive governance concept, the extensive body on 
transition management theories and the concept of evolutionary governance theory 
are discussed in this respect. We clarify on the prevailing governance strategies and 
how they relate to the orgware components that were presented in Section 2.2. At 
the end of the section we should be able to answer questions about the meaning of 
governance, and the different governance approaches that can be distinguished. 
 c What is governance, and which governance strategies are applied? 
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Section 2.4 translates the screened concepts from the previous sections to the field 
of mobility, to build a conceptual research framework for the orgware agenda of 
mobility. That framework has been previously published as Van Brussel, Boelens, 
and Lauwers (2016). We start from systemic schemes or conceptualisations of 
mobility to refine and work towards an appropriate orgware framework in which the 
co-evolutionary governance approach receives most attention, as that approach 
embraces complexity. The multi-market mobility model (Egeter and van de Riet 
1998, Lauwers and Allaert 2013) serves as a starting point for a co-evolutionary CAS 
approach of mobility. We confront the found answers and orgware elements with the 
selected mobility schemes, to answer the following subquestion. 
 d How does a co-evolutionary governance approach looks like? 
The answer results in a twofold challenge or a two-tiers approach that intervenes 
in both the actor field and the conditions to overcome both internal and external 
challenges. After operationalising this challenge or two-tiers theoretical framework 
we should be able to answer
Chapter 4 delivers on the methods suitable for operationalising and testing the 
framework. Because everything acquires meaning or relevance by its context, and 
because of the complex nature and the suggested actor-centred approach, we 
conduct a multiple case study analysis. Evidence is gathered from mostly Flemish 
mobility governance case studies. However, the findings can be of interest for 
research on the governance of mobility elsewhere. We test the two-tiers approach 
by reconstructing the actor network stories and their structural couplings, and 
by elaborating on the associated institutional context to answer the following 
subquestion
 e What does the orgware of the case studies learns us about the used  
  governance strategies? Which are the challenges for a co-evolutionary  
  approach with respect to the two-tiers framework?
Before discussing the case studies, we need to spend a few words on the Flemish 
mobility planning discipline and its evolutions in the past decades. Chapter 4 
describes the evolutions of the mobility planning tradition, in Flanders, Belgium. 
We list the major developments in spatial planning and transport planning relevant 
for our orgware agenda. As such, we can detect the early roots for the disconnect 
between spatial planning and mobility in Flanders. It also enables us to see 
the governance approaches change over time, accompanied by their planning 
instruments and decrees. Against that background, the cases must be regarded. 
We selected cases from two major developing governance processes over the 
last decade. In Chapter 5 we discuss the establishment of interregional mobility 
cooperations. We tell the story of setting up a mobility platform in the southeast 
of Antwerp (MOZO). We continue by how that case has fed the transport region 
discussion not only in general, but also particularly in Mechelen. Chapter 6 
elaborates on the entrepreneurial governance strategy, introducing the market 
principle in mobility. We concentrate on De Verkeersonderneming Rotterdam and its 
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real world MaaS application. For a final case, Chapter 7 examines the still ongoing 
but increasingly wicked large infrastructure project process of the Oosterweel Link 
and the input delivered by citizen movements as Ringland. For each case we look 
at challenges with regard to the two-tiers approach of structural couplings and 
condition planning. We try to determine the opportunities and weaknesses of the 
adopted planning approaches. In Chapter 8, we make a detour along an interesting 
spinoff in the Oosterweel Link case: the citizen science project Curieuzeneuzen, 
launched by the Ringland Academy. We report on the findings, strategies of, and 
strategic partnerships enabling the CurieuzeNeuzen project, a large-scale citizen 
science project analysing the ambient air quality in Antwerp. 
Chapter 9 presents the main findings from the previous chapters by resuming the 
subquestions to enable building our final answer to the main research question. In 
Section 9.2, we derive important lessons from the cases and discuss with regard 
to the two-tier framework. In Section 9.3, the remaining orgware challenges are 
listed in a concluding orgware agenda and a few policy reflections are made. Section 
9.4 elaborates on the value and adequacy of the applied approach and theoretical 
framework to find the answers to our research question. We conclude this section 
by formulating interesting future avenues for research. 
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2.1
Wickedness and complex adaptive systems
In the introduction we have considered mobility issues as wicked problems, as the 
proposed solutions have generated new mobility problems time and again. Indeed, 
the mobility patterns that have resulted from our individual behaviours, choices, 
and collective customs in the dynamic, complex real world are not predictable, but 
ever changing. As such, the predict-and-provide approach, looking for hardware and 
software interventions, could not offer long-term mobility solutions neither with 
regard to congestion, nor with regard to negative environmental and health impacts. 
If we thus consider mobility issues as wicked, we need to engage in a more systemic 
conception of mobility. We need to unfold, or materialise the mobility orgware so to 
say. An appropriate approach should highlight the many interrelated components 
that result in our mobility patterns. It preferably accounts for both supply-side 
and demand-side actors and measures. The approach should address the actors, 
factors, and institutions related to the generation of travel, to its transport 
modes, to the displacement patterns in time and space, and to the impacts on the 
environment (in fact the basic principles of the sustainable mobility paradigm are 
still a valid starting point). All those components are connected and reciprocally 
influence each other, often in an unpredictable way. As such, a systemic mobility 
conceptualisation exhibits many parallels with a complex system. Besides, this 
interest in complexity theories increased not only in the transport and mobility 
planning disciplines, and the public administration research, but in many other 
disciplines as well (Teisman 2008, Schwanen 2017). 
Complexity theories typically study systems or networks that are characterised by 
a-linear feedback loops and self-organising processes. The theories are especially 
interested in the adaptiveness of such complex systems, in its learning capacity 
(Stacey 1996). As such, we will arrive at the complex adaptive systems (CAS), at the 
end of this section. When we want to allow for complexity, our mobility planning 
strategies or mechanisms need a makeover, a shift in think patterns. The complexity 
literature and the related systems theories suggest to work on a few basic 
conceptions that go along with a complex understanding. In this chapter, we first 
have to sort out why mobility problems are wicked and why the mobility transition is 
complex. What does it mean to embrace complexity? Second, we have to answer the 
question: who or what enables a mobility transition? A third question deals with the 
meaning of governance regarding this complexity framework. As a last question the 
chapter should give us some clues about the remaining challenges for our orgware 
agenda. 
2.1.1 
About “complex” and “complexity”
In this dissertation complex systems can be outlined by a-linear development, 
by order and chaos, by static and closed systems or dynamic and open ones. 
Nevertheless, systems as a whole predominantly develop in a chaotic, a-linear way 
according to the following quote of Stacey (Teisman 2005: 42-43). 
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Contrary to some of our most deep-seated beliefs, mess is the material 
from which life and creativity are built, and it turns out that they are built, 
not according to some prior design, but through a process of spontaneous 
self-organization that produces emergent outcomes. (Stacey 1996: 9)
Adopting complexity means that certainty and predictability are replaced by 
emergence and a-linearity. There are so many interrelations that a simple causal 
relation cannot be distilled anymore. Instead, there are infinite future paths which 
we cannot oversee, and which will each direct us towards different future outcomes. 
Even a process that is run several times under the same conditions, will not produce 
the same results twice, except by mere coincident. Hence, situational approaches 
gain attention over generic ones (De Roo 2012, Jessop 1997) and the emphasis shifts 
from being and planning on the basis of the here and now, towards planning for an 
undefined becoming (Boelens and De Roo 2014). Instead of focusing on inputs and 
outputs, working with complexity demands an approach that focuses on throughput 
(De Roo 2012). 
Different levels of complexity can be distinguished. Additional to simple systems 
or entities, there are complicated systems, that can only be fully understood by 
experts in that matter. In their turn, complicated systems contrast with complex 
systems, because the latter can never be truly understood or predicted. An example 
of a complicated system is a watch or any kind of machine, that consists of several 
parts, but those parts interact in a stable way. As such, they can be fixed by certain 
experts in that particular matter. Not everyone knows how to repair such systems 
or how to build them, but some of them do. A complex system, on the other hand, 
has also various subsystems on multiple levels, but these subsystems interact with 
each other in a dynamic way, driven by their own objectives and ideas (self-orga-
nising). That is why they cannot be fixed once and for all. Solving then becomes a 
matter of “playing with complexity” (Hertogh and Westerveld 2010), rather than 
neglecting complexity.
Hertogh and Westerveld (2010) combine the degree of complicatedness (or “detail 
complexity”) and complexity (or “dynamic complexity”) into a matrix, proposing 
four kinds of systems (in the quadrants): simple, complicated, complex, and both 
complicated and complex, see Figure 3. We included their matrix, as they refer to 
those quadrants and propose for each quadrant a preferred governance strategy. 
Those governance strategies will be elaborated in more detail further on in this 
dissertation.
Figure 3   
Complicatedness 
versus complexity. 
Source: based 
on Hertogh and 
Westerveld (2010: 
222, figure 5.6).
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2.1.2 
Complexity in planning – the rise of complex adaptive systems
Traditionally, planners adopted a quite linear perspective on issues; a problem was 
experienced and a rapid solution was sought. In many occasions the perspective of 
that solution space was too reductionist and did not suffice to offer solutions that 
did not generate other problems. In response, it became increasingly acknowledged 
that complexity should be grasped, and that a more holistic attempt to solve the 
issues would start from the actors and the opportunities that emerge in specific 
situations (i.e. specific in time and place) (Teisman 2005, Chapter 2). This last 
complexity-embracing perspective in planning and (public) management stems from 
evolutionary insights and complexity as encountered in the field of biology (Hertogh 
and Westerveld 2010). Also the adoption of the concept “complex adaptive system” 
(CAS) in planning and governance research originated from the latter field and 
increasingly gained attention in recent decades. A CAS can be defined as a “complex 
macroscopic collection of relatively similar, connected micro-structures, formed to 
adapt to a changing environment” (Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod 1999, Stacey 2001).
Planning turned to complexity theory and system theories to get insights in the 
dynamic processes of change in organisations, institutions, planning processes, etc. 
that have not yet been answered or utilised by former (more traditional) planning 
rationales.
Bovaird (2008: 320) summarises which characteristics of CAS attracted social 
scientists (like us) in particular: 
 • The existence of self-organizing activity, apparently without any form  
  of central direction or control, resulting in system-wide behaviours which  
  bring positive benefits to system members.
 • The apparent generation of functional group behaviour from simple shared  
  rules, rather than cognitive decision-making.
 • The existence in complex adaptive systems of “strange attractors”, or  
  underlying and unchanging regularities in system behaviour which mean  
  that the nonrepeating (and often apparently chaotic) behaviour of the  
  system conforms nevertheless to some level of predictability.
 • The appearance in complex adaptive systems of “phase transitions”, in  
  which rapid system transformations occur.
 • The appearance in complex adaptive systems of “emergent properties”  
  which are not predictable from the other characteristics of the system and  
  which make its future behaviour more homogeneous.
To describe complex systems and how we should perceive their functioning, the 
concept of complex adaptive systems is introduced (Axelrod, Cohen, and Babylonia 
2001, Stacey 2001). CAS should be regarded as complex systems that exist out of 
many subsystems on multiple (scale) levels and hyper-systems or environments,  
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that are continuously self-organising in the interaction with each other (De Roo 
2012, Holland 1992). In complex adaptive systems the aggregated behaviour 
cannot just be summarized or derived from the actions of the constituting parts. 
Additionally, they have the specific ability to adapt their structure and working 
mechanisms to the environment they encounter. This adaptive nature characterises 
CAS as it reflects the openness of the system (and its mechanism, behaviour) and its 
self-organising adjusting capacity to survive.  Non-adaptability, on the other hand, 
is typical for complicated systems, their structure remains the same irrespective 
of developments of changes in the environment (Portugali 2012). The concepts of 
reflexive governance and evolutionary governance theory, which are elaborated 
in section 2.3, also refer to the adaptive or reflexive capacity that characterises 
CAS (Rip 2006, Beunen, Van Assche, and Duineveld 2015, Van Assche, Beunen, and 
Duineveld 2013). 
But the concept cannot be copied completely from the field of biology. Evolutionary 
theories in biology emphasise both a blind variation and selection, implying that the 
quality of outcomes cannot be guaranteed, except that they “fit the contingencies of 
the selection environment”. This cannot be said for the evolution of CAS in the field 
of science and technology or social life; for selection is not blind in that case. Arising 
and infantine variations (or thus innovations) are sometimes protected or subsidised 
to survive. So, there is even “anticipation on eventual selection up to attempts to 
change the selection environment so as to increase the chances for variation to 
survive” (Rip 2006: 84).
The ‘complexity’ of complex adaptive systems expresses a system in motion 
as a consequence of a situation that is out of equilibrium. Rather than 
descending into a ‘dead’ situation or into chaos, complex adaptive systems 
show emergent behaviour and co-evolve, while maintaining a proper level 
of ‘fitness’, that is, the ability of a system to survive between extremes – 
between order and chaos, coherence and diversity. (De Roo 2012: 141-142)
The various interrelated entities of CAS have the potential to co-evolve. Coevolution 
is to be understood as the resulting process of self-organising subentities on the 
aggregated level of the system. Through co-evolution the system adapts to a new 
context and hereby simultaneously influences this context. Thus, through this 
co-evolution the institutional context – that is supposed to bring stability – exerts 
influence and is influenced itself. Therefore, one could speak of a process that 
keeps the balance between stability and dynamics (De Roo 2012: 150), between 
control and interaction (Hertogh and Westerveld 2010), between variety and 
reduction (of options) (Salet, Bertolini, and Giezen 2013). Some would even call 
co-evolution a diagnosis, rather than a theory, considering it a plea for bridging the 
gap between theory and practice, between science and society (Nowotny, Scott, and 
Gibbons 2001). 
Co-evolution is often used as a broad characterisation of co-development 
and mutual shaping, without specific reference to evolutionary theory. […] 
Such terminology carries a message (and an important message): things 
hang together and linear cause-effect relationships are the exception rather 
than the rule. (Rip 2006: 95)
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Cities can be regarded as CAS, since they are artefacts (originated and reproduced 
by art and human culture), and human beings are their living and self-organising 
underlying entities that can live, decide, plan, and change their mind. As such, their 
actions are the product of their intentions, their plans, their habits or routines, 
culture, etc. In addition, humans themselves, however, are also CAS, as they are 
composed of smaller parts (organs, tissues, etc.) that are interconnected as well; 
they too have the ability to self-organise to adjust to their changing environment 
(Portugali 2012). 
De Roo (2012: 140) explicitly mentions the complexity of traffic and infrastructure 
as an example of an issue that is to be regarded as a complex adaptive system. 
However, it is not considered as such by politicians; e.g. politicians are inclined 
to solve congestion problems by adding new infrastructure, providing for missing 
links or increasing the present capacity by adding new lanes. This is a too simplistic 
solution, stemming from a linear way of thinking, De Roo (2012) argues. Indeed, at 
first, congestion will seem to have disappeared or diminished, but on the longer 
term, these new lanes will attract even more people, that previously did not 
prefer the car precisely because of the congested traffic (induced traffic effect). 
Consequently, in the long term, road traffic becomes congested again. 
2.1.3
CAS steering mechanisms
Earlier, we have mentioned that complex systems and complex adaptive systems 
consist of multiple parts (subsystems) that continuously interact according to their 
own rules and objectives (self-organising). On an aggregated level the interactions 
and activities of self-organising actors and subsystems result in co-evolutionary 
patterns. But, this implies that system changes cannot be steered or managed 
directly (Luhmann 1997). The systems and changes emerge as result of deliberate 
actions of certain parts of the system (self-organisation) or, more often, as result 
of fortuitous events (or confluence of events) in the system or its environment. 
Self-organisation is seen as “a central source for system evolution, as important 
as guidance by politicians and governments” (Teisman 2008: 344). The remaining 
question is: if/how CAS can be steered to tackle the wicked problems they often 
generate?
To answer that question we refer to Luhmann’s ideas in his “Society of Societies” 
(1997). The core of Luhmann’s theory is the systemic approach of society. It allows 
individuals, politicians, planners, experts, etc. to arrange a level of stability within 
a chaotic surrounding world, by a systematic selection, interpretation, and structu-
ration (Luhmann 1997). This system of structuration has become autopoietic7 
because of the communication and elaboration of rules in each of the subsystems 
within society (Richard and David 2006, Van Assche and Verschraegen 2008). In fact, 
according to Luhmann, the subsystems can be compared with islands of reduced 
7  cf. ‘autopoiesis’ in section 2.3.3.1; autopoietic refers to the ability of the system (or actor) 
to reproduce itself again and again, and meanwhile to react upon the challenges imposed by a 
changing environment. 
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complexity. Although all of these subsystems evolve relatively closed, and are 
driven by a self-steering focus, Luhmann sees them as open systems. Our society, 
for instance, encompasses several systems, e.g. the economic, the political, the 
cultural, the educational, the infrastructural, etc., which all reciprocally influence 
each other. Luhmann then conceptualises the constitution of social consistency 
in two ways. First, social (sub)systems are islands of reduced complexity that 
continuously reproduce and adapt themselves (i.e. self-organise) within a fuzzy 
world. Second, those subsystems are conditioned by and are co-evolutionary to 
other systems (or to their environment or setting). Although Luhmann and other 
system theorists remain sceptical about direct forms of steering, opportunities 
for indirect steering have been investigated (Anderson 1999, Van Assche and 
Verschraegen 2008). 
So how do we have to perceive those subsystems, that self-organise and interact 
with other subsystems? Who has self-organising capacities? Therefore, we 
have to zoom in on the subsystems and look for the actors, factors, and institu-
tions it comprises. Actors or subsystems8 can self-organise, as they can arrange 
themselves, their goals, and the way they operate without necessarily being 
subject to external pressures. What results from their interactions, convergence 
or divergence, often results from incremental changes. But those incremental 
steps can generate major changes in course (desired and undesired) when they are 
aggregated (Teisman 2008: 344). Furthermore, each subsystem comprises other 
subsystems, and hyper systems, and is the result of self-organising processes and 
of the interaction or co-evolution with other systems and with its environment. 
As the actors themselves are at the very basis of steering a CAS, we consider it 
important to dig deeper into those subsystems; to zoom in and trace the actors 
themselves. How do actors self-organise and arrange themselves? In this respect, 
the actor network theory and the actor relational approach offer some handhold to 
proceed our research.
2.2
The orgware: on the interplay between actor  
networks and structure
Scientists working with complex adaptive systems take a fundamentally 
different approach. They do not look for an overall blueprint for the whole 
system at all but, instead, they model individual agent interaction, with 
each agent behaving according to its own local principles of interaction. The 
interaction is local in the sense that each individual agent interacts with 
only a tiny proportion of the total population and it is local in the sense that 
none of them are following centrally determined rules of interaction. In such 
interaction, no individual agent, or group of agents, directly determines the 
rules of interaction of others or the patterns of behaviour that the system 
8  Actors that are closely interacting and as such can be aggregated to what we call a 
subsystem, or what by some is called an action system
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displays or how those patterns evolve and neither does anything outside of 
the system. This is the principle of self-organisation: agents interact locally 
according to their own principles, in the absence of an overall blueprint for 
the system they form. (Stacey 2007: 196)
The quote above captures why we, as planners that want to grasp complexity, 
try to unravel what we see; why we try to zoom in and out on the mobility system. 
Because we do not look for an overall blueprint or solution, but we consider the 
local interaction patterns between actors and institutions. Adopting the perspective 
of complex adaptive systems (i.e. zooming out), brings important processes as 
co-evolution, self-organisation, emergence, and adaptiveness central into planning 
theory (De Roo 2012: 144). Besides, notions of resilience, multilevel and situatio-
nalism, have already upgraded the planning vocabulary. However, when zooming in 
closer on the system again, by descending the system’s subsystems to its smallest 
entities, a tangled assemblage of actor networks becomes visible. They form 
the structure that enables and constrains action (Giddens 1984), by continuous 
interaction patterns that can be reproduced and ceased again (Geels 2004: 907). 
Action does not take place in a void, but happens within the actor network’s 
structure, including their institutions and practices. Therefore, questions of power 
and agency can be answered by looking into the actor network theory, and by 
elaborating on institutional theories.
2.2.1
Actors and actor networks
Actor network theory (ANT) learns us something about actors and how they become 
intentionally and unintentionally entangled in dynamic networks that together 
produce (and reproduce) the system. Callon & Law have conceptualised an actor 
network theory based on four principles. First, they see the social as fundamentally 
heterogeneous. Secondly, they state that all entities are networks of heterogeneous 
elements. Those networks act unpredictable and are fixed neither in form, space, 
nor time. Their identity changes while interacting in the network, it is only within 
and through (re)actions within this network that entities have meaning. Finally every 
stable social arrangement is simultaneously a point (individual) and a network (a 
collective), depending on the level of zooming in or out. By these four rules they 
overcome the individual/collective and the agent/structure dualism, by stating 
that this dualism does not exist, but is only a matter of perspective (Callon and Law 
1997). 
There is no difference between the person and the network of entities 
on which it acts. Or (the real point) between the person and the network 
of entities which acts through the person. Network and person: they are 
co-extensive. (Callon and Law 1997: 169)
ANT is based on actors and their relations (called networks). These relations 
are not only between the actors themselves but also between the actors and 
the non-human actors or factors, such as the more local conditions or the legal 
framework. ANT stresses that such networks are not necessarily stable or fixed 
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between the heterogeneous actors. Rather, ANT assumes that all actors are 
continuously reassembling and organizing their network in a certain way to become 
more innovative and vigorous (Boelens 2010: 36). In that respect, Callon elaborates 
four phases of translation. By “translation” he means the process “during which the 
identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the margins of manoeuvre are 
negotiated and delimited” (Callon 1999: 59), see Figure 4.
The translation phases are not mutually exclusive, the phases have no clear 
beginning nor end. But each phase has its own focal characteristics or objectives. 
Callon distinguished the problematisation as a first translation phase. During this 
phase, actors define themselves in relation to the problem that they encounter and 
try to react upon. In addition, the initiators then have “determined a set of actors 
and defined their identities in such a way as to establish themselves an obligatory 
passage point in the network of relationships they were building”(Callon 1986: 59). 
At the end of the problematisation, the initiators have become indispensable in the 
network. Defining an obligatory passage point (OPP) is of paramount importance. 
The initiators want to show that joining the project is in the interest of all addressed 
actors. As such, during this actor networking phase, “a system of alliances or 
associations” is described and what their objectives are (Callon 1986: 61). 
Secondly, the interessement phase then “locks the allies into place” (cf. Latin: 
inter-esse, literally being in between, being part of). With interessement, Callon 
refers to “the group of actions by which an entity attempts to impose and stabilize 
the other actors it defines through its problematisation”. He argues that “the 
interessement, if successful, confirms (more or less completely) the validity of the 
problematisation and the alliance it implies” (Callon 1986: 62, 65). But that does 
not necessarily exclude the possibility that the problematisation can be refuted 
afterwards.
The enrolment is the third phase in the translation of the actor network in which the 
roles are defined and coordinated. If the interessement is successful alliances are 
formed. In the enrolment phase, new roles are defined within the newborn associa-
tions; though it does not necessarily refer to pre-established roles. Each context of 
translation can offer other roles for the same actors. 
The last phase is the mobilisation of allies. Callon speaks of mobilising because that 
means “to render entities mobile which were not so beforehand” (Callon 1986: 71). 
After the mobilisation of allies, the actor network has been built but can be subject 
to new translation rounds. Likewise, four translation phases are described by 
(Latour 2004) as wonderment, consultation, hierarchy and institutionalisation (also 
displayed in Figure 4).
From the present planning practice, Boelens addresses three imperfections of ANT, 
regarding the field of spatial planning. First, ANT stands out for its analytical power 
in retrospect, as it mainly concentrates on how things have become the way they 
are. But the ANT framework does not provide further details on the next steps for 
improving or sustaining certain initiatives. Boelens (2010) therefore argues that ANT 
stops where spatial planning starts. 
Second, Boelens questions the equal weight of all actors in the network. He 
specifically points to the weighting of non-human entities compared to conscious, 
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human actors capable of anticipating and negotiating (Boelens 2010: 38). Whereas 
in ANT non-humans are represented by intermediaries or mediators, those are in 
ARA not considered the leading actors, and thus only taken into account as part of 
the factors of importance. The differentiation or dichotomy between humans and 
non-humans in the field of mobility is not useful, because in reality as much as there 
are actors or assemblages of the human kind there are actors or assemblages of 
the non-human kind (e.g. infrastructures, ongoing projects or funds, technology, 
etc.). Furthermore, the division between the individual and the collective has to be 
overcome (Callon and Law 1997: 165). Hence it is important to differentiate between 
actors and actants9, with actants being the more dominant actors defining and/or 
organizing the network, and with actors as all other associations and acting bodies 
(Latour, 1997: as in Boelens 2010: 37). 
The approach is not about actors as such, in the broad sense of interactive 
planning (i.e. all affected parties), but about leading actors, who are primarily 
encountered in the world of human action. (Boelens 2010: 41)
Third, the last translation phase of ANT does not shed light on how a support base 
is created for the actor network association, nor how it should be communicated, 
etc. (Callon 1999). As planners do not only intend to plan for the here and now, but 
mainly for the future and future development, one has to account for the actors 
(entities, people, resources) of future generations, that are not yet but will become 
part of the network, especially in the context of taking sustainable measures 
(Boelens 2010: 39). 
9 ‘actant’: ‘a person, creature, or object playing any of a set of active roles in a narrative’  
(cf. Oxford Dictionary). 
Figure 4  Comparison of ANT translation phases and ARA planning steps. Source: own elaboration, 
based on Boelens (2010).
ANT
1. Problematization
1. Wonderment
2. Interessement
2. Consultation
3. Enrolment
3. Hierarchy
4. Mobilization of allies
4. Institutionalization
1. Situational uniqueness
2. Actor analysis
3. Windows of opportunities
4. Roundtables
5. Bussiness Cases
6. Regime development
7. Associative democracy
ARA
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To respond to those imperfections with respect to planning, and to narrow the 
gap between theory and practice, Boelens (2010) works out a planning approach 
that starts from ANT. He suggests to go beyond ANT onto a more “outside-inward” 
instead of inside-outward approach. He composes an actor relational approach 
(ARA) by extending the ANT approach with ideas from urban regime theories (URT) 
(of, i.a., Stoker and Mossberger 1994, Stone 1993) and from associative democracy 
(AD), (developed by, i.a., Hirst 1994, Hirst and Bader 2001, Cohen and Rogers 1992). 
Unlike the translation phases of the ANT, reconstructing the actor network associa-
tions from the perspective of the actors, the ARA approach specifically concentrates 
on the roles of the planner in this actor networking processes.
Postmodern, post-structural, and communicative alternatives have been developed 
to counter the highly top-down planning, but could not always deliver effective 
and sustainable practices. Boelens seeks explanation for this in that the alterna-
tives are adaptations from within the same (governmental) planning framework, 
with the same vested actors eventually taking the lead. He then argues to turn the 
framework around: alternatives coming from the outside-inward should counter 
the established planning practices. This approach goes beyond the plan, “it does 
not focus on a particular plan or a particular formal institution as the given central 
objective”. It leaves a prominent role for a neutral moderator or mediator, and an 
open medium to sketch and explore the opportunities in an uncertain and complex 
world (Boelens 2010: 41). The seven planning steps proposed by ARA have an 
overlap with the four translation phases of ANT, as illustrated in Figure 4. Though 
they extend beyond the mobilisation of allies or institutionalisation to give some 
ideas on how to direct or sustain the emergent actor network associations. 
The actor-relational approach does not focus on a particular plan or a 
particular formal institution as the given central objective. A behavioural 
actor-relational view demands a prominent role for a more neutral moderator 
and an open medium in which to sketch opportunities. (Boelens 2010: 41)
As the approach is based on URT and AD, ARA emphasises the need for a mix of 
actors from business society, public society, and civil society. Later the knowledge 
institutions were added to those. The first two ARA phases concentrate on 
identifying the relevant key actors: (1) “interpreting the problem by determining the 
focal actors and unique core values” and (2) “actor identification and actor analysis” 
(Boelens 2010: 43). The third step is to identify the windows of opportunity, or 
the developmental possibilities. All available planning instruments, technologies 
or methods can be used for this. The planner’s creativeness becomes important 
to figure out those possibilities. In the fourth phase, those identified windows of 
opportunity are discussed with the actors in bilateral or roundtable discussions. 
Phase three and four overlap with the interessement or consultation round of ANT. 
The fifth step includes testing the negotiated opportunities that were identified in 
the previous phase. The actors’ investments are specified. Phase six deals with the 
project-transcending added value of the tested business cases or pilot projects. 
This added value is then referred to as a developing regime (cf. URT). That regime 
can reconfirm or redevelop the unique selling points that have been defined before 
(in the first step). ARA phases four, five, and six can be linked to the enrolment 
phase. The seventh step considers how the developed regime can be “anchored in 
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associative democracies” (Boelens 2010: 45). Affected or triggered actors (citizens, 
businesses, etc.) can affiliate to those organisations, they can associate themselves 
with the developed regime to experience the benefits. This associative democracy 
can never replace the centralised top-down governmental apparatus, but it can 
be considered an important complement to that. It starts from the outside-in, 
namely from the civil, business, or academic society. Phases six and seven can be 
attributed to the mobilisation of allies or institutionalisation phase in ANT. But, as 
mentioned earlier, phase seven concretises the mobilisation of allies. It delivers 
concrete insights in how to sustain or direct emerging self-organising regimes 
(Boelens 2010: 43-46). 
The ANT – ARA framework argues that every (social) action is fundamentally 
relational, it can only occur as a consequence of the specific connection between 
the heterogeneous material that shapes the network. It is only within this network 
that people, entities, institutions, and resources have meaning (Boelens 2010: 36, 
Law 1986). Only within specific interaction contexts institutions do exist. Indeed, 
because the actors are not only engaging in (inter)action within a given institutional 
framework, but also recursively making and reconstituting the institutional matrix 
(Jessop 2001: 8). Furthermore, Latour has even named the last translation phase the 
institutionalisation phase. As such, an introduction to the institutional theories is in 
place here. 
2.2.2
Structure – Institutional theories
The previous section dealt with the building blocks of CAS: the actor networks. 
These actor networks do not act in a void, as illustrated by the different ANT or ARA 
steps, in Section 2.2.1. These actor networks shape and are shaped themselves 
by institutions. This also applies vice versa: “institutions never exist outside of 
specific action contexts” (Jessop 1997: 8). History matters, but change is possible; 
self-organising actor networks can make a difference, they can choose to change 
their direction. Hence there is a need to refocus on agency and power, on institu-
tions in general, since they play a major role in the development of actor networks 
themselves. By answering the question on how and by whom institutions are 
shaped and changed, we get an idea of how the necessary orgware adjustments and 
behavioural change can be reached (Chapman 2007, Marsden, Mullen et al. 2014, 
Anable, Brand et al. 2012, Rajan 2006). By some, the refocus on behavioural change 
and agency is even called a recent mantra in transport planning, that surmounts 
the rationale of the individual (since there is no absolute rationality, the homo 
economicus does not exist) and therefore elaborates on the collective customs or 
structure behind them (Schwanen, Banister, and Anable 2012). 
To get an insight in the Flemish mobility system and how the necessary orgware 
arrangements must look like, we have to decide which players and variables in the 
field of mobility and related policy fields we take into account, without neglecting 
the setting. The setting  also “context” or “structure” – both determines possible 
outcomes and is itself determined and changed by the actors within the structure. 
Consequently, we cannot only focus on actors while neglecting the broader context 
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of institutions. For Law denotes that actors and actants, thus people, entities, 
resources that are connected, only have meaning within and through their network 
(Law 1986). 
So before we go on examining and listing all important actors and factors within 
the mobility field, we need to indulge in this chapter in the institutional theories 
to get an image of the influences institutions can exert, and how they can possibly 
shape the mobility transition. From an institutional perspective, making the mobility 
system more sustainable can be seen as an institutional turn, or less radical, as 
an institutional change. Therefore we also need to focus on the conditions for an 
institutional change in order to identify possibilities in making this institutional 
change possible. 
2.2.2.1 Institutions and perspectives on institutional change
Although much has been written about institutions and institutionalisation theory, 
it is not the purpose of this section to give an exhaustive overview of the different 
schools of/ perspectives on institutional theories. We elaborate on institutions for 
insights in how actors can influence institutional change. 
Definitions of institutions often share the same basis: namely that institutions are 
formal and informal uncertainty reducing features, that create a certain order to 
(inter)act by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure (i.a. North 
1990, DiMaggio 1988, Giddens 1984). 
Following Weimer (1995) institutions result from gradual evolution that is punctuated 
by acts of purposeful design. Buitelaar et al. (2007) add that institutionalisation 
is “accompanied by the development of particular discourses, and power and 
resource relations” (Buitelaar, Jacobs, and Lagendijk 2007: 894). Furthermore, 
specifically in the context of policy-making, Linder and Peters (1995) argue that 
institutional design often resembles a “tireless tinkering”, based on a decisional 
strand (producing solutions to problems), and based on a dialogical approach that 
concentrates on the social embeddedness of the process of institutionalisation. 
“Design will require conscious efforts at changing the cultural as well as ideational 
elements of the institution as well as its structural elements” (Linder and Peters 
1995: 133). Consequently institutions can be considered as “social practices that 
are regularly and continuously repeated, that are sanctioned and maintained 
by social norms, and that have a major significance in the social structure” 
(Abercrombie et al., 1994, p. 216; Eisenstadt, 1968, p. 409; Wallis, 1985, pp. 399-401: 
all as in Jessop 2001). 
By combining the various aforementioned flavours of institutional theory, Young 
(2017) defines institutions as “collections of rights, rules, principles, and decision-
making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants 
in these practices, and guide interactions among the participants” (Young 2017: 27).  
Thus, institutions can be seen as the immaterial “atmosphere” that surrounds and 
influences the actors and factors. Imagining institutions as atmospheric allows 
to reveal the dual relationship. Actors can breath and live because there is an 
atmosphere providing air, but by breathing in and out they simultaneously alter  
the atmosphere. 
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On the other hand, institutions are often popularly seen “as organizations or  
social bodies that have major significance for the wider society and act in a quasi- 
corporate manner” (e.g. the branches of government, thus “institutions” as parts of 
government bodies) (Jessop 2001: 6). The latter definition can be crossed out in the 
context of this dissertation. 
In their review on institutional theories dealing with institutionalisation (or institu-
tional change), Buitelaar, Lagendijk, and Jacobs (2007) assess several perspec-
tives dealing with institutional change, often resulting in the institutional design 
versus the evolutionary institutionalism dichotomy (Buitelaar, Lagendijk, and 
Jacobs 2007). The institutional design perspective holds an instrumental view on 
institutional change. It considers “the devising and realization of rules, procedures, 
and organizational structures that will enable and constrain behaviour and action 
so as to accord held values, achieve desired objectives, or execute given tasks” 
(Alexander 2002: 1). The evolutionary perspective assumes that institutions evolve 
gradually and build an “organic variation”, from which the most efficient institutions 
remain selected. It starts from a market setting, that leaves selection and variation 
completely to the actors pursuing their self-interest (i.a. Hayek 1960, Webster 
and Lai 2003). In subsequent research, this perspective was centred around the 
minimisation of transaction costs and the rational thinking of actors. Differences in 
efficiency levels were  attributed to the bounded rationality of actors (Simon 1972). 
But critics disagreed that every institutional change brought about more efficiency 
(cf. Hodgson 1993). The evolutionary perspective focused on the increasing institu-
tional efficiency, but did not consider that the institutional change itself was also 
linked to a transaction cost (Furubotn and Richter 1991). As such, the choices 
and investments made in the past, have an influence on feasibility of institutional 
change in the future. That formed the start of the path dependency perspective on 
institutions and institutional change, in which “history matters” (North 1990). The 
path dependency perspective does not attribute institutional change to creation 
or evolution, but institutional change is considered possible by both. The sociolo-
gical institutional theories shed light on the symbolic and subjective values of 
institutions, which are sometimes the subsequent reason why institutional change 
does not necessarily result in an increasing efficiency. The perspective starts from 
the idea that not technical rationality but social or value-based rationality guides 
institutional change, and internal factors or pressures are assumed to instigate 
(incremental) institutional change (Olsen and March 1989, Linder and Peters 1995). 
The process of institutionalisation, or thus institutional change, is then defined 
as “a process in which fluid behaviour gradually solidifies into structures, which 
subsequently structure the behaviour of actors” (Arts and Leroy 2003: 31).
In our opinion, considering the complexity background of actors associating in 
dynamic actor networks and translating to strive their goals, the path dependency 
theory of North and the sociological institutionalism (Olsen and March 1989, Linder 
and Peters 1995) appear most relevant. That is why they are elaborated in more 
detail in the next section, in which we try to come up with a conceptualisation of 
institutional change that aligns with our actor network perspective. 
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2.2.2.2 Changing institutions: beyond history matters and lock-in
The path dependency perspective highlights that history matters and that an 
institutional path can be traced that is (partially) determined by events, made 
choices, etc. in the past (North 1990: 6). But sometimes, path dependency leads 
to lock-in situations, situations in which actors and institutions are stuck by 
successive choices, and find difficulty to break free from such situation. “In the 
path dependent model, actors are hemmed in by existing institutions and structures 
that channel them along established policy paths. Therefore, in any system, big 
(non-incremental) change is unlikely”, but not impossible (Wilsford 1994: 251). 
Machiavelli perceived it as follows. 
There is nothing more difficult to manage, more dubious to accomplish, 
nor more doubtful of success… than to initiate a new order of things. The 
reformer has enemies in all those who profit from the old order and only 
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit from the new order. 
(Machiavelli, as in: Wilsford 1994: 251)
A path dependent sequence of (political/economical) changes is a sequence that is 
tied to previous decisions, and limited by existing formal and informal institutions.  
In path dependent models, a choice made in the past, albeit random or not, and 
by individuals or not, has consequences and can limit options and choices in 
the future. Hence, we speak of a path and of path dependency. Very early in the 
evolution of things, various paths can be equally suitable. But, once a path is chosen 
it becomes increasingly likely to continue along the trodden path. Because over time 
little adaptions along this path will have the lowest transaction costs leading onto 
incremental changes all within the margins of the chosen path. Sometimes those 
trodden paths (the result of an aggregate of choices in the past) lead onto a lock-in 
situation where possibilities are limited just because of incremental and sometimes 
small decisions from the past (Wilsford 1994, Greener 2002). 
Yet, path dependency differs from historical determinism, as (self-organising) 
actors can choose to reshape the path incrementally, or to create another path. 
History matters, but it does not determine the complete future. Path dependency 
theories allow for deviations from the trodden path. They tolerate breaking free 
from lock-in situations under some circumstances (Greener 2002, Wilsford 1994). 
Often the term window of opportunity is used. The way Wilsford assumes institu-
tional change: “It is the combination of path dependent limits along with occasional 
windows of exceptional opportunity, or conjunctures, that determine the ways small 
or big that a political system responds to policy imperatives” (Wilsford 1994: 253). 
This vision aligns with the notions on institutional change of Buitelaar, Lagendijk, 
and Jacobs (2007), Burch, Hogwood et al. (2003), and Kingdon (1995), all pointing to 
“critical moments” or “windows of opportunity”. 
In this respect, and based on the ideas of Kingdon (1995), Buitelaar, Jacobs, and 
Lagendijk (2007) suggest three streams of interest that must converge: the societal 
stream, the policy at hand, and the political endorsement and support base (see 
later). They also take a look at the alignment of the streams over time, and the 
availability of viable alternatives for making the institutional regimes actually 
change (Buitelaar, Jacobs, and Lagendijk 2007). The convergence can happen as a 
result of a critical moment, a window of opportunity. 
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Burch, Hogwood et al. (2003) theorized the critical moment for institutional change 
as “the moment when there is sufficient pressure, whether internally or externally 
driven”. In this moment, the prevailing institutional frames or hierarchies are 
questioned and alternative discourses are arising. The critical moment can then 
further evolve into a “critical juncture” if opportunities are grasped and a “new 
branching point is made in which the institutional development moves on to a new 
trajectory” (Burch, Hogwood et al. 2003: 8). If no viable alternatives are available 
at the critical moment (open window of opportunity), no institutional change will 
arise. These critical moments also play an important role in the comparable theory 
of streams by Kingdon (1995). Instead of the critical moment for institutional 
change he speaks of the critical condition for policy transformations. He identifies 
two major pre-decision processes (politics): the agenda setting (problems) and the 
alternative specification (policy) (Kingdon 1995). 
The critical moment in Kingdon’s conceptualisation is formed by the matching 
of those three streams and is named the “window of opportunity”. For a window 
of opportunity to emerge and open, there has to be sufficient pressure, caused 
internally by alternative ideas (or solutions) and actions affecting the present 
situation, and/or externally by societal actors, trends, or events. At the same 
time acceptable other logics and discourses must be available. Three streams are 
introduced: the problems stream (setting the agenda), the policy stream (adapting 
the policy), and the politics’ stream (political endorsement and decision-making).
In […] policy primeval soup, many ideas flow around, bumping into  
one another, encountering new ideas and forming combinations and 
recombinations. […] While the origins are somewhat haphazard, the  
selection is not. (Kingdon 1995: 200)
If all the three streams are triggered, the probability of an item to rise on the 
decision agenda is dramatically increased. It is also important to keep in mind that 
the three streams act simultaneously, sometimes independently and sometimes 
coupled, through windows of opportunity and critical junctures. The quote below 
expresses how we must perceive it. The streams do not intend to reflect closed 
systems or streams. Rather, they can be aligned with the translation agenda of 
an actor network approach, if we consider the streams as dynamic actor network 
associations. Though, it might be necessary to bring interest and agency even 
more central into the institutional debate to identify the conditions for institutional 
change (DiMaggio 1988). The streams model of Kingdon has already been applied 
to explain the decision-making process and identify the encountered challenges in 
the case of a large infrastructure project10 by Vanveldhoven and Lauwers (2010), and 
Vanveldhoven, Lauwers, and Goethals (2009). 
Events do not proceed neatly in stages, steps, or phases. Instead, 
independent streams that flow through the system all at once, each with 
a life of its own and equal with one another, become coupled when a 
window opens. Thus participants do not first identify problems and then 
10  The Oosterweel Link project to be precisely, a case that will be studied in this dissertation  
as well.
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seek solutions for them; indeed, advocacy of solutions often precedes the 
highlighting of problems to which they become attached. (Kingdon 1995: 205, 
206)
2.3
Governing complex adaptive systems
As we have elaborated on both the actors and their surrounding structures (or 
institutions), in the previous sections, the orgware components that are the subject 
of governing have been discussed. The interplay itself, the governance, is left to 
complete our conceptual framework. It is the object of investigation in this section. 
First, we present some definitions of governance. Second, an overview is given 
of the changing role and position of the government regarding the governance 
in general, starting from an overview of governance paradigms from the public 
administration research field. Third, we investigate what governing complexity 
means and we discuss several governance strategies to deal with different kinds of 
situations.
2.3.1
Governance- some definitions
Governance is understood as the result of the interaction of many actors who 
have their own particular problems, define goals and follow strategies to 
achieve them. Governance therefore also involves conflicting interests and 
struggle for dominance. (Voss and Kemp 2006: 9) 
Nowadays, governance is a widely used and vague concept, that is often picked up 
in business contexts, where it refers to corporate governance. It is “the framework 
of rules and practices by which a board of directors ensures accountability, 
fairness, and transparency in a company’s relationship with its all stakeholders 
(financiers, customers, management, employees, government, and the community)” 
(http://www.businessdictionary.com). However, in this contribution, we specifically  
intend the much broader oriented institutional governance concept, which has 
already been extensively discussed in the literature and covers many more aspects 
(Bevir 2013, Jessop 1997, Pel and Teisman 2009, Rhodes 1996, Stoker 1998, 
Teisman, van Buuren, and Gerrits 2009, Van Assche, Beunen, and Duineveld 2013, 
Buitelaar, Jacobs, and Lagendijk 2007, Mayntz 1998, Pierre 2000). 
Often governance is defined in reference to the term “government”. The latter can 
be understood as the system by which a state or community is controlled (Oxford 
English Dictionary 2014). The government refers to the person or group of people 
exercising authority over a politically organised territory. In contrast, “governance” 
implies a new process of governing in times of change (Rhodes 1996: 652-653). 
Accordingly, governance is often associated with the more decentralised,  
horizontally organised, and interdependent counterpart of a rather top-down and 
vertically oriented government (Scharpf 1997, Boelens 2010). Government can 
then be considered as just one kind of governance. The shift from government to 
governance is rather subtle than radical (Van Assche and Djanibekov 2012). Young 
argues that the decoupling of governance and government allows us to explore other 
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mechanisms through which, for instance, the society or the civic takes up this role. 
Likewise, Stoker (1998) defines governance as creating the conditions for “ordered 
rule and collective action”, in situations where “boundaries between and within 
public and private sectors have become blurred”. Somewhat more generically, 
governance can be perceived as the coordination of various forms of (in-)formal 
types of public, private, and public-private arrangements. In this sense governance 
relates to sustaining coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors 
pursuing different purposes. 
The role of the state in society is challenged and questioned for several reasons. 
First, there is an increasing awareness that societal problems can be solved by 
political institutions, but also by other actors. Second, the state has increasing 
issues to maintain its steering capacity. Third, some capacities are taken over by 
other transnational political powers due to the ongoing globalisation (Pierre 2000). 
Jessop and Young also offered definitions of governance; respectively written more 
from the institutional theories perspective, and from a focus on the earth systems 
governance (see quotes below). Both definitions acknowledge the complexity 
of governance efforts by referring to a “complex art of steering” or to “a social 
function centred on steering collective behaviour” (Jessop 1997, Young 2017). 
Those definitions are especially of interest for elaborating our orgware agenda, as it 
focuses on the interplay between actors (and actor systems) and institutions. 
[…] the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems 
that are both operationally autonomous from one another and structurally 
coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence.  
(Jessop 1997: 111)
Governance is a social function centred on steering collective behaviour 
toward desired outcomes and away from undesirable outcomes.  
(Young 2017: 26)
When talking about governing or steering, the “regime” concept often emerges  
in the literature on institutional theories. There, regimes are considered “as 
institutions specialized to addressing functionally defined topics (e.g. health 
care, pollution, trade) or spatially defined areas (e.g. Antarctica, the North Pacific, 
Western Europe)”(Young 1982 as in: Young 2017: 27); knowing that “institutions are 
collections of rights, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures that give 
rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide 
interactions among the participants” (Young 2017: 27), as mentioned before. 
In the case of mobility, the present mobility regimes are institutions dealing with the 
governance issues or challenges of the sustainable mobility transition. For instance, 
the mobility regimes give rise to, amongst others, the preferences of transport 
modes, the attitude towards mobility measures, and the present mobility behaviour 
of people. 
The transition management literature, that will be elaborated in more detail later, 
adopts the regime concept that is both challenged by novel innovations (niches), 
and exposed to rather inert external pressures (landscape, e.g. climate change, 
global warming, etc.). 
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Earlier, the regime concept was used in the context of urban regime theory and 
the actor network process. It represented the outcome and crystallisation of a 
self-organising actor network association. This perspective can be merged with 
the definition of regimes of Young, but from a more active point of view; regimes 
are actor networking associations that enable an appropriate response to current 
issues, that are not (yet) adequately addressed by other actors. 
2.3.2
Evolution of the governmental position from a public administration 
perspective
Regarding the role of the government, governance developments or evolutions 
studied in the field of planning and public management research can be considered 
relevant. We can roughly follow the position or stance of government bodies in terms 
of extremes: from strongly top-down steered towards rather bottom-up oriented, 
eventually ending up with a combination of both. 
In the post-war period a strong idea of manipulability prevailed (before the 70’s and 
80’s). The outcomes of the highly centralised government apparatus dissatisfied, 
because planning problems seemed to get increasingly complex and crossed 
multiple policy fields. Consequently, an anti-government attitude dominated the 
next decade and the market principle and self-organisation gained attention. 
The role of the government was reduced to that of a facilitator, intervening in the 
conditions. However, some issues are not (and will never be) entirely accounted 
for by the market; some negative externalities are not sufficiently compensated 
for without any governmental interventions or incentives. Hence, in the 1990’s 
and 2000’s, one agreed that a mix of both was desirable, a combination of both 
top-down and bottom-up initiatives (Geerlings 2012). These three periods, end 
80’s, 90’s, 2000’s coincide with respectively the Public Administration paradigm 
(PA, till the 70’s and 80’s), the New Public Management (NPM, 90’s), and the New 
Pubic Governance (NPG, from the 2000s onwards) (Geerlings 2012, Osborne 2006)11. 
However, current public policy-making can still be characterised by features of all 
three approaches (Bovaird and Löffler 2009: 25). 
First, the Public Administration (PA) realm is characterised by “the dominance of 
the ‘rule of law’, a focus on administering set rules and guidelines; a central role for 
the bureaucracy in policy making and implementation; the politics-administration 
split within public organisations; a commitment to incremental budgeting; and the 
hegemony of the professional in the service delivery system” (Osborne 2006: 378). 
The PA was outlined by a top-down hierarchy (Osborne 2006). Though a certain 
notion of co-production was already developing, it was limited to considering 
citizens as “clients” of public services. The idea behind that was that public service 
provision requires co-production, because it focuses on serving the citizen (Osborne 
and Strokosch 2013). 
11  This sketch of the ‘evolution’ of public governance is indicative, since it is context and time 
dependent; additionally not all researchers see NPM as distinct from PA to be a new stage or 
paradigm, and some even see it as a failed paradigm (Osborne 2006).
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The wave of reforms in the public sector since the 1980s is often referred to as the 
“New public management” (NPM). This paradigm aspired to counter the bureau- 
cratic principles and to apply instruments and management styles from the private 
sector to the public sector. The basic values of the NPM could be expressed by 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Important features of the instrumental NPM 
reform were “the transition from input to output control and the replacement of 
the traditional centralised organisational structure by decentralised organisational 
devices” (Jan Van helden and Pieter Jansen 2003). The coproduction concept was 
introduced in the NPM. It could be interpreted as the distribution of the production 
of public services amongst private actors. The focus was primarily on efficiency and 
result-oriented work, so salvation was sought in market forces and public private 
partnerships (PPPs) flourished (Bovaird and Löffler 2009: 103). Over the years, 
co-production became associated, with the concept of “consumerism” and with a 
contrasting view on effectiveness. 
It has not been a steady state concept but has evolved, portraying service 
users as co-producers in different guises – as citizens/clients, consumers, 
customers – and latterly simply as ‘co-producers’.(Osborne and Strokosch 
2013: 34, on the evoling meaning of co-production)
The subsequent New Public Governance Paradigm (NPG) combined the best of both 
PA and NPM (Osborne 2006). Growing evidence demonstrated that neither a mere 
top-down (central) steering or “government” capacity, nor a bottom-up decentra-
lised market could handle the complex socio-technical systems that constitute 
reality (Geerlings 2012: 20-21). Accordingly, an answer was found by merging 
elements of both paradigms. In the NPM, interventions were judged based on their 
results (in terms of input-output). In contrast, the NPG focused on the process and 
the interactions between several stakeholders that resulted in certain outcomes 
(Bovaird and Löffler 2009: 9). Although co-production had been developed earlier, it 
eventually became a central and more comprehensive concept within the NPG.
Figure 5  Policy implementation cycle. Source: based on Rittel and Webber (1973) and  
elaborated by Mees, Tempels et al. (2016).
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As the often synonymous uses of “co-production” for different terms and contexts 
could create confusion, the multiple interpretations of co-production are put 
together. Based on the earlier work and conceptualisation of Brudney and England 
(1983), Alford (1998: 135) defines co-production as “the involvement of citizens, 
clients, consumers, volunteers and/or community organisations in producing public 
services and consuming or otherwise benefiting from them.” In public adminis-
tration theory it related (or was often restricted) to the “delivery of public services” 
(Osborne and Strokosch 2013). Planning theory interpreted the concept as the 
involvement or participation of citizens in the strategic planning process (Albrechts 
2012). 
2.3.3
Towards governing (in) complexity
In the past, the cornerstone of public administration was the policy implementation. 
But from that strong belief in manipulability and a hierarchical top-down steering 
policy, the steering mechanism shifted towards the total opposite in the following 
decade. A disbelief in steering prevailed in the NPM. The free market and self- 
organisation principles took the upper hand. The government became more 
fragmented and took the role of the facilitator in the new public management. 
From then on, public and private actors would coproduce governance services. 
Nevertheless, that co-production appeared time consuming, and it was still working 
towards a relatively fixed goal (albeit on the short or long term). In this respect,  
De Roo (2012: 134) pointed towards the paradox of planning: 
[…] most attention is focused on the precise moment at which a decision is to 
be made, with arguments referring to the here and now, while the ‘becoming’ 
(which is what we basically plan for, a fact that some of us tend to forget) 
is secondary, considered as not much more than the logical follow up of a 
linear extrapolation (technical rationale) and a commitment (communicative 
rationale) made operational to a decision. (De Roo 2012: 134)
Although notions of path dependency and related institutional insights gained 
interest, adopting a profound notion of time, acknowledging real complexity, did 
not yet receive the appreciation it deserves; a missed opportunity to narrow the gap 
between theory and practice and to align with debates on complex decision-making 
and organisational adaptiveness. 
Later endorsed by De Roo (2012), Pollitt advocated for a shift in perspective: from 
the past/present to the future; in this respect, the title of a recent book reflected his 
disappointment in the level of ambition of present government strategies: “Time, 
policy, management; governing the past” (Pollitt 2008). 
Scenario planning, can be considered a first step towards the incorporation of 
dynamics. That tradition already incorporates a slight notion of time, as for a certain 
given past various future options are considered (open future). However the extrapo-
lation is based on linear thinking, and can therefore not entirely grasp the notion of 
time with its associated uncertainty. The moment that one decides upon both the 
scenario and the issues that are planned for (problem definition) is bound to the 
here and now, leaving an open future behind (De Roo 2012: 147). 
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Transition thinking is affiliated to scenario planning given its intrinsic notion of 
time. But unlike scenario planning, transition approaches adopt a non-linear 
progression over time; transitions can be perceived as a-linear movements from 
one stable situation or level to another (Geels 2002b, 2004, 2012, Geels and 
Schot 2007, Rotmans and Loorbach 2010, Switzer, Bertolini, and Grin 2013). 
Transitions will only take place when the time is “right”. This inclines De Roo (2012) 
even more to perceive transitions as an important step towards incorporating 
time within planning theory. Speaking of transitions also refers to a reality that 
recognises different levels of stability. It reflects a spectrum that ranges from 
out of equilibrium to near equilibrium (De Roo 2012, Portugali 2006). The idea and 
relevance of path dependency returns here, but in multilevel and a-linear way. At 
the same time it acknowledges the intertwining with the contextual environment 
(reciprocal influence). Transitions thus take account of the interrelated, fuzzy, and 
unpredictable course of tangled paths. 
Transition is a relatively new concept derived from the complexity sciences 
that could become instrumental to planning theory and practice. […] it 
touches upon reality more realistically than scenarios and their linear 
assumptions. Transitions present a reality full of leaps and sudden change, 
causation being strongly relational. […] The cause of the transition emerges 
out of the often fuzzy relationship between a system, its subsystems and the 
contextual environment to which the system is connected. The connectivity 
between the system and context diminishes, affecting the system’s 
relationship to its subsystems through self-organizing mechanisms, pushing 
the system into a process of co-evolution towards a better fit with a new 
contextual environment. (De Roo 2012: 151)
If we truly want to allow for time and dynamics, we cannot solely focus on delivered 
objectives or output at a given time. Because these are bound by the here and now. 
Many governance processes are still co-production oriented, and directed towards 
realising a relatively fixed goal (albeit on the short or long term). That fixed goal is 
something difficult to accept when acknowledging the complex nature of the real 
world. Especially regarding our previous reflections in Section 2.2, only considering 
co-production does not comply with our view on the potential of the self-organising 
actor networks, that are at the very basis for change (by their continuous interac-
tions). Those processes lay at the basis of how actor networks come into existing 
and how actors influence and are influenced by their environment and institutional 
setting (cf. Section 2.2). Figure 6 illustrates the relation between a co-production 
and a co-evolutionary perspective. 
As we are still far from the desired mobility transition, some scholars call for a more 
radical and systemic change, or transition (i.a. Nykvist and Whitmarsh 2008: 1373). 
That is why the new realism approaches place hope in the transition management 
perspective (Nykvist and Whitmarsh 2008, Schwanen, Banister, and Anable 2012). 
They aspire to grasp the complexity that is encountered in real-world planning, by 
considering mobility in a systemic whole (Urry 2004). 
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Those approaches start from the conviction that the issues calling for a transition 
are complex12; they generate wicked problems; their solutions should span different 
interrelated policy fields, and no simple answer or solution exists. Therefore, 
the transition management approach places mobility in a wider socio-technical 
perspective. Institutions matter in that perspective, and present and future 
challenges from the in- and outside are taken into consideration. Behavioural 
change is also high on the agenda. Therefore, alternatives, context, and timing play 
an important role as well (Geerlings 2012, Geerlings, Shiftan, and Stead 2012).
 
[…] the notion of governance emphasizes the need to enrol multiple actors in 
processes of intervention and to work with more complex understandings of 
the intrinsic non-linearity of dynamic socio-technical systems. (Shove and 
Walker 2010: 475)
Despite huge theoretical efforts in this field, actual implementation of the 
knowledge in practice lags behind (Hull 2008, Marsden, Mullen et al. 2014, Paredis 
and Block 2015). Hence, we try to acquire an insight in the governance concepts that 
have already gained attention with respect to transitions.
The reflexive governance concept, for instance, focuses on how governance 
arrangements build the ability to evolve and adapt over time. But perhaps the most 
well-known framework, introduced in this respect, is the transition management 
approach. That framework relates to the concept of reflexive governance and 
advocates the multilevel perspective (Geerlings, Shiftan, and Stead 2012). 
Furthermore, reflexivity is also embraced by the evolutionary governance theory 
(EGT). EGT links notions of “change” in social systems theory and institutional 
theories to governance paths. It thus also refers to path dependency and other 
interdependencies that influence governance mechanisms. 
12  Transition management approaches often specifically address sustainability issues
Figure 6  Notions of co-production in relation to each other and to the policy implementation 
cycle. Source: based on Mees, Tempels et al. (2016: 25, figure 1).
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2.3.3.1 Changing governance mechanisms: reflexive governance,  
   evolutionary governance theory and transition management
Few attention has been paid to how governance arrangements themselves  
change over time, how the strategies can be adapted to a changing environment,  
or how they manage the challenges from the in and outside. In this respect, two 
related concepts are discussed that analyse and conceptualise the change or  
(co-)evolution of governance mechanisms. First, “reflexive governance” clarifies 
how change in governance arrangements should be perceived. Second, the  
evolutionary governance theory (EGT) refines the reflexive governance concept  
by zooming in on the various actors and their developmental paths, whereby  
issues of power and agency are never far away.
“Reflexive” regarding reflexive governance can be interpreted in two ways. First, 
it refers to the cycle of problem producing – problem solving, after which new 
problems emerge, which then are to be “solved” again, etc. Reflexivity is thus 
understood as the result of self-confrontation and self-reference. Voss and Kemp 
(2006) call this the first-order reflexivity. Earlier in this dissertation, Luhmann has 
named this the “autopoiesis”. It is the ability of the system (or actor) to reproduce 
itself again and again, and meanwhile to react upon the challenges imposed by a 
changing environment (self-organisation). If a problem originates from a certain 
environment, the system or actor can respond to the problem by proposing a 
solution and by rearranging itself to surmount the problem. Self-organisation can  
be defined as a process that spontaneously occurs when the system is triggered 
(e.g. by a substantial change in its environment) to re-organize itself in a different 
way than before; when they “produce a different pattern without any blueprint 
for that pattern” (Stacey 2007: 193). The second-order reflexivity occurs at the 
aggregate level of the system or the arrangement; it shows the ability to interfere 
within the (meta)system and recognises the active interplay between agency 
(actors) and structure (institutions), that is called “structuration” (Giddens 1984). 
The framework or cycle that introduces “problem producing – problem solving” 
routines is rethought and the execution is adapted. This second order reflexivity also 
relates to co-evolution. Both meanings are inherent to reflexive governance  
and enable the approach to grasp the complex reality. 
The reflexive governance approach focuses on dealing with sustainability issues; 
whereby the latter are regarded as profoundly complex problems. Those problems 
entail many interrelated (sub)problems at multiple scale levels. Consequently, 
addressing those problems  in a systemic way is desirable. Voss and Kemp (2006) 
argue that sustainability does not reflect a desired end state from which operable 
criteria can be distilled to act upon. They rather consider sustainability as a way of 
problem framing that exposes the many interconnections of the various underlying 
problems and scales, the impacts, albeit desired or not (side-effects), and this 
on the short and the long term. According to Voss and Kemp (2006) transition 
management is just one – but a rather comprehensive one – out of the many 
approaches that can be situated within reflexive governance.
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Reflexive governance thus implies that one calls into question the 
foundations of governance itself, that is, the concepts, practices and  
institutions by which societal development is governed, and that one 
envisions alternatives and reinvents and shapes those foundations.  
(Voss and Kemp 2006: 4)
Reflexive governance contrasts with the rational problem solving that is associated 
with modernity and is (and was) central to past and present governance strategies 
(Voss and Kemp 2006: 4). This rational problem solving governance strategy has 
reduced complexity by decomposing the messy problems into smaller, oversim-
plified but more manageable parts of the problem. Voss and Kemp (2006: 5) call 
this “a pattern of productive reduction of complexity” that “orchestrates modern 
science, technology development, bureaucratic organisation, project management, 
[…].” They state that the more evasive the character of problem solving is, “the 
more effective it becomes regarding implementation and valorisation (instrumental 
purposes), but “the stronger the impacts of unintended consequences become” 
(Voss and Kemp 2006: 5). 
Since the knowledge is distributed over various (self-organising) actors, it is logical 
that a variety of actors and roles are involved in the governance process. However, 
all roles are filled in contingently: some rather give, some only take; nothing can be 
guaranteed. So, “instead of steering, there is reflective (and reflexive) intervention” 
(Rip 2002 as in, 2006: 88). 
The orientation then is less towards solving problems (of sustainability),  
but towards creating and maintaining spaces for working towards solutions. 
This might include increasing reflexivity as an institutional capacity. In a 
co-evolutionary perspective, reflexivity and attendant learning is located in 
the processes and at the system level, not in the heads of individuals.  
(Rip 2006: 89)
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Figure 7  A dynamic multi-level perspective on technological transitions.  
Source: Geels (2002a: 1263, figure 5).
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In the research field of transition management, the multi-level perspective (MLP) 
is widely accepted (Figure 8). This approach starts from the assumption that 
transitions are a-linear processes resulting from concurring developments at three 
levels (ranked from the least stable to the most stable). The first level is the niche, 
the locus for radical action or change. The second level is that of the socio-technical 
regimes. At this level the established actors, practices, and rules are situated. The 
third level comprises the exogenous socio-technical landscape that is characterised 
by slow and subtle change (Geels 2002b, 2012). 
These different levels, as (Geels 2002a) calls them, have their own rhythm or inertia 
and will react upon changes during another moment or even period. Though the MLP 
can represent the general transition coarse of innovations, we want to voice a few 
remarks. The first one is about the “level” in multilevel perspective. According to our 
ideas, those should not be named “levels”, since this suggests a kind of threshold 
within the evolution or transition process to attain the next level. The distinction 
between niche-regime-landscape is rather subjective and more nuanced. However 
the three-division is useful indicatively. Second, we want to underline that this 
gradual evolution can be subject of discussion. Not every innovation is equally 
successful after all. Some innovations never leave the niche sphere, or some will 
never become institutionalised in the regime. Thus, not every innovation will have 
trodden the same path or will have followed the same stages in the proposed 
order. That is why we need not forget the smaller arrows at the bottom of Figure 7. 
According to those critiques, we conceive these levels of actors and institutions of 
the socio-technical system as contingent and co-evolving over the various levels. 
We would preferably speak of “arenas”, and of a multi-arena perspective instead of 
a multilevel perspective.
Figure 8  Multiple levels as a nested hierarchy. Source: Geels (2002b: 1261)
However, from this MLP framework the distinction between the levels proves useful. 
Representing these levels is interesting to estimate both the capacity and the 
accessibility of resources to change. So we will maintain some of the key-features 
of the transition management approach in our further conceptualisation of the 
mobility system. 
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Evolutionary Governance Theory (EGT) as conceptualised by i.a. Lowndes and 
Skelcher (1998), Van Assche, Beunen, and Duineveld (2013), Van Assche and 
Djanibekov (2012) has much in common with the reflexive governance concept. It 
frames evolutions and changes in governance arrangements by focusing on multiple 
governance paths. It looks at how the various dependencies have made those paths 
to what they have (or will) become. 
In EGT, there are three types of dependencies that exert force over the developing 
path: path dependency, interdependency, and goal dependency. First, path 
dependency is an obvious dependency that gains a lot of attention in explaining 
certain developments over time (history matters). Path dependency concentrates on 
the transaction costs and the cultural aspects that form the bases of past choices 
and will determine to some extent future options. It focuses on the capacity to 
adapt to the changing environment, and thus on the autopoiesis, on the production 
and reproduction of the self to keep up with changes in the environment. Second, 
interdependency reorients the focus from the self to the other players and the 
accompanying rules of the game. Anticipating the other’s ideas and future “moves” 
or “game making”, becomes important since you are never playing alone. The 
interactions between various other actors and between their arrangements also 
influences the paths that can be followed. Although this dependency is substantial, 
it is often neglected when studying evolution or development of systems. Third, goal 
dependency refers to the interfering paths of actors when sharing a goal or vision; 
this can also enable or restrict certain future options. Many links between EGT and 
institutional change theories can be drawn; e.g. the use of ‘streams’ or ‘paths’, 
the interdependencies and opportunities offered at moments of interference (cf. 
windows of opportunity, critical moments, cf. Section 2.2.2.2). 
As EGT focuses on both the actors and rules of the game, and how they mutually 
arrange and are arranged (multiple interdependencies), and as EGT even mentions 
co-evolution, one could ask why the framework was not called the “co-evolutionary 
governance theory”; that might suit the framework better in our opinion. 
Figure 9  The dual meaning of reflexive with regard to reflexive governance. 
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Characterised by the same elementary characteristics (self-organisation, 
co-evolution, situationalism), reflexive governance and evolutionary governance 
theory, thus, converge with our reading on the indirect steering and change of 
complex (adaptive) systems. Reflexive governance can be seen as an umbrella 
concept for both adaptive (1st order reflexivity) and co-evolutionary (2nd order 
reflexivity) development. Rip (2006: 89) argues that this reflexive capacity is not yet 
sufficiently present in governance arrangements at hand; the focus is still too much 
on ad hoc problem solving and not enough redirected towards the processes of 
change, thus, towards “becoming”. 
2.3.3.2 A spectrum of governance approaches 
In summary, while previous approaches did not engage with a more complexity- 
embracing, situational perspective on governance, it is increasingly recognised 
that mobility has the characteristics of a complex system. It is complex because 
it “depends on multiple actors and factors, including the patterns of human 
settlements and consumption, the organisation of production, and the availability 
of infrastructure” (Geerlings, Shiftan, and Stead 2012: 5). In those complex systems, 
decision-making often also becomes complex. As “complexity strikes back if it is 
neglected” (Salet, Bertolini, and Giezen 2013: 1989). Likewise, “managing these 
processes involves much more than getting the problem right, choosing the best 
alternative and forcing through a plan. It is about acting in complexity” (Teisman 
2008: 342). Adopting a co-evolutionary perspective allows us not only to grasp the 
adaptive capacity building of such complex systems over time, but it also accounts 
for the influence on their environment (conditions, institutions, circumstances, 
etc.). In this respect, some public administration researchers have elaborated on 
governing complex systems (Teisman, van Buuren, and Gerrits 2009). They have 
envisioned a new agenda for governments and the role they should play regarding 
“creating the right conditions for effective policy making, including the domain of 
transport” (Geerlings, Shiftan, and Stead 2012: 5). 
By combining the governance interpretations of the recent past (in Section 2.3.2), 
with the more recent encounter with complexity and co-evolutionary approaches (in 
Section 2.3.3), a spectrum of governance approaches can be composed according 
to the level in which the complexity regarding actors and setting is acknowledged 
(Hertogh and Westerveld 2010). Recall the matrix in Figure 3, setting out the 
different problems according to their score on complicatedness and on complexity. 
The scheme offers four quadrants of problems: from simple, complicated, or 
complex, to both complicated and complex. For each of those situations, Hertogh 
and Westerveld (2010) have formulated a management approach to deal with 
complexity in LIPs, see Figure 10. 
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Those strategies ranged from a low to a high level of complicatedness and from a 
low to a high level of complexity. The four strategies that their LIP research showed 
were: internal and content management, interactive management, systems  
management, and dynamic management. The matrix of strategies has been 
elaborated by Verbeek (2017: 110), Verbeek and Boelens (2016: 1925, figure 4), 
(Boelens 2015) to suit the field of environmental health in spatial planning, or 
respectively to propose an agenda for mobility, and was adopted by Tempels (2016: 
158) in flood risk management. Although founded on a different body of planning 
literature, a similar matrix was developed by Terryn (2016: 215) to fit a spatial 
planning evaluation framework. 
Within our search for a governance framework, we focused on the actors and the 
setting (cf. Section 2.2). Therefore, we also rearranged the axes of the matrix in 
Figure 10, into the complexity of the setting versus the complexity of the actor field, 
Figure 10  Four approaches on the management of complexity. Source: based on Hertogh
and Westerveld (2010: 228, figure 5.9).
Figure 11  Four approaches on the governance of complexity with respect to actors and setting.
Source: own elaboration based on Hertogh and Westerveld (2010: 228, figure 5.9) as in Boelens 
(2015).
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see Figure 11. The setting represents the institutional context: not only the planning 
project (the problem to solve), but also the institutional atmosphere in which to 
plan, including cultural aspects, planning instruments and rules, etc. The actor 
complexity mirrors the actor playing field and relates to the dynamic interactions 
between the actors and their networks (actor networks). It deals with the actors and 
their prominence in the planning process, as roles and (power) relations can change 
during the process. The proposed four extremes are: path dependent, adaptive, 
collaborative, and co-evolutionary. 
If we adopt a path dependent governance strategy for solving mobility issues, we 
start from a fixed actor field and a stable context. The solutions seems clear and 
can be found in a technical or financial fix. The path dependent strategy therefore 
relates to the earlier mentioned technical realm in planning (or governing). If a  
road is structurally congested by car traffic, the solution according to this strategy 
would provide additional infrastructure (lanes). The problem definition is not 
well-elaborated and a quick fix is found in a technical infrastructural solution. 
An adaptive strategy is mostly embraced when dealing with mobility issues that are 
characterised by a relatively stable actor field in a highly changing and uncertain 
setting. The planning object, or the system is new or changing. The adaptive strategy 
thus looks for updating the planned reality to the short- or long-term needs. As 
such, scenario planning can be seen as an adaptive strategy, but also strategies 
that target the conditions are part of an adaptive solution.
If a road is structurally congested by car traffic, the solution from an adaptive 
approach would develop a long-term vision and could come up with for instance the 
implementation of a low emission zone or congestion charge, that tries to influence 
the situation starting from the conditions.
With a relatively fixed planning setting, but an unstable actor field, a collaborative  
governance approach offers a suitable solution. That kind of governance 
concentrates on shaping alliances and getting the actors on the same page. 
Correspondingly, the collaborative planning era did not steal its name. 
An urban road is structurally congested by car-traffic. A collaborative approach 
brings the actors together and tries to determine the problem definition, by focusing 
on the conditions, or the setting, so that it becomes shared by all involved actors. 
Local inhabitants, for instance, mention the problem of air quality and traffic 
unsafety. While local shop owners blame it to the harmful parking policy that 
does not take into account their customers’ parking needs. Still others mention 
the lack of a separate tram lane so that the tram is not beneficial to the car. 
When we combine those claims in a shared vision, we focus on a fixed setting as 
solution. A collaborative approach then comes up with for instance a change of the 
infrastructure design so that it suits the actors. A city boulevard concept might be 
proposed, that provides separate tram lanes, cycling paths, and short-term parking 
places here and there. The actors are gathered around their specific city boulevard 
project.
Finally, when both features are volatile, both the actor field and the planning 
setting, a co-evolutionary approach could be suggested, that allows to grasp the 
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encountered complexity without entailing a standstill. The transition management 
and the reflexive governance are interesting concepts that adopt a notion of 
co-evolution. 
An urban road is structurally congested by car-traffic. A co-evolutionary approach 
starts by gathering the major actors and by brainstorming about plausible future 
settings (and changes). Suppose the actors come up with the same claims and 
problems as in the previous example (cf. collaborative strategy). In that case a 
co-evolutionary strategy allows the actor playing field and settings to be dynamic. 
The solution does not come up with one fixed adaption of the setting, but allows 
a dynamic (present and future) implementation Maybe the design should not be 
entirely fixed or concreted for the following decades, but leave some room for a 
flexible setting. An updated (but still flexible) transport circulation plan might 
already resolve part of the problem. Some local shops might be encouraged to 
relocate to more suitable places. To counter traffic safety issues some places could 
be subject to speed limits. 
We applied the four strategies to the same example: the problem of a congested 
(urban) road. We did this to illustrate and compare the differences between each 
of the approaches when looking for solutions. But off course, it is not a question 
of what is the better approach in this case. The appropriate question is, given the 
nature of both actor field and setting for each specific case, what the most suitable 
approach is. Each approach can prove useful, when applied in the appropriate 
context (cf. Figure 11). Nevertheless, we consider sustainable mobility as a complex 
adaptive system, that is characterised by a dynamic actor field and setting. 
Consequently, we prescribe a co-evolutionary mobility governance approach 
as most appropriate. We elaborate on what such approach means for mobility 
planners. 
2.4
Building a theoretical Framework: the application 
towards a sustainable mobility system
This section articulates the theoretical findings from previous sections to address 
the orgware agenda for mobility. A summary of theoretical concepts is given, 
combining all of those theories and applying them to mobility. The theoretical 
framework, presented in this section, has been previously published as Van Brussel, 
Boelens, and Lauwers (2016). 
Hitherto, no clear image exists of the associations and interactions between the 
various mobility-related actors, organisations, and institutions. Various mobility 
innovations of a socio-technical nature or new citizen’s initiatives challenge 
governing mobility. Governance used to adopt either an engineering approach or 
a collaborative planning approach. But, both approaches have been contested as 
they could not offer the intended solutions, cf. previous sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 
(Boonstra and Boelens 2011, Hertogh and Westerveld 2010, Boussauw and Boelens 
2015). 
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Those approaches introduce linear and incremental strategies to overcome 
complexity, only by reducing it. While that accommodates complexity in decision-
making even more (Teisman, van Buuren, and Gerrits 2009, Hertogh and Westerveld 
2010). In practice, most projects or innovations do not evolve in a linear fashion; 
the number of actors is not predictable, nor are their aspired objectives. As a 
consequence, a more engaged approach of mobility planning is necessary to grasp 
the associated level of complexity (Boelens and De Roo 2014). 
In Section 2.2, therefore, the focus lies on the actors, their actor networks, and the 
relation of those actor networks with their setting, or thus the governance paths 
(cf. EGT). The dynamic (sub)systems, shaped by the aggregation of actor networks, 
could benefit from a co-evolutionary (Beunen, Van Assche, and Duineveld 2015) 
and an actor-relational approach of steering as an inclusive process of “undefined 
becoming” (Boelens and De Roo 2014). Consequently, challenges must be tackled in 
a dynamic, contingent, and situational context (Hillier, Van Wezemael, and de Roo 
2012). Furthermore, the complex context should not be neglected, as it shapes the 
institutional, and eventually, the governance paths of actors and subsystems. Van 
Assche, Beunen et al. (2011) argue that the governance paths of systems are subject 
to constraints of multiple dependencies. Paths can be determined by their past 
(path dependent). They can be interdependent if the governance paths of different 
subsystems cultivate crossovers, or if systems interfere with their environment. 
Governance paths that are goal-dependent consist of actors and institutions that 
strive a shared vision and hence will decide the future path (Van Assche, Beunen, 
and Duineveld 2013). 
We perceive complex decision-making as hardly fixed or predictable, but instead as 
situational and co-evolving (cf. Section 2.3); it is about dynamic insights to deal with 
social changes in the outer world; it differs fundamentally at various moments in 
time and space (Bovaird 2008). Complex planning problems cannot be solved by the 
traditional path dependent approach of problem definition, analysis and solution, in 
sequential steps, but by adopting a more complex adaptive way of governing (Rittel 
and Webber 1973). 
The here proposed governance starts from considering mobility as a complex 
adaptive system, comprising mobility arenas in which the stake- and shareholders 
associate and act. The approach accounts for their intentions and ambitions, 
but also shapes the setting for transition. The arenas refer to the subsystems 
or markets within the mobility system in which actors co-act. On the one hand, 
steering mobility refers to intervening in the interactions between the actors 
and between the mobility arenas. We use Luhmann’s concept of “structural 
coupling” to clarify the link between these (internal) interactions to an overall 
steering capacity or decision-making (Luhmann 1997). On the other hand, steering 
implies manoeuvring from the outside-in (Boelens 2010), by shaping the fruitful 
conditions for transition. Our ambition is to apply this two-tiers orgware to optimize 
the Flemish mobility system. Therefore, the present mobility orgware has to be 
unravelled first. Which underlying arenas and associated key actors can be defined? 
Conducting case study research is unavoidable to analyse the added value of such 
orgware approach. Since the proposed framework calls for situational solutions (i.e. 
specific in space and time). 
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2.4.1
Mobility as complex adaptive system 
Regarding the quest for a mobility transition, we emphasised the need to add an 
orgware agenda and regard mobility in a more systemic way, as a complex adaptive 
system. Therefore, we start this section with the selection of a systemic conceptu-
alisation of mobility, that fits a CAS approach of mobility. We defined CAS as a 
“complex macroscopic collection of relatively similar, connected micro-structures, 
formed to adapt to a changing environment” (Cohen, Riolo, and Axelrod 1999, Stacey 
2001). CASs are complex because they comprise a dynamic network of interactions.  
Their relationships are not simply an aggregate of individual static entities, but 
a dynamic network of interpersonal, functional or heterogeneous interactions. 
CASs are adaptive, since the collective behaviour co-evolves with the changing 
environment and evolving features of the subsystem itself (Solvit 2012, Holland 1992).
 
Figure 12  System diagram for mobility. Source: Egeter and van de Riet (1998).
To conceptualise a mobility CAS, we draw on several systemic mobility approaches. 
Egeter and van de Riet (1998) have experimented with the system approach of the 
Dutch mobility; they focused on the interplay between the demand side (socio- 
economic attitudes, trends) and supply side of mobility (technological and 
infrastructural means, providers and political strategies). They distinguished a 
travel market (the travel volume, depending on socio-demographic factors, spatial 
density, diversity, telecommunication, etc.), a transport market (depending on the 
modal choice, system efficiencies, transport information, and communication etc.), 
and a traffic market (depending on traffic efficiency, infrastructure design, vehicle 
technology, etc.). 
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Later, Lauwers and Allaert (2013) added the subsystems of the available resources 
(economic, ecologic, spatial) versus their impacts (environment, quality of life, 
etc.) to the scheme, see Figure 13. Furthermore, each of these markets can be 
considered as CAS themselves. This makes the multi-CAS model of sustainable 
mobility even more complex; it becomes impossible to oversee all its interconnected 
features, let alone the impacts of intended proposals on each of them. 
A mobility system can be regarded as a CAS, within the greater societal/environ-
mental system, but also on micro-level. It consists of various dynamic features, 
influencing each other continuously: socio-demographic factors, macro and micro- 
economic trends, socio-cultural trends, the pluralisation of life- and subsequent 
mobility styles, the impact on pollution and health, technological and logistic 
innovations, and the respective policies. Hence, researching mobility has become 
increasingly complex. Additional insights are needed on each of the features 
mentioned above, and in the reciprocal interactions between them, to elaborate on 
the orgware, and effectively govern the mobility system (Williams 2005: 11-12).
2.4.2
Two-tier steering of complex adaptive systems
It is not our intention to reduce complexity by dividing mobility into multiple mobility 
subsystems or arenas. But we think it might help clarify the orgware components 
and their interactions or feedback loops. Especially when we want to analyse 
possibilities to “steer” those CAS and tackle its wicked problems, those markets 
can be understood as Luhmann’s “islands of reduced complexity”, when considered 
on their own. Each of those subsystems operates relatively self-centred to arrange 
a level of stability within a chaotic surrounding world, by a systematic selection, 
interpretation and structuration (Luhmann 1997). Although all of these subsystems 
evolve relatively closed, and are driven by a self-steering focus, Luhmann sees them 
as open systems; not only other actors or subsystems exert pressures (external), 
but the subsystem is also challenged by internal pressures. 
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Figure 13  Mobility arenas and their embedding in the environment. Source: based on Lauwers  
and Allaert (2013).
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But how can those systems be steered? Complexity theorists and system theorist 
remain sceptical about direct forms of steering, as self-organising processes 
and co-evolution cannot be orchestrated. But, there are still opportunities for an 
indirect steering. Therefore, the idea of “structural couplings” is borrowed from 
Luhmann’s work on conceptualising “the social” (Luhmann 1997). Governing then 
means creating those “structural couplings” between sub-systems. In this respect, 
Fuchs (2001) presents the role of the planner as an active and constructive role; 
the planner is perceived as a person who digs deeper, manoeuvres and connects 
the actors and the subsystems (Fuchs 2001: 39-42,332), this aligns with what 
Hertogh and Westerveld (2010) propose in their research titled “Playing with 
Complexity”. But also intermediary organisations, often called “innovation interme-
diaries” or “innovation brokers” (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2009) can take up this role. 
Sometimes, “these innovation intermediaries emerge in response to a perceived 
suboptimal degree of connectivity between relevant actors…” (Johnson, 2008; Smits 
& Kuhlmann, 2004). The challenge then remains to establish and embed those 
intermediary organisations in the existing structure (Klerkx & Leeuwis, 2009). 
Therefore, we point to a second steering mechanism that occurs at the level of the 
subsystems. The latter steering should focus on setting the specific conditions 
to direct the subsystems and their actor networks. With conditions we mean the 
context that is to be planned, but also the institutional framework, the formal and 
informal institutions that can be stimulated. It refers to the content of present 
and future plans, but it goes beyond that plan. It addresses the attitudes, the 
behaviour, etc. Nevertheless, Luhmann advocates for a steering that benefits from, 
and does not eliminate the differences between the subsystems (Van Assche and 
Verschraegen 2008: 274). 
In summary, governance of complex adaptive systems concentrates on realising 
two main objectives. First, from an inside perspective, governance should intervene 
in the subsystems and their actor networks. So that structural couplings and 
alliances can be forged. Second, from an outside perspective, governance can 
shape the necessary conditions to allow these structural couplings to come into 
existence. A comprehensive rational steering is opposed, as that does not enable 
to come up with tailor-made solutions (see quote below). Furthermore, we are not 
only interested in the actors or the conditions, but also in their interactions. The 
latter interactions, or that kind of structural embeddedness relates to the actor’s 
or subsystem’s governance paths (Van Assche, Beunen et al. 2011). That can be 
considered as a higher order structural coupling, that creates consistency between 
the various subsystems. That is why some call it “the art of creating consistency” 
(Boonstra 2015: 362), cf. Figure 14. To describe and anticipate on those governance 
paths, the actor networks can be re/deconstructed by digging into the translation 
phases or ARA steps. 
Successful governance is always provisional, localized, and partial and 
always has unintended consequences which operate to the detriment of 
other subjects, interest, and projects and may eventually prove counter-
productive even for those who instituted the governance mechanisms and 
projects in question. (Jessop 1997: 133)
78
2.4.2.1 The art of forging structural couplings
The mobility arenas can be conceived as specific domains of Luhmann’s reduced 
complexity. This is schematically illustrated by presenting an arena as a core 
surrounded by its environment (see Figure 15). The subsystems however should 
always be regarded as open systems, consisting of many actor networks that 
are not necessarily tied to only one subsystem. Earlier we have elaborated on 
how actors and institutions can be conceptualised, drawing on the actor network 
theory and institutional theories (cf. section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Remember that those 
networks are never static. They might be interwoven with many more networks, 
thus, exerting different influences. Since no one can oversee all of these changing 
actor networks, ANT proposes to penetrate into the smallest elements: to trace the 
actors, their routines, ambitions, and interests. It is hereby useful to distinguish 
business (focus on profit), civic (focus on self-value), public (reproduction of the 
given order), and academic actors (knowledge-driven), as it is argued that a mix of 
those sectors results in more robust actor networks (Scharpf 1997, Boelens 2010). 
Tracing the actors allows not only to perceive complex situations from the interre-
latedness of leading actors, but also to anticipate the impact of future innovations. 
In that respect, ANT focuses on “policies in the making”, instead of “readymade 
policies”, proposing four phases of translation in which the network gains shape 
(cf. section 2.2.1) : – problematisation – interessement – enrolment – mobilisation 
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Figure 14  Two tiers approach in planning: forging structural couplings and engaging with
condition planning. Source: Van Brussel.
79
of allies (Callon 1986). Those ideas are also reflected in the transition management 
approach, where niche innovations aspire to get adopted by the regime actors, and 
to have an influence on landscape evolutions on the (very) long term (Geels 2002a). 
Tracing the actor networks reveals emerging alliances and structural couplings at 
micro-level. On a more aggregated level such structural couplings might imply or 
provoke structural couplings between the subsystems. The magic happens where 
the overlap between the subsystems starts (cf. ‘the art of creating consistency’, 
Boonstra 2015: 362). 
Figure 15  Structural coupling of the subsystems of sustainable mobility. Source: Van Brussel,
Boelens, and Lauwers (2016).
2.4.2.2 The art of adaptive condition planning in time and space
Those kinds of structural couplings, that can launch a transition, go hand in hand 
with an adaptive environment; as those influence the setting themselves. Within 
complex adaptive systems everything is relational, both the elements (actors) and 
their institutional context. Consequently everything is “situational”, i.e. specific 
in space and time. Comprehensive central steering does not work. But that does 
not eliminate a conditional steering from the outside. As said before, the context 
determines possible outcomes and is in itself arranged and changed by the actants 
within the setting, to attain their objectives. Hence we cannot only focus on the 
structural couplings of actants, while neglecting the broader context of “structu-
rational” settings. For Law denotes that actors – thus people, entities, resources – 
that are connected, only have meaning within and through their network (Law 1986). 
Hence, we approach the settings as institutions in formal (laws, regulations, policies 
etc.), informal (norms, codes, cultures etc.), and in differential and heterogeneous 
sense. Following (Giddens 1984) and (Jessop 2001) the conditions are both 
constraining and enabling. They refer to the reciprocal relation between agents and 
institutions (i.e. conditions or structure); institutions are the resources and simulta-
neously also the means for institutional change. Hence institutional change would 
not be driven in a one-directional way top-down or bottom-up. Instead, change 
would be the result of a complex interplay between actors and settings, focusing on 
an improved embeddedness.
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We return to how institutions can change and how such actor-setting embedded- 
ness is shaped. Various levels of embeddedness of social organisation can be 
distinguished according to institutional theorists (Jessop 2001). First, social 
embeddedness draws attention to the more symbolic and cognitive dimensions 
of institutions and attributes institutional change to internal pressures (Olsen 
and March 1989). The process of institutionalisation can be defined as “a process 
in which fluid behaviour gradually solidifies into structures, which subsequently 
structure the behaviour of actors” (Arts and Leroy 2003: 31). Second, functional 
embeddedness refers to the path dependent perspective on institutions and 
associates institutional change with path dependent possibilities. in which 
sequences of (political/economic) change are associated with previous decisions 
and limited by existing institutions. For in path dependent evolutions a choice made 
in the past, albeit random or not, has consequences and limits future options. 
Change is only possible in moments of conjunctures, or “occasional windows of 
exceptional opportunity” (Wilsford 1994: 252). This view harmonizes with the idea 
of Burch, Hogwood et al. (2003), and Kingdon (1995) on institutional change. But 
we should not completely let the past shape the future, nor should we wait for the 
“right” internal social pressure to stimulate conditions to change. A third more 
differential embeddedness is required. A kind of embeddedness that addresses the 
situation and interferes with the setting to open a window of opportunity. Condition 
planning in this sense not only becomes dynamic and focused in the specific course 
of transition, but also undefined; this planning tries to induce actions in a certain 
direction, but can never foresee if the outcome will be as expected. 
2.4.3
Let’s reconstruct the orgware: towards operationalisation
The two-tiers approach focuses on (1) forging structural couplings and creating 
consistency amongst the various subsystems, and simultaneously on (2) facilitating 
these couplings by re-arranging the setting. How do we analyse who is playing the 
most central role, who is connected to whom, who the intermediaries or mediators 
were to forge the necessary structural couplings, etc.?
Materialising or visualising the mobility orgware is, in our opinion, important to 
formulate an orgware agenda. We therefore suggest to reconstruct the translating 
actor networks regarding mobility transitions. We start from the ANT and the 
translation phases, but we focus on the key actors and differentiate among 
business, civil, public, and knowledge actors cf. ARA. As it is shown that mixed 
strategic partnerships are more robust. When going through the actor network 
translation phases, each time adding a layer of the actor network, we account for 
path-dependency, as we the case story continuously develops. From the multilevel 
perspective in transition management theories, we also differentiated the actors 
according to niche, regime, or landscape actors. We interpreted those categories 
based on Geels (2002b) as follows. Niche actors are innovations or novel actors 
that challenge the present regime actors. They do not possess the means for 
decision-making, they focus on agenda setting instead, and on influencing the 
chosen policies. Regime actors are rule-defining, they are setting out the main 
course of the process and they manage the power and instruments. Landscape 
actors or factors are external to the project or process we describe, but can still 
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exert some influence. For instance governmental actors at other levels also do have 
an indirect influence on the cases and can as such be defined as landscape actors. 
Representing these levels, e.g. whether or not an actor’s initiative or a project is 
already institutionalized (part of the regime) or not, can be interesting in order to 
define or estimate the capacity to change and the accessibility to resources as a 
means for change. Figure 16 illustrates the proposed method and legend for the 
unravelling the orgware. 
Figure 16  Elements for deconstructing the orgware into differentiated actor networks. 
Source: Van Brussel.
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In the previous chapters we provided a systemic conceptualisation of mobility 
that enabled us to depart from the various subsystems, actor networks, and their 
interrelations. We found that mobility issues often become wicked problems, that 
challenge the present governance arrangements. Our hypothesis is that the mobility 
orgware in those circumstances might benefit from a co-evolutionary governance 
approach. To answer the research question – What can an orgware agenda add 
to hard- and software solutions tackling complex mobility issues? – we proposed 
to look at a two-tiers steering framework: (1) forging structural couplings and (2) 
interfering in the institutional context or the conditions. In this chapter we discuss 
the specific methods to operationalise that theoretical framework. 
3.1
Multiple case study research
A governance approach that suits the encountered complexity is related to a 
specific situation. There are no one-size-fits-all solutions available. Therefore, 
and for several other reasons, we adopted a multiple case study method. First, 
our research question has an exploratory nature, asking about ‘how’ to steer etc. 
In-depth case studies can offer substantial information to answer those questions. 
Second, as researcher, we have little or no control over the subject of analysis: 
i.e. the mobility governance. We cannot manipulate and isolate relevant actor 
behaviours or planning processes to see what is successful in practice and what 
fails. Hence, we are almost obliged to carry out case study research, as in fact 
“there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 221). 
Although, a gamification or experimental setup with existent actors of the mobility 
field in a role play, or an actual living lab as experiment, could also have fit this 
kind of research question. Third, we want to observe the cases in their context, so 
we arrive at a certain closeness to the real-life situation. Those characteristics are 
more associated with case study research than to other known qualitative research 
methods (survey, experiment or history) (Flyvbjerg 2006: 223, Farthing 2016). Lastly, 
there is little prior research that has attempted to materialise the orgware and 
unravel the mobility governance, nor in any other governance field that we know of. 
So we have to explore and gather our own data. 
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (‘the case’) in depth and within its real world context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not clearly be 
evident. (Yin 2014: 16) 
In Section 2.4, we have built a theoretical governance framework, based on the 
literature review on governance and planning in complex environments (cf. Chapter 2). 
The respective underlying hypothesis of our research suggests that present 
governance strategies do not proof effective in the complex real world. As they are 
challenged by new stakeholders or dynamic conditions. We thus propose a matrix 
of four governance strategies that each address a specific situation of actor field 
(static versus dynamic) and setting (static versus dynamic) to plan for (Hertogh 
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and Westerveld 2010, Boelens 2015). A complex situation characterised by a 
dynamic actor field and a dynamic setting, calls for a co-evolutionary approach. We 
hypothesize that governance of mobility often fails as it does not address or respond 
to the encountered complexity. We thus try to derive what kind of governance 
approach or governance path they follow/followed, and what a co-evolutionary 
approach could offer/have offered. 
By conducting case study research, we derive detailed governance understandings 
 on both the actor field, the institutional setting and the followed governance 
approach (cf. matrix). Our perspective on governing complexity calls for situational 
understanding and tailor made solutions, which standard formulas and stable 
solutions do not exhibit. But that does not mean that this in-depth information 
cannot be of use elsewhere. We think there will be certain lessons that can be 
learned, some do’s and don’ts that can be applied and tested in other (future) cases. 
3.2
Selection of cases 
Figure 17  Quadruple helix scheme. Source: based on Carayannis and Campbell (2009).
There are several ways or strategies to select cases for analysis, e.g. by Flyvbjerg 
(2006: 230). He distinguishes between a random and an information-oriented 
based sampling. The most suited strategy depends on the main research aim. This 
research aspires to shed light on different governance processes that are dealing 
with the mobility transition, by focusing on actor network constellations and their 
interplay with the setting. A random sampling will thus not help us gather the 
specific and diverse information we are looking for. 
Several questions guide the direction in which to look for case studies. Which cases 
enable the study of a broad orgware agenda for the governance of mobility ? Is every 
initiating party, whether from business, civil, public or knowledge sector, even 
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successful in rearranging the governance of mobility? Who were the game changers? 
What can be the various roles and relations? In the last decade, two major threads 
emerged regarding governing mobility and rearranging the way to deal with mobility 
issues. First, in the mid-nineties the planning process of the large and complex 
infrastructure project Oosterweel Link started ( and is currently still ongoing) and 
has become a story of a diverse range of actors. Second, in 2015, the switch was 
made from “basic mobility” (supply-side oriented) towards “basic accessibility” 
(demand-side oriented). To implement this concept or transition, intergovernmental 
or regional mobility cooperations have been developed (public initiative), called pilot 
transport regions (vervoerregios). We included those two processes in our research. 
Where the cases gave rise, or referred to, other relevant examples, we selected 
them as well (snowball sampling). We ended up with three cases per major mobility 
storyline. Figure 18 illustrates the (chrono)logic of the cases (and sub-cases) and 
the way they are associated. 
In Section 2.3, we stated that governance is increasingly understood as the 
interplay between all kinds of actors; that it is no longer the sole responsibility 
of governmental actors. Therefore, it is interesting that all selected cases and 
subcases can be positioned in the quadruple helix to some extent (cf. Figure 17); 
a concept that is often presented as one of the ingredients for a “successful” 
transition; it proposes the combination and engagement in strategic partnerships 
of business, civil, public, and knowledge sector (cf. quadruple helix scheme by 
Carayannis and Campbell 2009). As governance is not the sole responsibility of 
governmental actors any longer, in addition, civil, business, and academic initiatives 
and developments gain importance. Therefore, we selected a large infrastructure 
project and several upcoming governance concepts or initiatives from various 
nature (civic, public, knowledge, and business). We are interested in exploring the 
differences between their strategies, and interaction with the setting, which results 
in their governance paths.
Chapter 5 deals with the rise of regional mobility cooperation in Flanders and the 
more recent establishment of transport regions. The roots for the transport region 
discussion were already present in the SLUIZO/MOZO story. But the concept only 
reached maturity years later, with the actual transport regions (Vervoerregios). 
The transport regions were established in a few pilots, of which Mechelen and 
Antwerp will be discussed in particular. Here and there, the setup of a marketplace 
for mobility was considered. Such a marketplace for mobility had earlier been 
materialized and implemented by De Verkeersonderneming (the VO) in Rotterdam. 
Therefore the VO was incorporated as a third case in chapter 6. Besides, in the case 
of the regional mobility cooperation, explicit reference was made to the VO. Chapter 
7 presents the history of the large infrastructure project of the Oosterweel Link. 
The governmental side (BAM) and the opposition side of the citizen movements are 
merged into one wicked story with many sub storylines or translation rounds. 
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Figure 18  Chronologic of the selected case studies their interrelations and the quadrant of the
quadruple helix in which they arose.
3.3
Data collection and analysis
The two-tiers approach proposes to reconstruct the cases, by focusing on the 
actors and the institutional context. To enable the case stories to become more 
clear and neutral, different information channels are mixed and mastered; personal 
perspectives and noise are filtered. In our case, this so-called triangulation 
requires combining insights from policy documents, the information retrieved 
from stakeholder interviews, and additional expert interviews for a more external 
perspective (Yin 2014). 
 
Since the cases belong to different storylines, also the data acquisition methods 
vary slightly (cf. overview in Table 1). Most data on governance, actor constella-
tions, and priorities were gathered through interviews. Interviewees were selected 
based on a short screening of reports or other documents and press coverage of 
the case. During the interviews reference was often made to other relevant actors 
to interview, so they were interviewed were possible as well (snowball sampling), 
We preferred unstructured interviews as we wanted to gather as much detail as 
possible. Besides, such interviews reveal the true priorities and focal points of the 
various relevant actors. What they consider more important is more prominent in the 
interview and transcript. However, during the interviews a set of minimum topics 
(guidelines) was to be covered; the order and length of the answers or story did not 
matter (cf. Yin 2014). The transcripts of the interviews can be retrieved from the 
author. 
The interviews were conducted to reconstruct the case’s history. Questions were 
introduced to get insights about the origins of the proposed project or governance 
innovation, about setting the agenda, building alliances, etc. We also asked about  
the weaknesses and opportunities of the alliances, and the roles of the actors. The 
questions were adjusted to fit the background of the specific interviewee to deliver 
as much information as possible. The order of the topics varied dependent on the 
flow of the conversation and the logical place to introduce them elegantly. The 
interviews were conceived as open non-structured interviews, so other questions, 
personal reflections or remarks were added here and there. Where relevant and 
possible, interviewees were asked about their presumed role or position in any of 
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the other cases that were included in our research. A list of the interviewees or 
involved persons and the specific questions and topics to be discussed is provided 
per case in Appendix 1. Those interviews were complemented by source analysis of 
project reports and minutes and (popular) press coverage. 
Sometimes, either interviewing was not possible13, because there was too little 
or even no response to individual interview proposals, or, conducting interviews 
would be too time-consuming. In that case, other ways were pursued: roundtable 
discussions, source analysis of parliamentary committee minutes. For instance, in 
the case of Oosterweel, interview proposals addressing the project management 
company were not responded14, and interviewing all relevant actors would be 
too time-consuming. Considering those aspects, the analysis was based on 
the parliamentary committee minutes of the project and its progress in the 
parliamentary commission of mobility and public works (Flemish Parliament). The 
advantages of these sources is the frequency and the level of detail of those reports. 
They do not only reflect what the discussions were about (focal points). But they 
also provided insights in the actors that were invited at certain points in history. 
The reports are transcribed and often detailed annual reports of the project or 
other annexes are added. These sources can thus be easily screened for actors and 
themes with specific software packages such as NVivo, to allow an objective data 
handling afterwards. The parliamentary committee minutes we selected and their 
distribution over time are listed in Table 15 (see appendix 2). Where it was possible 
to reveal even more details, which was the case with the Ringland initiative, an 
ethnographic approach was adopted. The Ringland movement provided me access 
to formal and informal meetings and meeting minutes, daily activities and (past 
and present) email correspondence. From the shadows, I could observe the daily 
Ringland tactics, how they dealt with the encountered challenges, how they 
answered the fierce “opponents” of their project, who they were planning to have a 
meeting with, the strategy that applied, and the topic the meeting would be about, 
and this on a daily basis; the Ringland actor network came to live.
The gathered and transcribed interview and source data were stored and processed 
in NVivo Qualitative Data Analysis Software; QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 11.  
This database environment allows a swift querying and data manipulation. 
While coding the transcript or text, the prevailing themes of discussion and the 
occurring actors in the case were respected. The themes of discussion focussed on 
complexity aspects as mentioned in earlier literature sections. How is the variety 
of actors dealth with, the opposition, the uncertain future, etc.? Aspects that relate 
to the technical, financial, procedural or juridical, social, organisational and time 
components of complexity. 
To examine the institutional context and the interplay with the actors, the 
translation process (cf. ANT) can be screened for windows of opportunity. In those 
13  within the limited time frame of the research
14  Besides, some actors have quit the case’s scene or the political scene in general, which 
makes it difficult to trace the actors in the first place. Sometimes, actors showed interest and 
tried to arrange an interview, but the actual meeting never took place, despite all the efforts (e.g. 
Intendant A. D’Hooghe, Governor C. Berx).
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moments necessary structural couplings are forged that are visible in the actor 
networks. Governance paths of actors become clear, and formal and informal 
changes in the conditions can be at the basis of those windows of opportunity.
3.4
Visualising the results 
3.4.1
Related work using social network analysis
Due to a personal predilection for maps and quantitative data, the case study 
research entails more than storytelling, a more “objective” materialisation was 
strived. Therefore, a social network analysis (SNA) approach has been settled for, 
because it allows both processing and mapping the qualitative data as if they were 
quantitative. Mapping the interactions between actors is a well-known method to 
study networks, and thus governance patterns (Klijn 2008). The regional differences 
in SNA research techniques and traditions have been discerned by Marcussen and 
Olsen (2007). In Europe, studying governance by use of SNA is rather rare. Instead, 
preference is given to more qualitative research-oriented methods like case studies 
and discourse analyses. In contrast, in the USA, social network analysis and other 
more quantitative methods prevail. Marcussen and Olsen (2007) argue that both 
traditions develop separately, with only few cross-references made to one another. 
But, that qualitative versus quantitative division misses the point, since more can 
be unravelled when both techniques are combined. 
Social network analysis and the concept of “network governance” is often referred 
to in the economic fields, in innovation literature, and in public management 
literature (Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997). Hence, also the visualisation of 
those networks remains in the business or management sphere: the governance 
of (micro)-economies (e.g. in Marín and Berkes 2010, Pryke 2005). Visualisations 
of business networks typically show the spatial clusters that have emerged. The 
results demonstrate to what extend the found network structure enables firm 
innovation and performance (e.g. Bringmann, Verhetsel et al. 2013). In transport or 
mobility planning, using social network analysis to enhance insights in governance 
constellations is rather unique to our knowledge. Here and there, network analysis 
might be performed for analysing the infrastructure network performance or 
hierarchy (i.a. El-adaway, Abotaleb, and Vechan 2016, Huang, Zhu et al. 2016, 
Schwanen 2017). But visualising the governance networks of mobility planning 
remains an extraordinary undertaking. We are convinced that visualising and 
materialising the networks can add objectivity to the cases. It can reveal interesting 
patterns for successful governance, regarding actors and conditions. 
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3.4.2
Social network analysis and mobility governance – visualising the 
translation process
3.4.2.1 Data acquisition: nodes and connections 
For each case the origins and leading actors are traced and the actor network is 
reconstructed over time (cf. ANT translation phases). Where the case is too complex 
a time line is provided, to get an overview of the conditions and institutional context. 
It should come as no surprise that an actor network diagram is the representation 
or visualisation of an actor in his network – or thus the actor network. The nodes 
in the network represent the key actors or key factors of the case. These nodes are 
connected to one another by ties, making it a network, or more precisely an actor 
network. Those ties cover a diverse range of relations (social, business, financial, 
etc.) that are specified in the documents or interviews on which our data is based.
Figure 19 illustrates how the gathered data is converted into actor network 
diagrams. After having conducted the interviews or having selected the relevant 
documents, the transcripts and/or documents are coded at different actors (nodes), 
and a list of the actual connections between the relevant actors is composed. The 
data was transferred from NVivo to a database environment (Access) for a proper 
data management and for attributing additional parameters to the coded actors and 
themes specifying the actors.
To maintain a proper overview on the governance constellations, the dataset is 
restricted to a selection of actors, specified for each case (based on frequency in 
sources or documents). The selection criteria and selected actors are elaborated 
in more detail per case in Appendix 2. For the simplicity of the final visualisation 
we merged the actors that obviously belong to the same “parent” organisation. 
Suppose there is information coded at the level of individual members of the 
parliamentary commission of mobility and public works (Flemish parliament). Those 
individuals will be merged under their common denominator: the commission of 
mobility and public works. 
The presence of network ties or connections between actors is based on the source 
or interview data, own experience, and common knowledge. E.g. member of the 
same political party have a presumed connection, people who worked for other 
people or organisations that are also in the diagram are also connected, etc. 
Note that the presence of a connection in the actor network diagram is always tied 
to the end-situation. This is also the case for the size of the displayed nodes (cf. 
centrality). A more dynamic mapping of the evolution of the actor networks over 
time would be interesting, but was not possible in this research for several reasons. 
First, No in-depth information on the specific number and intensity of connections 
between actors was available, nor was their variation over time; or at least not for 
the scale of these cases. Secondly, therefore it was also not very opportune to vary 
the actors over time and see how their position in the network changed and their 
centrality increased or decreased. Third, if the latter issues could be resolved, then 
a real dynamic mapping would still be a very time-consuming undertaking, as it 
would require connection matrixes for each year. Fourth, by reconstructing 
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Figure 19  Schematic overview of how the actor network diagram is generated.
– or deconstructing – the final15 situation, the actor network diagrams allowed a 
straightforward reading and showed how subnetworks rose and connected towards 
other subnetworks or actors. Hence, we are convinced that reconstructing the end 
situation still provides valid information with regard to our orgware agenda.
3.4.2.2 Data handling for visualisation
The actors and their connections (stored in the attribute “connections”) are 
converted into a connection matrix by a script run in VBA. After composing the  
connection matrix, and accounting for possible omitted connections by symmetrising  
the matrix (maxsym principle), a cross check is run in NVivo to estimate the intensity 
of the connections. For each (f)actor, the matrix coding query reveals the frequency 
that the (f)actor is coded together with all of the other (f)actors. This illustrates the 
strength or intensity of the connections. Afterwards, we still have to correct for the 
actors that have been coded together by coincidence,16 but do not have a relevant 
15  or most recent situations, in cases that are still developing
16  Because of time-efficiency, we coded the documents per paragraph, or even per section in 
case of large documents. This allowed us to cover more details in less time; the Oosterweel Link 
case documents, for instance, comprised more than 2000 pages in total.
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connection. Both matrices , i.e. the connection matrix and the coding query matrix, 
are combined in a resulting matrix, cf. Figure 19. This matrix lies at the basis of 
the actor network diagrams that were generated with the Ucinet-Netdraw social 
network analysis software package. Besides the straightforward user interface and 
swift visualisation, this software enables calculating centrality measures for each of 
the actors in the diagram (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson 2013). 
3.4.2.3 Fine-tuning the visualisations using attributes reflecting  
   our theoretical insights
The visualisations allow a diverse use of parameters for the shape, size, and colour 
of the actors (nodes), and for the intensity of the connection between the actors. 
A detailed overview of all actors per case and their corresponding attributes is 
listed in Appendix 2. The parameter legend is displayed in Figure 20, and exists of 
following components: 
Figure 20  Legend visualisation.
• Node size: the size of the actors varies according to their centrality value  
 (eigenvector17 centrality as calculated by Ucinet SNA software package).
• Node shape: the shape of the node reflects its type: niche, regime or landscape  
 actor. Based on transition management theories we interpreted the definitions  
 as follows, so that they become relevant for mapping the actors in our case  
 studies. 
 – Niche actors are innovations or novel actors that challenge the present  
  regime actors. They do not possess the means for decision-making, they  
  focus on agenda setting, and the influencing of policies.
17  The eigenvector centrality shows the popularity or well-connectedness of actors, in the sense 
that actors with a high eigenvector centrality are typically connected to other well-connected 
actors. It does not just focus on the amount of connections an actor has (i.e. degree centrality), 
but it also accounts for the amount of its neighbouring actors.
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 – Regime actors are rule-defining, they are setting out the main course of the  
  process and they manage the power and instruments.  
 – Landscape actors or factors are external to the project or process we  
  describe, but still can exert some influence. For instance governmental  
  actors at other levels also do have an indirect influence on the cases and can  
  as such be defined as landscape actors. 
• Node colour: the colour of the node mirrors its sector: business, civil, public,  
 knowledge actor. 
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4.1
Transport planning versus spatial development:  
a brief retrospective
For most part in the past mobility planning, from the 1940’s until the 1990’s, the 
planning process was in the hands of engineers, calculating and providing for the 
necessary (predicted) capacity. After the Second World War, the free movement 
of persons and goods was installed within Europe, after which an era of new 
large-scale infrastructure construction works started. Economic welfare was – and 
often is still – the leitmotif for constructing new infrastructures. 
the highway or infrastructure construction in general, serves as a vector of 
urbanization. (Ryckewaert 2012: 60) 
While there was neither an overarching spatial planning vision, nor a legal frame- 
work18, this vacuum was filled by infrastructure planning in Belgium. Road, rail, and 
water infrastructures mainly served “as an instrument of economic urbanization” 
(Ryckewaert 2012). At that time, transport planning dominated in relation to spatial 
planning. Spatial development patterns and “in-between cities” emerged as a 
result of the infrastructure planning (Ryckewaert 2012, Peleman 2010). Before, the 
construction of a fine-meshed railway network (Buurtspoorwegen) incentivised 
large-scale suburbanisation, as it allowed people to keep living in the countryside 
while working in the city agglomerations (De Decker 2011).
The trans-European networks projects and funds, that responded to the European 
welfare crisis in the mid-nineties, form a more recent example of this “vector for 
urbanization”. They had to facilitate the increasing flows of goods, people, energy, 
etc. The potential that these flows would bring dominated the value of the place 
itself; and thus how it was used and appropriated by locals. It was criticised that 
the spatial translation was no longer “the space of places” but instead “the space 
of flows”. In many projects this resulted in different planning scale-levels (global 
versus local) opposing one another (Albrechts and Coppens 2003). 
Since the first law on planning in 1962, the fundaments had been laid for the spatial 
planning discipline of today (Albrechts and Meuris 2000). Based on this law, the 
whole Belgian territory became covered by zoning plans, they destined the land 
to a specific land use function and associated development. Spatial planning was 
limited to the elaboration of binding sub-regional, local, and detailed zoning plans 
(i.e. Gewestplan, 1972). But the zoning plans did not reduce the housing sprawl 
that had already started before, as successive earlier infrastructure works, policy 
18 Except for the rather architectural urbanism tradition, that is often omitted in setting out the 
planning tradition. That tradition also has developed interesting concepts for urban development 
even on the scale of cities. However, the impact of those interventions on urban and spatial 
development was less than the large infrastructure works carried out by civil engineers (Boussauw 
and Boelens 2015). Unfortunately, that is why  not that many words are spent to the urbanist 
tradition and evolutions in this dissertation either.
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decisions and legal acts had been favouring suburban, and later, car-oriented 
development (De Meulder, Schreurs et al. 1999). 
Major spatial planning aims of the RSV include protecting the remaining open 
countryside, limiting the development of new infrastructure, optimizing the 
existing infrastructure and densifying urban areas and residential nuclei in 
the regional outskirts. These principles are nothing new in themselves, but 
they are a novelty when applied to Flanders. The desired spatial structure is 
totally contrary to the existing one. (De Meulder, Schreurs et al. 1999: 80). 
In 1997, planning adopted a more strategic way of thinking in the Spatial Structure 
Plan for Flanders (Ruimtelijk Structuurplan Vlaanderen, RSV), formulating a 
pro-active long-term vision to counteract urban sprawl and the fragmentation 
of the open space (cf. quote above). The planning concept of “deconcentrated 
clustering” was put forward, implying that the already spread out urban develop-
ments (deconcentrated) were preserved but resisted any further sprawl (clustering). 
In addition, building on the more communicative planning discourses at that time, 
it addressed the importance of involving a broad field of actors in the planning 
process (Albrechts, Healey, & Kunzmann, 2003). 
The Spatial Structure Plan for Flanders was soon to be followed by lower-level 
structure plans for the provinces and municipalities. The plan was considered 
ambitious and future-oriented, as it strived for a more sustainable spatial 
development. But after only a few years, the weak points of the plan became 
apparent. Several policy objectives “proved incompatible with the institutional 
context” that had been settled in previous decades (Boussauw and Boelens 2015: 
6). In addition, the collaborative planning process turned out to be very time-con-
suming. This was often counteracted by rushing through the procedures to get the 
plan approved. The RSV became a shadow of what it once had envisioned, cast by 
a rigid formal structure. Furthermore, from 1999, the disconnect between spatial 
planning processes and large-scale infrastructure projects (public works) became 
official, when in contrast to previous political legislations, the two policy fields now 
had their own minister (Boussauw and Boelens 2015). 
Another important evolution that came along with the structure planning was the 
decentralisation tendency going on in Flanders – as elsewhere (De Decker 2011, 
Lauwers and Gillis 2010). This led to the shift of the actual power from the regional 
administrative departments to the provincial branches. Regarding the portfolio 
of mobility, the decentralisation became apparent with the road categorisation 
(Lauwers and Gillis 2010). It is important however to distinguish between ownership 
and control or management over the infrastructure on the one hand, and the 
functional road categorisation on the other hand. The road infrastructure used to 
be in the hands of three authorities: the Flemish government, the provinces and 
the local municipalities. But after the debate on the core tasks between regional, 
provincial and municipal government levels (Kerntakendebat, between 2001 and 
2003) in accordance with the administrative agreement of 2003, the province have 
been transferring that responsibility to the other two government levels19. The 
19 By 2009 all major provincial roads were transferred to the Flemish government.
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corresponding management and exploitation associated with those authorities  
are, respectively, the Flemish Agency for Roads and Traffic (AWV), and the local 
municipalities themselves. 
The preparations for the first Mobility plan for Flanders started in 2001. Two 
years later, in 2003, the plan was approved20. It concentrated on accessibility with 
a particular focus on the economic competitive position of Flanders in Europe. 
Additionally, also the social and ecological pillar of mobility were considered. 
Sustainability was already adopted in the plan, but would receive much more 
attention in later plans.
The right to basic mobility21 had been initiated in 2003, guaranteeing a minimum 
public transport supply in even the most sprawled urban areas. At the same 
time, the prevailing spatial structure plan for Flanders proposed the concept 
of “deconcentrated clustering”, to resist further sprawl. Moreover the domain 
of spatial planning was dominated by lawyers and geographic planners, while 
the domain of mobility was dominated by the civil engineers in Flanders. Both 
disciplines followed their own path dependencies and acted apart from each other. 
They often even opposed each other, ignoring their interconnectedness. However, 
mobility policy itself did not follow a clear path either. On the one hand, the basic 
mobility decree and the concerning expenses expressed the focus on a qualitative 
public transport supply. But, on the other hand, tax benefits for company cars were 
about equally large22, and were even amongst the highest in the world (De Smet 
2014). Hence we could speak of a fragmented mobility policy, spanning different 
arena’s (or scale levels), that lacks a clear discourse and misses consistency. 
Furthermore a number of mandatory impact assessments and strategic advisory 
councils have been established around 2005, also as a consequence of the 
European Directives23 and standards that were established from the early 2000’s. 
But as these institutions and assessments have prolonged the planning processes 
to improve quality and to minimize externalities, more recently the tendency has 
been to bundle them again.  
20 http://www.mobielvlaanderen.be/pdf/mobiliteitsplan/beleidsvoornemens.pdf
21 The Basic Mobility decree, established in 2002 by the Flemish Government, guarantees a 
minimum mandatory public transport supply in residential areas. This minimum supply depends 
on or is proportional to the kind (and often size) of the involved residential area, distinguishing 
metropolitan areas, urban areas, suburban areas, smaller urban areas and rural areas. Each  
of these categories of urban development have clear set operational objectives for public 
transport regarding the distance to a transit hub, the frequency of the public services, etc. The 
implementation of this right on basis mobility started in 2002 and was expected to be finished  
in 2007. The public transport company (De Lijn) was appointed to carry out the project  
(http://www.mobielvlaanderen.be).
22 Data on public transport expenses for the regions retrieved from (Belgisch Staatsblad 2014, 
Service Public de Wallonnie 2014, Vlaams Parlement 2013) data on company cars tax advantages 
retrieved from (De Smet 2014)
23 For instance the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (Directive 2001/42/EC), 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (Directive 2011/92/EU) and several air quality 
directives (e.g. 2008/50/EC Directive on Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe).
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In 2004 for instance the Minaraad was founded; the advising council for the 
Flemish government concerning environmental and nature associated issues. This 
council was soon followed by the mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment 
reports (EIA, MER, milieu effecten rapportage) for large projects with potentially 
major externalities for the environment. In 2006, a mobility council for the Flemish 
government was established. Followed by the set out of an assessment specifically  
for mobility impacts, in 2009: the Mobility Impact Assessment (MIA, MOBER, 
mobiliteits effecten rapportage). Also the mobility test (mobiliteitstoets) became 
compulsory, a rather brief report that screens the potential mobility impact for the 
smaller mobility projects (http://www.mobielvlaanderen.be/). Nevertheless, all 
these new institutions and assessments have further formalised and extended the 
complexity of up-to-date and innovative space-mobile interventions. 
Since the millennium break, the sustainability concept became adopted in 
prevailing policy documents. At the European level that switch was made as well. 
Since the negative EC report on urban transport regarding the share in congestion 
costs (80%) and carbon emissions (14%), and because “urban areas accounted for 
60% of Europe’s population, but over 85% of its economic output” (May 2015: 3), the 
EU wanted to hold a stronger grip on the management of this urban transport in the 
transition towards a. Seeds for the Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans (SUMPs) were 
planted. It started with the EC 2009 Action Plan for Urban Transport, after which 
the SUMPS were further conceptualised, elaborated, and finally communicated 
in a guidance document in 2013. The guideline clearly stated that it was not the 
purpose of the SUMP concept to act as a one-size-fits-all solution to urban mobility 
planning. Instead, the approach strongly encouraged adaptions to the particular 
conditions of the member state and specific urban area (Wefering, Rupprecht et al. 
2013). The guidelines stressed the differences of the SUMPs with the traditional 
approach to urban more sustainable mobility, whereas the EU used to proclaim the 
subsidiarity principle in this matter (May 2015) transport planning (see Table 2). 
Most importantly, it is argued that SUMPs have “a greater emphasis on developing 
a long term vision, involving citizens and stakeholders throughout the process, 
specifying objectives, and setting targets related to all aspects of sustainability, 
and developing effective packages of measures, without undue emphasis on 
supply-side solutions” (May 2015: 4). However, it seems that when the SUMPs are 
translated into practice, the supply side is still much more (explicitly) elaborated 
than the demand side or traffic demand-curbing measures in many cases. 
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Table 2  Differences between traditional transport plans and SUMPs. 
Source: Rupprecht Consult (2012)
The switch to a sustainability adopting approach was also translated to the regional 
level, to Flanders (Belgium). In 2009, the decree on mobility policy (Mobiliteits- 
decreet) was established to set the mission, principles, and objectives of mobility 
plans at all governmental levels: from regional to local, and inter-municipal. The  
two most important principles in developing such plans were respecting the 
STOP-principle (stappers, trappers, openbaar vervoer, particuliere wagen; 
pedestrians, cyclists, public transport, private cars), and adopting a participatory 
approach (Vlaamse Overheid 2009). The five strategic objectives that were incorpo-
rated covered the sustainability triple P (People, Planet, Profit): the accessibility 
of the economic nodes and gateways, selective accessibility for everyone (social 
concern), traffic safety, liveability, and the environmental quality and nature. The 
decree also demanded alignment with other associated policy plans and documents 
(at least with the spatial, environmental and water plans). But in absence of a 
substantial accordance with the spatial structure plan for Flanders, both the 
mobility polity council (MORA), and the strategic advice council for spatial planning 
and heritage (SARO), issued a negative opinion on the draft version of the new 
Regional Mobility Plan. As such the draft mobility plan from 2014 was not approved 
by the Flemish government, but was translated into the mobility policy.
In Flanders, a lot of municipal or local mobility plans (LMPs) have been developed 
since 1998 and have undergone a streamlining as well. The earlier mentioned decree 
on mobility policy represented an administrative simplification in the relationship 
between the municipality and the governments. Whereas in the previous covenant  
policy, separate start and project notes were required with each of the 
governmental partners, this is now simplified to one agreement in order to increase 
efficiency in the transition towards a more sustainable mobility. The decree also 
established several intergovernmental platforms, such as the municipal guidance 
T r a dit ion a l  T r a n s por t  P la n s S u s t a in a ble  U r ba n  M obi l i t y P la n
Often short-term perspective without a 
strategic vision
S t r a t eg ic  lev el  /  v is ion
Including a long-term / strategic vision 
with a time horizon of 20-30 years
Usually focus on particular city G eog r a ph ic  s c ope
Functional city; cooperation of city with 
neighbouring authorities essential
Limited input from operators and other 
local partners, not a mandatory 
characteristic
L ev el  of  pu bl ic  in v olv emen t
High, citizen and stakeholder involvement 
an essential characteristic
Not a mandatory consideration S u s t a in a bi l i t y
Balancing social equity, environmental 
quality and economic development
Low, transport and infrastructure focus S ec t or  in t eg r a t ion
Integration of practices and policies 
between policy sectors (environment, land-
use, social inclusion, etc.)
Usually not mandatory to cooperate 
between authority levels I n s t i t u t ion a l  c ooper a t ion
Integration between authority levels (e.g. 
district, municipality, agglomeration, 
region)
Often missing or focussing on broad 
objectives
M on it or in g  a n d ev a lu a t ion
Focus on the achievement of measurable 
targets and outcomes (=impacts)
Historic emphasis on road schemes and 
infrastructure development
T h ema t ic  f oc u s
Decisive shift in favour of measures to 
encourage public transport, walking and 
cycling and beyond (quality of public space, 
land-use, etc.)
Not considered Cos t  in t er n a l is a t ion
Review of transport costs and benefits 
also across policy sectors
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committee (GBC, Gemeengelijke Begeleidingscommissie)24, and the regional mobility 
commission25 (RMC, Regionale Mobiliteitscommissie). The latter. for coordination 
between all parties and scale levels and for quality control and monitoring. 
These LMPs typically hold sustainability objectives, public involvement, and 
agreements with all the higher transport and traffic authorities. The mobility plan 
has to be approved by the higher transport authorities, i.e. the public transport 
provider (vervoersmaatschappij De Lijn) and the Agency for Roads and Traffic 
(Agentschap Wegen en Verkeer, AWV). Consequently the local mobility plan complies 
with the higher-level mobility plans. Besides, municipalities can only obtain funding 
from higher authorities for mobility projects if the broader vision on mobility is 
explicated in a local mobility plan. Following a study carried out for the state-of-
the-art sustainable urban mobility plans, in 2012, 90% of the Flemish municipalities 
had an approved LMP. That is quite a high percentage compared to other European 
countries (Rupprecht Consult, 2012). Figure 21 shows that, in 2010, most of the 
municipalities had either an approved LMP (green colours), were preparing an 
actualisation of the former one (which still formed the legal basis), or were drawing 
up a new one (pale colour in the figure). Only a few municipalities did not have 
an approved LMP (shown in red). This number has further been reduced to seven 
percent of the municipalities (http://www.mobielvlaanderen.be/mobiliteitsbeleid). 
Sustainability principles were translated at different governmental levels. Many 
urban regions and municipalities adopted the SUMP approach in their urban 
transport planning frameworks, when providing their regional or local mobility 
plans. In Flanders, there was a strong link between the establishment of such local 
mobility plans and financial support (from higher authorities for mobility projects), 
most Flemish municipalities had an approved mobility plan. Because of that, 
Flanders’ mobility governance was considered to be amongst the most well- 
organised in Europe (May 2015, Rupprecht Consult 2012). 
However, this kind of mobility planning has its limiting aspects. First, the SUMPs 
should not be considered as fixed procedures, nor as standard plans. But the 
framework becomes highly formalised after being translated to the regional and 
local level. Although the planning approach left some room for new actors or 
initiatives, this was not translated into practice. Altering interest and innovative 
ideas have not found their way into the mobility debate. Most often, the usual 
suspects, mostly traditional civil society or intermediary organisations, are involved 
in the planning procedures that feed mobility policy. The mobility planning therefore 
is threatened by a lock-in regarding the planning procedures and involved actors. 
While much can be expected from new actors in a context of budget cuts and 
phasing out the welfare state. Second, local mobility plans can only deal with 
24  GBC: a multidisciplinary and cross-policy platform in which the involved partners identify the 
main challenges and seek solutions for those. They are responsible for the setup, the evaluation 
and monitoring of the mobility plans and they support the municipalities in their search for a more 
sustainable mobility. Representatives of the municipality, DMOW, De Lijn, the road authority and 
the initiating party take part in the GBC.
25  RMC replaced the previous provincial audit committee (PAC, Provinciale Auditcommissie)
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Figure 21  Status of Local Mobility Plans in 2010. Source: DMOW, 2013.
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mobility problems on the municipal territory. Some municipalities, predominantly 
in the direct vicinity of cities, often encounter cross-border mobility issues, such 
as transit traffic problems and the debates on P+R locations. For these issues an 
inter-municipal or inter-governmental cooperation is more appropriate; the limited 
workforces cannot only be clustered, but also cross-border mobility issues can 
be tackled. Those intermediary levels are supported by the mobility policy decree, 
but, with a few exceptions, have not found their way into practice. Moreover, 
municipalities together can sometimes create enough critical mass to enforce new 
public transport services from the public transport provider. But not many of such 
cooperation or governance partnerships have been successfully and sustainably 
established hitherto. Third, even within the most well-established transport 
planning frameworks according to the SUMP principles, “most countries fail to 
meet all the requirements” (cf. Table 2). Amongst the barriers are: a strong procar 
and proinfrastructure lobby, the lack of mutual engagement between transport or 
mobility planning and land use planning, and of an intensive citizen and stakeholder 
involvement, an inadequate coordination between governmental departments and 
tiers, and conservative politics (May 2015, Rupprecht Consult 2012).
4.2
More recent efforts in spatial and transport  
planning
Returning to the evolutions in spatial planning, in 2011, a new initiative was 
started to update and rethink the current spatial structure plan (RSV). The update 
would eventually result in the Spatial Policy Plan for Flanders (Beleidsplan Ruimte 
Vlaanderen, BRV). It was the start of a laborious planning trajectory that roughly 
followed the European administrative course of green papers and white papers. 
Nevertheless it missed the opportunity to reconnect with the current real world 
spatial developments. According to some, the co-production of this process 
happened among the vested (often paid) actors and experts and mainly addressed 
self-fulfilling themes. Often those papers were accompanied by vague concepts, 
which do not ease quantitative research support. Accordingly, salvation was sought 
in qualitative techniques. Hence, monitoring the implementation progress became 
increasingly difficult. 
Even before the BRV has come into being, some already argue that the “BRV process 
seems to have evolved into a highly introspective endeavour working on a reality 
that is constructed by a select group of involved actors, and that bypasses spatial 
and infrastructural developments in daily practice altogether” (Boussauw and 
Boelens 2015: 1389). 
On the first of March 2015, the decree on complex projects26 came into effect. 
The Flemish government wanted to bring about a new and more dynamic way of 
planning. To respond to the complex reality that planning processes encounter 
26 Complex projects are often large infrastructure projects, but not always; they can also include 
urban renewal projects.
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these days, the decree aimed to streamline the LIP planning processes and focused 
on building support. The new complex projects approach integrated the former 
two separate procedures: (1) for changes made to the legal land use (function) as 
defined by the zonation, reflected in drawing up a spatial implementation plan 
(RUP, ruimtelijke uitvoeringsplan), and (2) to get the necessary permits, namely 
the building and the environmental permit, that have recently been integrated 
in one environmental permit or “omgevingsvergunning”. By giving more weight to 
interaction, between a diverse range of stakeholders and interest groups in the 
planning process, a smoother and more broadly supported implementation of the 
projects is strived for. In the new complex projects approach, the participatory 
trajectory is much more elaborated in both formal and informal way, and continues 
throughout the whole planning process. The rough outline of the complex project 
process according to the new approach is illustrated in Figure 22. The complex 
planning approach is characterised by the following phases: 
 (0) Exploratory phase (start decision)
 (1) Study phase (decision on preference)
 (2) Development phase (project decision)
 (3) Implementation phase 
In the introductory phase, project managers of complex projects explore the most 
beneficial approach to get their plans implemented; this phase is the prelude to the 
complex approach, as project managers can still choose to follow the old procedure; 
The new “complex” procedure is optional. But, because by some, the legal certainty 
is disputed by the start of the project, or because the additional costs of the new 
approach are considered too high, many of the current strategic or complex projects 
still opt for the old (regular) procedure27. The new complex projects procedure is 
estimated to take minimum 4.5 years in total, which is often longer than the old 
approach, and thus an additional reason to opt for the old approach. 
When complex projects do proceed according to this new complex approach, they 
follow the rough outline that is sketched in Figure 22. The actual first phase is 
the study phase, in which the problem definition is elaborated and the impacts 
and alternatives are compiled into an inventory. The first phase concludes by 
explicating the project agenda and final problem definition in a start decision note 
(Startbesluit). In the second phase, various options to respond to the formulated 
problems are evaluated based on multiple criteria elaborated as a study of alterna-
tives (Alternatieven onderzoeksnota, AON). This report can be compared to an 
environmental impact assessment (plan-MER) and is typically associated with a 
formal consultation and feedback round. After that, a preferred option is decided 
(Voorkeursbesluit). The project increasingly takes shape, now that the preferential 
option can be elaborated and further designed in the development phase. In that 
phase, a project assessment (Project onderzoeksnota, PON) is carried out analysing 
the specific impact and effects of the implementation. It can be compared with the 
project environmental assessment of the old approach (projectMER), but it includes 
more than just the environmental impact (socio-economic, mobility, etc.). On the 
27 The preliminary process, often takes 9 months, after which in almost half of the cases the 
regular procedure is still chosen
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one hand, this assessment describes the project and the accompanying measures 
included in the decision on preference. On the other hand, this note determines 
what still needs to be investigated: which alternatives should reasonably be 
examined at the implementation level and how the effects of the project, accompa-
nying measures and reasonable alternatives will be examined and assessed in the 
light of the project decision to be taken. After a formal consultation and feedback 
from several advisory councils or public authorities, the project decision is approved 
and the implementation of the project can start conform that formal decision. At 
the end of the development phase, the integrated legal framework is set and the 
environmental permit (Omgevingsvergunning) is granted. 
Since the Decree came into force, 10 projects have been launched, including not 
only infrastructural, but also urban development projects. Most of these projects 
are still in the exploratory phase, or have just entered the study phase28.
Although the interactive and informal side of the new complex project procedure 
is emphasised, many experts remain somewhat sceptical about the complex 
28 D. Stevens (Departement Omgeving), personal communication, 16/02/2017 and 26/02/2018.
Figure 22  Generic phases of the complex projects planning approach in Flanders.
Source: based on https://rsv.ruimtevlaanderen.be.
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projects approach, especially at the regional level. The new procedure shows good 
intentions and is certainly an improvement compared to the previous instruments, 
especially regarding the organisation of participation (i.e. on a more continuous 
basis in the new approach). Though, some consider it as a new template, in which 
complexity is reduced to a delineated process with a clear phasing from a still rather 
rational-technical perspective. The large complex projects on the regional level 
often involve political navigation, in which the fragmentation of Flemish projects 
becomes clear, and party politics exert pressure as well. As such, the criticism is 
that there is hardly room for the process to run its own course29. However, to be able 
to evaluate this new strategy, we have to wait until the first complex projects reach 
a project decision. 
Another important switch can be situated at the end of 2015, when the Flemish 
government decided to replace Basic Mobility by the concept of “Basic Accessi-
bility”, to enhance a more integrated mobility planning approach. This was impeded 
by the right to basic mobility before; because of the rigid conditions that had to be 
fulfilled, public transport providers developed independently (rail versus buses and 
trams, regardless of bicycle or other collective or shared mobility initiatives). But 
Basic Mobility has not lead to a multimodal integration, as the separate modes are 
not adjusted to one another at all. 
The former basic mobility paradigm ensured a minimum level of public transport 
service supply. It stemmed from a supply-side oriented approach. But the cost-ef-
fectiveness of Basic Mobility was poor. Particularly because it did not address the 
(much more) specific travel demand. Hence, many smaller-scale initiatives arose, to 
respond to this demand.
 – In 2006, the ‘Commuter Fund’ (Pendelfonds) was established to make  
  commuting more sustainable. It subsidised specific (collective ) commuting  
  initiatives between employer and employees. 
 – Several municipalities launched a system of taxi cheques to fill in the  
  missing individual transport needs. 
 – Additional efforts were undertaken to adapt the services to the needs of  
  disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility. Not only the national  
  railway NMBS, but also the provincial mobility centres are targeted for  
  adapted transport services (i. e. Mobiliteitscentrale Aangepast Vervoer, MAV).
Those additional initiatives show that the focus on supply-side measures was not 
sufficient and the already costly Basic Mobility still required extra investments 
to cover the travel needs. In the past, inter-municipal mobility issues had already 
raised the need for inter-municipal and intergovernmental cooperation: Regionet 
Leuven, C-AR by IGEMO; not to mention the earlier MOZO pilot. In addition, De 
Lijn commissioned several studies to analyse its future operational network, and 
elaborate several scenarios (study by Deloitte and TML). As such, De Lijn aspired to 
concentrate their resources on and optimise their services in the core network. 
29 F. De Rynck, personal communication, 10/02/2017; T. Wassenberg, personal communication, 
24/03/2017.
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The Basic Accessibility concept was to be implemented in transport regions 
(Vervoerregio’s). Those transport regions would be the new governance constellation 
or model to integrate all transport modes and allow the top-down decisions to 
be complemented by decision from the bottom-up (Weyts 2016). Combi-mobility 
became a keyword in the new approach (i.e. often used in policy circles and papers). 
It referred to the diverse and situational interventions to respond more adequately 
to the region-specific travel demand and that aligns different modes (for first 
and last miles). The shift was initiated towards smart (soft) measures that would 
optimise the present infrastructural capacity and stimulate a mobility behavioural 
change. As such, governing mobility could evolve cautiously beyond the plan, as 
the first attempts had been made towards more adaptive governance (or mobility 
orgware).
The new paradigm raised hopes to scale back the fragmented urban development, 
by reducing the benefits for suburban lifestyles as we know them today. 
Furthermore, the transport regions would monitor and evaluate the cooperation 
process and progress, and were considered as a permanent body for governing 
mobility. To experiment with these new forms of cooperation, an “exemption 
decree” (decreet regelluw kader, 8 July 2016) was necessarily established in these 
pilot zones, since public transport services are officially still the monopoly of De 
Lijn. 
Within the transport regions, a mode-independent, local, mobility 
management is organised. The transport region is responsible for bottom-up 
monitoring, control and evaluation of Basic Accessibility. The transport 
region enjoys a great deal of freedom to fill in the Basic Accessibility for their 
region from the bottom-up, as a compliment to the top-down defined core 
network. (translated from Dutch, Weyts 2017: 2)
The first demarcations of the transport regions were stipulated in the passenger 
transport decree (Ministerie van de Vlaamse gemeenschap 2001). Thirteen 
transport regions (vervoersgebieden) were identified to effectively organise the 
public transport system. Those zones corresponded with the 13 major cities 
and their hinterland. However, in the context of Basic Accessibility, those first 
demarcations were thoroughly revised and adapted so that they could account for 
existing relevant intergovernmental cooperation and specific regional challenges. 
Correspondingly, a new zonation was proposed. During the two years, however, 
some municipalities still changed from one transport region to another. Eventually, 
the governors of the provinces were addressed to discuss and decide the final 
constellation in close consultation with the municipalities. The resulting transport 
region division is represented in . 
Initially, three pilots30 for basic accessibility were established as intergovernmental 
cooperations, called transport regions (Vervoerregio’s). These transport regions 
were based on more or less the same organisational structure and shared the same 
main targets. The organisational structure is centred around the (political) transport 
30  Later, as a result from the Future Covenant in March 2017, a fourth pilot transport region was 
established in Antwerp. This will be described in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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region council (vervoerregioraad) that takes the final (and political) decisions.  
A work group or administrative transport region council comprising officials from 
all municipalities and from the Flemish and provincial administrations discusses, 
analyses, and elaborates the travel demands in the region. They work towards a 
content-specific implementation of Basic Accessibility in the region. Based on their 
work, the transport region council can decide. Furthermore, a sounding board is 
consulted to acquire feedback from civil society actors and citizen movements. 
Because the above mentioned organisational structure is minimal, it can thus be 
adjusted and extended with other meetings, panels, etc., if necessary or useful.
After a two-year pilot period (December 2017)31, transport regions should have 
developed a regional transport plan (regionaal vervoersplan) that is approved by all 
participating local and regional governments. The ambition was expressed to extend 
this transport plan to a mobility plan (including all transport modes) (Weyts 2017). 
This is necessary to further enhance ‘combi-mobility’, which takes into account 
the first and last miles as well. But apart from the transport region of Antwerp, the 
elaboration of a fully-fledged regional mobility plan will be for the coming years, as 
discussing and elaborating a regional transport plan is very time consuming. 
Recently, the duration of the pilot transport regions has been extended till 31 March 
2018. The exemption decree for public transport experiments in the pilots has been 
stretched till the end of March 2019. In 2018, the preparations were started for 
the kick-off of the other transport regions in the whole Flemish region, and for the 
definitive legal framework replacing the decree on passenger transport (Decreet 
personenvervoer, 2001) and the temporarily exemption decree. By 2020, the new 
transport networks and demand specific services should be operational everywhere. 
31 This timing will be prolonged till the end of March 2019 
Figure 23  (top) Initial division in transport regions 2001; (Bottom) demarcation of transport
regions at the end of 2017. Source: DMOW
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This is consistent with the Flemish government’s mission (to conform with 
EU-Directive) to have a free public transport service market by 2020, even for the 
core network services. In several pilots, the progress of the transport plans is also 
affected by the forthcoming elections; the approval of some of the final transport 
plans are postponed till after the elections of 2018.
The current methodology used to draw up the transport plan differs slightly between 
the various pilot projects, but is based on the following principles: 
 – Identifying the supply side (existing public transport lines, services adapted  
  to transport, etc.)
 – Mapping the missing links and ‘white spots 
 – Making an inventory of the attraction poles, transport magnets and transport  
  hubs.
 – Developing a core, a supplementary, and a customised transport network
 – Looking for overlap between attraction poles, transport magnets and  
  transport nodes to decide and draw the core network. 
 – Analysing and aligning the core network, the complementary network, and  
  customised transport. 
 – Awaiting the advice from the transport regional council and adjusting the  
  plan accordingly. 
 – Approval of the regional transport plan by the transport region council. 
Though the focus is not solely on public transport services, change will still be most 
noticeable in public transport. Where De Lijn had the monopoly on providing public 
transport in Flanders, this changes in the pilot transport regions. The basic accessi-
bility concept divides the public transport services in 4 main levels, or operational 
networks: (0) the train network (treinnet), (1) the core network (kernnet), (2) the 
supplementary network (aanvullend net), and (3) the customised transport (vervoer 
op maat). All of those networks were previously managed on the national (railway 
NMBS) or regional (Flemish) scale (public transport De Lijn). What changes for the 
pilot transport regions then? The transport regions will be able to manage the 2nd 
and 3rd network themselves. But for developing and aligning their scheme with the 
higher networks, they still depend on the public transport company (De Lijn) and the 
national railway service (NMBS).
Where does the money come from? Before, the municipalities in the transport 
region paid De Lijn to operate in those specific service networks (supplementary 
network and customised transport, like dial-a-bus services and specific shuttles, 
see  and ). In case of the transport region pilots, they do not spend that money on 
De Lijn anymore, but the transport region council decides what and how to organise 
those networks; how to merge them to each other, and to the higher transport 
networks. This is consistent with the Flemish government’s mission (to conform 
with EU-Directive) to have a free public transport service market by 2020, even for 
the core network services. 
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Table 3  Exploitation costs of De Lijn for the customised transport. Source: Weyts (2017)
 
Table 4  Exploitation costs of De Lijn for the core and supplementary network. 
Source: Weyts (2017)
Only looking at the total exploitation costs illustrates that De Lijn invested most 
in the core network, closely followed by the investments in the supplementary 
network, but leaving those in the customised transport far behind. In contrast, 
in Mechelen the investment in the supplementary network (2nd layer) is 4 million 
euros higher than the budget for the core network (1st layer) according to Table 
4. In the pilot Westhoek, De Lijn not only invests by far the least, but also the 
customised transport (4th layer) costs more than the supplementary network (3th 
layer). This table is proof of the very different existing regional public transport 
infrastructure and the diverse regional-specific transport demands. The budget 
that can be used for alternative travel projects32 can be derived from the sum 
spent in the supplementary network and the customised transport: 16.610 million 
euros. Nevertheless, these budgets are only of indicative value and do not cover 
all costs. For instance, many municipalities or organisations coordinate some kind 
of arranged specific transport themselves and cover the costs for these specific 
demands. Those costs should thus also be integrated in the transport regions.
32  other than interventions from De Lijn
Cu s t omis ed t r a n s por t  D e L i jn k €
VAV Operators 70,242
Coordination VAV 8,649
VAV Operators 21,290
Taxi Operators 868
Total 101,049
k €   C or e  N e t w or k
S u p p le me n t a r y  
n e t w or k
C u s t omi s e d  
t r a n s p or t *
Total
Mechelen 11,632 15,543 1,076 27,175
Aalst 11,804 5,797 1,325 17,601
Westhoek 5,336 3,437 4,710 8,773
Total exploitation 28,772 24,777 7,111 53,549
* Customised transport: including demand-dependent transport (Vraagafhankelijk vervoer, VAV) and taxi 
transport (organised or commissioned by De Lijn),  not including student transport; parameters from 2016.
- Available budget: parameters as is 2015, except for customised transport
- Excluding depreciation costs of rolling stock and PPP maintenance component
- Excluding overhead costs
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4.3
Conclusions
The overview illustrates that the disconnect between spatial planning and mobility 
or infrastructure planning is deep-rooted, and that actually addressing the 
mobility orgware, or thus the organisational matter, lags behind. Policy domains 
and associated plans did not connect to each other. The collaborative process 
of updating the RSV started in 2011 and has – at the moment of writing this 
dissertation – only resulted in a Green Paper (2011) and a white paper (end of 2016). 
An actually approved Spatial Policy Plan for Flanders has not yet seen the light. 
The same can be said for the regional mobility plan. The updating process had been 
started around 2010. By the end of 2013, the draft of the regional mobility plan had 
provisionally been approved by the Flemish government. But for the final version, 
more integration with the Spatial Policy Plan and the Flemish Climate Policy Plan 
(Vlaams Klimaatbeleid) was necessary according to several participation rounds and 
advisory councils (i.a. MORA and Flemish Parliament).
We could say that an orgware attempt is in its infancy with the Basic Accessibility 
concept implemented by the transport regions and transport region councils. How 
do those innovations contribute to the mobility transition and which challenges 
remain? To answer that question, we dig deeper into the mobility orgware in the 
next chapters. By conducting case studies we try to gather evidence to answer our 
central research question: What can an orgware agenda add to hard- and software 
solutions tackling complex mobility issues?
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In the previous chapter, we reviewed the mobility planning tradition, and its 
relation to spatial planning, and we discussed the recent evolutions of the mobility 
planning tradition in Flanders. We focused on the major developments that are 
relevant for our orgware agenda. As such, we detected the early roots for the 
disconnect between spatial planning and mobility in Flanders. But we also saw the 
governance approaches develop over time, accompanied by their changing planning 
instruments and decrees. We selected two major threads to shine our light on in this 
dissertation: the roots for regional mobility cooperation (cf. transport regions) and 
the implementation and streamlining of large infrastructure processes. We try to 
unravel how they influenced the case-specific orgware, and where the opportunities 
lie for improvement. 
In this chapter we begin our case study approach with two cases that engaged with 
setting up a regional cooperation for mobility: the SLUIZO/MOZO case, and the 
regional cooperation in Mechelen. We deconstruct the actor networks. Following 
sub questions are answered. How was the actor network of the inter-municipal 
mobility platform developed or ‘translated’ over time? Where there decisive 
moments in which the conditions changed the course of the translation process? 
Which governance strategies were applied?
5.1
Unravelling the SLUIZO/MOZO orgware
In the aftermath of implementing the Masterplan 2020 for Antwerp, discontentment 
arose concerning the (non-) governance of mobility in the southeast of the Antwerp 
region. The local mayors urged for specific actions in their region as well, in contrast 
to the projects and support that city of Antwerp got. A more integrated mobility 
vision for the region was necessary to counteract the present mobility malaise. Their 
joint efforts resulted in a mobility study of the region (SLUIZO study), and finally the 
launch of an inter-governmental mobility platform for the region, i.e. the later MOZO 
platform. Accordingly, a permanent further consultation, evaluation, and monitoring 
of the more integrated mobility problems across these municipalities would be 
guaranteed. That is the SLUIZO/MOZO story in a nutshell. But how did this story, 
and respective actor networks actually associate? To answer this, we visualise and 
deconstruct the case-specific actor network. 
5.1.1
Problematisation
Figure 24 reveals the actual problematisation phase of the MOZO project. In the 
southeast of Antwerp, discontentment arose as tangible infrastructure measures 
in the region lacked, especially compared to the city of Antwerp, that got all the 
attention. But the actual straw that broke the camel’s back was the increasing 
transit traffic. It was the trigger to join efforts, or thus the obligatory passage point. 
Some municipalities in the region indicated the transit traffic as problematic or  
even dramatic for the accessibility, safety, and liveability in the region. Such 
inter-municipal issues could not be met within local mobility plans as those were 
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tied to the municipal territory. As some municipalities took measures that were not 
approved by neighbouring municipalities, politics were never far away. Mortsel, for 
instance, governed by a green mayor, took a controversial initiative. The municipality 
reduced the car capacity in the centre in favour of public transport, and liveability 
and safety interventions. Therefore, Mortsel was regarded as the black sheep, 
passing on the transit traffic problems to neighbouring municipalities (e.g. Borsbeek 
and Edegem). Furthermore, the municipal administrations reported a lack of time 
and budget to carry out inter-municipal strategic planning studies and processes. 
Those municipalities were rather small and since they had little primary roads on 
their territory, the Flemish Agency for Roads and Traffic (AWV) could not intervene; 
the agency focuses on its own management responsibilities that includes the 
primary road network. To get the necessary attention for the urgent mobility malaise 
in the region some municipalities joined forces and addressed their issues to the 
Flemish government (Arckus 2007). As a result, a study was carried out to analyse 
the needs of the region and the impact of transit traffic on the local transport 
network (SLUIZO33-study). 
Figure 24  Reconstruction of the SLUIZO actor network diagram before 2007.
33  SLUIZO (SLUIpverkeer ZuidOost Antwerpen): study analysing the transit traffic issues in the 
south-eastern fringe of Antwerp
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Figure 25  Actor network diagram SLUIZO in 2007, the municipalities’ joint efforts.
Figure 26  Reconstruction of the SLUIZO/MOZO actor network diagram, the hesitant start of the
mobility platform at the end of 2008.
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5.1.2
Interessement – discovering the actual problem
The initial incentive for further action arose from the bottom-up. A few dissatisfied 
mayors in the southern fringe of Antwerp addressed the Flemish government for 
a solution. They convinced other municipalities to join forces. The actor network 
around the theme of transit traffic in the southeast of Antwerp grew (see Figure 25). 
Eventually, the following municipalities engaged in the study process: Aartselaar, 
Boechout, Borsbeek, Edegem, Hove, Kontich, Mortsel, Ranst, Wijnegem and 
Wommelgem. Later on also the municipality of Zandhoven got involved in the 
project. 
At first it was unclear whether the solution should be a kind of platform or whether 
some further research was needed. The minister decided that a study, mapping and 
analysing the mobility issues in the Antwerp region, would be beneficial to objectify 
the political mobility debate. Also, the transit traffic was not specified. So, in order 
to adequately address the problem, a proper analysis of these traffic flows and a 
clear problem definition was required. Consequently, a study process was launched 
making an inventory of the issues in the region together with the municipalities and 
Flemish administrations; the SLUIZO study.
Figure 27 and Figure 28 illustrate the road infrastructure network of the study area. 
Surprisingly, there is no tangential network connecting or crossing the study case 
area. Hence, the municipalities were convinced that congestion on the primary road 
infrastructure (from Antwerp to Brussels and to the East, and vice versa) caused 
a transit traffic flow through the region and its municipal cores. The perceived 
problem to solve appeared to be that of transit traffic. 
Figure 27  Situation and road infrastructure within the SLUIZO study area. Source: Google Earth,
2015, https://www.google.be/maps/.
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Figure 28  Tangential road network in the SLUIZO region according to level (from primary: I; to 
local: III) and location with respect to residential area (hatch). Source: Arckus (2007: 105, figure 22).
When the municipalities first came together for the SLUIZO study, they stated that 
the project could not just result in a new study. They proposed a roundup of the 
already ‘extensive’ existing literature and research material on mobility for the 
area34. That perceived body of existing mobility literature appeared to be limited for 
the specific SLUIZO region and issue of “transit traffic”. As the study budget did not 
allow much new analysis, the SLUIZO study therefore focused on traffic flows within 
the area and on the public transport supply. The interactions or travel patterns 
within the SLUIZO area perceived as transit traffic are shown in Figure 29.
In defining the problem it became apparent that the participating municipalities had 
different perceptions of transit traffic. Some municipalities took the traffic from 
neighbouring municipalities into account as transit traffic of their own territory. 
Putting together all these perceptions, the actual issue to tackle appeared to be the 
lack of a carrying (tangential) road network for in- and outgoing traffic in the study 
case area. The congestion on highways and primary roads, and the lack of transit 
flow on this primary road network was in fact the real cause of the problems in this 
area. The initial SLUIZO study on transit traffic became the MOZO project, thus 
incorporating the broader mobility picture of the area, and resulting in the MOZO 
platform (Arckus 2007). 
34 Note that such studies are in fact secondary sources. They are not conducted for the same 
purpose, they may carry a lot of information, however this is not direct applicable to the SLUIZO 
study area. So mainly secondary sources are useful, but they are often not sufficient.
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Figure 30  Overview of infrastructural clusters that need adaptation. 
Source: Arckus (2007: 59, figure 16)
Figure 29  Internal travel patterns from municipalities within the SLUIZO area, often perceived as
transit traffic. Source: Arckus (2007: 51, figure 14).
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The Arckus consultancy group conducted the SLUIZO study. They followed a 
consultation structure at three levels. The first level, or the research track, existed 
of the consultancy leading the project (Arckus). The second comprised the policy 
preparation and the more technical assistance, and was named the project group 
(in which people from local and supra-local administrations took part). The third 
track included the steering group, which was rather political. This level carried out 
the final choices for implementation. Between the three planning tracks a lot of 
interaction was organised in the form of workshops and consultations. Moreover 
it was crucial that the tracks would co-evolve towards a solution or a consensus 
(Arckus 2007: 17-19).
In the first phase, the mobility literature on the concerned area was analysed by 
the research group to gain an overview of the available research in the southeast of 
Antwerp. For the concrete problem definition in the area, the SLUIZO study took into 
account both bottom-up and top-down approaches. The municipalities listed the 
local traffic difficulties, while the Flemish administration indicated the bottlenecks 
on the primary and secondary roads. This resulted in a problem tree, illustrated 
for the infrastructural part in Figure 31 (Arckus 2007). Merging both perspectives 
revealed that transit traffic was not the actual cause of the mobility issues. Instead, 
the congested traffic on the principal road network and the lack of a tangential 
secondary road network caused the real mobility problems. 
Figure 31  SLUIZO study outcomes of an integrated scenario, suggesting measures per theme and 
context. Source: translated from Arckus, 2007, p. 7.
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In a second phase, the project group came up with a solution tree considering 
four different future scenarios. They focused on how and where to implement 
the tangential road network (e.g. where freight traffic would be allowed). Those 
scenarios held a long-term vision and included operational objectives that were 
rapidly achievable. Eventually, an integrated scheme was composed, including all 
the strengths of the basic four scenarios. Afterwards, the operational objectives 
were translated into tables of measures, clustered according to the relevant policy 
field. Some of the suggested measures were selected as quick wins, feasible in 
the short term and at relatively little expense (Arckus 2007: 21-23,94,98,161). 
Figure 31 shows the three involved policy domains or arenas taken into account 
for the interventions: the spatial structure (travel market), the transport market, 
and the infrastructural policy (traffic market). The latter, however, was much more 
elaborated than the first two, demonstrating a stronger focus on the infrastructural 
layer and the still dominant engineering approach in mobility planning. In October 
2007, the final study was published and the resulting action plans and infrastruc-
tural measure catalogues were offered to the municipalities. 
5.1.3
Enrolment 
After publishing the study results, considerable time elapsed before the actions 
were implemented and an inter-municipal and intergovernmental platform was 
established. Actually, the idea of installing a cooperation platform was originated 
from the top down, from the consultation rounds for the Masterplan 2020 35. The 
Masterplan calculations revealed severe mobility issues on the southern ring 
road and in the southeast of Antwerp.  As such, the set-up of a mobility platform 
met the needs expressed by the SLUIZO study (by the bottom-up). However, the 
mobility platform and budget was frequently questioned in the Flemish Parliament. 
To respond to the growing critiques in parliament, the minister of mobility (K. Van 
Brempt) asked the provincial mobility deputy (I. Verhaert) to take the lead in the 
further process. The provincial government was in direct contact with the mayors 
and they had already collaborated frequently. From this ‘in-between’ position, the 
province had to neutralise the highly political matter and make linkages to other 
ongoing mobility or infrastructure projects. The enrolment phase is illustrated in 
Figure 25.
The platform was operational at the end of 2008. It had its own administration, was 
financed by the Flemish government, and was initially even mentioned to serve as 
a pilot for other inter-municipal mobility challenges (Vlaams Parlement 2008). The 
platform enabled a smooth quality check, follow-up, and monitoring of the inter- 
ventions suggested by the municipalities. Strategic and bilateral consultations and 
collaborations between two or more municipalities were facilitated by the platform. 
The coordination was assigned to civil servants form the Department of Mobility and 
Public Works (DMOW), namely to F. Leys. Other regions with cross-border mobility 
issues such as the region around Mechelen and the Noorderkempen showed 
35  The “Poort Oost” consultation and support platform guided by the governor of the province of 
Antwerp, will be mentioned also in the case of the LIP Oosterweel link in Chapter 7. 
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interest in such an intermediate planning level platform as well. This demonstrated 
the broader need for such in-between governance. 
Unfortunately, major changes were not yet directly visible; due to the quick-win 
focus adopted in the SLUIZO study. At that moment, and in the context of the new 
political legislature (2004-2009), the domain of Mobility and Public Works was 
divided between two ministers, respectively K. Van Brempt and K. Peeters36. Due to 
a new political balance, cooperation among the two ministers was not going without 
a hitch. Indeed, the study launched by the minister for mobility (and public transport 
services) recommended the implementation of infrastructural measures for which 
she was not in charge. Some municipalities and politicians lost not only their faith in 
the MOZO platform, but also in the need for this in-between level of collaboration.  
The operational budget was questioned: “Why would a platform with little or 
no feasible outcomes receive money, while there is less and less money for the 
municipalities’ infrastructure?” (translated from: Vlaams Parlement 2008). 
Although, the MOZO platform was frequently questioned in Parliament, from its 
start till around 2010, the minister of Mobility and Public Works37, H. Crevits kept 
on financing the platform, as she believed in its importance and potential (W.A.M. 
2010). An evaluation of the study and cooperation process itself was commissioned 
by the minister. The assignment was carried out by the consortium Omgeving-
Stramien-Vectris in 2010. This consortium also supported the MOZO platform for 
the more technical analyses necessary to guarantee the progress and quality of 
interventions (Vlaams Parlement 2010). However, the process and formation of a 
mobility platform was not supported by the majority of the politicians in the region 
and died a quiet death.
5.1.4
Demobilisation of allies 
Although initially the municipalities themselves were enthusiastic about the 
cooperation during the first roundtables, in the further course of the process the 
party politics and election fever took their toll. Expectations of the final study report 
were high and municipalities were focusing on their own municipal interests (new 
infrastructures, bus services, etc.). Especially when further (financial) engagements 
had to be explicated. As a result, so did the engagement from the public actors 
decrease (the Flemish Agency for Roads and Traffic (AWV), the public transport 
company De Lijn). A lack of commitment and trust between the various partners 
(ministries, municipalities, infrastructure agency, public transport company) tore 
away the platform before it could even show its full potential. As such, the institu-
tionalisation phase of the MOZO project was short-lived. Yet the quest for an 
inter-municipal or intergovernmental cooperation platform had only just started. 
36  When K. Peeters became Prime Minister of the Flemish Government (minister-president), his 
colleague H. Crevits replaced him as Minister of Infrastructure and Public Works.
37  After the elections of 2009, H. Crevits became minister of Mobility and Public Works. As such, 
the previous split between the two domains (Mobility versus Public Works) was reversed. 
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5.1.5  BOX
Noorderkempen
What did not happen in the SLUIZO/MOZO case, took place later in the Noorder-
kempen, a region situated east of Antwerp (see Figure 32 ). Under supervision 
of deputy Verhaert, a study process for an inter-municipal mobility vision and 
intergovernmental cooperation started in the Noorderkempen. The study process 
was based on the same principles as the MOZO process. Therefore, it can be seen 
as a successful direct outcome of the MOZO platform.
Figure 32  Study area Noorderkempen. Source: Vercruysse, Van den Broeck et al. (2012: 2)
On their own initiative, the 15 municipalities of the Noorderkempen38 gathered 
together with representatives of the Flemish administrations and ministerial 
offices: the Agency for Roads and Traffic (AWV), Spatial Development Department 
(Departement Ruimte Vlaanderen39), public transport company (De Lijn),  
national railway (NMBS). Sometimes, in specific workshops also other relevant 
municipalities or administrations were invited (e.g. the department for 
Immovable Heritage, Onroerend Erfgoed). 
One aim was to develop a shared view on the future mobility for the region in a 
participatory study process. In 2010, an engagement statement was signed and 
the process took off. The study was commissioned by the province of Antwerp 
and carried out by a consortium of consultants: Stramien, Vectris and Tri-vizor. In 
July 2012, the final report was published and the implementation could start. 
38  Arendonk, Baarle-Hertog, Beerse, Brecht, Hoogstraten, Lille, Malle, Merksplas, 
Oud-Turnhout, Ravels, Rijkevorsel, Turnhout, Vosselaar, Zandhoven, Zoersel
39  Nowadays known as Departement Omgeving.
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The cooperation in the Noorderkempen started with an engagement statement 
of the involved local municipalities and the higher authorities. After the joint 
study process for a regional mobility vision, strategic actions were stipulated 
for all partners. The Noorderkempen engagement and its action programme had 
been reaffirmed in the town councils and the provincial council at the start of the 
new legislature. Accordingly, the unfinished interventions could be continued 
or finished while monitoring was guaranteed. During the process, feedback was 
provided by a sounding board in which civil society actors could discuss their 
concerns. After the study process, the intensity of the cooperation lessened, but 
there was still a steering committee that monitored and kept watch of the action 
programme progress. Furthermore, several theme specific subprojects emerged 
(concerning smaller parts of the Noorderkempen area). 
Figure 33  Reconstruction of the MOZO actor network diagram, the silent death of MOZO and
the start of study process Noorderkempen.
5.1.6 
Results and discussion of the SLUIZO/MOZO orgware
Mobility orgware – solidifying structural couplings
The actor network diagrams illustrated that the SLUIZO/MOZO case tells the story 
of vested public mobility actors involved in the transport and traffic market in the 
southeast of Antwerp, i.a. between the municipalities, the Flemish administrations  
(AWV and DMOW), the public transport providers (De Lijn and NMBS), and the 
province of Antwerp. Tackling the transit traffic was the obligatory passage point 
to gather the municipalities and start the initiative from the bottom-up. Apart 
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from limited financial resources, also an in-depth knowledge on the nature of 
the perceived transit traffic problem was lacking. Therefore, the municipalities 
engaged in a study process (SLUIZO). Later, financial means were enrolled from the 
top-down, by the establishment of a MOZO mobility platform, that would implement 
and monitor the actions proposed by the SLUIZO study. 
When reflecting on the used governance strategy, we can say that an adaptive 
governance strategy prevailed: the issue was rather considered complicated; an 
in-depth knowledge on the nature of the problem lacked, and the actor field was 
rather stable (mostly vested public actors). 
The solution tree and the action programme showed that the planning object, or  
the conditions, were mainly infrastructure oriented interventions. Furthermore, as 
the domain of mobility and public works was divided amongst two ministers, this  
did not enhance the implementation of the action programme. In addition to 
the action programme, another important SLUIZO objective was establishing an 
inter-municipal mobility platform. That platform had to obtain a support base 
among the municipalities for the broader mobility issues. It was a new in-between 
institution for carrying out research and for making strategic and integrated plans 
for the area. The MOZO platform could supervise the quality and alignment of 
the local policy mobility proposals and interventions. The platform was led by a 
civil servant from MOW. The platform never really took off, as the outcomes and 
functioning were repeatedly questioned in parliament and the political interference 
was never far away. 
Setting up the MOZO platform finally failed. In fact, the actors, the municipalities 
in this case, got interessed with the project because of the wrong reasons. They 
wanted infrastructural interventions and therefore raised the transit traffic issue 
as the origin of all traffic misery in the region. The expectations of the final study 
report were high; the municipalities focused on their own municipal interests 
(new infrastructures, bus services, etc.), especially afterwards when financial 
engagements had to be explicated. As soon as the study results concluded that 
the actual problem was not the transit traffic, but an oversaturated road network 
and a lack of alternatives, the interest of several municipalities to install a mobility 
platform dropped. The obligatory passage point, i.e. cooperating to counteract 
the transit traffic, became irrelevant and teared down the developing MOZO actor 
network. The deputy was given the lead in setting up the MOZO platform, while the 
province did not play a central role in the story. So, since the deputy could never 
enforce a real breakthrough in the MOZO case, the platform gradually evaporated.
Adapting the conditions – Opening up for change?
When looking at the subsystems, in Figure 34, the translation of MOZO did not 
result in covering the whole CAS of mobility but focused on the transport and traffic 
market. Subsequently, interventions (or the conditions to change) mainly addressed 
the traffic market. With regard to the opportunities of a two-tiers framework, we 
can be short. The initiative was taken by the municipalities that self-organised to 
get their issues on the policy agenda. But those actors stopped engaging, and the 
new-born association fell apart. The conditions that were the object of planning (i.e. 
SLUIZO results proposing a quick-win programme to overcome the oversaturated  
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road network) did not appeal to the actors. As a result, no windows of opportunity 
were opened and no structural couplings could be solidified between the 
subsystems. 
5.2
Case regional cooperation Mechelen
5.2.1
Situation
The area around Mechelen, a medium-sized city situated on the axis between 
Antwerp and Brussels, has a long history of mobility issues. Traffic is frequently 
congested on the primary and secondary roads. While the major traffic flows are 
oriented north-south (A12, E19, railway and canal), the local traffic flows in the 
region are mainly directed east-west, in particular to the N16, the primary road 
crossing and fragmenting the region. Within the region there is a lack of alterna-
tives for cars. A sufficient tangential transport network that connects the smaller 
residential areas with each other is absent (Figure 35). 
As Figure 35 illustrates, the case study area is divided by major north-south 
oriented infrastructures. The E19 slices the area of Mechelen in two parts, western 
and eastern. In the western part, the N16 is the major road connecting the villages 
of Bornem, Puurs and Sint-Amands, and gives access to the A12. Furthermore the 
N16 connects those municipalities with the city of Mechelen and the more eastern 
situated municipalities. In the east, the N15 connects Heist-op-den-Berg with 
Putte, Bonheiden and Mechelen. But on this road in the direction of Mechelen, 
structural traffic congestion already starts at Putte. Mechelen itself forms a 
bottleneck on the axis for a smooth east-west flow. The major traffic problems 
Figure 34  Overview of MOZO mobility system.
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in the area do not (necessarily) stem from the primary road network alone. The 
structural daily congestion on the Antwerp-Brussels axis sometimes extends to the 
region of Mechelen, which then becomes manifest on the secondary roads. 
To respond adequately to mobility challenges in the region, the local municipalities 
called for a mobility cooperation across both spatial borders and levels, and policy 
domains. Although, examples of regional governance have existed for a long time40, 
an integrated mobility cooperation is still in its cradle. In Mechelen, the need to 
extend this kind of regional approach to other policy fields (e.g. spatial planning, 
education, housing) is undeniable. 
5.2.2
The cooperation ‘Accessible Region’ (C-AR)
5.2.2.1 Problematisation
 
As mentioned earlier, during the MOZO pilot, the region surrounding Mechelen 
showed interest in such inter-municipal and intergovernmental platforms for 
mobility. Despite the fact that the MOZO case did not live up to expectations, 
40  i.a. waste collection and processing cooperations, fire departments and police areas, 
intercommunal associations, etc.
Figure 35  Major infrastructures in the region of Mechelen.
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the wish to set up a cooperation for cross-border mobility issues and knowledge 
exchange only grew stronger in Mechelen. The actual start of the actor networking 
process, or the problematisation phase, took place at the Conference of Mayors in 
the arrondissement of Mechelen (Conferentie van Burgemeesters, COBUR) at the 
end of 2014. The need for a more integrated view on mobility was there stressed 
once more. The intercommunal association IGEMO41, that chairs and facilitates 
these COBURs, considered that it was the right time to think of mobility as a lever 
for setting up an intergovernmental cooperation; the cooperation also entailed other 
policy domains (education, housing, etc.). The setup of a regional intergovernmental 
mobility cooperation would enable the region to respond to present and future 
mobility challenges. To continue the project and round up the problematisation 
phase, IGEMO had to persuade the actors of the relevance of a mobility cooperation 
(i.e. the obligatory passage point). 
At the COBUR of March 2015, IGEMO presented its first ideas on such cooperation  
to a broad audience, ranging from local municipalities to higher governments, as 
well as administrations. To send a stronger message, the director of De Verkeers- 
onderneming (VO, Rotterdam) was invited to the conference as keynote speaker 
and exponent of a best practice in mobility governance42. In March 2016, after 
negotiations on several later COBURs, the 13 municipalities of the arrondissement 
of Mechelen, the province of Antwerp, the Flemish administrations (DMOW, AWV, 
W&Z), and the public transport providers (De Lijn and NMBS) signed an engagement 
statement for strategic actions in the following 3 years (till the end of 2018). The 
Cooperation ‘Accessible Region’ was established and coordinated by IGEMO (C-AR, 
Samenwerkingsverband Bereikbare Regio).
41  IGEMO: Intercommunal association for the development of the region of Mechelen and its 
surroundings (Intergemeentelijke vereniging voor de ontwikkeling van het gewest Mechelen en 
omgeving).
42  We will not discuss the story of the Verkeersonderneming here in detail, as it is included as a 
case study in Chaptern 6.  
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Figure 36  The first actor network developments of the C-AR (left: very beginning). 
Source: Van Brussel.
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5.2.2.2 Interessement
IGEMO elaborated an operational structure (cf. Figure 37) that would enable a 
straightforward interaction between various policy domains and projects in the 
region. Various current or future projects in the region were screened to enhance 
the C-AR. Projects that fitted in the bigger regional mobility cooperation picture 
were integrated into C-AR framework and activities (see Figure 36). The resulting 
organisational structure and included projects or basic pillars of the cooperation are 
detailed in the rest of this section. 
Figure 37  Overview of the organisational structure of the inter-municipal cooperation in the region
of Mechelen, coordinated by IGEMO. Source: (based on IGEMO 2016: 6).
Figure 37 represents the organisation structure, that entails the following 
components:
• Regional mandate group (Regionale Mandaatgroep)
The mandate group comprises all mayors in the C-AR and takes the administrative 
decisions. Several parliamentarians inhabiting the region (both in Flemish and 
Federal Parliament) are invited to attend. With their broader scope they transcend 
the local interests. Also the deputy for mobility is represented in this group. In 
addition to public actors, both civil society actors and citizen movements each have 
one collective vote in the mandate group. 
• Policy groups – mobility policy group (Beleidsgroepen, Beleidsgroep Mobiliteit),  
 project and work groups
These groups focus on the elaboration of the more theme-specific projects, e.g. 
developing the masterplan in the case of the mobility policy group. They are the 
forum for consultation, knowledge accumulation and exchange. For the mobility 
policy group and work groups, people active in mobility can take part. In addition, 
the administrations (local, provincial and regional) are present, and when desired, 
external experts or civil society actors can join the group for other insights. 
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To communicate the project’s intentions and to gain support base, the C-AR 
organises a ‘States Regional’. This is similar to a States General, but on a regional 
scale and for mobility. It is a kind of mobility conference in which decision makers 
from all governmental levels take part. Civil society actors and citizen movements 
are also welcome. The main purpose of this forum is to inform the broader audience 
about the proposed interventions or future vision, as well as to gain feedback from 
that audience on building a sustainable support base.
Developing an integrated masterplan for the region was the core business of 
the C-AR. The masterplan would take into account all transport modes. Once 
established, the C-AR cooperation seemed like the appropriate place to incorporate 
other governance-related mobility projects that had already been launched earlier. 
Accordingly, the inter-municipal cooperation was characterised by four pillars:
 • The map for logistics (Logistieke kaart) dealing with the guidance and routes  
  of freight traffic in the region. The project received European funding and was 
  cofinanced by the Enterprise Flanders (Agentschap Ondernemen).
 • The marketplace for mobility Mechelen (Marktplaats voor mobiliteit  
  Mechelen) stimulates private partners to invent mobility services to reduce  
  peak hour traffic (peak avoidences, spitsmijden). 
 • The masterplan for mobility ‘Accessible Region’ (Masterplan Bereikbare  
  Regio43) elaborates a sustainable mobility masterplan for the whole region. 
 • The regional network Mechelen follows the example of the Regional Network  
  Leuven project (Regionet Leuven). The equivalent for Mechelen has been  
  initiated by the city of Mechelen. 
5.2.2.3 Enrolment 
When the roles and organisational structure were approved, the C-AR became 
“operational” and the associated projects ran their own course; they were 
coordinated by IGEMO.
The Masterplan was developed in four phases: (1) the inventory, (2) the analysis, 
(3) the definition of measures, and (4) the programme of the measures. Phases 
1 and 2 resulted in an analysis report, based on which the further two phases 
would be elaborated and bundled in an implementation programme. The content 
generation on bottlenecks and priorities took place in the project group and work 
group discussion events. The process coordination and the actual composition of 
the masterplan was assigned to IGEMO, under the supervision of an external expert. 
To save time, each feedback meeting at the end of a phase was considered as the 
start of the next phase. For phases 3 and 4, two extra work group meetings44 were 
organised with experts, mobility officials and aldermen to generate and discuss the 
43  The official title of the report is Regional Masterplan Sustainable Mobility (Regionaal 
Masterplan Duurzame Mobiliteit), but in the interviews more often the name ‘Masterplan 
Accessible Region’ (Masterplan Bereikbare Regio) was used, to stress the link with the cooperation 
‘Accessible Region’ (Samenwerkingsverband Bereikbare Regio) and to avoid confusion with other 
mobility governance initiatives later on.
44  one for the west part of the study area and one for the east.
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area’s specific content and solutions. At the end of 2016, the final report mapped 
the major bottlenecks to target for each sub-region and listed the corresponding 
financial engagements necessary for the quick-wins. However, this report was never 
published; thus never officially presenting the priorities and concrete interventions 
in the region. Since the start of the pilot transport region Mechelen, the C-AR master 
planning process was put on hold45.
In March 2016, thanks to a high attendance, the kick-off meeting of the cooperation 
Accessible Region (C-AR) resulted in a successful exchange and acquisition of all 
available information on mobility in the region around Mechelen. In the two following 
months, the diverse data (often from studies commissioned by local municipalities) 
were analysed and cross-checked by an external contracted mobility expert, W. 
Abels (IGEMO).
Although the kick-off provided extensive mobility material, several challenges for 
the regional analysis occurred. Only the most generic data on traffic flows could 
be obtained. There was no specific data on transit or local traffic available, nor 
could the travel motives or travelled kilometres per trip be pinpointed. Questions 
concerning the ‘where’ and ‘why’ of the traffic had to be left open. However, those 
questions are of major importance when car travel peak avoidances are among 
future mobility objectives (i.e. spitsmijden).46 
Not surprisingly, the setup of a systematic traffic monitoring system was brought 
forward as an important first step; not only for the registration of the vehicles and 
45  Pieter Dresselaers (IGEMO), personal communication, 06/03/2018
46  Peak avoidances (i.e. spitsmijdingen): reducing the number of vehicles during peak hour by 
seducing people to engage in tele-work, taking alternative travel modes or avoid peak hours for 
traveling.
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Figure 38  C-AR actor network developments in enrolling their structure (dashed line represents 
the strived equivalence with other projects). 
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the displacement patterns, but also as a reference base, to monitor and compare 
the effects of future interventions. Moreover, a lot of freight traffic passes through 
the region, not necessarily being local traffic. Regarding public transport there 
is also room for improvement. Intraregional bus connections are poor, and the 
connections bus-train are almost inexistent. Whereas the north-south axis, passing 
Mechelen, has a frequent service, the east-west axis lacks frequent connections. 
The present public transport service is fragmented and does not correspond to 
the travel demand in the region. When defining interventions to address specific 
mobility gaps (phase III and IV), the region was divided into 2 subareas, one west of 
Mechelen and one east. They were spatially separated by the E19 and characterised 
by their own specific needs. The interventions or main pillars in each of the subareas 
could  be as follows. 
In the eastern part of the C-AR area, the focal points were: mobility management 
and an increasing use of the bicycle (IGEMO 2016: 20): 
 a 80% of the area is situated at less than 5 km from a railway station  
  (combi mobility bike/car train) 
 b urbanisation is increasing on the Lier-Mechelen axis with both residential  
  areas and industrial sites. 
 c successful and relatively fast bus connection Heist-on-den-Berg – Mechelen  
  offers a scope for more comparable services 
 d Lier-Leuven corridor (shortest route: 35 km) is multimodal: train (line 16), car  
  (N10) and bicycle and mopeds.
In the western part of the C-AR area the central task was the introduction of combi 
mobility (IGEMO 2016: 19):
 a Stimulating combimobility of bicycle or car and public transport (train, bus) 
 b Accelerated construction of bicycle network 
 c Reinforcement of train network and core network of bus (concept of basic  
  accessibility) 
 d Water bus connections for the Scheldt, Dijle and Nete 
 e Launching a mobility monitor 
 f Regional budget for a traffic monitor
At the time of conducting the interviews in November 2016, the concept vision for 
the regional masterplan was being finalised and the findings from the third and 
fourth phase were being bundled in an implementation programme. Before the 
ultimate approval, all stakeholders would get the chance to give feedback on this 
report. 
5.2.2.4 Mobilisation of allies
Although the actors enthusiastically engaged in the C-AR project, interest gradually 
faded away and was captured by another actor–network process that will be 
elaborated in the next section. For the financial part, IGEMO expected support from 
local municipalities combined with a co-financing from the province of Antwerp 
and the Flemish government. But eventually, only the participating municipalities 
made a financial engagement. Possibly because the internal development of the 
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transport region around Mechelen was simultaneously taking shape. Though those 
financial engagements already had become clear during the first phases, personal 
engagement and interest from the higher authorities was still present. The C-AR 
initiative could still take off, and proceed its actor networking. Since the funding 
was less than expected, some projects in the C-AR were postponed. For instance, 
setting up a marketplace for mobility was temporarily suspended as were the 
associated participation and communication. We run through the four project pillars 
of the C-AR cooperation and we sketch what has come of them, in what they have 
resulted (so far).
The Logistics Map originated separately and earlier than the partnership, but its 
follow-up and framing fitted within the Cooperation Accessible Region. It was 
co-financed by the Enterprise Agency and was launched within the framework of 
the call ‘entrepreneurial friendly municipality’ (ondernemingsvriendelijke gemeente). 
The project aimed to improve the accessibility of the companies, partners in this 
project were Febetra, Mobiel 21, Voka, Unizo, and the municipalities in the arrondis-
sement of Mechelen. It had two finalities: (1) optimising accessibility for companies 
and suppliers, and (2) defining preferred routes so that the quality of life in the 
neighbourhood and the safety of road users can be guaranteed.
The Marketplace for Mobility has not started yet. The regional master plan had been 
prioritized, because of the impact of the problem definition, mobility vision and 
programme of measures on opportunities for such a market place. Recently, the 
project was submitted to several project subsidy calls. The most recent proposal 
was submitted as an Interreg North Sea region project in the beginning of March 
2018 (at the time of writing this dissertation) together with Dutch, German, British, 
and Danish partners. According to IGEMO, the latter represented a major challenge 
and a major difference with the mobility market as elaborated by De Verkeersonder-
neming in Rotterdam (see section 6.4.1).  
The proposal for the Regional Network Mechelen (Regionet) was rejected by the 
Spatial Development Department and the project got marginalised somewhat in 
anticipation of subsidies.
As already mentioned, the final version of the report on the last phases of the 
Masterplan Accessible Region was never published. In this report, the implemen-
tation programme, consisting of a list of measures, could have been defined. The 
proposed interventions would have begun before the end of 2018. Those measures 
ranged from infrastructural to policy measures that require additional, more 
in-depth study work. 
The Regional Masterplan assessed the present mobility situation and the existing 
knowledge from the municipal to the Flemish level. Accordingly, an integrated 
future perspective and shared vision for the C-AR area could be developed. This 
resulted in presenting readymade handles for mobility policy in the form of a list of 
interventions and priorities. A concrete coordination between the mobility plans and 
municipal, provincial and regional bottlenecks became top priority. 
The masterplan thus provided an integrated picture; it summarised the bottlenecks 
to draw up a programme of measures, ready to implement on the short term 
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(2016-2018). By signing the engagement statement, all partners committed 
themselves for three years of intergovernmental cooperation. 
The regional mandate group assumed that the master planning process would be 
continued by the planning processes within the pilot transport region Mechelen. But 
that has not been the case so far. Nevertheless, the draft memorandum on basic 
accessibility of October 2017 mentioned to broaden the scope from drawing up a 
transport plan (concentrating on public transport) to elaborating of a fully-fledged 
mobility plan (regarding all modes). But in most transport region pilots (except for 
Antwerp) developing such a mobility plan is will only start after having approved the 
transport plan, and thus after the two-years pilot47. 
The C-AR focuses on an integrated cycle network to form the backbone of the public 
transport’s core network. Not only because the core and supplementary networks 
do not cover the complete area. But also because the planning and construction 
of cycle streets is relatively easy (less governmental parties involved, less costly) 
compared to planning for car or public transport services. Several initiatives had 
already started. Although the master plan was put on hold, the C-AR got redefined in 
relation to the transport region and  five quick wins were  launched under the C-AR 
umbrella by the end of May 2017:
 – Eight municipalities organised a collective purchase of e-bikes 2.0 (e-bikes,  
  hooverboards, e-steps, etc.). 
 – “Smart cycling” was listed as a second quick win. Information and best 
practices in the region regarding cycling, safety, and theft prevention would 
be gathered in a kind of cycling vade-mecum. This guide would contain, for 
instance, the type of cycling reward projects in Bonheiden registering the 
cycling patterns of individuals with bike tracking systems. The municipality 
of Bonheiden even won the Agoria Smart City Award with its cycle scanning 
project to stimulate children and employees to go to school or work by bike. 
To reach behavioural change, opting for the alternatives is linked to game 
aspects. Competition (i.e. comparison of scores between schools) plays a 
role up to a certain level, such as indicated in Figure 40 (Agoria 2017). In this 
light, the municipality of Bonheiden also suggested to transform several local 
roads and passages (trage wegen) into bicycle streets so as to enhance the 
supra-local functional bicycle route network (BFF, bovenlokaal functioneel 
fietsroutenetwerk). Sint-Katelijne-Waver, Putte, and Mechelen joined the 
initiative so the conversion could result in a cycling street network. One of 
these cycling streets even turned out to be the longest in Europe: the 6.6 km 
long part of the Oude Baan between Putte and Mechelen (HLN. be). Some 
neighbouring municipalities in the province of Flemish Brabant, Keerbergen, 
Haacht, Boortmeerbeek and Hever also were enthusiastic about the interven-
tions. They submitted a subsidy application and a request for a public 
bicycle system (rental services) in the surrounding area and nearby stations. 
In anticipation of the transport plan and (reduced) future public transport 
services, the combination bicycle or (shared) e-bike and public transport 
would provide the region around Mechelen with a complete mobility service. 
47 Filip Boelaert (DMOW), personal communication, 07/03/2018; Pieter Dresselaers (IGEMO), 
personal communication, 06/03/2018
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The exact details and partners in the project are yet still to be established. 
Existing organisations such as Bluebike were considered, but there was not 
yet enough critical mass to get those actors on board.
 – The third quick win was labelled “Traffic data acquisition from traffic 
monitoring (ANPR)”. The project idea was registered and selected for the call 
“City of things” of FIT and Imec, but there is still a lot of deliberation about 
the specific approach to take. 
 – The establishment of a Yammer-platform around mobility in the region was 
  considered as fourth quick win, but the enthusiasm for this measure was  
  low.
 – A fifth quick win overlaps with the transport region pilot (discussed in 
detail later in this chapter). It elaborates a business case for a new form 
of public transport, namely “the flexbus”. Though IGEMO elaborates the 
Flexbus possibilities, there is no systematic communication or project 
group in direct contact with the transport region. “It all depends on personal 
network contacts of individuals that engage in both C-AR and the transport 
region”48. 
Figure 39  Left: the longest cycle track of Europe between the municipality of Putte and the city
of Mechelen, Source: Antoon Verbeek, HLN, 27/05/2016; right: cycling street network. Source: 
Gemeente Bonheiden.
Figure 40  Cycling scanning project in Bonheiden first results. Source: Gemeente Bonheiden.
48 Pieter Dresselaers (IGEMO), personal communication, 06/03/2018
136 REGIONAL MOBILITY COOPERATION
5.2.3
Towards a transport region Mechelen
 
5.2.3.1 Same problematisation, different interessement
Figure 41  Reconstruction of the problematisation and interessement of the Transport 
Region Mechelen.
While the Cooperation Accessible Region (C-AR) was taking its first steps (see 
section 8.2.2), the Ministry of Mobility and Public Works developed the setup of 
transport regions. Both initiatives developed separately. They were launched by 
different actors so the arguments were formulated differently. Yet, both initiatives 
interfere with the same problematisation and obligatory passage point: the need 
for a regional intergovernmental mobility cooperation to tackle present and future 
mobility challenges. The C-AR cooperation started earlier, from the bottom-up, 
while the transport region Mechelen was initiated from the Flemish administrations 
(top-down). The developing C-AR in Mechelen showed that there was interest and 
engagement to govern mobility on an intergovernmental level. The cooperation was 
one reason why Mechelen became selected as a pilot region Basic Accessibility. 
The developing C-AR actor network served the transport region well. It formed the 
basis for the transport region. The C-AR problematisation phase had just been 
rounded up successfully: an alliance was created and an engagement statement 
signed, thus officially making the region around Mechelen a pilot. Meanwhile, and 
based on the same problematisation, the transport region was busy shaping another 
actor network. By selecting other objectives and interesting projects, actors from 
the C-AR network (e.g. the municipalities) were seduced to join the transport region 
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actor network. As the transport regions were top-down led, they benefited from 
more guaranteed financial means than the C-AR. Actors involved in both initiatives 
sought to ensure the mobility cooperation and favoured the certainty of the 
top-down initiative. Though it remains difficult to say exactly where the transport 
region initiatives start49 and those of C-AR end, what is certain is that substantial 
interest to cooperate was present in the C-AR and many actors got engaged in both 
initiatives’ actor networks. 
Which municipalities are engaged in the transport region? Figure 35 displays the 
arrondissement’s border and Figure 23, displays the initial transport areas from 
2001 (De Lijn), and the most recent demarcations of the transport region. Because 
the Cooperation Accessible region had just started, the 13 municipalities of the 
arrondissement were initially considered for participation in the transport region 
Mechelen too (at least in the very beginning in 2016). In contrast with the earlier 
zoning, dating back to 2001, the municipalities north of the river Rupel50 are  
no longer part of the transport region Mechelen. At the end of 2017, a few  
municipalities switched to other neighbouring regions. In summary, the transport 
region Mechelen covers 14 municipalities and crosses the provincial boundary 
between Antwerp and the eastern part of Flemish-Brabant.
In December 2016, a call for tenders was launched to supervise the process and 
to support the transport regions technically and administratively. In Mechelen, 
four consortia submitted a tender. One of them was the intercommunal IGEMO, 
in partnership with BUUR (architects and urbanists), and Mint (mobility and 
infrastructure planners). IGEMO wanted to develop the mobility cooperation in 
the region, but their bid was not selected. Another consortium got the assignment 
for the region: The New Drive (project manager for cleaner mobility solutions), 
in partnership with Goudappel Coffeng (expert in mobility and (IT)-services for 
mobility), IMOB (Hasselt University Transportation Research Institute), and APPM 
(Management consultants)51. IGEMO regretted and even contested this decision52, 
but reconsidered later under pressure of the local mayors. After all, the region 
around Mechelen had finally been rising on the policy agenda, and had made it to 
pilot transport region. Nevertheless, the relation between the intercommunal and 
the commissioning Flemish administration for Mobility and Public Works (DMOW) 
remained difficult for a while.
What happened to the C-AR initiative and what was the role of IGEMO in relation 
to the transport region Mechelen pilot then? While the transport regions were still 
49  From the interviews we conducted with IGEMO, the Flemish administration, and a mayor, 
the outlines of both cooperation initiatives did not become very clear. The interviewees were 
involved in both cooperations to some extent (whether official or unofficial), and did not make a 
clear distinction between the two initiatives when talking about governance structure, proposed 
interventions or examples in the field. Although the interviews were specifically addressed (and 
titled) to explore the one initiative or the other in detail, and to look for their differences and 
interrelations afterwards.
50  Aartselaar, Boom, Hemiksem, Niel, Rumst en Schelle switched in the most recent transport 
region zoning, to the Antwerp transport region.
51  This consortium also got the Aalst transport region project
52  its own autonomous initiative, this time not supported by the mayors and municipalities 
which it represents
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‘under construction’, the cooperation Accessible Region was elaborating the final 
phases of its regional masterplan. But after a while, the once so engaged municip-
alities were withdrawing from the C-AR platform and concentrated on the transport 
region. Yet, the Regional Mandate Group still gathered a few times and its decisions 
also influenced the transport region Mechelen. Because mostly the same mayors 
sat around the table. To avoid an unnecessary duplication of effort, both initiatives 
were urged to align. Indeed, guided by IGEMO, the C-AR had already developed a 
regional masterplan and implementation programme for most part of the region. The 
master planning process was put on hold so it could be aligned the decisions of the 
transport region council. Later, IGEMO negotiated to be included in the transport 
region council and in the working group to enhance the knowledge exchange with 
the study team of the transport region Mechelen. In this way, despite their minor 
role, they are still engaged in regional mobility issues. The C-AR was redefined 
so that it sustained the work and planning process of the municipalities in the 
transport region. As the transport region council did not yet decide concrete actions 
or projects, the role of IGEMO in the story remained small53. 
5.2.3.2 Enrolment
Although the transport region Mechelen somewhat absorbed the C-AR cooperation, 
some organisational characteristics are inherited from the C-AR (see Figure 42  
and Figure 43). Section 4.2 already listed the organisation structure of the transport 
regions in general. But some structures are added to that generic layout.  
A politically well-balanced preparatory board of 5 prominent mayors prepares  
the agenda of the transport region council and prioritises the mobility issues.  
A Sounding Board, equal to the existing States General, narrows the gap with the 
municipal councils and gathers support for the proposed interventions. Citizen 
movements and civil society actors are invited to join this conference as well as 
to give their feedback on the proposed measures and the agenda of the transport 
region. Finally, IGEMO became involved in the transport region as well. They have 
a seat in the council, though as member without a vote, and in the work group that 
elaborates the mobility plan and interventions. Figure 42 also shows the Flemish 
administrations (on the right), they are represented in the transport region council 
by one person. The administrations and higher authorities should speak with one 
voice, so they do not outnumber the municipalities in the board. To get on the same 
page, the higher authorities organise a meeting to align their perspectives and 
objectives for the transport region.
The work conducted in the light of the masterplan Accessible Region has been 
useful for drawing up the transport region mobility plan. However, the actual policy 
decisions deviate from the intentions mentioned in the masterplan, especially 
regarding the implementation and priorities of the public transport in the region. 
According to F. Leys (DMOW) this will be the major challenge. In municipalities 
where the public transport network will be reduced, defining priorities for the whole 
region will be difficult. Often local interests are favoured at the expense of the 
regional programme. 
53 Pieter Dresselaers (IGEMO), personal communication, 06/03/2018; Frank Leys (DMOW), 
personal communication, 02/03/2018
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Figure 43  The official organogram of the transport region Mechelen. Source: Weyts (2017, 
bijlage 2, Figuur 2).
Figure 42  Organisational structures of the C-AR and the transport region and their intertwining 
illustrated as if it were two households, ending up as one.
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5.2.3.3 Mobilisation of allies
Figure 44  Enrolment and mobilisation of allies of the transport region Mechelen.
The Transport Region Mechelen could already count on a collaborative atmosphere 
established by the C-AR cooperation and on the knowledge bundled in a regional 
masterplan. That masterplan could then serve as a starting point for the regional 
mobility plan. Although there is a large overlap between the two documents, with 
respect to the view on public transport, there are some important differences in 
focus between both cooperation processes.
The municipalities indicated the willingness to work towards strengthening and 
improving cycling-related aspects in the region. These intentions were formulated 
as quick wins within the C-AR framework (cf. previous section), the cooperation was 
therewith redefined in relation to the focus of the transport region Mechelen (public 
transport). Those mostly cycling related quick wins not only include providing cycle 
infrastructure, i.a. e-bike sharing infrastructure, safe and comfortable shelter, or 
cycle tracks, but also setting up reward projects for cyclists and raising awareness 
of the available alternatives for the car. As a second important item on the to-do  
list, the municipalities stated to counteract the decreasing public transport  
services of De Lijn in the region. Discussing the future public transport services  
and possibilities  is the core business of the transport region and council. “But 
counteracting the reduction is wishful thinking within the time frame and budget  
of the transport region”54. It is argued that “the focus of Basic Accessibility seems  
to be on cutting the budget at this moment.”55
54  Frank Leys (DMOW), personal communication, 19/12/2016
55  Pieter Dresselaers (IGEMO), personal communication, 06/03/2018
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Regarding the public transport services on the supplementary network and the 
customised transport, most recent developments at the time of writing this 
dissertation are the following. De Lijn is still developing its final transport plans for 
the core and supplementary network. Regarding the customised transport layer, 
some further steps have been prepared. As the present core and supplementary 
network do not cover the whole transport region area, refining the fourth layer 
(customised transport) is necessary, especially outside peak hours and during the 
weekends. Considered future options integrate the existing and rising initiatives 
(bus, adapted transport, school transport, shared bikes, shared cars, etc.) and the 
setup of a coordination centre (to be established) to coordinate everything.
Proposed pilot projects in this respect that are currently being further developed 
are:
 – Neighbourhood buses (Flexbus) in Boortmeerbeek and Bonheiden, and one in  
  Bornem
 – Shared bicycle systems in Lier and Mechelen
The above-mentioned neighbourhood buses would drive and serve a fixed route 
in two (Bonheiden and Boortmeerbeek) or three municipalities (Sint-Amands; 
Bornem and Puurs), and provide a connection to public transport stops (core and 
supplementary network). The project will be further developed by IGEMO within the 
C-AR framework. Bonheiden and Boortmeerbeek also explore ways to optimise the 
capacity of vehicles used for school transport throughout the rest of the day, for 
other users and transport demands. For the first two proposals, a business plan is 
being prepared. The explicit intention is to start both projects in 2018 (Weyts 2017).
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Transport region of Rotterdam
In Flanders we recently have been developing transport regions, while transport 
regions have been established in The Netherlands for two decades now. There- 
fore, it is interesting to dwell on the origins and the political and administrative 
context of the Dutch transport regions. In The Netherlands, a substantial amount 
of national money was traditionally invested in large infrastructure projects. 
While the provinces also held a major responsibility regarding the mobility or 
transport planning and implementation. But in the 1990s, the debate rose on 
setting up transport regions to specifically address the regional needs of cities 
and their hinterlands. The cities in the Randstad argued that the centralised 
policy did not address the regional demands in the best way. They aspired to a 
greater say in mobility policy and interventions. Other cities and regions did not 
want to lag behind, so 8 transport regions arose: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den 
Haag, Utrecht, Arnem-Nijmegen, Twente, Limburg and Eindhoven, see Figure 45. 
Those regions dealt with more than transport issues alone, therefore they were 
officially called ‘city regions’ or ‘WGR-regions’.56
Figure 45  The city regions for region specific intergovernmental cooperation in The Netherlands.
Source: Castenmiller, Keur, and Woudenberg (2010: 22, Figure 1).
56 These regions of inter-municipal cooperation were first called city-regions (stadsregio’s) or 
WGR-regions (Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regelingen, law on shared arrangement regions)
143
These city regions became again the central point of discussion as there were 
too many governmental layers to pass before decisions were taken. Unlike the 
provinces, the transport regions did not have a hierarchical character, they 
were not ruled by a higher central government. Instead, all municipalities in the 
transport region had an equal say in the transport region council (regioraad), 
and thus, in the decision-making process. The local administrations guaranteed 
the quality and standards for their municipalities in developing a regional 
programme. 
However, the cooperation did not function well for most transport regions; they 
could not act decisively. From 2013, the transport regions were abolished again, 
except for the transport regions in the Randstad: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and 
Den Haag. The latter regions served the Randstad well regarding the challenges 
of economic competitiveness. Later, Rotterdam and Den Haag were aggregated 
in the metropole region Rotterdam – Den Haag (metropoolregio Rotterdam Den 
Haag, MRDH). The MRDH partnership focused on cooperation in several policy 
fields: transport, regional economics, education, labour market, housing, green, 
culture, and sports. In the abolished city regions, the provinces reclaimed the 
authority over transport policy (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2011, 2012). 
The city regions, thus the compulsory cooperation in the regions, had partly 
overtaken the central role and authority of the provinces regarding regional policy 
and dynamics. Therefore, the provinces always denied the usefulness of those 
city regions. They respected the cooperation, but considered it a competitor, and 
the mandatory statute of it was deemed unnecessary (Castenmiller, Keur, and 
Woudenberg 2010).
In contrast, some argue that those city or transport regions functioned better 
than the provincial authorities. Because they precisely adopted an interactive 
and cooperative decision-making process, and were not as static and 
hierarchical as the provinces. Since 2013, the province has engaged more with 
the still existing regions in order to bundle the forces.
The projects and organisation of the transport regions were financed by national 
money, as stipulated by the Brede Doeluitkering Verkeer en Vervoer (BDU VV57). 
This annually granted government money was earmarked for the regional 
infrastructure, traffic safety, and, for example, public transport is paid as a sum 
to the decentralised governing bodies. Besides those, other financial national 
contributions are the Beter Benutten programmes, and the Action programme 
regional public transport (Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag 2014: 13). 
In 2015, the MRDH estimated the costs of its traffic programme at 175.1 million 
euros, the public transport programme at 418.4 million euros, and the programme 
economic competition position at 5.6 million euros. This adds up to about 600 
million euros in total (Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag 2014). The BB-I funds 
accounted for approximately 150 million in the Rotterdam region. 
57 The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment distributes the BDU (size: approximately 
€ 1.6 billion per year) to the provinces and remaining  city regions for the implementation of local 
and regional mobility policy. Municipalities do not receive any BDU money themselves, but can 
apply to their province or city region for a contribution from the BDU pot. However, the BDU is not 
cost-effective, so local authorities are also expected to partly finance the realisation of mobility 
projects.
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Transport region Antwerp 
Figure 46  Transport region Antwerp, in relation to former mobility cooperation initiatives or 
zonations. 
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We added this box on the transport region of Antwerp, because this transport 
region emerged in respect to evolutions in another case that we will elaborate 
later (Case LIP Oosterweel Link). As it is part of the transport region orgware 
innovation, we wanted to elaborate it here.
Thirty-three municipalities take part in the transport region Antwerp: Aartselaar, 
Antwerpen, Boechout, Boom, Borsbeek, Brasschaat, Brecht, Edegem, 
Essen, Hemiksem, Hove, Kalmthout, Kapellen, Kontich, Lint, Mortsel, , Niel, 
Ranst, Rumst, Schelle, Schilde, Schoten, Stabroek, Wijnegem, Wommelgem, 
Wuustwezel, Zandhoven, Zoersel, Lier, Malle, Kruibeke and Beveren. The latter 
four were included later, at the end of 2017 (Vlaams Parlement 2017b). Figure 46 
displays the transport region Antwerp and the participation in the MOZO 
platform. A substantial part of the municipalities (especially in the southeast) 
had already engaged in MOZO project. Compared to the zonation of 2001 (see 
Figure 46) some municipalities north, northeast and south of Antwerp were 
added in the most recent transport region Antwerp. But note that this zonation is 
not yet the definitive transport region necessarily; the governors got the task to 
bring together all the municipalities of their province and eventual other relevant 
municipalities, to evaluate and discuss the preliminary zoning with regard to the 
region-wide implementation of the transport regions.
The transport region Antwerp officially started when the Flemish government, 
the city of Antwerp and some prominent citizen movements signed the promising 
Future Covenant58, in June 2017. Because of its priors and long history, governing 
mobility in the region around Antwerp had its own dynamics59. Hence, the pilot 
transport region Antwerp requires a more case-specific organisation structure to 
deal with the complex mobility situation, ongoing projects, impact management, 
and future perspectives (Figure 49). Just like in the other transport regions, 
the transport region Antwerp has a transport region council, a work group or 
administrative transport region council (ambtelijke vervoerregioraad) in which 
the elaboration and following up of the work by officials is done, a ‘core group’ 
representing the Flemish administrations, and an expert team facilitating 
and guiding the decision-making and cooperation process. There are however 
slight differences between the organisational structures from the transport 
region Mechelen and that of Antwerp. Sometimes only the name is different, 
e.g. the regional mobility plan for Antwerp is called the Routeplan 2030. More 
often however, the entities in the organisational structure are more elaborated 
– equipped to answer more complex issues. Exploring the differences or 
similarities among the transport regions, might give the impression that there is 
a standard or ‘regular’ transport region, which is not the case. The basic building 
blocks are each time manipulated differently and organised to prepare for 
region-specific mobility issues. 
First, the core group is much more embedded in the political sphere and 
58  The Future Covenant is signed by the city of Antwerp, the Flemish government and the citizen 
movements, and lists the ambitions and terms on which a further collaboration is based regarding 
mobility in Antwerp.
59  Not only the LIP Oosterweel link, but also the MOZO-platform has left its marks and is now 
finally picked up in a more integrated governance structure
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comprises two interlinked entities. The work platform that involves representa-
tives from the Flemish administration’s executive agencies (BAM, AWV, De Lijn, 
MOW), the national railways (NMBS and Infrabel) and local governments,  
that should guarantee a smooth implementation. The other entity is the  
administrative taskforce, in which the leading officials of the Flemish  
administrations engage to monitor the progress made regarding the Future 
Covenant and the Routeplan 2030. The work platform reports to the taskforce 
(Vlaams Parlement 2017a: 65-84). 
Figure 47  Work Platform (Werkplatform). Source Vlaams Parlement (2017a: 68,77).
Second, instead of a work group in which the administrations and the study 
team are present, the content is generated by a much broader team, ‘a working 
community’. As the mobility issues in Antwerp are complex, there is the constant 
need to get feedback from other ongoing and future projects, from citizen 
movements and interest groups, from experts, etc. There is the need to exchange 
knowledge and enable a flexible process and planning. As the ‘super workshops’ 
of intendant A. D’Hooghe were successful in breaking the deadlock and looking 
for compromises60, this way of working has been continued in the transport 
region. Under the umbrella of what is called a ‘Working Community’, led by an 
intendant, the super workshops (cf. LIP Oosterweel Link) are now named working 
tables (werkbanken). These tables engage: experts, people from the core team 
(administrations), from the citizen movements and from the business sector. 
Those people gather to discuss, work and communicate on the major themes that 
60  For more details about the process lead by the intendant we refer to figure 46. 
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keep the transport region busy: the capping of the ring road, the ongoing projects 
(impact management), the Radical Port Route and the Routeplan 2030. Although 
the first communication and reports on the organogram of the transport region 
referred to the working community as a team headed by an intendant that guides 
the processes and communicates to the other tables and with the transport 
region council, in practice, this role was taken up by the Secretary-General of 
the Flemish Mobility Department (MOW). Compare for instance Figure 47 and 
Figure 48, in the first one the intendant is still mentioned, in the second one he 
disappeared. His role is to lead the working table that deals with the capping of 
the ring road. 
Figure 48  Composition Working Community (Werkgemeenschap) and relations to the Transport
Region Council. Source: Vlaams Parlement (2017a: 67).
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Figure 49  Initial organisation chart of the Transport Region Antwerp. Source: Weyts (2017, annex 2).
Figure 50  Organisation chart of the transport region Antwerp in 2018. Source: DMOW, 2018.
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5.2.4
Results and discussion regional mobility cooperation – towards  
transport regions
Mobility orgware - solidifying structural couplings
The initiative to start cooperating is an example of a bottom-up collaboration; it 
was launched by the municipalities in the region around Mechelen. The intercom-
munal organisation IGEMO took the role of the mediator and started building the 
actor network for a ‘Cooperation Accessible Region’ (C-AR). All (public) actors were 
convinced that a joint effort was necessary to get the accessibility issues of their 
region on the policy agenda; the obligatory passage point (OPP) was settled. Soon 
structural couplings arose with other relevant projects and partners, and interna-
tional best practices (cf. the VO). The C-AR became a mobility umbrella to target 
mobility issues in the region. Apart from the vested public actors, also business 
partners and civil society actors were addressed; although only in the initial 
phases, and to a lesser extent. IGEMO fulfilled a central role in further expanding 
the actor network. Lessons from the ended MOZO story were learned; financial 
engagements were explicated. The C-AR association positioned itself in relation to  
other interesting mobility initiatives (Regionet Leuven, the VO Rotterdam). One of 
the objectives was to launch a marketplace for mobility in Mechelen, to enrol new 
business partners. But finally those ideas were postponed due to a lack of money. 
With their masterplan for mobility they tried to shape the conditions for future 
mobility interventions, though the final document never made it to publication.
More or less simultaneously, the basic accessibility concept was launched by 
the Flemish government. The shift was made from supply side towards demand 
side oriented policy-making. To implement this demand side oriented approach, 
governing mobility would be in the hands of newly established transport regions. 
At the time that IGEMO had just launched its C-AR, the transport region pilots had 
to be selected. Mechelen became a pilot transport region, because there was this 
cooperation ‘esprit’ and the same OPP was settled. The transport region Mechelen 
did not have to start from scratch, as for the most part, the masterplan accessible 
region had already been elaborated. Thanks to a sounding board, the civil society 
and business actors become involved as well, although rather marginal. Also the 
organisational structures of both initiatives strongly resembled one another. When 
looking at the actor network diagrams we see that the transport region Mechelen 
has eventually absorbed the C-AR actor network. The protagonists are the vested 
public mobility actors.
Adapting the conditions
The C-AR cooperation would not only cover mobility, but also spatial planning, 
housing and education. The travel, transport and traffic market, were thus part of 
the C-AR plan. But, at the moment of writing this dissertation, only the mobility part 
has been elaborated. The initiative also proposed to set up a communication and 
sensitization approach, and a marketplace for mobility, to curb the travel demand, 
but by lack of financial means these ideas were postponed. As such, mostly  
modal choice options were elaborated, and a few infrastructural interventions  
were considered in the Masterplan Accessible Region. The focus was on smarter  
alternatives, as the budget for new infrastructural measures was limited. 
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The transport region adopted parts of the Masterplan Accessible Region, and 
aligned all the transport modes and networks (from core network to customised 
transport), creating structural couplings. A regional mobility plan screened the 
specific travel alternatives in the region, for which the necessary financial means 
were reserved, and the legal framework has been set to try out new kinds of 
mobility. The first structural couplings had been made during the C-AR process. 
Consistency was created by dividing the transport market in four different networks, 
that all have become structurally coupled. 
Both regional intergovernmental mobility cooperation agreements in Mechelen did 
not adopt a fundamentally different orgware approach, as illustrated in Figure 51.  
In both cases, a rather traditional adaptive governance approach is followed, 
to counter future mobility challenges, resulting in a mobility plan for the region. 
Different is however, that new transport initiatives will be given more room, as the 
public transport in the region is reconsidered. The question is whether the transport 
regions will really enhance the sustainable mobility transition. Only vested actors 
are brought together, no self-organising initiatives are considered in the process, 
and associations do not develop much ‘beyond the plan’. The link with the travel 
Figure 51  Overview of the orgware of C-AR (top) and the transport region of Mechelen (bottom).
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market actors is also non-existent yet, as business and civil actors are not included 
in the transport region council that decides on the mobility programme. In some 
municipalities, interventions or projects started to enhance a more sustainable 
mobility behaviour (e.g. cycle reward project for children in Bonheiden). But 
targeting the mobility behaviour and attitudes is not particularly focused on in the 
framework of the transport regions. 
5.3
Conclusions regional mobility cooperation
Both the SLUIZO/MOZO case and the case for regional mobility cooperation in 
Mechelen show a rather adaptive governance strategy, that tries to accounts for a 
dynamic context, from a stable actor setting. 
The actor networks display a lot of blue, meaning that mainly public actors became 
involved. The need for cooperation was raised from the bottom up in both cases, 
namely from the municipalities, acting more or less as niches in these cases. The 
lead in the process was however taken by the department for mobility (Flemish 
government). 
While in the case of SLUIZO/MOZO, the role of the municipalities seemed to be 
played at the end of the SLUIZO study, this was not the case in the initiatives in the 
region around Mechelen. There, the municipalities were given a seat in the further 
decision-making process (cf. regional mandate group and the transport region 
council). Though the MOZO platform was established to continue the intercommunal 
and intergovernmental cooperation between the participating municipalities, it did 
not have much political power and the interest in the platform gradually dropped. 
Furthermore, the municipalities had not explicated further engagements. The 
platform did not become anchored in the mobility policy institutions, consequently 
the SLUIZO/MOZO actor network fell apart. 
In the case of Mechelen, some actors stated to have learned from the MOZO 
experience, for instance by politically anchoring the actor network in the mobility 
decision-making process, and by expressing engagements and by specifying 
financial contributions. 
In both cases the proximity of elections interfered with the translation of the actor 
networks and their institutionalisation process. The MOZO initiative was criticised 
for not being effective, and party politics were never far away. In the case of 
Mechelen, the transport region council postpones its decisions (cf. interregional 
mobility plan) till after the elections. As such, cooperations lose vigour, though at 
the other hand, that political support or backup proofs to be important. 
The transport region approach in Antwerp shows some major differences in orgware 
compared to the other pilot transport regions. This proves that a tailor-made 
implementation of the “transport region” is possible, but is not always translated 
into practice (cf. other pilot transport regions). The transport region Antwerp 
emerged from a combination of a top-down and a bottom-up story resulting in an 
actual mix of involved actors, which does not apply for any other pilot. The regional 
cooperation for mobility, is thus crystallising, but whether this approach will pay 
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off, will depend on the tailor made translations and actor networks. Because, when 
they do not, they might end up as in the Dutch case, where many of the earlier 
established transport regions have been abolished later, because they did not have 
enough added value, except for the transport regions of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
The Hague. 
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This chapter elaborates on an entrepreneurial public initiative that introduces 
the market principle in mobility: De Verkeersonderneming (VO) Rotterdam and its 
real world MaaS application. This case indirectly relates to the former chapter as 
the VO also deals with regional mobility cooperation, but from a different – out of 
the box – angle. Their creative character makes the difference; the VO is not just 
another new intergovernmental cooperation but entails more. This is proved by 
the many references to the VO and its projects as best practices by interviewees 
from the former case studies. Therefore, we will shed light on the origins, context 
and organisation of the VO. The marketplace for mobility is discussed in particular, 
because that approach has been translated to the Flemish mobility practice as well, 
for instance, in the city of Antwerp, where the initiatives are clustered under the 
umbrella of ‘Slim Naar Antwerpen’. That the approach is translated and institutiona-
lised in other mobility policy contexts proves its success. To find some clues for that 
success, we deconstruct the actor network of the VO and try to find the windows of 
opportunity that were necessary to establish the new governance approach, and we 
identify the applied governance strategies. The marketplace for mobility in Antwerp 
will also be discussed briefly at the end of the chapter.
6.1
Problematisation
Figure 52  Problematisation – accessibility of City and port of Rotterdam requires cooperation
In 2008, the road authorities wanted to anticipate and counteract the traffic misery 
that was expected during the planned major road works at the A15 in Rotterdam. 
The accessibility of the city and the port of Rotterdam had to be guaranteed. During 
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the five-year works, the capacity shortage on the A15 was expected to be 20%61. By 
lack of a decent transport alternative in the area, the present road network would 
become quite susceptible to congestion during peak hours and in case of calamities, 
see Figure 53. Even after having upgraded the A15, the (lack of) river crossings 
would remain the major bottleneck62, but would be addressed later (see Figure 54).
Figure 53  Road network and access to the port. Source: PlanMER NWO, https://www.cob.nl. 
Figure 54  Options for extra river crossing west of the city of Rotterdam, the Blankenburg option
(route Krabbeplas West – in yellow) was retained. Source: http://vervoersplanoloog.blogspot.com. 
61 It was stipulated that the contractor should guarantee a capacity of 90% of the original 
capacity of the A15. At the same time, the traffic prognosis expected an increase of 10%. 
Consequently, the total capacity shortage for the coming five years of road works was estimated 
at 20%.
62 In the meantime, the planning process and intensive participation trajectory (together with 
100 stakeholders and citizens) of the LIP Blankenburgverbinding, as a most wanted extra western 
river crossing, started somewhere in 2008. In the beginning of 2016 the Tracébesluit (cf. planMER 
or EIA) was finalised. The construction of the project is planned for the second half of 2018.
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Within the existing structure of authorities, adequately responding to this 
substantial capacity shortage appeared impossible. This forced the authorities 
from all governmental levels to think about cooperating in a new way (i.e. the 
obligatory passage point). As such, the actor network translation started: enter 
the problematisation phase (cf. Figure 52). The specific purpose of the cooperation 
was addressing and compensating the road capacity shortage, by elaborating a 
programme for sustainable, long-term peak avoidances (spitsmijdingen). But where 
and how to start? The Port of Rotterdam had already strived for such a cooperation, 
or even an autonomous transport and traffic authority in the region, for a long time. 
With the upcoming road works, they thought the time right to finally create such 
transport and traffic authority.
Even Rijkswaterstaat (RWS)63, always keen to solve the road problems alone, 
reconsidered. Before, Rijkswaterstaat had made efforts in transport management 
and travel demand reduction. Unfortunately, connecting to the employers to obtain 
a behaviour change seemed more difficult than expected. The eagerness to solve 
the things on their own also applied to the other stakeholders, especially for the 
municipality of Rotterdam. The strong willingness of the port authority had not 
sufficed to establish such kind of cooperation in the past. However, at that time, 
there was an important political momentum as well. The director of the Port of 
Rotterdam, Hans Smits, was a prominent member of the same political party as the 
former Minister of Infrastructure and Public works, Camiel Eurlings. The very start 
of the cooperation began at one of their political encounters; the breakthrough had 
been forced in the political backrooms. 
6.2
Interessement 
De Verkeersonderneming started with 4 parent organisations (moederorganisaties)  
that joined in a partnership: Rijkswaterstaat, the MRDH, the municipality of 
Rotterdam and the Port of Rotterdam. Those four public actors remain central 
in the actor network diagram, but are complemented in the centre by their new 
cooperation: the VO (cf. Figure 52). Why did those four public organisations become 
interessed in the actor network? The influence areas of those authorities largely 
overlap. So, when addressing accessibility in the region of Rotterdam, those 
four authorities become naturally involved. After all, Rijkswaterstaat is the road 
and water authority. The Port of Rotterdam guards the claims of the port and its 
logistics in the region and on the port territory. The municipality of Rotterdam 
and the city region of Rotterdam largely overlap and are responsible for the local 
roads and quality of life issues. Accordingly, they all enter the accessibility issue 
for Rotterdam. Consequently in 2008, Rijkswaterstaat, the former city region of 
Rotterdam (later “transport region” of Rotterdam), the municipality of Rotterdam, 
63 Rijkswaterstaat is part of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and 
responsible for the design, construction, management and maintenance of the main infrastructure 
facilities in The Netherlands. 
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and the Port of Rotterdam joined as partners in De Verkeersonderneming (VO, which 
literally translates as ‘traffic company’ or ‘traffic enterprise’). 
Interestingly, in 2008 when the works started, one of the initiators of the VO 
organised an excursion to Antwerp; the VO was inspired by the impact management 
of the BAM64 regarding the large infrastructure works of the Masterplan Antwerp 
and the Oosterweel Link infrastructure project (see Chapter 7). Especially the efforts 
regarding the temporary viaducts in the city during the major works at the Leien 
had not gone unnoticed. As such, the BAM and the Oosterweel Link story became, 
albeit marginally, enclosed in the actor network of De Verkeersonderneming. Almost 
ten years later, it would be the other way around: people from the city of Antwerp 
and the BAM would visit De Verkeersonderneming, to see how they successfully 
established a marketplace for mobility and how they implemented the associated 
smart measures to keep their region accessible.
Figure 55  Interessement – De Verkeersonderneming becomes encapsulated in a dense network
6.3
Enrolment: actors and organisation
Initially, the cooperation was considered a public-private partnership, with a strong 
business link, thus including business partners and employers’ organisations like 
VNO-NCW65 and Deltalinqs. But that relation gradually disappeared and the VO 
became a public actor on paper. However, if you would ask different people what 
64  BAM: Beheermaatschappij Antwerpen Mobiel, project management company of the 
Oosterweel Link project
65  VNO-NCW: Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO) en het Nederlands Christelijk 
Werkgeversverbond (NCW)
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kind of organisation the VO is, the answer would be more ambiguous. Business 
actors consider the VO as a fellow business partner, whereas public actors look at 
it as an extra public party. In fact, the VO belongs somewhere in between the public 
and the private sphere. The principle was that the paying partners had a say in the 
programme. Accordingly, the link with business actors eventually disappeared and 
they were not included in the Steering Committee anymore, even not without vote. 
At the time that the foundation came into existence, it was stated quite clearly that 
it is the party who pays, who determines. (R. Boshouwers)
In the cooperation agreement, first signed in 2008, the purpose of the partnership 
was clarified, the parent organisations and their roles were specified, and the 
financial engagement and exchange of personnel was set out. The cooperation 
agreement was updated a few times to accommodate to the changing needs and 
function of De Verkeersonderneming. In the agreement the governance structure 
was defined, see Figure 56 and Table 5 for an overview. This structure included 
a steering committee, an account holders group, a director managing the VO 
Foundation, and the VO programme organisation itself, including programme 
managers hired by the VO. When the more creative tasks that accompanied some of 
the projects were carried out by the VO programme organisation, the projects were 
delegated back to the parent organisations for implementation, where they were 
coordinated by project leaders from the parent organisations. 
After a few years of partnership, it became apparent that a separate management 
entity was necessary. The VO established a foundation to enhance the pace and the 
effectiveness of the partnership. The foundation served one specific public purpose: 
reducing the travel need and realising peak avoidances to guarantee the accessi-
bility of the Rotterdam region. In the first phase of the VO, the accessibility 
Figure 56  Organogram of the structure of De Verkeersonderneming (based on SOK)
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of the port region was addressed, as the road works on the A15 would cause severe 
congestion. Consequently, the port authority contributed considerably, as their 
stakes were high in the first phase of the partnership, but their contribution did not 
decrease afterwards, as the port authority saw the merits of the approach.
Although it does not do justice to its creative character, the VO is often called a 
programme organisation, a kind of extra organ to implement the negotiated accessi-
bility interventions. The main objective of the VO is to keep the Rotterdam region 
accessible. How does the cooperation work? First, the programme and priorities 
should be discussed and politically approved by all parent organisations. If so, then 
the VO foundation can do whatever they have to do to make sure, they obtain the 
objectives of that programme and ultimately to keep the city and region accessible. 
How they achieve the goals is not disturbed, nor questioned by politics. Thus, 
the steering committee gives directions to the director of the VO and decides the 
agenda and content of the programme. The vehicle of the foundation allows for a 
more flexible and vigorous performance. The director is the only member of the 
foundation, but he can easily hire experts and people from the parent organisation 
to develop a strategy and implement the programme. Therefore, VO is a very flexible 
organisation that can act vigorously. The specific purpose of peak avoidances is 
always kept in mind. The director of the VO, A. Van der Bend formulated it as follows. 
We have two basic principles. First, we have to aim for the result. If we do 
not achieve the result, we simply have to stop. Second, we can never achieve 
those results in a way that is already familiar to the way the parent organisa-
tions work. Because in that case we as organisation should leave as well. 
(translated from Dutch, A. Van der Bend)
The VO foundation vehicle thus enabled and ensured creative solutions in fields 
that had not been explored before, such as marketing strategies. Take, for instance, 
the congestion-loving animal (filedier) campaign, alluding to herds of people taking 
the car during rush hour. However, the parent organisations were not always fond 
of, or were initially even sceptical of, the VO treading those new grounds. But that 
might have had to do with the organisational culture differences between the VO 
and its parents as well. The Port of Rotterdam had always been more strict; they 
focussed on the agreed points and wanted to know how things would happen. This 
often clashed with the innovative, creative, and flexible way of doing things in the 
VO. Although some people from the port authority worked part-time in the VO, the 
distance between the VO and the Port of Rotterdam remained large. This was less 
the case with, for instance, the Municipality of Rotterdam. The transport region 
Rotterdam (or city region) was still searching its specific role and rather stood on 
the side lines. The role of the province was marginalised and limited to membership 
of the advisory committee. In the region of Rotterdam, the province was not a major 
accessibility player (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 2008). Years later, when 
the VO was acknowledged by foreign organisations as a best practice for mobility 
governance, the parent organisations gradually became less sceptical and even 
positive about their partnership.
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Formally, the VO and the Foundation only elaborate and carry out the programme. It 
is an executive body, that acts upon the decisions made in the Steering Committee. 
The formal responsibilities or powers remain with the parent organisations. For 
instance, if the solution that has been decided by the VO programme demands 
new road infrastructures, this task is delegated to the parent organisation 
responsible for the infrastructure, i.e. Rijkswaterstaat. As such, the solution space 
of the partners is utilised and maximised. The VO limits its activities to engaging 
in activities that the parents cannot. In fact, you can consider the construction 
like this; each governmental layer, from the local to the national level, has its 
own independence, although in line with the higher level decisions. But those 
governmental levels now directly collaborate in the VO. When the objectives are 
shared or parallel, the VO now realises them in an innovative way. The cooperation 
agreement also stipulates that the managing director of the VO should be assigned 
to an official from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment or Rijkswater- 
staat because they could not be partner in the Foundation (determined by the 
Second Chamber). Appointing someone from their department ensured not 
only their connection with the VO, but also enabled them to keep an eye on 
the ministries’ expenses (especially during the national mobility management 
programmes after 2012). 
The VO was initially conceived to be a small organisation of around ten people that 
would engage in the coordination and streamlining of all accessibility projects 
and interventions. But over the years, when specific knowledge, other than that of 
the parent organisations, was required to realise the needed behavioural change, 
the organisation had to attract external people and the VO grew (60 people on the 
payroll at a certain point in time). The people working for the VO partly came from 
the parent organisations or were external experts. Knowledge was exchanged 
between the parent organisations and the VO. Only involving external people in 
implementing the VO programme was deemed risky; due to a lack of  exchange, no 
lessons would be learned or specific knowledge or ‘memory’ would be built within 
the parent organisations. Likewise, a model of staff exchange and cross fertilisation 
was strived for. 
 “If at some point there is ordinary work again, then it just has to leave the VO 
and has to be returned to the existing parent organisations. (translated from 
Dutch, F. Bus)
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Steering committee – Each of the parent organisations or parties has a  
representative in the Steering committee: the Municipality  
with the alderman for Transport and Traffic, the city region  
with the portfolio holder for Traffic and Transport, Rijks- 
waterstaat with the HID Zuid-Holland and the port authority 
with its director for infrastructure & maritime Affairs.
– The Steering committee approves proposals and products of 
De Verkeersonderneming.  
– The Steering committee also serves as an escalation level for 
the Managing Director of De Verkeersonderneming and for the 
board of Account Holders.
Account holders – Each of the parties and the director of the VO sits in this 
board.
– Each account holder is the primary contact within his or her  
party for matters relating to the VO and the agreements in the  
steering committee.
– They discuss the progress, issues and obstacles encountered  
by the VO and the foundation.
De Verkeersonderneming (VO) – The VO is headed by a managing director. 
– The VO is responsible for drawing up and coordinating  
mobility management projects, while its implementation  
often lies with the VO foundation.
(Managing) Director VO – The director of the VO chairs the steering committee. He  
does not have a vote, but has an advisory role in the steering  
committee. 
– The director of the VO is accountable to the steering  
committee on the basis of the annual plan of the VO.
Programme agency – The programme agency carries out the tasks and assignments 
of the steering committee under the direction of the director,  
as set out in the cooperation agreement. 
– Furthermore, it is responsible for the communication,  
environment and relationship management of the VO and the  
foundation.
Foundation  
Verkeersonderneming
– The foundation is responsible for the implementation of the  
programme.
– The foundation prepares the projects, takes care of the  
financing, executes tenders, directs the execution of the  
projects, or hires a third party to do so. The foundation also  
prepares agreements with third parties, negotiates and  
concludes the relevant conditions.
– The board of the foundation consists of one person: the same  
person that is also the managing director of the VO. The board 
is charged with forming and implementing the general and  
daily policy within the objectives of the foundation,  
implementing the approved annual plan, and representing the 
foundation.
– The director and the CEO of the VO is in principle the same  
person.
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Advisory Council – The advisory council consists of representatives of relevant  
partners for the region’s accessibility task, who are not  
represented in the steering committee.
– Those members are representatives of Deltalinqs,  
Netherlands Transport and Logistics (Transport en Logistiek  
Nederland), Chamber of Commerce, Municipality of  
Spijkenisse, EVO, the province of Zuid-Holland and the  
Rotterdam/Rijnmond Police.
Table 5  Overview organisation De Verkeersonderneming. Source: based on Ministerie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat (2008).
6.4
Mobilisation of allies: evolving activities
Figure 57  The mobilisation of allies – De Verkeersonderneming is institutionalised and is 
responsible for new activities
Accessibility A15 (2008)
Initially, the VO was established to reduce the traffic congestion by concentrating 
on peak avoidances. Several temporary peak avoidance programs were installed for 
rewarding people when they avoided traveling during peak hours by car (Palm and 
van der Meulen 2014). The first years of the works on the A15, the VO had to take 
20% of the commuters out of their cars. Because they succeeded, the municipality 
of Rotterdam asked an additional 2000 peak avoidances in and around the city (Palm 
and van der Meulen 2014). 
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BOX 
Rewarding the peak avoidances in Rotterdam 
(Spitsscoren reward project)
It is interesting to see why people took part in the reward project; how they 
avoided the peak and whether their behavioural change was sustainable. The 
paper of Palm and van der Meulen (2014) evaluates the reward project in more 
detail. Here, the most interesting results are highlighted. 
In 2009, soon after start of the A15 works, the reward project was initiated in 
the port area and went on until the end of 2011. Of the targeted people (i.e. car 
drivers) in the area, some 2000 participants were selected and became involved. 
The rewarding scheme included €5 in the morning peak ( i.e. 6 – 9 AM) and €1.50 
in the evening peak (4 – 7 PM)66. From August 2012, the scheme changed to €3 
and €3.50 respectively for morning and evening peak avoidances. A reduction of 
about 800 passenger cars (7%) was achieved in the morning peak and of about 
600 in the evening peak (only rewarded from May 2011). After having adjusted the 
evening reward, peak avoidances increased but they never reached the morning 
peak results. 
Figure 58 illustrates that the group of participants, i.e. their number and 
behaviour, was quite stable across the three years of the project. From the 
participants that started in 2009 or 2010, two-thirds were still active in June 
2012. A significant aspect is that more than half of the participants has reported 
to maintain their peak avoidances without monetary reward. They probably got 
accustomed to the new behaviour and they experienced the benefits.
 
Figure 58  Participants and their degree of activity during the project. 
Source: Palm and van der Meulen (2014, figure 8).
66  Most participants that were avoiding the morning peak, logically also were already avoiding 
the evening peak (as a consequence of completing their working hours from a new starting point 
outside the peak) , therefore avoiding the evening peak was rewarded less.
164 DE VERKEERSONDERNEMING ROTTERDAM
The major effect of the rewarding project was that car commuters changed 
their departure time or took another route, see Figure 59. ‘Working from home’ 
and ‘changing travel mode’ did scarcely occur, probably because the specific 
work conditions in the harbour did not allow those options. As there were 
no comfortable alternatives for the car in the area. The shift towards public 
transport was rather limited. Most of the participants only tried one new 
alternative that they did not use before. The major motives for participation are 
illustrated in Figure 60. The monetary reward was the most important driver 
among participants, followed by the benefits of less off-peak traffic, less 
congestion, and getting a smart-phone to communicate easily the project. Other 
motives regarding health benefits by using the bike, or trying new alternatives, 
were reported less.
Figure 59  Travel behaviour of the participants in the morning peak. 
Source: Palm and van der Meulen (2014, figure 6).
Figure 60  Motives for participation. Source: Palm and van der Meulen (2014, figure 9).
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The development of a Marketplace for Mobility and the national programmes:  
‘Beter Benutten’ (2011-2013) and the sequel ‘Beter Benutten Vervolg’ (2014-2017) 
In the years following 2008, the economic crisis had struck and the financial 
prognoses for the coming years did not allow for new infrastructure investments. 
So in 2011, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment launched the Beter 
Benutten programme (BB, ‘optimise capacity’ programme), focusing on smaller 
and smarter interventions for a better accessibility. The national BB programme, 
for which 170 million euros was reserved in total, was implemented by Rijkswa-
terstaat. In Rotterdam, the VO approach was paying off: two reward projects were 
successfully wrapped up (SpitsScoren and Spitsmijden010, resp. 715 and 1,638 
peak avoidances). Therefore, the transport region Rotterdam and the other parent 
organisations wanted the VO to implement the BB programme for their region. 
Within the BB programme, the VO was expected to realise 15,000 peak avoidances, 
distributed across multiple initiatives as illustrated in Figure 61.
Figure 61  BB target peak avoidances (left) versus registered peak avoidances (right). 
Source: De Verkeersonderneming (2015: 29).
Since the BB programme was assigned to the VO, the latter became a different 
organisation. The government appointed a new director, Aernout Van der Bend, who 
had been involved in shaping the Beter Benutten programme at Rijkswaterstaat. 
For most of the BB programme (smart measures or demand-side management, 
and behavioural change interventions) the work could not be delegated to the 
parent organisations; they did not have experience in those fields. Meanwhile, the 
marketplace philosophy was elaborated, and was actually launched in the middle 
of 2013. As a result, the programme agency had grown considerably during those 
years. The BB programme focused not only on behavioural change and impact 
management, thus on the orgware approach, but also the software (ITS) and 
hardware (new infrastructure) pillars were elaborated, though they were always 
accompanied by an orgware agenda. 
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During the BB programme the VO aspired to fine-tune the cooperation between 
government, industry, and communities. The idea grew that the VO had to take 
up a more facilitating role instead of a resolving one. They had to engage citizens 
and employers more actively in the mobility behavioural turn. Therefore, a broader 
palette of alternative mobility options had to be created. Soon all efforts of the 
VO (whether these were campaigns, reward projects, employers or inhabitants 
approaches) were part of a major logic: considering mobility as a service (MaaS) 
and setting up a marketplace for mobility. The process through which they were 
integrated is elaborated in more detail in Section 6.4.1.
Future activities and anchoring the lessons from the Beter Benutten programmes
The municipality of Rotterdam asked the VO to support the mobility management 
during the infrastructure works on the Maastricht tunnel, starting in 2017. In 
collaboration with the MRDH, the VO also aimed at improving the accessibility of 
the Rotterdam-The Hague Airport. Furthermore, the marketplace for mobility was 
expanded. As such, the future of the VO seemed confirmed, although not all of the 
founding fathers agreed on the on-going collaboration in the exact form of the VO. 
As some argue that the VO was not destined to be a permanent collaboration or 
organisation.67 (cf. R. Boshouwers). 
6.4.1
Marketplace for Mobility Rotterdam
6.4.1.1 Re-inventing themselves: a marketplace for mobility  
   (new problematisation) 
To generate more transport alternatives or mobility options, the VO sought salvation 
in the market principle, they had to find a way to create a private third party. 
Besides, at the time, it was calculated how much the private actors and the public 
actors each spent on transport/mobility or infrastructure. Remarkably, private 
companies together had spent more money reimbursing travel expenses than what 
all public authorities together had invested in traffic management or infrastructure 
works. Travel expenses were ranked the third largest expense after salaries and 
housing (De Verkeersonderneming 2015). These findings indicated that there was 
a lot of potential for a marketplace for alternative mobility services addressing the 
specific travel demand. 
By creating a marketplace for mobility and integrating it within a wider (mobility) 
behavioural change agenda, the VO engaged in organising its mobility as a service 
(MaaS). The VO even claimed to be the first international attempt to implement 
this new mobility concept at regional scale. Recently, MaaS has become a fancy 
but often vague concept that is embraced by mobility service providers. However, 
originally, it was defined as follows. 
67  R. Boshouwers (consultant marketplace for mobility Rotterdam), personal communication, 
11/05/2017.
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Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is a mobility distribution model in which a 
customer’s major transportation needs are met over one interface and are 
offered by a service provider. Typically services are bundled into a package 
– similar to mobile phone price-plan packages. The vision is to see the 
whole transport sector as a co-operative, interconnected eco - system, 
providing services reflecting the needs of customers. The boundaries 
between different transport modes are blurred or disappear completely. 
The ecosystem consists of transport infrastructure, transportation services, 
transport information and payment services. (Hietanen 2014: 2-3)
6.4.1.2 Interessement: the philosophy behind the marketplace
Figure 62  Overview of activities VO and positioning of the Marketplace for mobility.
Developing, facilitating, and innovating the marketplace for mobility is to be 
considered as the core business of the VO, see Figure 62. The orgware pillar is 
amongst the most acknowledged of all the VO activities, not only by the parent 
organisations, but also by foreign organisations that want to set up their own 
marketplace for mobility. The philosophy behind it includes both raising awareness 
and applying marketing strategies to launch alternative mobility services. The 
goal is to make the peak hour drivers aware of the other possibilities and of their 
sometimes irrational travel choices. Therefore, the Filedier campaign, ‘Wild! van de 
Spits’, was launched in the beginning of the BB programme, in 2011. The framing 
was important, as most people were not aware of their travel choices and of their 
own behaviour (often simply a matter of habit). To elaborate this pillar of the 
mobility market strategy, behavioural psychologists and marketers were integrated 
into the VO. During this period, the VO rapidly expanded. Given that the activities 
were totally out of the comfort zone of the parent organisations, they had to be filled 
in from the outside. In the ‘Wild van de spits!’ campaign, the focus was on making 
people aware of their (bad) travel behaviour (see Figure 63). After a while, the tone  
of the campaign altered and the alternatives were positively approached (see  
Figure 64) (De Verkeersonderneming 2015). 
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Figure 63  Filedier campaign, raising awareness about habitual travel behaviour. 
Source: De Verkeersonderneming (http://www.filedier.nl/).
Figure 64  Filedier campaign, addressing the alternatives in a positive way. 
Source: De Verkeersonderneming (http://www.filedier.nl/).
To increase awareness, the Wild! van de Spits reward project was launched in 
Rotterdam. The idea behind this was that the participants (11,000 in the end) would 
continue to avoid the rush hour after the rewarding period, using services from the 
marketplace for mobility. With almost 6,000 peak avoidances per day the project 
was successful. 
In addition to that campaign, the VO specifically addressed employers and 
residents (werkgevers- en bewonersaanpak) to make them aware of the alterna-
tives. Accordingly, various (small) communities (inhabitants) and ambassadors 
(employers) emerged in the region. Good examples are employers such as 
Alphatron (producer of electronics), the Erasmus MC (university medical centre), 
and IHC (producer of offshore, dredging and mining equipment and vessels), who 
encouraged their employees to travel differently. 
from peak hour driver, to peak hour avoider (translated from Dutch)
Van een spitsrijder een spitsmijder maken (R. Boshouwers)
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6.4.1.3 Enrolment and mobilisation of allies: How to establish the  
   Marketplace for mobility? 
After having assessed the financial and legal constructions,68 the traditional public 
tenders seemed the most adequate option to launch the marketplace for mobility. 
Within the strict format of the public tender, the VO added as much creativity as 
possible. As they wanted to end up with different mobility service suppliers, they 
aimed for 30 winners instead of one. Therefore, the tender consisted of a number of 
parcels, each targeting a package of peak avoidances to realise. As such, the public 
assignment of realising peak avoidances was distributed amongst a diverse range 
of new private suppliers. The VO co-financed 50%, but only if the promised peak 
avoidances were achieved (performance condition instead of intention). But the VO 
supported and monitored its new suppliers; accessibility managers were hired for 
additional professional support, and the VO campaigns and data were used to the 
benefit of the new-born suppliers. However, no cure, no pay!
To be able to launch the tenders quickly, the foundation vehicle was extremely 
useful. Meanwhile, there had been three rounds of public tenders. Furthermore, the 
mobility market even got a counterpart in Antwerp. 
Together the new mobility services realise approximately 3,000 peak avoidances. 
Some examples of successful mobility services are still part of the range of mobility 
services within the marketplace for mobility:
 • The service provider Waterweg Rotterdam BV carries out contract transport 
with the water taxi for various employers (initiators Alphatron, Van Oord, 
and later IHC and Hollandia). Employees living south of Rotterdam park their 
car in the ‘Veranda’ garage near the Feyenoord stadium and are transported 
by boat to the companies (and vice versa). This service offers 275 peak 
avoidances.
 • Bicycle discount scheme (Tweewieler Kortingsregeling) is a purchase subsidy 
on a bicycle, (e-) bike or a scooter, that is largely put on the market by local 
bicycle dealers, and thus a mobility service ‘avant la lettre’. At the end of 
2014, there were almost 2,000 participants who altogether realised 1,019 
structural peak avoidances.
 • The cooperation with the Gadering Express, a relatively small contract 
transport service (by small vans), is also pursued. The operation of the 
express service is entirely privately funded from 1 January 2015. The service 
has 135 customers, the average number of people boarding per day is 40, 
which accounts for 30 structural peak avoidances. 
68  In addition to the instrument of the public tender, also the grant-based support and a Mobility 
fund were considered.
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BOX 
Marketplace for mobility in Antwerp
Problematisation
Figure 65  Problematisation – the city’s role in the accessibility and communication about it
The origins of the marketplace for mobility cannot be separated from the 
implementation process of the Masterplan 2020, and the Oosterweel Link project 
(this will be elaborated in chapter 7). In that process, the city of Antwerp took 
on a rather marginal role, to the city’s regret, as they did not approve the impact 
management and communication strategies of the BAM, the company leading 
the process. During the negotiations that eventually forced a breakthrough, the 
city reclaimed a more central role in its own mobility story. This is no surprise, 
as the major part of the works was situated on the city’s territory. A transparent 
governance structure was set up by the city to guarantee a smooth communication  
and alignment among the different masterplan projects and sites around 
Antwerp69. 
Interessement
As illustrated in the actor network diagram, in Figure 66, the city reconnected 
with their city’s mobility, got itself into the network and took the lead in the 
communication around the projects (central position, right next to the BAM). 
70Accordingly, the city could keep an eye on the accessibility information, where it 
69  At the time, the mandate of the intendant had not yet been introduced, so there were no 
super workshops guaranteeing a broad cross project communication and in which all parties were 
involved.
 
70  Note that the actor networks shown here are a zoom of the actor network of the VO, as such, 
therefore the VO is displayed as a big node, while in fact, for the case of Antwerp, that link has 
been very important but the VO as actor has become rather marginal in the further story of the 
marketplace for mobility in Antwerp.
AWV
Supply-side measures
Masterplan Antwerpen
Oosterweel Link
BAM
Governor
De Lijn
De Vlaamse Waterweg nv
DMOW
R. Boshouwers
Verkeersonderneming
Rebel
A15
171
went wrong in the past, and elaborated the ‘Smarter towards Antwerp’(Slim naar 
Antwerpen) campaign; an effort to cluster all communication about construction 
sites or accessibility (how to reach the city as an inhabitant, visitor, etc.). Several 
masterplan projects became interessed with the marketplace actor network and 
Slim Naar Antwerpen: The Noorderlijn, the Oosterweel Link, etc. Before, this was 
provided by the various instances or partners in the projects themselves. For 
instance, BAM dealt with the impact management, whereas the public transport 
works were communicated by De Lijn. The result was a dispersed and not always 
transparent communication, and impact management. 
Although the Masterplan 2020 for the region of Antwerp initially intended a focus 
on demand-side management, this pillar was soon forgotten; only the infrastruc-
tural pillar (supply side) was elaborated. The city of Antwerp tried to re-engage 
with an integral demand-side management in the Slim naar Antwerpen platform. 
As such, it entailed more than the previous impact management measures 
(minder hinder maatregelen). A marketplace for mobility was developed to 
provide more alternatives to cars. Therefore, the city of Antwerp visited the VO in 
Rotterdam, by mid-2015. City officials wanted to investigate the communication 
and the impact management strategies of the VO, to guard the accessibility of the 
city. Later, R. Boshouwers, one of the initiators of the marketplace for mobility in 
Rotterdam was hired to support the setup a marketplace for mobility in Antwerp. 
Enrolment and mobilisation of allies 
The first call for projects took place in the autumn of 2016. An independent jury 
selected ten projects from the various entries. The jury consisted of representa-
tives of the Flanders Institute for Mobility (Vlaams instituut voor Mobiliteit, VIM), 
the Flanders Institute for Logistics (Vlaams instituut voor Logistiek, VIL) and De 
Verkeersonderneming Rotterdam. The following ten ‘winning’ projects achieved 
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Figure 66  Interessement of the city of Antwerp – taking the lead in the accessibility 
communication
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peak avoidances by offering feasible transport alternatives or services (https://
www.slimnaarantwerpen.be). 
  • Avantida – DepotX launched an internet-based solution to request
 alternative drop-off/pick-up locations outside Antwerp for empty sea  
 containers. In this way freight transport in the bottleneck zones could be  
 reduced.
  • Blue Line Logistics is committed to a modal shift through an innovative
    inland shipping solution, Pallet Shuttle Barges, and the use of (temporarily) 
   idle capacity on transhipment quays in the city.
  • Plastiek Van Wauwe, a dealer in plastic materials for construction and
 industry, created an extra collection point in Schoten. This allowed 
 customers to avoid the bottleneck zone in Deurne, in particular at the 
 crossing with the Albert canal.
  • Plastiek Van Wauwe also created an extra pick-up point in the southern 
   edge of Antwerp. This allowed customers coming from the south to avoid 
   congested zones.
  • Cloudbike would use ‘Bike-sharing on a cloud’ to offer a fleet of 300 shared 
   bikes via a smartphone application. This system would become 
   complementary to the existing Velo bike share system. 
  • Jobruil.be (job exchange platform) is a unique platform that links  
   employees with the same skills and interests via an advanced database.  
   Employees can then exchange their jobs and work closer to home.
  • Mellowcabs are compact electric vehicles used in strategic locations to  
   accommodate the first or last miles of commuters or visitors.
  • Taxistop wanted to expand the carpool.be platform in 5 pilot companies  
   in the port of Antwerp. This resulted in an extended database, so that a  
   large number of extra carpool matches could be reached.
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Figure 67  Enrolment and mobilisation of allies: establishing a market for mobility in Antwerp
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  • BAAV – The office bus allowed employees to work during their home-work  
   journey. The commuting time was then considered working time. 
  • B2Bike – Bike2Go is a user-friendly system for companies that want to  
   offer electric service bikes to their employees, so that they become less  
   dependent on the car for work-related trips.
In addition to those ten initiatives, 4 strategic partnerships were forged after 
a European tender in April 2017, delivering three demand-side management 
initiatives. Together the three initiatives were to obtain 3,000 peak avoidances 
(https://www.slimnaarantwerpen.be). 
• TimesUpp, the personal travel assistant 
TimesUpp is a personal travel assistant that warns the user of unexpected 
delays, even before the journey starts. You indicate when you want to arrive at 
your destination and the app shows the best route and calculates the optimal 
time of departure. The app encourages the user to behave in a smarter way, for 
example by leaving earlier or later, or by choosing an alternative transport mode 
to replace the car. TimesUpp has been developed by Innovactory International, a 
Dutch company that has realised over 1,000 peak avoidances in Rotterdam with 
such an application.
• Olympus Mobility 
The Olympus Mobility app offers employees a total solution for different modes 
of transport. The app allows the purchase of tickets for the train, tram, bus or 
bicycle and even allows the payment of parking fees. The employer can thus 
easily monitor the mobility budget per employee with only one invoice for the 
entire range of used transport modes. 
• Location-related travel advice with the Slim to Antwerp app (SNAPP)
Where many apps stop at the front door or on the car park, SNAPP leads the 
user all the way up to the office chair. This can be a useful service for hospitals, 
cultural centres, event locations, and restaurants. The app allows an accurate 
estimation of the total duration of the journey and the exact route. Calculations 
incorporate for instance how long it takes from the bus stop or parking lot to the 
conference room, etc. SNAPP is being developed by Advier, a Dutch company that 
has realised a substantial amount of peak avoidances in the region Arnhem- 
Nijmegen using this kind of technology. The app is developed in collaboration 
with Localise, a Belgian company that partners Google Maps. 
Like the philosophy in Rotterdam, the Antwerp marketplace also supports those 
new-born initiatives intensively; the strategy engages in a citizens/employees 
approach and an employers’ approach to target and trigger the mobility 
behaviour or foot-print of the respective citizens/employees or employers 
in the impacted area. The Slim naar Antwerpen platform not only covers the 
information on accessibility and construction sites pillar, but also creates 
alternative options for employers, commuters, and visitors (see Figure 68). In 
addition to the new mobility options delivered by the marketplace, the strategic 
partnerships, and the collaborations with citizens and employers, the Slim Naar 
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Antwerpen umbrella takes other initiatives as well to reach a behavioural change. 
The marketplace offers a discount arrangement for bikes and provides service 
boxes to increase bike comfort. Some pilot projects around working smarter 
(Slim Werken) were set up. Networking events to exchange learning experiences 
regarding the mobility footprint of companies are also fostered. Furthermore, 
various (often specific, individual) information tools have been developed and 
fiscal advice and extra training are provided to stimulate the demand-side 
management strategies. Nevertheless, the solutions and investments by the  
Slim naar Antwerpen approach need to be much more creative as the financial 
means of which it disposes are about 10 times smaller than the means of the VO 
to establish the marketplace in Rotterdam.
The Marketplace for Mobility was conceptualised and launched before an 
intendant had set foot on Antwerp territory. There were then no super workshops, 
nor could one speak of a Future Covenant or transport region Antwerp. For the 
civil servants developing and monitoring the Slim naar Antwerpen campaign, it 
is not clear how their platform and services will be merged with the processes of 
the recently established transport region of Antwerp after the Future Covenant. 
The city of Antwerp is trying to keep engaged with the mobility decisions on its 
territory as much as possible. Yet some actors stated their fear that the mobility 
issue in Antwerp remains within the decision and action of a Flemish perspective 
only. Some recall with regret the ‘Poort Oost’ platform71 led by governor Berx, in 
which the city of Antwerp did not have a major say. 
Figure 68  Overview of the offered tools and services by the Slim naar Antwerpen platform.
Source: city of Antwerp.
71  a platform to build a (public) support base in the Oosterweel Link project
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6.5
Results and discussion
In the region of Rotterdam, the vested mobility actors opted for a radical orgware 
shift, by adopting a co-evolutionary governance, that structurally coupled to 
and facilitated a CAS of mobility. Both aspects of our two tiers approach were 
addressed: structurally coupling the actors, and setting the ‘right’ conditions. 
VO orgware – Structurally coupling the actors
The vested public actors started the cooperation initiative to keep the region 
accessible in times of road works and ever-increasing car traffic. Not only did the 
vested actors get involved, but also citizens, daily commuters, and employers. Thus, 
in addition to public actors also civil and business actors became part of the actor 
network and were targeted appropriately (cf. citizen approach versus employers 
approach). 
Though the VO can be considered a new public actor, the link with the parent 
organisations has not been broken. More importantly, the parent organisations 
remain central in the actor network diagram, but they are supplemented by the 
VO; the actor network of the VO became a supplementary network to their own. 
To maximise the capacity and accumulate knowledge and experience, the VO 
only engages in actions or projects that the parents are not familiar with. Each 
actor keeps his specialty. The structure (cf. cooperation agreement) of the VO has 
been adapted a few times over the years, to fit the functioning of the VO and the 
evolving challenges to tackle. Political interference remains situated at the level 
of the programme (discussed by the steering committee); once the programme is 
decided, the VO is entrusted to carry it out. Because they are held accountable for 
the programme towards the steering committee and the board of account holders, 
the progress was closely monitored, for instance, with regard to peak avoidances 
and number of involved companies in the employers approach. The VO has always 
cultivated the relation with its parent organisations. Although that is sometimes 
a balancing act, as the management cultures of the parents sometimes largely 
diverge. Yet, the balance has always been found so far. 
When the Beter Benutten programmes reserved national funding for smart 
measures, the VO was assigned to roll out those programmes in the region of 
Rotterdam. As such, the VO actor network has mobilised all possible means for the 
accessibility in the Rotterdam region. If we take a look at the mobility orgware of the 
VO, we see that all parts of the schematic multi-mobility market model are targeted 
(Figure 69). Whereas the parent organisations already cover all mobility arena’s, the 
VO aligns them and focuses on the gaps: the behavioural change and attitudes, and 
the creation of more alternatives to cars. We can say that the VO not only knows how 
to link networks to one another, but also how to create consistency between all the 
subsystems of the CAS. 
 
Setting the conditions for change 
Thanks to a political momentum, the vested actors from all mobility markets got 
engaged in the VO, a kind of recombination and innovative association between 
already existing parties, entrusted with keeping the region accessible. As the 
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involved parent organisations covered all three mobility markets, the opportunities 
for finding solutions were many; one could aim for an integral planning solution. 
Solutions combined orgware, software, and hardware measures, and targeted all 
parts of the mobility CAS. Though the origins of the VO are of infrastructural nature 
(A15), the solutions and interventions exceed the infrastructural sphere. The travel 
demand and accessibility issues were examined thoroughly; all stakeholders from 
employers to employees and inhabitants were addressed. But as those efforts were 
not sufficient in curbing the peak travel demand, a marketplace for mobility was 
launched, to provide Mobility as a Service. The legal and financial frameworks were 
set for new mobility providers (niches) to enter the scene and take down the peak 
travel. Furthermore, the evolutions were monitored according to peak avoidances. 
As such, the parent organisations could keep track of the evolutions of the VO. 
The successive BB-programmes, in which the VO got involved not only mobilised 
more means, but also left their marks on the organisation. The VO grew, and 
although the organisation remained faithful to its creative spirit and ‘Pietje Bell’ 
role (cf. the marketplace and the Filedier campaign), it rather became a programme 
implementation organisation. 
With the BB programme agreements, the cooperation between the parents and 
the VO has been set for the next years. Future structural couplings between the 
various mobility markets are ensured, as the programme approach got taken up 
in the multi-year infrastructure, spatial planning and transport programme (MIRT, 
meerjarenprogramma infrastructuur, ruimte en transport), that is composed by the 
national and regional level together. In summary, the mobility orgware in Rotterdam 
develops beyond the plan and even beyond establishing new public parties, because 
the association with the citizens and businesses was made. 
As the marketplace for mobility proved successful regarding peak avoidances, the 
VO gained widespread interest. Some of the founding fathers of the marketplace 
for mobility in Rotterdam even got involved in setting up such a marketplace in 
Figure 69  Schematic overview of the VO orgware.
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Antwerp. The financial means, the fiscal, and legal framework are, however, very 
different in Flanders. By creating the marketplace for mobility, the city of Antwerp 
aspired to keep the city accessible during the coming years of road works in and 
around Antwerp (cf. Chapter 7). 
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7.1
Selection of case and specific methodology
The Oosterweel Link LIP (Antwerp, Belgium) is the research object of this case 
study for several reasons. The project process is already long lasting (mid 1990s 
– …), the project is controversial and the process can be characterised by various 
rounds of opposition resulting in change. Furthermore, there is a sense of urgency 
as the congested mobility situation necessitates action. The notion for precisely 
answering to mobility issues has transformed over the years. The project process is 
characterised by several rounds of opposition during which the course of the project 
drastically changed.
The theoretical framework suggests looking into the actors first. By following the 
actors and their actor networks, the project is unravelled; the origins and evolutions 
are traced. The ANT-translation phases were used to structure the Oosterweel 
Link project’s course. This allowed to figure out which actors were in charge or 
outlined the project. Second, the conditions are discussed; the setting in which the 
actors took their decisions and developed their own goals. A roundtable discussion 
was organised to let the Oosterweel Link protagonists elaborate on the project’s 
planning process. They were asked to give their opinion about the proposed 
co-evolutionary governance. They discussed how they could understand such an 
approach, when applied to the Oosterweel Link project. 
Ringland was distinguished as an interesting citizen movement to follow. This 
because the initiative acted differently from the previous ones regarding organisa-
tional aspects, influencing the agenda and making the ideas and concepts public. 
Therefore, the initiative was followed in its initial footsteps and an ethnographic 
research method was adopted. Ringland gave us the opportunity to take note 
of their day-to-day activities by giving access to daily email correspondence, 
frequently organised board meetings, events organised by Ringland, etc. For that 
part of the analysis we concentrated on the time-lapse in which Ringland expanded; 
from the early start at the end of 2012 until the end of 2016. After that period, the 
major evolutions were still registered, but an active observation of the initiative 
was no longer necessary. The initiative had matured by then and got involved in the 
Oosterweel Link story. As such, the different sides – or even camps? – of the project 
were merged somewhere in the last translation phases. 
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7.2
Complex interplay of different actors and their 
translation processes
7.2.1
First translation round: How to solve mobility issue in and around 
Antwerp? 
7.2.1.1 First Problematisation – once upon a time an optimistic and  
   futuristic infrastructure story starts... (1995-2005)
Figure 70  The Oosterweel Link section (red). Source: Het Nieuwsblad, March 4, 2009,
http://www.nieuwsblad.be.
In 1995, AWV, a part of the Flemish administration Admin LIN launched the start of a 
new masterplan to counter the structural congestion in and around Antwerp. Soon 
the idea comes to mind that a third Scheldt crossing would solve the problems. 
This extra crossing would serve the completion of the Antwerp ring road. The 
idea gained ground and a consensus about the obligatory passage point (OPP, i.e. 
extra river crossing, as to complete the inner ring) was shaped. As that connection 
was situated somewhere around the old village of Oosterweel, the project was 
soon labelled the Oosterweel Link (Figure 70). Now that the OPP was settled, the 
challenge was to get those projects and plans implemented. Who should be involved 
and which organisations would bring the project to an end? Of course, another main 
question was: where could the project be situated? As such, the next step was to 
think about governing the project and exploring possible options to choose the 
exact route. In the mind of the former governor (C. Paulus), however, the project had 
already taken major proportions. He perceived it the crown jewel of the masterplan 
and of his province (Vanveldhoven and Lauwers 2010, Vanveldhoven, Lauwers, and 
Goethals 2009). 
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Figure 71  The actor network of the Oosterweel Link project the first project years
7.2.1.2 Interessement – elaborating the Oosterweel Link
To define the precise route of the project a study was carried out by ABM (Atenco, 
Belgroma – Grontmij, and Maunsell). This study initially came up with six plausible 
routes. In the end, the consultants added a seventh possibility, a combination of 
parts of the previous options. We added those route scenarios in appendix 3.  
The city of Antwerp, the Port of Antwerp, the province of Antwerp, the Flemish 
administration and some other institutions approved this ‘optimised medium route’, 
which later would be known as the notorious ‘BAM route’. This seventh option would 
be further studied and elaborated by a consultancy cooperation (Verhoeven and 
Ysebaert 2008). 
7.2.1.3 Enrolment of the Oosterweel Link project
The Flemish government approved the ‘Masterplan Mobility Antwerp’ on  
15 December 2000. It was agreed to levy a toll for the financing. To ensure a smooth 
and efficient implementation of the plan, it was also decided to set up a public 
limited liability company: BAM (Beheersmaatschappij Antwerpen Mobiel). This 
would allow a more flexible way of working and the recruitment of more specialised 
personnel on market terms. In September 2001, the framework agreement, 
including the study work, the drawing up of the project specifications and tendering, 
and the project guidance and monitoring for the Oosterweel link and all other 
masterplan projects, was granted to the joint venture TV SAM (Study group Antwerp 
Mobile). This consultancy consortium comprises three large consultancy companies 
(Belgroma, Technum and Gedas72). 
72  Belgroma would later become Grontmij, and Gedas became Arcadis.
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7.2.1.4 Mobilisation of allies of the Oosterweel Link project
 
The framework agreement was established for the entire duration of the implemen-
tation of the Antwerp Master Plan for Mobility. The realisation period was estimated 
at six years, but it would soon be on the increase. In October 2003, TV SAM 
estimated that the work could not start until 2005 at the earliest because of the 
procedures and consultation moments.
Increasingly, the Oosterweel Link project was encapsulated in a broader network, 
that had been initiated by the Flemish government and administration. Soon, it was 
surrounded by other governmental actors and factors, infrastructural agencies, 
plans (cf. Masterplan Antwerp), legal documents, new organisations to deal with the 
project, municipalities that got involved (see Figure 71).
Figure 72  The actor network of the Oosterweel Link project in 2005
To promote and build support for the Masterplan and the Oosterweel Link project, 
the governor – very eager himself to see the project realised within his mandate – 
organised a States-General. This support base event brought together the various 
but vested mobility organisations: civic society actors and governmental actors. 
By 2003, a management company came into being (BAM, Beheermaatschappij 
Antwerpen Mobiel) to take over the project management and to replace the role of 
the Flemish administration in fulfilling the framework agreement with TV SAM.  
A close collaboration between the consultants of TVSAM and BAM started. Though 
both companies TV SAM and BAM were private, political interference was never  
far away. When determining and securing the route of the LIP in a regional 
implementation plan (GRUP), they preferred to follow the (at that moment still 
optional) environmental impact assessment procedures. 
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7.2.2
Second translation round: the specific route choice and its  
implications
7.2.2.1 Problematisation – The awakening after having seen the  
   model and the costs increase...(2005-2009)
Figure 73  Model of the Lange Wapper dubble deck viaduct skimming over the city of Antwerp
without and with underlying urban fabric. Source: (right) http://4.bp.blogspot.com; and (left) 
http://www.bavo.biz.
 
When the BAM, in 2005, eventually showed the model of the Oosterweel Link to 
the press and the Flemish parliament (Figure 73), it caused a lot of buzz. At first, 
reactions were almost unanimously enthusiastic. But the model was met with great 
resistance afterwards, during the public inquiry of that procedure where the model 
was shown to the general public for the first time. A first activist group voiced its 
concerns and came up with its own alternative route for the project. StRaten- 
generaal, suggested to alleviate the city from transit traffic and complete the ring 
road much further away from the city than the initially chosen route. 
7.2.2.2 Interessement of the opposition against the Oosterweel Link
The city of Antwerp also gradually became alarmed. The city council wanted to 
become engaged in the project 73and tried to stall before making a decision. They 
ordered another study of alternatives: the Horvat study, named after the Horvat 
consultancy agency that carried it out. In addition to the BAM route with the Lange 
Wapper viaduct, this study also took into account the tunnel variant of the BAM 
route (ABM route scenario 2, later called the ‘Horvat-route’, see Figure 75) and the 
alternative of stRaten-generaal. The research was rushed and concluded that a 
tunnel option was more expensive than a viaduct. Hence the approval was given 
for the viaduct landmark and the tunnel option was abandoned. The next step was 
launched. Building consortia were notified with a call tendering; the BAM route 
could be designed, further elaborated and eventually implemented. 
73  In the first years of the project, a visa scandal at the Antwerp city council resulted in the
discredit of local politicians that became  side-lined in the Oosterweel Link project story.
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Figure 75  Tunnel variant of the Oosterweel Link on the BAM-route (Horvat). 
Source: http://www.nieuwsblad.be. 
7.2.2.3 Interessement of the chosen policy
As the chosen policy did not suffer from the Horvat conclusions, the BAM group 
went on with their project process. They retained four consortia for submitting a 
‘best and final offer’ (BAFO). An independent quality division (‘kwaliteitskamer’) was 
established, existing of national and international infrastructure experts. Chaired by 
the governor, this council was set up to examine and criticise the submitted BAFO’s 
Figure 74  The actor network of the Oosterweel Link project in 2006
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and advise the BAM on their final decision. Soon preference was given to the offer of 
the Noriant consortium. Though Noriant BAFO was criticised by the quality division 
for not being the most economical, nor most qualitative one, the other consortia 
were excluded (Penris and Peumans 2007). The governor had an eye for the architec-
tural beauty of the Lange Wapper viaduct74 for his province (Vanveldhoven and 
Lauwers 2010, Vanveldhoven, Lauwers, and Goethals 2009). 
Members of parliament had difficulties accepting that alternative routes were still 
taken into account during the environmental impact assessment (EIA, MER), while 
the building consortia finalised their BAFO according to the BAM route. In addition, 
by absence of valid competitors, the total cost of the Oosterweel Link proposal 
could increase from 0.6 to 1.3 billion euros. This raised many questions about the 
communication and the transparency of the BAM and the opposition towards the 
deal with Noriant grew from then on. The precise roles and relations between TV 
SAM and BAM remained vague and the budgetary resources for the conducted 
research were repeatedly questioned. 
7.2.2.4 Enrolment of the chosen policy
In response, BAM commissioned PWC and Deloitte for an external audit of TV SAM. 
The commission followed the dossier more closely as of then. From 2005, BAM had 
to present regular progress reports in the parliamentary commission. The Court 
of Audit of Belgium also monitored the achieved progress (Peumans and Penris 
2005). Due to the accumulated delays and compensation measures, the total cost 
estimates continued rising. Therefore, at the end of 2007, the Flemish government 
established a price cap for the project of 1.8 billion euros (Penris and Peumans 
2007: 7). 
During this phase the actor network demonstrates that the plans for the Oosterweel 
Link are further developed, but in a technocratic shielded way. When looking at 
Figure 72 and Figure 74, we notice that TV SAM and BAM held the key to the design 
and planning process within the regime and niche alternatives from stRaten-ge-
neraal were blocked. 
7.2.3
Third translation round about health– From landmark to ... scratch? 
(2008-2012)
7.2.3.1 Third problematisation – the opposition gives a first  
   real stab
While the BAM proceeded with the Oosterweel Link project, the opposition did not 
stand still either, cf. actor network diagram in Figure 77. Earlier, stRaten-generaal 
had brought up the route choice discussion and had proposed its own alternative. In 
74  The Lange Wapper viaduct was designed as a combination of a tunnel that gradually 
converted into a double-deck viaduct above the docks and the northern part of the city that was to 
be developed at the time (het Eilandje). 
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response to that, the city undertook a first rather marginal initiative in the process 
with the Horvat study. Though this study did not change the course of the project, 
it did not stop the activists or citizen movements to proceed to their opposition. 
Various concerns were voiced in parliament: about the non-transparent decisions, 
the role division between BAM and TV SAM, and about the increasing total cost.
In 2008, Ademloos (‘Breathless’) a new civil movement stood up to put the harmful 
environmental health impact of such an infrastructure project on the Antwerp 
citizen on the agenda. Ademloos was experienced with communication strategies, 
whereas stRaten-generaal mainly focused on the technical aspects (e.g. alternative 
route) and quality of life issues in general. A fruitful collaboration between the two 
civil movements had started, whereby each organisation remained faithful to its 
own specialty. In addition to citizen movements, so did academics condemn the 
political (infrastructural) choices and, above all, how decisions were taken. George 
Allaert, a renown Flemish professor in urban planning, did not shy away from stating 
that the Oosterweel link was a medieval project (Verelst 2008). The obligatory 
passage point in this translation round was the agreement on the negative 
health impact of the Lange Wapper viaduct on the city (e.g. by particulate matter 
emissions) and urban development. 
7.2.3.2 Interessement and re-enrolment of the Oosterweel  
   Link camp (chosen policy)
Under the pressure of an increasing opposition against the Oosterweel Link project, 
the Flemish government had all alternative routes for the project studied once 
more (L.B. 2010). In July 2008, Arup/Sum starts investigating the alternatives. The 
expectations of the study were high. However, in March 2008 Arup/Sum presented 
a striking conclusion: none of the proposed routes excelled the others overall. 
Consequently Arup/Sum proposed to elaborate an alternative route; one that 
located the third river crossing more norther, similar to the proposal of stRaten- 
generaal. The Flemish government approved this additional work on March 28, 2009 
(‘Dubbelbesluit’). But in that decision the government simultaneously instructed 
the BAM to file the building permission for implementing the Lange Wapper. 
Nevertheless, due to the Arup/Sum study, the final agreement on the routing of the 
project was postponed to the next legislature. 
Soon after the decision, the civil movements launched a petition against the 
BAM-route of the Oosterweel Link project and together they managed to enforce 
a referendum. Their support base grew steadily (Moolenaar 2008, Verelst 2011: 
163-165,185). On October 18 (2009), the citizen movements victoriously terminated 
the Lange Wapper chapter on their first public event; the majority of the citizens 
voted against the viaduct in the referendum (Vandenbergh 2009). But they 
criticised that their alternative route was not properly taken into account in the 
EIA (projectMER), which they were only allowed to consult much later. Besides, the 
building consortia were elaborating their infrastructure design for the Lange Wapper 
viaduct on the BAM route while the environmental impact assessment, comparing 
the different alternatives, had not yet even been concluded.
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7.2.3.3 Enrolment and mobilisation of allies within the  
   opposition camp
In July 2009, the further research of Arup/Sum unexpectedly concluded that the 
studied Arup/Sum route tunnel alternative was technically feasible and economi-
cally viable. More importantly, at all levels their alternative outperformed the Lange 
Wapper viaduct (the BAM-route). Swayed by the growing civil opposition, the city of 
Antwerp organised a referendum on October 18 (2009). That referendum resulted 
in rejecting the Lange Wapper viaduct (Brinckman 2010). As the permits and plans 
were delivered for the viaduct structure, the procedures of the regional spatial 
implementation plan and the associated EIAs (and their public inquiries) had to be 
re-done for the tunnel-variant. The referendum had transformed the project and a 
new full-rebidding was unavoidable. This compromised the financial agreement that 
had already been made with the building consortium Noriant for the Lange Wapper 
(Dendooven 2010, Verstraete 2010). 
In the meantime, the civil movements elaborated their alternative, the ‘Meccano-
route’, an optimisation of the Arup/Sum-route (that in turn was based on the earlier 
stRaten-generaal-route). Together with Forum 2020, a group of influential experts 
and captains of industry in Antwerp, they had their Meccano-route studied by an 
independent research institute (TML). The results of the TML study preferred the 
Meccano-route to the BAM route (Yperman & De Ceuster, 2010). In response, the 
Flemish administration instructed the Flemish Traffic Agency to investigate the TML 
study (Grispen, 2011). The story is comparable to a ping-pong game. 
7.2.3.4 Mobilisation of allies of the chosen policy
In response to that sudden plot twist, in 2010, the Flemish government promised  
to run through the alternatives once more and include them in the environmental  
impact assessments (EIAs) before taking a final decision. These EIAs were 
necessary for the approval of the renewed Masterplan 2020. That much needed 
update broadened the project’s scope and regarded multimodal solutions for 
mobility and included mitigating measures that compensate for negative impacts on 
quality of life aspects of the plan. 
In 2012 a new research institute (Anteagroup) was entrusted to carry out the 
environmental impact assessment, including the BAM-route (tunnel variant), 
the Meccano route and five other alternatives (one of which was the Oosterweel 
North-route), see Figure 76. Implementing the tangents A102 and R11bis was 
already incorporated in the Masterplan 2020 at the time. 
On February 14th 2014, based on the finalised EIA (planMER Oosterweel) by 
Anteagroup, the Flemish government decided to follow the chosen path of the BAM 
route (stated policy, ‘beslist beleid’). To refrain from further legal actions Noriant 
received a settlement of 37.19 million euros (Moens 2014), a measure that was met 
with dismay in parliament. 
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Figure 77  The actor network of the Oosterweel Link project in 2010.
7.2.4
Fourth translation round –‘capping’ the ring road
7.2.4.1 Problematisation: air quality and quality of life (2012-2015)
As the debate about the route choice went on, the focus shifted to the negative 
environmental and health impact of the existing ring road in the south. As such, 
another discussion point had been rising on the agenda: covering or ‘capping’ the 
ring road. Since air quality and environmental health had entered the debate in 
2008, the theme of ‘capping’ or tunnelling some major roads would never disappear. 
Figure 76  The alternatives investigated in the environmental impact assessment. 
Source: De Standaard
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Through research by design, the city of Antwerp had looked into the feasibility and 
impact of covering (parts) of the city road network. In November 2012, Ringland, 
a new civil movement in Antwerp stood up and launched the idea of capping the 
southern ring road. This was the dawn of a new era of civil opposition. 
Figure 79  Ringland, the concept. Source: Ringland.
The Ringland concept came into being in response to a study by the city of Antwerp 
on the opportunities offered by capping the ring road (June 2012). Peter Vermeulen 
picked up the idea and engaged in redesigning and covering the ring road around 
Figure 78  The actor network diagram of the upcoming Ringland initiative at the end of 2012.
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Antwerp (R2). This idea had earlier been put forward by stRaten-generaal and 
BorgerhouDt van Mensen (around 2000). However, the study concluded that the 
concept proved to be virtually impossible near the entrance and exit complexes 
of the current ring road; a complete reorganisation would be necessary. Peter 
Vermeulen, an engineer architect and partner at Stramien (a design office in 
architecture, urban planning, spatial planning, and design of public space) took up 
the challenge. The capping concept was given a new interpretation from a design 
perspective. With the document ‘Uit de Ban van de Ring’, published at the end of 
2012, Ringland first came out of the shadow. In November 2012, the concept was 
presented publicly for the first time (Ademloos 2012). But the attention to the 
launch of the concept was somewhat disappointing and got no more than local 
press. Nevertheless, the idea came to the attention of Cathy Berx, the provincial 
governor of Antwerp. She encouraged including the Ringland concept in the ongoing 
EIA procedures (plan-MER A102/R11bis) for the Oosterweel project. Accordingly, 
the Oosterweel debate was opened yet again; with its positive capping imaginary, 
Ringland had revitalised the debate. However, Ringland was only a concept and a 
collection of ideas at that time.
In 2013, on the very same day of the Valentine agreement, the Ringland initiative 
officially arose. Ringland proclaimed the capping of the ring to improve the 
liveability and health of the citizens, combined with a new concept for the ring 
road structure. This implementation alternative to the southern part of the ring 
road was partly inspired by the capped M30 in Madrid, and was suggested earlier 
by stRaten-generaal. Beyond problem solving, the Ring-land (the land on the ring 
road) was especially well-developed and presented as an opportunity for enhancing 
a qualitative and liveable urban development. By combining expertise and 
creativeness with mastering the contemporary communication channels to target 
the citizens, and by launching events, Ringland became a qualitative brand. By this, 
the Ringland movement distinguished itself from the other citizen movements in the 
story so far.
In three months’ time, by the end of 2014, Ringland had collected over 100,000 
euros by symbolically selling the land on the surface of the ring (4m2 for 20 euros). 
Ringland spent this crowdfunding money on extra research: a mobility study, a cost 
benefit study and a liveability study (E.D.M. 2015). StRaten-generaal and Ademloos 
launched an online call to vote for Ringland and, thus, against the spatial implemen-
tation plan of Oosterweel (GRUP Oosterweel) (Ademloos, 2015). Embracing social 
media, finally, over 15.000 statements of objections were obtained. This gave the 
citizen movements the right to speak in the Flemish Parliament on July 2 (Belga 
2015b). 
When looking at the specific actor network developments as generated by the 
Ringland data, the actor networks show an interesting evolution. Whereas in the 
previous translation rounds, based on the BAM data, the diagrams showed a rather 
marginal position of the citizen movements, this changed with the upcoming and 
vibrant Ringland initiative. The actor networks of both chosen policy and opposition 
(by citizen movements) became tied to one another, and they were evenly matched. 
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7.2.4.2 Interessement of Ringland and the citizen movements
Figure 80  Reconstruction of the Ringland actor network in 2013.
This phase is very important for Ringland and the other citizen movements. 
Neither time nor effort were spared. Figure 78 to Figure 81 demonstrate the further 
development and central positioning of the Ringland initiative in the actor network. 
The civil niche actors not only tried to associate with experts but also with business 
actors and public regime actors. Though strengthening the ties with the local 
citizens was never overlooked.
First, the capping concept was elaborated within the urban planning and 
architecture office Stramien. Playing with sophisticated narratives and images of 
the capping concept (Figure 79), Peter Vermeulen, the leading urbanist of Stramien, 
and his Ringland entourage steadily gained ground. The civil support base reached 
even further than the city of Antwerp. Ademloos and stRaten-generaal joined the 
new spirit and collaborated with Ringland. The opposition to the BAM project gained 
a more positive public image. 
7.2.4.3 Enrolment of the citizen movements 
The Ringland team further developed the concept internally, within the office of 
Stramien. At the first Ringland colloquium in March 2014, the studies and concepts 
were presented to the public and not only commented, but also heavily supported 
by external experts who openly agreed with Ringland (cf. the purple actors in the 
centre of Figure 80): Bruno De Borger (University of Antwerp), Hans Bruyninckx 
(European Environmental Agency), Jef Van den Broeck and André Loeckx (both from 
the Catholic University of Leuven). With a first crowdfunding campaign, at the end of 
2014, the area on top of the ring road was symbolically sold to carry out additional 
studies on mobility, health, feasibility, and urban development. As a result, the 
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support base, which was now even partially financial in part, increased even 
further. The studies were carried out by the independent consultancies of Vectris, 
OMGEVING, Idea Consult, and Vito. Initially, they were quite sceptical about the 
assignment, but they faced the challenge. Fortunately for the citizen movements, 
the studies analysing the impact on mobility, health, the feasibility, and the 
financing of the project, showed promising results. The results were presented for 
a larger public at the Roma in Borgerhout (for their own people), and later on, in an 
expert colloquium in DeSingel. Those favourable results did not escape the popular 
press (Huyse 2015). A few months later, Ringland presented its studies in the 
Flemish Parliament and at the Antwerp municipal and district council. At the yearly 
Ringland Festival in June, the results were celebrated as well. The first edition in 
2014 attracted 15,000 visitors, a year later they wrote 20,000 on their books, and 
in the meantime, the Ringland festival has become an annual phenomenon (Belga 
2015a).
Through a fruitful collaboration with communication agencies, a formal non-profit 
association ‘Het Ring Genootschap’ was established. Ringland adopted an organisa-
tional structure with various working groups to anticipate future challenges, develop 
a financial plan and address different target groups. The citizen movement became 
a strong brand with supportive, tailor-made campaigns. Ringland on Tour (October 
2014), a trip through the districts, generated 20,000 euros. The online crowdfunding 
campaign generated a further 80,000 euros to carry out additional studies. Later, at 
the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, the ‘Build with us’ (‘Bouw mee’) campaign 
was launched. Under the slogan ‘Ringland at Home’ , Ringland volunteers were 
invited to inform friends, acquaintances and family members about the concrete 
content and impact of the Ringland plans. They wanted to refocus on the local level 
again. The ‘Bouw mee’ campaign also provided money, in the form of permanent 
transfers, to hire two permanent half-time employees for a further coordination and 
professionalisation of the Ringland organisation. In addition, the Ringland Academy 
was launched, comprising four working groups in which external experts examined 
the current plans and strategies and to fine-tune them (Brinckman, 2015). Within 
this framework, Ringland organised and financed the CurieuzeNeuzen project, 
together with the city of Antwerp, the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), KULeuven 
(KUL), and the University of Antwerp (UA). The residents of the Ring and academics 
appeared to be mobilised easily. In contrast, although Ringland could count on 
much political support behind the scenes, the willingness of politicians to openly 
change course turned out to be much smaller. But the actor network shows many 
cross-connections between individuals of the chosen policy camp and the Ringland 
network. 
Ringland initially started a new, more positive story; the concepts they elaborated 
added value to the already existing infrastructure of the ring road. They did not 
yet position themselves in the third Scheldt crossing debate on route choices 
at first. But they could not postpone this positioning for a long time, as both the 
associated citizen movements and their civil support base wanted a clear answer. 
After a thorough investigation, they tended towards the route choice of the citizen 
movements, as they found their covering idea not compatible with the BAM-route 
(aro 2015). Consequently, the actor network included Meccano and the Oosterweel 
North route options.
194 LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
As the Ringland actor network grew and increasingly became entangled with the 
subnetwork of the Oosterweel Link project, the hierarchisation of the initiative 
became opportune (see Figure 80 and Figure 81). With the Ringland Memorandum 
in 2014, Ringland forced the political parties to show their colours, pro or contra 
Ringland (Moolenaar 2014, Ringland 2014). Later, in mid-2015, Ringland collected 
enough petitions to obtain the right to speak in the Flemish Parliament, thanks to a 
joint effort of all citizen movements and their large civil support base. The Ringland 
studies were presented and followed with great interest. Later that day, for the 
occasion, the Antwerp city council and the district council were exceptionally united 
and Ringland got the opportunity to convince the city of its plans. 
The studies were distributed among the administrations and the Cabinet of the 
Minister for Mobility. However, little enthusiasm came from that side; the ‘chosen 
policy’ continued along the trodden path in the meantime. 
On Ringland’s proposal, the mandate of the intendant was introduced, to streamline 
the various plans and tracks. However, the final, formal assignment of the 
intendant, as announced by the Flemish government and the BAM in early July, was 
much more limited; it only considered the capping of the ring road. Suddenly, the 
mobility story was omitted, as the route alternatives were no longer considered as 
points of the discussion; the chosen policy had opted for the Oosterweel route (BAM 
route). 
Nevertheless, Ringland was cautiously hoping for a fruitful cooperation with the 
intendant, who could initially hardly deviate from the chosen policy path. While 
Ringland kept communicating openly to open up to decision-makers and to think 
constructively, the formal role of Ringland in the Oosterweel Link project remained 
vague and far from central. 
The Ringland capping concept became included in the current EIA procedures 
(A102/R11bis). But, in the meantime, the chosen policy (BAM) track continued with 
the Oosterweel project (separate EIA Oosterweel). As the mandatory EIA developed 
separately, there was no guarantee that the Ringland concept (only considered in 
the second EIA) could be awaited; nor the ambition note of the intendant. So, back 
in 2016, the strategy or politics of a ‘fait accompli’ prevailed (Ringland, personal 
communication 10 April 2016). Ringland still engaged in this’ enrolment phase, while 
it also invested in the problem-saturation and’ interest’ phases in order to continue 
and expand the broad support base; e.g. the Ringland Academy was established and 
started the CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project. 
7.2.4.4 Interessement of the chosen policy
In practice, the preparatory works had already started in the end of 2015 (B.B.R. 
2015). As the opposition parties and many citizens supported Ringland, the 
government established an ‘intendant’ (an idea prompted by Ringland itself75); 
this external person should harmonise the Ringland and the BAM project, bring 
all actors together and look for opportunities to pursue a maximal capping of the 
ring road within the project margins as negotiated with the BAM. For the latter 
75  Sven Augusteyns (Ringland movement), personal communication, 9/06/2015
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reason, opposition groups were sceptical and expected little room for manoeuvre 
for the intendant, thus little outcome. But at least the collaboration processes had 
re-started, which was considered an important first step. 
7.2.4.5 Mobilisation of allies of the citizen movements
Figure 81  Reconstruction of the Ringland actor network in 2015. 
During our close observation period of Ringland from the end of 2012 until the end 
of 2015, Ringland and the other citizen movements could only dream of actually 
becoming involved in the project process. The final episodes of the Oosterweel 
Link story, prove that the intendant could force a real breakthrough. He could bring 
the opposing actors around the table again to discuss and tie up the loose ends 
of the project (cf. second, third, and fourth translation round). The efforts in the 
super workshops even culminated in the Future Covenant (Toekomstverbond). This 
covenant, signed by the city of Antwerp, the Flemish government and the citizen 
movements, listed the ambitions and terms of a further collaboration regarding 
mobility in Antwerp. Although not during our close observation period, Ringland and 
the other citizen movements appeared to have reached the fourth stage of actor 
networking. But those negotiation rounds are far from over at the time of writing this 
dissertation.
The central position of the intendant in Figure 81 gives away the importance of his 
mandate in the project process. His node is situated in the centre and connects all 
subnetworks together. Public regime actors, civil niches, knowledge institutions and 
experts are collaborating in the super workshops organised by the intendant. His 
196 LARGE INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
reconciliation mandate initially only included researching the potential of capping 
the Oosterweel Link project and the capping of the whole ring road; thus without 
accounting for the mobility system of the ring road beneath this cover. Together with 
the actors he, however, ended up by analysing the route alternatives again. 
In the end of 2015, Ringland set a new campaign in motion and launched the 
Ringland Academy, bringing together a wider group of experts and professionals  
beyond the core Ringland team. They offered ad-hoc inputs into Ringland’s 
activities, contributed to ongoing study work, and developed projects related 
to one of the core themes of Ringland. The CurieuzeNeuzen air quality citizen 
science project is one of the main outputs of the Ringland Academy up to now. 
CurieuzeNeuzen would offer insights for a better understanding of air quality 
problems in Antwerp. But the project could also sensitise and trigger Antwerp 
citizens (and politicians) about their living environment and the urgency for action 
regarding traffic-related air pollution. As such, Ringland managed to increase its 
support base by reinventing itself repeatedly.
Figure 82  Reconstruction of the actor network of the Oosterweel Link project in 2017.
7.2.4.6 Enrolment of the chosen policy – Working with the intendant –  
   landing or stranding? (2016-...)
In the end of 2015, after public tendering, Alexander D’Hooghe was selected as 
‘intendant’ or mediator. He was associated with the MIT and experienced with 
participatory planning processes; he had been, for instance, involved in the 
‘Rebuild by design’ initiative in the aftermath of the passage of hurricane Sandy 
in New York. In January 2016, he invited all stakeholders to hear and discuss their 
ambitions and values in the story. Within six months, he had to deliver an ambition 
paper, in which the outlines for a maximal capping of the ring road were formulated 
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and supported by all stakeholders. Some found his mandate too limited, as the 
BAM and the Flemish government only commissioned investigating the capping 
options; leaving an inquiry of the mobility system underneath the capping out of 
the discussion. During his mandate, he gained the trust of all the stakeholders. The 
‘safe’ atmosphere in which the super workshops took place to elaborate opportu-
nities, collaborate, and discuss a compromise payed off. Soon, for the southern 
part, a political compromise was reached and supported by all stakeholders (city of 
Antwerp, the civil movements, the Flemish administration and the minister)..
For the northern part, the round of debates and private meetings lasted much 
longer. The stakes were high, because of the pending legal disputes, and as, in 
addition, the three civil movements had already collected enough signatures 
to enforce a second referendum in Antwerp, in case the government would not 
postpone submitting the building permit for the Oosterweel Link until after the 
intendant finished his work within the different workshops. In March 2015, the 
key actors signed the Future Covenant (Huyse 2016, Peeters and Wauters 2017, 
Van Ginneken 2016). However, the following months were dominated by heated 
discussions, putting the Future Covenant under pressure (Truyts 2017). The 
intendant and the major stakeholders intensively analysed and elaborated a new 
option – combining the BAM route proposal (Oosterweel Link but ‘light’ version) 
with that of the citizen movements (a capping of the whole ring road and completing 
the ring further north of the city, through the port of Antwerp) as illustrated in 
Figure 83 (Brinckman 2017). Though still remained the question on how ‘light’ the 
Oosterweel Light would become in practice, and how the capping of the ring road 
could be financed. In the meantime, all personal legal claims or thus obstacles were 
eliminated, after discussing the new alternative options (N.N. 2017).
Figure 83  Compromise proposed by intendant. Source: Brinckman (2017)
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7.2.5
Fifth translation round: how will the ring be covered? 
7.2.5.1 Problematisation and interessement – the international  
   capping contest 
The ambition paper of the intendant and the Future Covenant between the city 
council, the Flemish government, and the citizen movements had already delivered 
a new obligatory passage point. Those papers had brought the actors together by 
promising, amongst other things, the capping of the ring road. In May 2017, parallel 
with the proceedings of the implementation of the Future Covenant, the capping of 
the Ring Road thus entered a new phase. The intendant launched a design contest 
in which six international interdisciplinary teams competed for covering a section of 
the ring road. 
Figure 84  Six segments for capping the ring road. Source: D’Hooghe et al. (2016, pp. 116-117).
The obligatory passage point had been settled during the negotiation rounds with 
the intendant: the capping of the ring road would become a fact. The ambitions for 
the spatial interpretation and implementation of the capping had been elaborated 
by the team of the intendant in the Ambition Paper (D’Hooghe, Blondia et al. 2016) 
as well as negotiated and approved by all stakeholders (citizen movements, city 
of Antwerp, Flemish government). In the Ambition Paper, proposed financial 
investments were set out per segment, as listed in Table 6. Accordingly, the total 
costs for the ring road covered (including pilot projects, a larger initial phase and 
a finalisation phase) were estimated at approximately 9 billion euros. As no such 
project could be financed within the regional budget, the project was considered to 
be intergenerational; indeed, when staggered across several years and even legisla-
tions (e.g. 10 years), the budgetary deficit caused by such a project decreases thus 
making the operation more feasible. 
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7.2.5.2 Enrolment
How will the capping arise in practice? Therefore, the intendant launched a Capping 
Contest in the beginning of 2017. Earlier, in the super workshops three coalitions 
or cooperation processes characterised by different dynamics had already been 
initiated. These cooperation processes with the citizen movements, city and 
Flemish administrations are picked up by the design teams in the contest. A series 
of workshops with large-scale citizen participation was organised to develop a 
vision for the sections (Ringdagen). For each of the capping segments a one-day 
workshop was arranged and attracted many subscriptions. Citizens, citizen 
movements and interest groups wanted to represent their neighbourhood, make 
sure their claims were heard and their field knowledge exchanged. The scale of 
participation was unprecedented according to the local press (asry 2017); over those 
6 days, 1566 participants formulated 3452 written suggestions and diverse claims. 
The most prominent were: creating the city (1671 suggestions), connecting (918) and 
breathing space (425). 
Table 6  Segments, design teams and estimated costs for covering the Antwerp Ring Road. 
Source: D’Hooghe et al. (2016: 133)
Following this intense introduction, in December, a second round of workshops 
was organised to give the design teams the opportunity to get even more practical 
input. Still two other feedback moments with the participants were/will be held in 
February and April; respectively to introduce the first designs to the citizens and get 
feedback, and to present the ultimate fine-tuned plans (Over de ring 2017).
 
first phase 
(incl. pilot projects)
finishing 
phase
North*
B U U R , L A T Z , S 3 3 3  a n d G R E I S CH , 
in collaboration with Levuur, Tree Company, ProFlow, 3E, eld and Anno
390
Northeast*
O R G
in collaboration with ARUP, Common Ground and Deltares (a.k.a. the team of the 
intendant)
330
East**
5 1N 4 E , N D V R  a n d H + N + S ,
in collaboration with Mobility In Chain, BOLLINGER+GROHMANN and Bagaar
1,980 960
Southeast
S t u dio P a ola  V ig a n ò, G r a f t on  A r c h it ec t s  a n d M A A R CH , 
in collaboration with Sweco Belgium, Idea Consult, Antwerpen aan't woord, 
Sertius and D2S International
1,420
South
A g en c e T E R , T V K  a n d A R CA D I S
in collaboration with Interboro/ Marleen Goethals, IBM, Deloitte and Crepain-
Binst
2,120 1,100
West*
D E  U R B A N I S T E N , O M G E V I N G  a n d CO B E ,
in collaboration with NEY, SBE, D+A Consult, Yellow Window, Mint, ABO and 
Copenhagenize.eu
180
6,420 2,060
N ot es
* Segments included in Oosterweel Link project
** Segment partly included in Oosterweel Link project
I n v es t men t  ( M E U R )
8 ,4 8 0
T ot a l
S eg men t D es ig n  T ea ms
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7.2.5.3 Mobilisation of allies
Financially, the total cost of the Oosterweel Link infrastructure project has been 
rising from 600 million euros in the first years (only including the Oosterweel Link, 
thus the new part completing the ring road ), to 4.5 billion euros more recently, 
including mitigating measures. But covering the whole ring road will cost 9 billion 
euros more (D’Hooghe, Blondia et al. 2016: 131-137, Moens and Van de Velden 
2017). To finance these works, the city of Antwerp and the Port of Antwerp will 
provide 250 million euros. The Flemish government, in turn, has reserved 1 billion 
euros and plans to finance the project through a revolving fund (rollend fonds). 
Remaining financial resources from the department of mobility and public works will 
be transferred to that fund. As such, the government estimates raising the budget 
by approximately 100 million euros each year. In spite of this, the financial plan is 
certainly not waterproof yet and the solidity of the Future Covenant is questioned 
here and there. The current financial budget only ‘covers’ a first step of the whole 
ring road, though the initial ambition remains a complete cover (Wauters, 2017). 
7.3
Case Epilogue – highlights of a roundtable  
discussion
Many mobility planning strategies, and LIP strategies in particular, still predomi-
nantly focus on the implementation or the input-output story of the project. Too 
often LIPs are handled within the sole field of infrastructure and public works, while 
the interests and implications are more far-reaching. Many other policy fields and 
plans are influenced by transport interventions (finance, economy, environment, 
spatial planning, labour, etc.). Hence, more stakeholders (government bodies, civil 
movements and other societal stakeholders) enter the planning scene, making 
alignment more difficult in the planning process. 
Figure 85  Participants in the roundtable discussion on the LIP Oosterweel Link.
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What was the object of the Oosterweel Link project planning? More interestingly, 
could we persuade some of the more prominent actors in the Oosterweel Link 
project of the complexity of the case, and the implications for the planning object, 
or conditions? That it would require a more complex decision-making process? In 
order to respond to those questions and to investigate the planning conditions, we 
organised a roundtable discussion. The round table took place in May 2016, at Hof 
Van Liere (Antwerp University) from 16:00 till 18:30. For a collaborative atmosphere 
and a fruitful discussion, we limited the number of participants to seven, excluding 
the organising committee76, and we aimed for a diverse range of actors engaged in 
the project (business, civil, or public). We, the organising committee (existing of the 
doctoral student writing this dissertation, and both supervisors), affiliated to Ghent 
University, completed the quadruple helix, as academics. After a doodle round, 
some actors were put aside77. The participating actors are illustrated in Figure 85. 
The participants were introduced to complexity thinking in the field of managing 
large infrastructure projects (LIPs). In the quest for a more sustainable mobility, 
present mobility planning approaches did not prove effective; in particular in 
the case of LIPs. Realising LIPs became increasingly difficult, resulting in many 
stranded projects (i.a. Uplace, Eurostadion, widening of the Schipdonk Canal, 
the Oosterweel Link, etc.). Previous LIP research has shown that reality could 
be more complex than expected. What makes those projects so complex then? 
Decision-makers often still focus merely on financial, technical, and legal issues 
of complexity (Flyvbjerg 2007, Priemus 2007). While the influence of social and 
organisational complexity is heavily underestimated with respect to planning 
processes and procedures, see Figure 86 and Figure 87. A mismatch could thus be 
identified between what the approach concentrated on, and what was experienced 
as most challenging by project managers (Hertogh and Westerveld 2010). 
Figure 86 illustrates the relative importance of the different complexity aspects of 
the Oosterweel Link project over time, as expressed by members of the Commission 
of Mobility and Public Works (Flemish parliament), by the officials of the BAM, 
by activist groups (occasionally invited to this commission), by experts, etc. The 
figure is built based on parliamentary committee minutes reporting on the project 
progress. Those sources were coded in NVivo to allow further data processing and 
thematic analyses. 
The six components of complexity and what they stand for are briefly described. 
The social component of complexity relates to the number and representation of the 
actors and the alignment of their (conflicting) demands. Also, communication and 
having a support base, political and societal, is part of the social component; as well 
as  issues of a decision-making process that is still in the hands of vested planning 
actors favouring backroom politics. The organisational aspect of complexity is 
76  The organisational committee consisted of my supervisors Prof. Dr. L. Boelens and Prof. D. 
Lauwers, both (very) familiar with the project and the protagonists of it, and me of course, as PhD 
researcher analysing the governance of the Oosterweel Link project.
 
77  The actors that were invited and showed interest to attend, but had to be excused due to 
conflicting agendas: S. Betz, Senior advisor spatial planning and environment at Voka (business 
actor); K. Kennis, Aldermen for Mobility and Public Works in Antwerp, and the head of his Cabinet, 
B. Van Camp (political actor); C. Berx, governor of the Antwerp province and former guardian of the 
support base of the governmental actors in the Oosterweel dossier (Poort Oost platform).
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closely connected to the social component, but focuses specifically on: (power) 
relations between the stakeholders, responsibilities, appropriate scale levels, 
organisational needs for implementing the project, etc. The financial aspects 
include everything relating to the total cost of the project, the risks that are related 
to the project and construction over time, and the financing itself. Legal aspects 
cover the juridical claims made by stakeholders, but also include the European 
guidelines for tunnels and transport infrastructure, etc. The time aspects contain 
everything referring to time, and risk management with regard to time, the project 
phases, the delay and start of the infrastructure works, etc. Finally, the technical 
aspects refer to the technical details, the extra studies that have to be conducted, 
the design, construction details and risks, the route options, the search for  
alternatives to decrease the impact, etc. 
The scheme shows that social complexity is a major part of the discussion in 2005 
(42%), 2008 (32%), in 2010 (32%), in 2011 and 2012 (resp. 29% and 25%), and in 2016 
(25%). It is no coincidence that those are also the years in which opposition stirred 
the debate or when their alternatives sparked the discussion on route options again. 
The figure, however, also demonstrates that a substantial part of the discussion is 
still attributed to the technical aspects. In the years following the boom of the social 
aspects, striving for better alternatives, the technical discussions dominated the 
debate again; for instance, in 2009, the technical aspects ruled the debate (38%). In 
2013, when Ringland proposed the ‘capping of the ring road’, the technical aspects 
took a share of 33% and held that level during the following years. 
The financial and legal aspects account for a significant part of the discussion 
as well, as could be expected from the scientific and general literature and press 
coverage on large infrastructure projects. However, they are not the sole aspects 
dominating the parliamentary discussions. The organisational part only took a 
Figure 86  Attention paid to the various aspects of complexity in LIP Oosterweel Link.
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prominent share in 2007 (31%) when the consortia had to be selected and a support 
base had to be built, and in 2016 (21%) known as the year of the intendant and the 
beginning of a new era of cooperation and super workshops. 
By zooming out and taking a general look at the project, the resulting relative 
importance of all complexity aspects is slightly different (Figure 87). The average 
image of the Oosterweel link, shows that the technical aspects still outperform 
the social complexity. The financial complexity ranks third in the top three. So, for 
several years, the general conclusions of Hertogh & Westerveld, referring to the 
substantial part of social and organisational aspects, can be confirmed; but this 
conclusion does not apply when considering the overall image of the Oosterweel 
Link. In the figure, the LIP research average from Hertogh and Westerveld (2010) 
is set out against the average of each component in the Oosterweel Link project. 
As shown by the red bars, the differences are largest for the social aspects and 
organisational aspects (much less given attention), and for the legal aspects (much 
more highlighted in Oosterweel Link project). 
It is important, however, to note that we were not able to interview the project 
managers of the BAM themselves. So, we based our data and occurring themes on 
the progress presentations of the BAM, and the discussions afterwards, as reported 
and published in the parliamentary committee minutes. 
Figure 87  Attention to the various aspects of complexity in LIPs in the case Oosterweel Link, the 
LIP research of Hertogh & Westerveld, and the difference. Source: own elaboration, partly based 
on Hertogh and Westerveld (2010).
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BOX 
Total costs of the project – what is all the  
fuzz about? 
 
Although we are not planning to make the same ‘mistake’ again here, we will not 
deny you a closer rough financial inspection. It received substantial attention, 
after all. Figure 88 show the rise of the project’s total cost over the years. In the 
first years, constructing the project was estimated to cost almost 600 million 
euros. But soon, the costs almost doubled alarming the Flemish Parliament that 
instructed the Court of Audit to follow up on the project. A price cap of 1,850 
million euros was established by the Flemish government, but that did not stop 
the project cost from increasing. In the following years, the project’s total cost 
had risen till 3.2 billion euros. The passage of the intendant and the Future 
Covenant, and the ambitions (Port Route alternative and a complete cover of 
the ring road) caused the price tag to further escalate. Covering the ring road is 
estimated to cost an additional 9 billion euros, while the port route alternative is 
thought to be 1 billion more expensive than the previous route. The total bill has 
thus been added up to 13.500 billion euros. 
Figure 88  The total cost of the Oosterweel Link project over the years, including the Port Route 
alternative and the total covering of the Ring Road. 
The fact that until now – in LIPs – a major focus is still given to financial costs and 
technical aspects (Flyvbjerg 2007, Priemus 2007), points towards the still prevailing 
technocratic planning approach; towards the notion of the (mobility or transport) 
planner as engineer. This planning perspective used to pay off, but more recently, 
other mobility planning approaches have been sought for as ‘complexity strikes 
back if it is neglected’ (Salet, Bertolini, and Giezen 2013: 1989). Hence, the central 
questions for our round table discussion are: (1) ‘What can such new complexity 
embracing mobility planning approach add to LIP planning processes?’, and (2) 
‘What does this mean for the actors and the conditions?’
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After a brief introduction to the complexity theories in LIPs, we confronted the 
roundtable participants with the whole project history again, as presented in 
Figure 89. Just like we guided you through the project in the previous sections. The 
challenge was to bring the key-stakeholders in the process together. We wanted to 
collect their perceptions of the encountered complex actor setting and conditions. 
A second question then was whether they could sympathise with each other’s 
perspectives and decisions at several crucial moments in the project process. More 
specifically, we wanted to concretise how the conditions or the setting changed for 
decision-making; or whether there were some windows of opportunity.
To cope with the encountered complexity, we focused on the matrix of governance 
approaches (cf. Figure 10 and Figure 11). For the Oosterweel Link we suggested 
a co-evolutionary approach, as both actors and conditions were dynamic. This 
co-evolutionary approach incorporated elements of the ‘dynamic management’ 
strategy as proposed by (Hertogh and Westerveld 2010). Their approach would 
allow a certain flexibility, and simultaneously, the urgency to act could also be 
responded to. The various participants agreed on the merits of such co-evolutionary 
approach. When asked about their perception of co-evolution regarding the LIP 
process, they ended up identifying ‘click’-moments; moments that were decisive 
for the rest of the process. But according to the civil movements, some of these 
click-moments (moments of control in the dynamic management approach) were 
ambiguous, as they did not actually ‘click’ or secure certain decisions, but remained 
open for alternative options. Those click-moments can be considered as windows of 
opportunity in the actor’s governance trajectories. 
As a first click-moment, all participants identified the presentation of the Arup/
Sum alternatives study as a moment for seeking potential prospects and leads. The 
alternatives were assessed and compared based on various criteria, but none of 
the proposed route variants stood out. Therefore, ARUP/SUM proposed to conduct 
a follow-up study, elaborating on a variant that would outperform the others. 
The Flemish government then made a ‘fatal mistake’ by turning this window of 
opportunity into an ‘ambiguous click-moment’ according to some of the roundtable 
participants; Arup/Sum could carry out further research (i.e. a non-click), while 
the BAM was commissioned to prepare the building permission (i.e. a click). Some 
argued that the government should have taken a break and set the Oosterweel Link 
procedures ‘on hold’. Conversely, by taking their decision, trust was compromised 
and polarisation increased. Everyone agreed that a pause was not sufficient; that 
one should have switched to a co-creative or collaborative approach already back 
then. 
According to the civil movements, a second click-moment was the decision of the 
Flemish government in 2011 to assess all alternatives in a final environmental 
impact assessment once again. At that moment, the civil movements cherished 
hopes that their suggestions would be taken into account seriously. However, after 
a while this feeling of trust dropped due to a lack of sustained communication; but 
that is – according to the administration – inherent to the formal procedures. Also, 
the transparency with which the alternative options were adopted and modelled in 
the assessment was criticised. Not all alternatives were taken into account on the 
same grounds. This had prompted the civil movements to file a legal complaint, their 
last hope.
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For some roundtable participants, the exact click might have happened earlier: 
when the Flemish government decided on the ‘optimised medium-route’ (the later 
BAM route), already in round one. Some argue that once the political choice is made, 
one should respect that decision and cannot call that into question repeatedly. 
Otherwise, the project stagnates and opposition increases. But not all partici-
pants agree, as they argue that the process was not transparent enough and not 
well-communicated. Furthermore, there was no participation at all, and thus, 
no broad support base as the project was steered internally. Besides, on various 
moments, unfair treatment of alternatives or decisions made with conflicts of 
interest, rendered these decisions unstable. Furthermore, the enduring protest 
against the project has broadened the project scope: quality of life aspects, 
a redesign of the mobility system, the aspect of air quality and the concept of 
capping, etc. were initially not on the agenda.
The civil movements argue that it is only logical that the process should be redone, 
since the project scope has more than doubled. But the participants representing 
the administrations replied that the question is rather ‘how long can the government 
as client last without a solution?’ They point out the risks of taking more than can 
actually be handled, of overcharging the project. Because that would result in the 
project’s failure. They are in favour of not questioning previous decisions. There is 
Figure 89  The Oosterweel project and the various underlying tracks, events, actions and 
interactions. 
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no lacking sense of urgency, but according to some, although the problem is clear, 
the problem solution(s) and precise objectives are not (!) and are still debated. Is a 
third crossing of the river Scheldt actually necessary? Will that solve the problem? 
Even that is questioned, so, how can we decide already?
A final indicated click-moment is the decision of the Flemish government to 
definitively choose for the BAM route. However, for all roundtable participants, 
this felt as an ambiguous click as well, since the government had just appointed an 
intendant (an idea that was prompted by Ringland. The intendant had to align all 
actors and build a broad support base for the capping (cf. idea of civil movements) 
of the entire ring road. At the time of the roundtable discussion, most participants 
had just started an intensive cooperation process guided by this intendant. The 
mandate of this man was too limited according to the civil movements and most of 
the experts in the debate. Shouldn’t this also be a moment for a break, to alleviate 
the ongoing processes of the intendant? 
The participants argued that the key for working with complexity is to release 
the process and to shift focus from output- or implementation-oriented towards 
process-oriented or co-creation. They identified click-moments where co-evolution 
flourished or got stuck. Furthermore, they agreed on the necessity of a more 
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integrated governance, implying a less fragmented government. A balance of inter- 
action and control should be strived from the beginning onwards; decisions or ‘clicks’  
should be made when broadly supported. The importance of a mediator or intendant 
was acknowledged in this case to balance between interaction and control. 
7.4
Summarising the changing setting
The general decision-making setting at the start of the project cannot be compared 
to the setting during the later stages, in which opposition grew. During the first 
years, the city of Antwerp only had a weak position, due to the visa scandal that 
compromised the legitimacy of the Antwerp city council at that time. The Flemish 
government and administrations took the lead in the project. Citizen movements 
had only just risen, and were particularly engaged in/opposed to smaller public 
domain projects at city or district level78. Accordingly, the government could rush 
the problem definition phase. Soon arose the solution of building a third79 river 
Scheldt crossing. The study work was carried out by TV SAM, that collaborated 
closely with the BAM. Soon the project was all about route choices. But, as they 
shielded their planning and design process, they signed up for a rising opposition. 
Not only the role division between BAM and TVSAM was questioned, but also the 
study costs, and the non-transparent and non-communicative style of working.
From the moment the model was shown in 2005, the opposition increased. The 
empowerment of the citizens had been launched. They accused the BAM and the 
government of non-transparent planning strategies and a lack of (civil) support base 
for their decisions. Also, the city was triggered to play a more active role. The results 
of the Horvat study however countered the first round of opposition (2nd translation 
round). 
A second round of opposition (3rd translation round) included health in the already 
very booked agenda of the project. The citizen movements made use of the 
upcoming environmental health arguments and the associated body of scientific 
evidence, for instance, with respect to the impact of high particulate matter 
concentrations. They rapidly learned how to anchor their (op)position against the 
project. Through the ever-growing media possibilities, the citizen movements 
gathered enough petitions to claim a referendum, allowing the Antwerp citizen to 
become engaged and express his opinion about the project (tunnel or viaduct)80. The 
citizens chose a tunnel instead of a viaduct. 
78  stRaten-generaal, for instance, came into being in 1999 as a reaction to the harvesting of the 
Japanese cherry trees bordering the Museum square (Museumplein) in Antwerp. There was a great 
deal of protest against the removal when, in the hollow of the night, those trees were taken away. 
79  It would be the third river crossing when only considering the primary road network. 
80  The city of Antwerp had to give its advice regarding the Oosterweel Link project. However, the 
city council could only ask for an opinion in the referendum about the implementation (tunnel or 
bridge) of the project. Legally, another route could not be included in the question, because that 
was not part of the project. Nevertheless, this referendum gave a vote to the Antwerp citizen and it 
was important first step for the citizen movements.
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The citizen movements began to organise themselves more professionally. As they 
gathered knowledge themselves, they could no longer simply be side-lined by any 
study. Moreover, they felt supported by an ever-increasing group of academics 
who spoke out against the Oosterweel project. To get things right, the Flemish 
government conducted a new study of alternatives, carried out by international 
external experts. But the conclusions of that study were not as was expected: 
the BAM route did not outperform the other variants. In fact, no alternative did. 
But, in the meantime, the BAM was told to continue the project, while a new route 
alternative was elaborated and fine-tuned (Arup/Sum route). 
A third round of ‘opposition’ followed (fourth translation round), led by Ringland, 
a citizen movement that somewhat differed from the others. One could not really 
speak of opposition, as that connotation is too negative for a citizen movement 
eager to collaborate and negotiate, and bringing a positive new story. They 
advocated a ‘capping’ or covering of the ring road. Ringland did not engage in a 
conflict model, but openly invited experts, businessmen, and politicians to discuss 
their ideas. Initially, Ringland did not position itself with respect to the Oosterweel 
Link project and the necessity of a third Scheldt crossing. But after a while, Ringland 
could not avoid that discussion anymore, all the more because of its alliance with 
other citizen movements that clearly had chosen their path (Arup/Sum route – later 
Meccano route). 
In the meantime, the widespread introduction and use of social media had enabled 
Ringland to build a broad support base. That support base kept growing as Ringland 
continuously reinvented itself, keeping the debate alive with extra study material. 
Ringland almost became a professional organisation, with two payed, part-time 
communication employees, and many actively engaged volunteers from the 
various Antwerp districts. The movement always kept a strong connection with its 
civil support base. In addition, Ringland tried to reach out to politicians (e.g. the 
Ringland Memorandum) and to experts with the colloquia. The citizen movement 
even prompted the idea of appointing an intendant to get the project back on track. 
As such, they wanted to broaden the conditions for planning; the capping idea was 
planted into the regime. Ultimately a Ringland academy was set up, populated by 
many volunteer academics and experts from various disciplines. Ringland invested 
in three pillars: (1) in their civil support base of mainly Antwerp citizens, (2) in 
accumulating expertise, and (3) in influencing the policy agenda and even decision-
making process. Some academics in Flanders dare say that such citizen movements 
in fact performed the different roles that had been neglected by the government. 
Such actors mark the project process and cannot be ignored (Vandaele and De 
Rynck 2016, De Rynck 2017). 
While, in previous rounds, the governmental solution was sought in a new study of 
alternatives, they decided differently this time. They acknowledged the importance 
of the opposition and their added value for the Oosterweel Link project. Therefore, 
as proposed by Ringland, the government appointed an intendant; he had to analyse 
the options of covering the ring road and the feasibility of combining that with the 
Oosterweel Link project (3rd Scheldt crossing). Most importantly, though, he had to 
narrow the gap between all parties in the project. Accordingly, the external expertise 
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to level the playing field came from an intendant who gathered an (inter-) nationally 
praised team of academics and consultants around him. He started a co-creative 
process, as he had done, in the Rebuild by Design project to find a supported 
compromise to cover the ring road. 
Many argued that the initial mandate of the intendant was too limited. As it only 
included investigating the opportunities and partnerships for covering the ring road 
to reduce negative health impact by traffic. The reorganisation of the transport 
system underneath that cover was out of the question, to the displeasure of 
the citizen movements. However, the intendant’s super workshops payed off. 
An ambition was reached for covering the ring. After several additional months 
of collaboration and negotiations, the discussion opened up to the point where 
previous opposition rounds had stranded. The intendant tied up the loose ends of 
health, quality of life, and eventually the route choice. Although initially resisted by 
the governmental actors, the intendant eventually, and under the pressure of the 
citizen movements, reached the loose ends of the project: the route debate was 
reopened and the mobility layer was added to his mandate. A momentum or window 
of opportunity was created. 
Not only the government, but also the citizen movements got acquainted with the 
rules of the game and its game-style. The citizen movements wanted guarantees 
from the government and threatened to give rise to a new referendum81, and to 
ultimately lodge a complaint at the Council of State (Raad Van State). As such, those 
pending legal threats were omnipresent in the debate as they were used as a big 
stick; they could blow up the project for at least many years (or even permanently). 
We could speculate about the reasons why the intendant initially took up the job. 
But probably, if he had proposed to widen the mandate from the beginning on, to 
investigate both the reorganisation of the transport system (and route choice), and 
the capping of the ring road, he had not convinced the government. In contrast, 
he took a step at the time, and eventually ended up with a Future Covenant, an 
agreement that deals with much more than ‘just’ the Oosterweel Link project. It 
included ambitions about a Masterplan for Antwerp (Routeplan 2030), a radical 
modal shift, an Oosterweel Link light infrastructure connection, a port route, a 
covering of the ring road, and managing the impact of the construction sites and 
ongoing infrastructure works. In the end, the citizen movement withdrew from 
further judicial steps, because they at least saw some opportunities and guarantees 
for the future mobility decision-making.
The working community (Werkgemeenschap) and the super workshops, that 
had been set up to allow for a collaborative approach with various stakeholders 
(business, civil, public actors, and experts), have more recently been adopted by the 
transport region Antwerp (see Chapter 5, BOX transport region Antwerp). 
81  For which they had gathered enough valid signed petitions.
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7.5
Results and discussion
During the course of the large infrastructure project, the orgware changed 
drastically, thanks to the interplay of a diverse mix of actors. The governance  
ranged from a strongly top-down oriented technocratic planning approach, to  
a collaborative approach, and even towards the inclusion of a cautious  
co-evolutionary layer. The various mobility subsystems became structurally  
coupled and the institutional setting was altered to facilitate this.
a)         b) 
 
c)   
Figure 90  Overview of the LIP Osterweel Link orgware: a) during the first phases (BAM), b) as 
proposed by citizen movements, and c) as after the passage of the intendant. 
The Oosterweel Link orgware – Structurally coupling the actors? 
From the general overview of the actor network diagrams we can conclude that 
the actor network started within the public sphere. In particular the Flemish 
planning administration, the Roads and Traffic Agency, and the governor of the 
Antwerp province took the lead. By establishing the management company BAM, 
they shielded the planning in a technocratic circuit even further; but they became 
isolated from the process themselves (cf. marginal position of the administra-
tions, except for AWV). In 1999, civic activists opposed this kind of ‘bureaucratic 
infrastructure planning’ for the first time. Since then, not only the subnetwork of the 
BAM grew further, but also the activists’ subnetwork rose steadily. Since 2008, after 
a professor of spatial planning of Ghent University exposed the controversy in the 
media by calling it a ‘medieval project’ (B.V.B., 2008) a growing number of research 
institutions and universities joined the debate. The opposition’s subnetwork was 
boosted with the Ringland initiative in the end of 2012, giving birth to numerous 
interactions between civic, public, business and academic sectors in the debate; 
and resulting in an overall complex image of the project’s actor network. 
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Since the start of the LIP planning process in 1995, several opposition groups from 
various backgrounds have joined the scene. They have evolved from marginal to 
more central in the project debate. Proclaiming health and liveability aspects, they 
increasingly gained the interest of the Antwerp citizens. The actor network diagrams 
show that during the years, the subnetworks of BAM and Ringland have become 
evenly matched. With an active presence on social media and events, Ringland’s 
support base is still growing; not only within the realm of the Antwerp inhabitants, 
but subsequently also the political arena and that of consultancies. The evolution of 
the Oosterweel Link actor network therefore shows an increasing number of actors 
and connections over time in various directions. Hence, the actor network of the 
project encounters an accumulating complexity that called for different governance 
strategies; indeed with the present planning strategy the solution to one problem 
exposes other controversies, which in turn generate even other problems, etc. 
Having observed and examined the Oosterweel Link discourse and storyline, based 
on parliamentary meeting minutes, interviews, social media, and written press, it 
could be concluded that the ‘wickedness’ was linked to a predominant bureaucratic 
governmental input of the project. The path dependent governance strategy 
prevailed, at the expense of more complexity-embracing strategies, and a co-evolu-
tionary CAS governance. Rather than an open and dynamic planning process for 
developing a shared vision on the problem, opportunities and solutions, the process 
became locked-in and goal-dependent (cf. soon infrastructural solution of the 3rd 
river crossing). The usual suspects of governmental planning held the planning 
responsibility, the problem definition and apparent solutions, trying to ‘represent’ 
the other (niche) actors within the process; ignoring the level of complexity and 
omitting the interdependencies of the project in its context. However, with the 
entrance of Ringland the course of the project changed. 
Adapting the conditions
Prompted by Ringland, the governmental answer to the unavoidable wickedness 
of the LIP process comprised the appointment of an intendant; an external expert 
that had to demine the debate and gather all actors and their sub-actor networks 
in the story together. His initial mandate was to manoeuvre and enforce structural 
couplings in the quest for capping the ring road. In the actor network diagrams, 
he is situated right between the governmental side and the opposition’s actor 
network. Consequently, as illustrated in the diagram, he became the key figure in 
the further course of the LIP. The intendant adopted a collaborative research by 
design strategy, to get the ring road capped. That he is a spatial planner engaging in 
research by design gave him the tools to bring the citizen movements together, but 
also to get support from the “ordinary” citizens.
But, only a few months later, when under pressure of the citizen movements the 
mandate of the intendant was extended from only looking into the capping towards 
reconsidering the whole project setting (route choice, quality of life, implemen-
tation, etc. ), the actors became aligned; the citizen movements wanted guarantees 
that the project would account for environmental health, environmental, and quality 
of life aspects. As such, we can in fact conclude that the governance approach 
eventually ended up to be co-evolutionary, as the institutional setting (and the 
environment to plan for) and the actor field became intertwined and mutually 
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influenced each other. The structural couplings for the alignment of the actors were 
consolidated in the Future Covenant,  and in the working community that would roll 
out the projects that were anchored in the Future Covenant. 
The role that Ringland fulfilled in the Oosterweel Link story can be called unique. 
The movement successfully combined different roles throughout the process. 
First, and foremost, Ringland was (and still is) a citizen movement, by and for 
citizens; the link with the support base had always been maintained. Second, they 
succeeded in getting their spatial planning, mobility, and health ambitions on the 
policy agenda. They had formed the basis of the new coproduction atmosphere that 
was adopted and navigated by the intendant. Eventually, together with the other 
citizen movements, effective policy adoption was pressed for, as confirmed in the 
Future Covenant. Furthermore, the citizen movements got themselves involved 
in the further decision-making and implementation of the Future Covenant and 
mobility governance process (cf. working community). Third, they invested in 
specific knowledge, necessary to further develop their concepts and their actor 
network. Financially supported by crowdfunding money, the Ringland movement 
re-invented and positioned itself by having many studies carried out by scientific 
institutions and experts. By starting a Ringland Academy, the movement associated 
and engaged experts and academics on a voluntary basis around the central values 
of health, qualitative spatial development, and safe and sustainable mobility. 
The citizen science project initiated by the Ringland Academy involved over 1,800 
citizens in measuring the ambient air pollution in their street (further details in 
the next chapter). As such, Ringland not only mobilised allies to get their ideas 
implemented, but the movement built its support base from the bottom-up, and by 
investing in the environmental democracy, through for instance citizen science, they 
also provided their associative democracy. 
When looking at the layout of the mobility CAS in the LIP Oosterweel Link, we can 
see that it started from the traffic market, the infrastructural Oosterweel Link 
project and route were soon formulated (Figure 90a). Gradually opposition came 
from actors that were rather situated in the travel market, they were questioning 
the quality of life and the impact on the urban structure of such project. Ringland 
somehow bridged the gap between that travel and traffic market, as their Ring-land 
proposal addressed not only the liveability in the city (cf. capping concept), but also 
the problematic mobility system of the ring road (traffic market) (cf. Figure 90b).  
Thanks to the intendant the actors became aligned and the mandate of the 
intendant became broadened, so that the whole mobility CAS was comprised. Even 
the transport market was incorporated, as in the Future Covenant also objectives 
and measures were incorporated to reach a modal shift (Figure 90c). 
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In the actor networks of Ringland, displayed in the previous section, the Ringland 
Academy took an interesting position; the academy bridged the gap between 
several less connected sub-networks. Furthermore, the Academy gave Ringland 
the objective means to position itself even stronger in the mobility debate of the 
Oosterweel Link project. With respect to our two-tiers framework we could state 
that the Ringland Academy did not only manoeuvre certain structural couplings, 
it also could get its project institutionalised. The Academy has moved beyond the 
plan. They address the ordinary citizen with their “CurieuzeNeuzen” citizen science 
project, measuring the ambient air quality in the city of Antwerp, we want to discuss 
it in more detail in this chapter. The origins and outline of the project are described, 
and how the project could manage a repositioning of the debate. The project 
focused in particular on traffic-related emissions, as traffic congestion is among the 
main contributors to local air quality variability in Antwerp. This part’s focus lies on 
the (social) dynamics that resulted from the CurieuzeNeuzen project. Parts of this 
chapter are published in a peer-reviewed article under the title “Citizen science on 
speed? Realising the triple objective of scientific rigour, policy influence and deep 
citizen engagement in a large-scale citizen science project on ambient air quality in 
Antwerp” (Van Brussel and Huyse 2018). 
Daily traffic volumes deteriorate air quality in and around cities, and call for 
an urgent mobility transition. As mentioned before, many scholars argue that 
technological innovations alone will not suffice to reach sustainability goals 
(e.g. Anable, Brand et al. 2012, Banister 2008, Chapman 2007). Thus, an actual 
change in the behavioural response of citizens is necessary, whereby insights in 
how individuals are influenced by collective customs are imperative (Schwanen, 
Banister, and Anable 2012, Hull 2008, Urry 2004). A possible way for evoking 
behavioural changes is to invest in social capital, i.e. “the features of social 
organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate co-ordination 
and co-operation for mutual benefits” (Putnam 1995: 67). In the environmental 
realm, this connection is also found: social capital is seen as a primary facilitator 
of civic action, e.g. behavioural change to reduce one’s impact on the environment 
(Wakefield, Elliott et al. 2001, Conrad and Hilchey 2011). Building social capital for 
sustainable development requires not only collective action by groups of citizens, 
but also participatory policy-making as argued by several scholars (Gerometta, 
Haussermann, and Longo 2005, Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012, Moulaert, Martinelli et 
al. 2005, Wakefield, Elliott et al. 2001, Agyeman and Angus 2003). 
Since the 1990s, one observes a ‘mushrooming of high quality and innovative 
community development initiatives in European cities’ (Moulaert, Martinelli et al. 
2005: 1970), many initiated as a response to the prevailing technocratic approaches 
amongst others in the field of mobility and spatial planning. Several grass roots 
initiatives working towards more sustainable cities have looked at citizen science 
to support their goals and agendas. Aside from influencing local policies, citizen 
science projects could be a stepping stone to build the required knowledge base, 
trigger behavioural change and strengthen at the same time the social capital 
through the actual involvement of the stakeholders and the broader public (Muro 
and Jeffrey 2008, Newman, Graham et al. 2011). In this way, citizen science 
projects can potentially catalyse transitions towards sustainability at the local level 
(Theunis, Peters, and Elen 2017, Whitelaw, Vaughan et al. 2003). 
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8.1
Citizen science
Although citizen science has already a long tradition (Silvertown 2009, Conrad and 
Hilchey 2011), especially with respect to the contribution of amateur scientists in 
the fields of birding (Sullivan, Wood et al. 2009), history, and astronomy (Raddick, 
Bracey et al. 2010), the concept “Citizen science” has only been included in the 
Oxford dictionary in 2014. It is nowadays described as “the collection and analysis 
of data relating to the natural world by members of the general public, typically 
as part of a collaborative project with professional scientist” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2016). Recently, citizen science has increasingly gained legitimacy 
as a scientific discipline with respect to both decision making and “mainstream 
science” (Storksdieck, Schirk et al. 2016, Freitag, Meyer, and Whiteman 2016). As 
the benefits of citizen participation in science projects and the accumulation of 
experience in citizen science outweigh the limitations, citizen science programmes 
are starting to push the limits of the citizen science tradition further and further 
(Tregidgo, West, and Ashmore 2013, Conrad and Daoust 2008). Particularly in 
ecology and environmental sciences involving citizens is booming (Conrad and 
Hilchey 2011, Dickinson, Zuckerberg, and Bonter 2010). Large-scale environmental 
science even necessitates citizen science (Silvertown 2009: 467) since obtaining 
data at a fine spatial resolution is often deemed too costly, especially in times of 
economic crisis and associated budget cuts (Whitelaw, Vaughan et al. 2003, Conrad 
and Hilchey 2011).
A widely accepted categorisation of citizen science projects is based on the extent 
to which participants are involved in the project’s origins and the project process, 
ranging from setup and design to implementation and evaluation. Going from little 
to almost complete involvement of participants, Bonney, Ballard et al. (2009: 17-18) 
distinguish between contributory, collaborative and co-creative citizen science 
projects. Most of the citizen science projects adopt a contributory approach, in 
which participants are only involved to help collect data. However, it is argued that 
the more involved the participants are, the more impact citizen science projects 
can have on them in terms of an improved understanding of environmental issues 
and of science in general (Evans, Abrams et al. 2005). Collaborative projects are also 
designed by scientists, but aside from the participation of citizens in the collection 
of data, they also have a say in the roll-out of the research project. Finally, 
co-created projects originate from at least a part of the citizens themselves, and are 
designed in combination with scientists. Contrary to the former two approaches, 
citizen participants are thus involved in the whole scientific process (from design 
to evaluation) (Bonney, Ballard et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the evidence about the 
extent to which the generated scientific literacy, social capital and environmental 
democracy building leads to environmental benefits is anecdotal until now (Conrad 
and Hilchey 2011, Dickinson, Shirk et al. 2012).
The challenges that citizen science projects generally face are related to the three 
objectives they often combine: (1) collecting large scale scientific data, (2) raising 
awareness amongst the broader public and looking for real citizen engagement in 
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the matter, and (3) serving society and encouraging political impact. (1) and (3) can 
be regarded as the external objectives of the citizen science project, they relate 
to the scientific results and the effects on policy. While the second objective can 
be seen as an internal objective, referring to evaluating these projects in terms 
of improving scientific literacy, building social capital, and trigger behavioural 
change. However, realising all three objectives at once seems difficult in many 
citizen science projects and requires significant effort (Bonney, Cooper et al. 2009, 
Brossard, Lewenstein, and Bonney 2005). 
Often scientific credibility of the monitored data is questioned by scientist and/
or politicians. They express doubts with regard to data fragmentation, inaccuracy, 
objectivity, experimental design, monitoring expertise of volunteers, quality 
assurance, etc. (Conrad and Hilchey 2011) In particular, for monitoring air quality 
the validity and quality of the used materials/devices and methods become more 
important than for example in birding or ecosystem programmes. 
Furthermore, most citizen science results are only scarcely adopted by decision-
makers (Conrad and Hilchey 2011). As a possible solution several authors refer 
to the necessity of “strategic” or “innovative” partnerships in which citizens, 
academic institutions and government bodies cooperate in citizen science projects. 
Hence, it is important that the act of monitoring is not the final aim, but that there 
is a proactive orientation towards influencing policy agendas and measures. As 
useful and detailed (large scale) citizen-generated data is much sought after by 
government bodies, fruitful strategic partnerships with government bodies and 
knowledge institutes can be build (Dickinson, Shirk et al. 2012, Conrad and Daoust 
2008). 
To maximise the impact it is equally important to get the results published, not 
only in academic literature, but also for a broader audience of citizens and decision 
makers (Conrad and Hilchey 2011). 
Accordingly, most citizen science projects have at least the double objective of 
scientific rigour and citizen engagement (and awareness raising). However, having 
an influence on policy decisions related to the field of inquiry, and/or making sure 
that the results are used in policy debates, is often put forward as a third objective. 
This ensures that people are not monitoring for the sake of monitoring, but they feel 
that the resulting data is relevant and used by policy-makers (Conrad and Hilchey 
2011). In our opinion mastering the triple objective is beneficial to increase the 
chances on bringing about behavioural change of citizens and at the same time 
getting accepted both by ‘academia’ and politics. 
Often scientific credibility of the monitored data is questioned by scientists and/
or politicians. They express doubts with regard to data fragmentation, inaccuracy, 
objectivity, experimental design, monitoring expertise of volunteers, quality 
assurance, etc. (Conrad and Hilchey 2011). In particular for monitoring air quality 
the validity and quality of the used materials/devices and methods become more 
important than for example in birding or ecosystem programs. 
Furthermore, most citizen science results are only scarcely adopted by decision-
makers (Conrad and Hilchey 2011). As a possible solution several authors refer to 
the necessity of ‘strategic’ or ‘innovative’ partnerships in which citizens, academic 
institutions and government bodies cooperate in citizen science projects. Hence, 
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it is important that the act of monitoring is not the final aim, but that there is 
a proactive orientation towards influencing policy agendas and measures. As 
useful and detailed (large scale) citizen-generated data is much sought after by 
government bodies, fruitful strategic partnerships with government bodies and 
knowledge institutes can be build (Conrad and Daoust 2008, Dickinson, Shirk et al. 
2012). 
To maximise the impact it is equally important to get the results published, not only 
in academic literature, but also for a broader audience of citizens and decision-
makers (Conrad and Hilchey 2011). 
Recently the internal values of such projects have become a growing theme within 
the citizen science literature. Hence, aside from tackling the challenges of scientific 
rigour and policy adoption, this paper also specifically pays attention to the interest 
and motivational aspects of volunteers, to scientific literacy (knowledge on the 
topic) and awareness raising aspects (sharing of information, attitudes toward 
policy measures).
8.2
The project’s (grass)roots
The Citizen Science project CurieuzeNeuzen (a wordplay in Antwerp dialect that 
relates to “nosing around”) was launched by the Ringland Academy, a think tank 
within the Ringland citizen movement (http://ringland.be/). Ringland started in 2014 
as a bottom-up initiative within the city of Antwerp (population 517,00082), and was 
established by a collective of spatial planners, architects, and other professionals. 
The Ringland initiative envisions a new future for the city of Antwerp by proposing 
a complete redesign of the Antwerp mobility system and a “capping” of the ring 
road that traverses the city. In the Ringland plan, this circular highway would be 
moved entirely underground in a tunnel system. This would entail a substantial 
improvement of air quality and allow large-scale development of new green areas 
within the inner city (Van Brusselen, Arrazola de Oñate et al. 2016). With the aid of 
an attractive and innovative (multi)media campaign, Ringland has developed into 
one of the most prominent civic initiatives within Europe these days, mobilising 
thousands of citizens to support their campaign. The mobility debate in Antwerp 
is already going on for a long time, with subsequent infrastructural master plans 
of the Flemish government being rejected through the lobby and advocacy work 
of increasingly strong citizen movements (Van Brussel, Boelens, and Lauwers 
2016). Ringland is different, however, from many other citizen movements by 
incorporating three different roles in the mobility debate in the city of Antwerp in 
recent years. The role of citizen movement (or “activist group”) is combined with 
the role of knowledge network (feeding the public debate at regular intervals with 
ideas around mobility, city planning, and quality of life), and finally that of policy 
influencer through their participation in policy preparation processes and high level 
negotiations. For example, in 2015, through the active advocacy work of Ringland 
an “intendant” was installed by the Flemish government with the mandate to 
82 Legal population in Antwerp as of January 1, 2016 (http://statbel.fgov.be/).
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demine the heated mobility discussion and to harmonize the vision of the different 
stakeholders. In April 2017, a breakthrough accord was negotiated with all mayor 
players and political parties promising a gradual capping of the ring, with more 
ambitious targets for sustainable mobility by 2030, and a more inclusive governance 
system for all large-scale infrastructure works in the province of Antwerp. The 
intendant managed to break the deadlock, especially by giving the different parties 
a more equal position in the policy debate. Because of this, the intendant has gained 
credibility and respect amongst the stakeholders, and through positive reporting in 
the media, possibly also amongst the wider public. 
The Ringland Academy has brought together a wider group of experts and professi-
onals beyond the core Ringland team. They offer ad-hoc inputs into Ringland’s 
activities, contribute to ongoing study work, and develop projects related to one 
of the core-themes of Ringland. The CurieuzeNeuzen project has been one of 
the main outputs of the Ringland Academy up to now. Aside from its objective to 
better understand air quality problems in Antwerp, CurieuzeNeuzen was created 
to sensitise and trigger Antwerp citizens (and politicians) about their living 
environment and the urgency for action with respect to traffic-related air pollution.
The idea of the project was originated in the Ringland Academy, but the project was 
fully designed and implemented by a temporary project team of volunteers. They 
were identified during the annual Ringland music festival by putting up posters with 
vacancies for specialists in various disciplines, for which not only sympathisers 
but also other inhabitants and passers-by in general could apply. During the 
festival, most of the applications were completed and a diverse project team was 
established with volunteer-programmers, -database analysts, -communication 
experts, -scientists, and others. For a majority of the team members it was their 
first experience with volunteer work for Ringland. 
8.3
Setup of the CurieuzeNeuzen project
The CurieuzeNeuzen project was finally turned into an air quality measuring project, 
focusing on the average nitrogen dioxide (NO2) concentration at a household 
resolution per street. NO2, was measured using a cost-effective standard protocol 
during the month of May 2016. The NO2 pollutant was chosen as indicator for air 
quality here, since the project is to be situated in a mobility context and abundant 
scientific evidence shows that air pollution by NO2 is more traffic-related, than, for 
example, particulate matter (Carslaw 2005).
From meeting minutes of the project design phase it can be derived that the 
CurieuzeNeuzen team was not willing to compromise on scientific relevance for 
the sake of citizen participation. Therefore, after a review process of different NO2 
measurement devices, the project settled for Palmes diffusion tubes to map NO2 
concentrations83. The team preferred the tested Palmes tubes (Palmes, Gunnison et 
83 The type of Palmes diffusion tubes that were used in the CurieuzeNeuzen project, were tested 
by the Flanders Environment Agency in earlier research and gave reliable results
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al. 1976), rather than digital devices for cost-effectiveness and simplicity reasons, 
allowing to reach out to large numbers of citizens. Several studies show that the 
passive monitoring method is complementary to the continuous measurements 
based on chemiluminescence used in reference methods (Lewné, Cyrys et al. 2004). 
The performance values of these tubes have complied with the European Union data 
quality objectives for indicative measurements of ambient NO2 concentrations. 
Additional quality control steps were undertaken to strengthen scientific rigour. At 
different phases of the project, the team consulted leading experts on air quality 
to review ideas and options. In addition, permission was sought from the Flemish 
Environmental Agency (VMM) to allow for the calibration of the Palmes tubes in the 
eight reference monitoring stations located in the study area. In an effort to further 
improve data reliability, the team designed a standardised and foolproof set-up, 
which had the additional advantage of creating visibility for the research project. 
A measuring setup (as illustrated at www.curieuzeneuzen.eu/en/about/) was 
used, whereby a measuring board was attached to a window pane, containing two 
Palmes diffusion tubes sampling NO2 selectively from the ambient air. The board 
allowed the tubes to be hung on a fixed distance from the building, improving the 
measurement’s standardisation. The total amount of NO2 collected in the tube’s gel 
is a measure of the mean concentration of NO2 in ambient air. For quality control 
purposes two tubes were used at each location and the mean value of those two 
measurements was used for data analysis. Simple instructions were designed 
with a lot of visuals and supported by video. Finally, a tight plan was designed to 
guarantee the swift distribution and collection of 2,000 sets, and the exact recording 
of measurement times, height, etc. After four weeks, the tubes were collected, 
stored in a fridge and brought to the lab for analysis. 
The project was announced on March 22 in local newspapers, on social media, and 
on the Ringland website. The initial goal was to distribute 1,000 sampling packages 
amongst citizens around Antwerp in order to obtain a fine-meshed monitoring 
network of air quality data, suitably covering the study area. But within 12 hours 
after the launch of the project website, the number of volunteers already exceeded 
the initial 1,000 participants limit. This illustrated that there was a large interest 
– and that the possibility of “measuring air quality on the doorstep” was somehow 
dear to the inhabitants of Antwerp. In total, about 2,600 people ended-up registering 
for participation. To accommodate for the unexpected success, it was decided 
to raise the participant number to 2,000 monitoring points. The selection of who 
finally could participate was based on several criteria, especially focused on having 
measuring points that were suitably equidistantly distributed across the inner city 
of Antwerp and its neighbouring districts; and obtaining a mix of individual citizens, 
schools, and other institutions. Eventually 1,996 sampling packages were installed, 
of which 1,840 by citizens, 51 by schools, 10 by hospitals, 45 by companies, and 
15 by other organisations. Additionally, 35 points were located in public parks and 
viaducts crossing the ring road highway. Participation in the project was free and on 
a 100% voluntarily basis. 
Participants could collect their sampling packages on four different pick-up 
moments at one central location (theatre “De Roma”) between April 24-30 (2016). 
A sampling package included a sampler board, the samplers themselves, as well 
as a clear description on the scientific protocol to follow. The actual air quality 
measurement started on April 30 and ended on May 29. At the end of the campaign, 
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sampling packages were handed in again at the same central location. During the 
measurement campaign, participants were asked to fill in technical question-
naires sent by email to verify the location and height of the tubes, and to document 
exceptional issues which could affect the measurements (e.g. a fire nearby, tubes 
getting damaged, etc.). With 98% of the measurement sets returned84 for scientific 
analysis, the project realised an exceptional return rate. The volunteers engaging 
in the CurieuzeNeuzen project team were also involved in the data-interpretation. 
To make this possible, the data was visualised on maps and, in several sessions 
facilitated by two experts, the team critically reviewed the findings neighbourhood 
by neighbourhood, checking for consistency and anomalies, drawing conclusions, 
and identifying possible patterns. 
All participants were invited to the Ringland Festival on 25 June, as the preliminary 
results were presented there on a large 4x4m canvas, with an estimated 1500 
people coming to view and discuss the results. A log book was provided for partici-
pants to note down the results which stood out, together with possible clarifica-
tions. The preliminary findings were also picked-up widely in the local and national 
audio-visual media and papers, and on social media. Along with the preparation and 
validation of the air quality results, an online survey was launched in order to know 
what participants learned from their participation in the citizen science project and 
how this changed their attitude towards mobility measures, behaviour, etc. Also, 
the reasons for participation were probed and demographical data was gathered. 
The final results were presented on a feedback event at a large theatre (De Roma, 
in Antwerp on 22 October 2016) for a public of around 900 participants. During the 
event, leading policy-makers, including the head of the European Environmental 
Agency, a representative of the mayor of the city, and the head of Ringland were 
asked to comment on the findings and their implications for the city of Antwerp. 
After the more general presentation, people were asked to pass by the information 
stands of the CurieuzeNeuzen results of their own neighbourhood. They engaged in 
the verification of the results (coloured dots on the map) and were asked to think of 
possible explanations, especially were results seemed rather deviant. 
8.4
Results 
8.4.1
Scientifically rigorous air quality data
Only a brief summary of the actual air quality measurement findings is provided 
here, mainly to demonstrate their academic and societal relevance. An in-depth 
discussion of these data is the subject of separate submission to another peer- 
reviewed journal. A high-quality data-set was obtained, which revealed large 
84 From these another 2% of the sets were disqualified by the laboratory doing the quality 
control and analysis.
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differences in air quality across the city of Antwerp. NO2 concentrations varied  
over short distances (100 m-scale) ranging from around 30 µg/m³ within urban 
greens to over 60 µg/m³ in traffic-congested street canyons (Figure 91). Multivariate 
data analysis identified that three factors (traffic intensity, street geometry,  
and the distance to the ring road) explained spatial variation in observed NO2 
concentrations. 
Figure 91  Air quality results map of the CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project. 
Source: http://www.curieuzeneuzen.eu/.
The CurieuzeNeuzen results contribute to the growing body of knowledge about 
urban air quality in two main ways. First, the between-street differences turn out 
to be larger than predicted by the existing computer models, that particularly 
appear to systematically under-estimate the level of pollution in the street-ca-
nyons. Secondly a substantially larger part of the sampling locations (45±10%) has 
concentrations that exceed the WHO yearly NO2-limit of 40µg/m³, compared to what 
computer models predict (2%). 
Aside from the quality control steps described in Section 8.3, networking with 
academics and experts was actively pursued throughout the project cycle to 
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increase the chance of academic recognition and uptake. The fact that some 
members of the CurieuzeNeuzen team had a research background, although not 
in the area of air quality measurement, still helped to access and establish these 
academic contacts. Additionally, three universities were approached for technical 
and financial support. Once the plans became more specific, the Flemish Environ-
mental Agency (VMM) and the VITO research institute, which does the modelling 
of air quality data in Flanders, were approached not only for technical advice but 
also to discuss how the research could contribute to ongoing research efforts. 
The fact that VMM had identified citizen science as one of its emerging research 
areas, facilitated collaboration, although the institute was careful not to rush in 
its engagements. By the time the data collection started, significant interest in the 
data-set was shown by these research institutes and at the time of writing of this 
paper, the different parties were comparing the empirical data with existing air 
quality models. 
8.4.2
Fruitful cooperation with and adoption of CurieuzeNeuzen results  
by policy-makers
CurieuzeNeuzen engaged in different ways with the city administration. The project 
became national news during various stages of the campaign, gradually putting 
the air quality problems in Antwerp higher up on the political agenda. However, the 
ground work for the policy influencing agenda of CurieuzeNeuzen started earlier 
through initial contacts with the city administration. 
Rather than publicly exposing the city administration or policy-makers and in  
line with the overall constructive approach of Ringland, meeting minutes  
and project team observations indicate that a dialogue was sought with the  
relevant administrative services, e.g. the environmental task-force of the city 
administration, responsible for the production of updated air quality maps. 
CurieuzeNeuzen submitted a modest funding proposal to a fund of the city which 
supports small sustainability initiatives, covering only a fraction of the total 
budget. But more importantly, it became the start of a fruitful dialogue with the 
city administration, which initially was not at all convinced that the project would 
generate any relevant data. Through regular contacts trust was built, e.g. by sharing 
tentative results first with the city administration before making them public to 
allow them to prepare a balanced response. Later on, personal communication of 
the project team demonstrates that contacts with the political level were pursued. 
At the end of the campaign, there was broad-based support within the city  
administration for the overall campaign, both in terms of the air quality findings  
and the behavioural change it had triggered with the participants. The  
administration actively participated in the final symposium, by including two 
information stands during the event, a shared press conference, and a political 
representative participating in a panel debate. 
Since CurieuzeNeuzen originated from Ringland, the main movement opposing 
the largest infrastructural plans of Belgium, getting buy-in from the political level 
was rather sensitive, yet happened in different ways. As soon as the campaign was 
launched it attracted media attention because of its scale and the overwhelming 
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response to the first calls for participants. Local television stations and newspapers 
started picking it up on the day of the launch, national media followed soon after. 
Some leading politicians of opposition parties residing in Antwerp even decided to 
participate as citizens in CurieuzeNeuzen. As such, ignoring the campaign became 
difficult at the political level. 
Meeting minutes, frequency of meetings and personal communication between 
members of the project team illustrate that in the period leading up to the 
announcement of the final results in October 2016, the political contacts intensified, 
culminating in a joint press conference to launch the findings with two city 
councillors, three universities, and Ringland. In the weeks after, opposition parties 
used the findings to question the air quality policies of the city of Antwerp and the 
Flanders regional government through interventions in the town council and in the 
Flemish parliament. Between October 2016 and January 2017, almost every week 
media were reporting about air quality news items, hereby regularly referring to the 
CurieuzeNeuzen project. As an example, the largest newspaper in Belgium featured 
an interview with the director of the European Environmental Agency in which he 
was asked to share his views about CurieuzeNeuzen:
“Antwerp has set the standards for Europe. Both regarding data quantity  
and quality the research projects is amongst the absolute top. From now on,  
I will use this research project as a school example when giving lectures, 
since the rise of both knowledge and citizen involvement is of major 
importance” (H. Bruyninckx, director of the EEA, as in PJBA 24 October 2016)
The political opinion on the CurieuzeNeuzen results was the subject of discussion in 
the written press and media. The political majority in Antwerp sought confirmation 
in the CurieuzeNeuzen air quality results for the “promising” policy measures 
they had already planned: the low emission zone (LEZ) in Antwerp and further 
investments in public transport. However, the opposition saw in the results an 
urgent call for more extensive measures and they insisted on more short-term 
actions, e.g. lowering the speed limits on the ring road, more frequent public 
transport services, and a park and ride strategy. By some it was proposed to include 
the ring road itself to the LEZ (cf. now the within area of the ring, but excluding the 
ring), as the results showed that the ring road had a major negative influence on 
local air quality.
The results of the monitoring campaign raised an overall awareness for the theme 
of air quality and quality of life in the city. The findings of the project featured in 
several local newsletters of neighbourhoods. As such, activist groups used the 
findings to call local government to action. Furthermore, the results were also 
used by teams of architects working on the capping of the ring, and at an individual 
level, many stories were shared by citizens on how they looked differently at their 
environment due to the project. For all those who were not particularly aware of 
the problem before, the pamphlets and posters revealing the results and the local 
and national media coverage on the CurieuzeNeuzen project have raised a sense 
of urgency, and have made it a very visible and personal matter. That is also why 
in the areas with the worst air quality, some participants appeared not keen on 
publishing the results poster at home, due to the fear of a decreasing value of their 
house. Some schools were reluctant as well, for they feared to lose pupils due to the 
reported air pollution levels. 
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Furthermore, not all media coverage was contributory to the general knowledge 
accumulation and sensitisation on air quality issues and the necessary mobility 
behavioural change. Without any communication with the research team and 
regardless of the research scope and focus, the Antwerp Airport authority 
distributed promotion pamphlets stating that the CurieuzeNeuzen results proved 
that air traffic appeared not to have a major influence on the local air quality85. 
8.4.3
Citizen engagement and the effects of participation on participants
Participant’s profile, motivational factors and perceived air quality
As awareness about liveability and air quality issues affects all citizens regardless 
of their age, gender, family situation, and level of education, the project was 
aiming at attracting citizens with different backgrounds by communicating in 
easily understandable language and through popular media. Although the group 
of higher educated citizens with ecological interests was well represented, the 
project managed to reach out to a wider group of concerned citizens from different 
age groups, and social and educational backgrounds (see Appendix 4). Meeting 
minutes of the project team proves that additional efforts were taken to reach out 
to Antwerp citizens with a migration background as experience learns that they 
are using different media channels and are less likely to be reached by traditional 
citizen science initiatives. A sub-team raised awareness amongst representatives 
of the Muslim communities in Antwerp, resulting in the participation of around 
30 families with a Muslim background. This is still limited but does show that 
additional efforts can improve the participation of hard-to-reach groups.
Participants received questionnaires before and after the publication of the 
CurieuzeNeuzen results. With response rates of around 76% for the first survey and 
40% for the second survey, the survey findings provide a representative picture of 
the participants’ perceptions. 
When asked about motivational factors for participation, most of the participants 
reported to participate out of curiosity about the local air quality in their street  
(91.8 %). Other (or additional) reasons for participating were: raising the importance 
of air quality amongst neighbours and local passers-by (62.3 %), making the citizen 
movement Ringland known to a wider audience (59.9 %), and being intrigued 
by taking part in a real research project (39.8 %)(n=1,412). At the start of the 
measurement campaign, only 5% expected a good to very good air quality in their 
street, compared to those who assumed it to be moderate (40%), or (very) bad (50%) 
(n=1,414). As the urban air quality was perceived quite negative, this emerged as a 
main driver to actually subscribe for participation. After having seen the published 
air quality results, 59% of the participants agreed that the air quality measurement 
conformed with their expectation (n=631). For some, the measured air quality 
results were better than expected (27 %), while 11% underestimated the level 
85 However, the CurieuzeNeuzen project specifically addressed road traffic and therefore used 
the NO2 pollutant as indicator. For measuring direct aircraft-related emissions and impacts on 
ambient air pollution in the surroundings, other pollutants are more appropriate and indirect 
airport activity related pollution should also be taken into account (Masiol and Harrison 2014)
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of ambient air pollution in their vicinity, leaving them with a worse scenario than 
initially presumed. 
Outreach of the project
Public outreach and awareness raising are critical components of citizen science 
projects. The impact of outreach can be assessed through different “circles of 
influence”: (1) the participants themselves, (2) direct interactions between partici-
pants and others, and (3) information to the general public through press coverage 
and the visibility of the campaign in the streets. Accordingly, the surveys integrated 
questions that indicated the outreach. As the focus of the research was more 
on the impact of CurieuzeNeuzen on the participants than on the general public, 
surveys were targeting the participants. However, a rough indication of the project’s 
influence on the public debate about air quality can be found through an analysis of 
the press coverage. 
The CurieuzeNeuzen project is estimated to have reached 5,610 people directly 
(participants were asked about the number of people residing in their house, 
n:1,395). Indirectly, another (estimated) 35,400 persons86 were approached by 
the CurieuzeNeuzen participants to discuss about the project (n: 660), especially 
friends, family members, and neighbours, and to a lesser extent colleagues and 
fellow social activity members (see Annex II). A tertiary outreach was achieved by 
the adoption of the CurieuzeNeuzen air quality results in the media (the written 
press, digital media, and the social media), where the project received nationwide 
interest. When the measurements started, CurieuzeNeuzen was an item on the 
Flemish television news at primetime (ca. 1,160,000 viewers), the same happened 
when the tentative results and later on when the final results were announced. 
Since the project announcement in March 2016, more than 70 newspaper articles 
were reporting on or mentioning CurieuzeNeuzen at local, regional, and national 
level, including one front page of a national newspaper, and at least three page 2 
commentaries from newspaper editors. In at least four national radio programmes, 
well-known actors and artists mentioned their participation to CurieuzeNeuzen. In 
addition, with nearly 2,000 announcement boards (3D real-estate form) attached to 
houses in almost half of the streets in the inner city, the project was quite visible 
during the measurement campaign. Further promotion was done by (1) asking the 
participants to distribute short leaflets about CurieuzeNeuzen (50,000 copies) 
amongst their neighbours, (2) the large 4x4m canvas on the Ringland festival, and 
(3) by distributing posters with the actual measurement results to the participants 
so that passers-by could also see the results on a given street. Later on, team 
members were asked to do presentations about the project in schools, other civil 
society movements, and at two universities. 
In September 2017, it was announced that the CurieuzeNeuzen team would receive 
the Science Communications Prize 2017 from the Royal Flemish Academy of Arts 
and Sciences for its contribution to science communication in Flanders.  
86 This total number is re-constructed from the answers provided by a representative sample 
of CurieuzeNeuzen participants to a range of questions about the number of people (separate 
questions for family, friends, neighbours, etc.) they had talked to about CurieuzeNeuzen.
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The combination of communication strategies at different levels therefore resulted 
in large groups of citizens participating or hearing about CurieuzeNeuzen, both 
directly and through the media. This was further re-enforced by the strong media 
profile of Ringland itself. The academic recognition of the communication efforts 
provides an additional indication of their relevance and uptake. 
Effects of participation on attitude and behaviour
Due to participation in the CurieuzeNeuzen project, participants reported to act 
differently or plan to do so in the near future (Figure 93). Amongst the biggest 
self-reported behavioural changes noted were: “informing other people about 
air quality”, “selecting healthier biking and walking routes” and “greening my 
façade and street”. The sensitizing objective has thus had its effect. Many partici-
pants already had quite a sustainable mobility pattern, with around 65% (n=655) 
indicating they were already using the bike a lot and limiting car use, but this 
number further increased to almost the full group after the project. Interestingly,  
a substantial group wanted to take advocacy action (from 8% before having seen  
the results, to 57% after the publication of the results). Finally, a large group caught 
the research virus, with 61% indicating they plan to do more research on air quality.
Participants were asked about their attitude change towards certain local upcoming 
or already established mobility measures in Antwerp compared to their initial 
attitude before the start of the CurieuzeNeuzen project (see Figure 92). The public 
support increased for almost all mobility measures compared to before the start 
of the project. A substantial number of people indicated they had a (much) more 
positive attitude towards an environmental-friendly city distribution system (57%), 
park-and-ride zones outside the city (51%), and public transport (51%). Interes-
tingly, the participants were also more positive about measures which tend to be 
less popular, such as congestion taxes for cars (46%) and the introduction of a LEZ 
(34%). 
A specific measure related to the Antwerp context is ‘realising Ringland’ (cf. Section 
3.1) which brought about the most change in attitude, approximately 60% indicated 
being (much) more positive towards it. This score can not only be explained by 
the profile of the participants, which counted a good number of people which 
already supported Ringland. From the first survey, we concluded that there was 
at least a group of 30%-40% whom were not necessarily supporting Ringland at 
the start of the project. Another explanation might be that the Ringland concept 
precisely addresses the air quality aspect by capping the ring road and by choosing 
for a radical modal shift. Contrary to this, the alternative option provided by the 
government: “the Oosterweel Link” is associated with more traffic-related air 
pollution and therefore the least moving of all, causing only about 13% of positive 
change in attitude and 35% becoming (much) more negative.
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Figure 92  Has your attitude changed regarding possible solutions to improve air quality (compared
to before the start of CurieuzeNeuzen)? (n=660)
Figure 93  Are there things you are doing differently or plan to do differently because of your
participation to CurieuzeNeuzen? (N=655)
8.5
Discussion
Citizen Science projects can offer a wealth of information, and can reach large 
scales and fine resolutions for data collection and monitoring. But the practice 
is not yet universally accepted as a valid scientific method. However, due to the 
expanding field and experience, citizen science is gaining scientific legitimacy by its 
attempts to account for credibility and validity issues through refining citizen-scien-
tists protocols, the increasingly closer collaboration between scientists and 
citizens, etc. (Bonney, Shirk et al. 2014). This paper on the CurieuzeNeuzen project 
results and dynamics contributes to the expanding citizen science field and 
elaborates on the triple objective of scientific rigour, policy influence, and deep 
citizen engagement, necessary for accumulating social capital in the transition 
towards a more sustainable development, and mobility in particular. While previous 
sections discussed the citizen science project design, process, and outcomes, this 
section further unpacks the underlying dynamics, success factors, and limitations.  
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8.5.1
Right Moment and Place for Citizen Science?
External factors created a sense of urgency around air quality issues in Antwerp. 
The mobility situation around Antwerp has deteriorated over the years; it is now one 
of the main traffic hotspots in Europe. Ringland, other local civil society groups, 
such as Ademloos, and academics have raised awareness about the associated air 
quality and environmental health risks, pushing the topic gradually higher-up the 
political agenda. Earlier plans to improve the mobility situation were repeatedly 
rejected because they did not address the health problems, nor the lack of green 
areas, and quality of life. Meanwhile, many citizens became eager to learn whether 
the air quality was indeed so problematic in their street. CurieuzeNeuzen used 
this window of opportunity by offering access to a free but reliable measurement 
devices. In addition, several research institutes and governmental bodies were 
looking for large-scale empirical air quality data-sets to validate the existing 
computer models, and possibly as baseline to assess the impact of new mobility 
measures. 
At least four internal factors played a prominent role in amplifying the effects of the 
project. Firstly, the CurieuzeNeuzen project originated within the Ringland initiative, 
and could build at regular intervals on its mobilisation power, its strategic reflection 
capacity and communication services, and its logistical support. 
Secondly, the reputation and credibility of Ringland further facilitated access to 
academic networks and the city of Antwerp. After a laborious project negotiation 
around the proposal, the research design was settled. The necessary funding 
from the partner-sponsors followed, though a substantial share came from 
crowdfunding. More importantly, policy relevance and adoption was strengthened 
as the negotiations and engagements resulted in a closer collaboration of the 
research project team with these partners. For example, the city administration is 
considering to use the results of CurieuzeNeuzen as baseline to monitor the effects 
of the LEZ as of 2017 in Antwerp. Meanwhile, the government’s desire to be more 
inclusive and actually engage citizens is also met. 
Thirdly, while there was support from Ringland at different stages, the Curieuze-
Neuzen project was careful to keep a certain distance from Ringland. The scientific 
independence of the research was prioritised to guarantee that the advocacy 
agenda of Ringland would not be conflated with the research agenda. All the 
communication with participants was done under the CurieuzeNeuzen banner, 
avoiding direct mailing from Ringland unless participants had indicated interest 
in receiving information about Ringland. The same applied to  communication with 
the press and the city administration. This allowed the team to keep its scientific 
credibility, and avoided a situation where participants felt that they were pushed 
into endorsing Ringland if they wanted to participate in CurieuzeNeuzen. 
Fourthly, through the diversity in the technical skills of the project team, the project 
had direct access to professional communication, high level programming, database 
management, statistical analysis, survey management, etc.
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8.5.2
Successful co-created citizen science initiative
The CurieuzeNeuzen project can be regarded as a co-creative citizen science 
programme (Bonney, Ballard et al. 2009, Bonney, Cooper et al. 2009) since the 
project originated from the bottom-up, was implemented through the joint efforts of 
volunteer-experts, and a team of engaged citizens (see also Section 3.2). During the 
design and start-up phase contacts with three research institutes were gradually 
established and later on formalised. This collaborative nature is also mirrored in the 
funding of the project, which combines crowdfunding with contributions by three 
research institutes, the city of Antwerp and Ringland. Furthermore, CurieuzeNeuzen 
can be considered a successful co-creative or bottom-up citizen science initiative 
for additional reasons. Firstly, the project started from the bottom-up, but unlike 
other bottom-up citizen science initiatives did not lack organisational capacity 
or research validity (Bradshaw 2003); the project has reached not only scientific 
objectives but also political ones. Secondly, the project reached a diverse audience 
directly (actual participants) and indirectly. Participants engaged in the project 
team were involved in all steps of the research process, from the set-up, to the data 
analysis and the eventual evaluation. Additionally, all participants were encouraged 
to attend several public feedback moments organised together with opinion makers, 
multiple knowledge institutions, and politicians, that were always framed within 
the bigger mobility context. The CurieuzeNeuzen air quality results have further fed 
the political discussion about the necessary mobility measures to take (cf. public 
transport, LEZ, etc.). Thirdly, in the survey, many participants reported to have 
learned new things, to have changed, or adjusted their attitude towards mobility 
measures and their behaviour with respect to displacement patterns. Though 
we must note that those are short term effects; measuring the effects of partici-
pation on the longer term is more challenging, but an interesting topic for future 
research. Additionally, an ambitious project as the Ringland initiative is increasingly 
considered a plausible way of realising a better quality of life in Antwerp. The 
CurieuzeNeuzen project appeared successful in building social capital and bridging 
the gap between the scientific and the practice as indicated by the broad project 
outreach. 
8.5.3
Limitations
Despite the many efforts to engage inhabitants in the project from all ranges of 
society, a bias towards higher educated people, aged between 26 to 50 years, was 
visible. The project’s strategies to engage with the large group of citizens with a 
migration background were only partially successful. Secondly, the analysis of the 
participants’ profile, motivations, and perceptions was constrained by the limited 
number of questions in the survey. The project team did not want to put off partici-
pants with a long list of survey questions. Additional in-depth interviews with a 
selection of participants would have increased the insights in how they experienced 
the project and get a better understanding if the expressed intentions about 
sustainable mobility were likely to be acted upon. Thirdly, as the project was careful 
to preserve a certain distance from the advocacy role of Ringland, this did affect the 
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survey. Questions about Ringland were avoided as much as possible to avoid scaring 
away the large group of participants that were interested in the study, but were not 
necessarily supportive of Ringland. Fourthly, as the main focus was on gathering air 
quality data, the social and learning aspects were at first not elaborated and gained 
attention during the campaign. Therefore, by the end of the project, the surveys 
were prepared and distributed rapidly (by volunteers from the project team) and by 
lack of enough ICT-experience and time, accurately matching answers from the first 
and second survey appeared infeasible in the end. Nevertheless, we do not think 
this makes the results and interpretation less relevant, but the interpretation is 
much more indicative and therefore we consider it a missed opportunity to make our 
contribution even more valuable. 
8.6
Conclusions CurieuzeNeuzen
The CurieuzeNeuzen project can be considered successful in the way it created both 
internal (contributions to personal learning and development) and external value 
(public utility of data for decision-making process) (Conrad and Hilchey 2011). In 
the aftermath of the project, Ringland and other civil pressure groups were given an 
active role in the further mobility decision-making process. 
The project allowed the measuring of air quality on a very detailed and large scale, 
and the involvement of volunteers from all over Antwerp. The project showed a 
highly variable air quality from street to street with the proximity to major roads  
(i.e. the ring road and Singel) amongst the most contributory factors to local air 
quality. Nearly half of the measurement locations registered NO2 concentrations 
that are expected to exceed the WHO yearly limit. Hence, the sensitizing effect 
of both participation in the project and the project results themselves that were 
dramatically displayed as red dots on the map, were substantial. The project roused 
a sense of urgency to act among inhabitants and politicians to act. After the project, 
participants indicated in a survey to have improved their scientific insights and 
knowledge on air quality. Moreover, they reported to have adjusted their attitude 
towards mobility measures and certain behavioural change was explicated (cf. use 
of the bike, preference for car-free routes, car sharing, informing other people, 
etc.). The survey results illustrate that the CurieuzeNeuzen project builds toward 
knowledge accumulation, through which social capital and eventually behaviour 
change can be catalysed. Future research could focus on the longer-term effects 
of this kind of project on participants. Further improving the participation rates 
of citizens with a migration background and other hard-to-reach groups is also a 
future challenge. 
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9.1
Main findings
This dissertation started from the observation that solving mobility issues 
and governing mobility remains troublesome. The prevailing mobility planning 
approaches are still entrenched in a technocratic oriented discourse, that is 
strongly oriented towards hardware and software solutions. Those approaches do 
not prove effective to launch the mobility transition as they either have faced an 
increasing opposition, or their solutions have generated undesired side-effects, that 
in turn developed new problems. Because of this, mobility issues, have increasingly 
become wicked problems. Adopting an orgware that complements hardware and 
software approaches and that aligns all those interventions lags behind. Only more 
recently, orgware interventions, focusing on the actors, the institutions, and the 
conditions are becoming part of the mobility governance scope. With orgware we 
mean the organisation in all its facets, e.g. alignment between actors, factors and 
institutions emerging in the mobility (planning) scene.  In this research we came up 
with a strategy to unravel the (case specific) mobility orgware in order to formulate 
an orgware agenda. A research outline was specified (cf. Section 1.3), corresponding 
this dissertation’s chapters, and subquestions were formulated to enable us build 
our answer  to the central research question: What can an orgware agenda add to 
hard- and software solutions tackling complex mobility issues?  
Hereafter, the results of each research step are resumed by giving an answer to 
the subquestions. In the next section, more general conclusions are formulated 
to address the central research questions and policy reflections and avenues for 
further research are stipulated. 
 a Why are mobility problems often wicked, and why is the mobility transition  
  complex? 
We started from the assumption that the mobility issues of today are inherently 
wicked. As space is scarce, the implementation of large infrastructure projects  
or urban development projects often meets with serious resistance by local citizen 
movements, environmental actors, inhabitants, and sometimes governmental 
actors as well. Other mobility interventions or discussions, such as the  
establishment of a low emission zone (LEZ), a circulation plan, a pedestrian zone, 
a congestion charge scheme, parking schemes, etc. do not escape this opposition 
either. As such, an ever growing and increasingly empowered number of actors enter 
the mobility planning scene, and renders mobility issues wicked and the governance 
of mobility complex.
To address this wickedness appropriately a systemic approach to mobility is 
necessary, an approach that takes into account all its parts; the actors, its setting, 
and their interplay. The multi-market mobility model served as the starting point 
for the fundamental orgware approach we propose: the complex adaptive system 
of mobility. The model has an eye for all the aspects that influence mobility choices 
and travel patterns, and it embeds mobility in a broader societal and environmental 
system of resources and impacts (cf. Figure 94). The CAS of mobility comprises a 
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travel market, a transport market, and a traffic market. Those interrelated markets 
do not act in a void, but are depending on resources87 and exert a certain impact on 
the broader socio-technical (hyper-)system88 – also . Each of those ‘markets’ is to 
be considered as a dynamic assemblage of actor network associations shaping and 
being shaped by their conditions. The mobility system can be regarded as a CAS, 
within the greater societal/environmental system, and on micro-level. It consists of 
various dynamic features influencing each other continuously: socio-demographic 
factors, macro and micro-economic trends, socio-cultural trends, the plurali-
sation of life- and subsequently mobility styles, the impact on pollution and health, 
technological and logistic innovations, and the respective policies. 
Figure 94  Mobility arenas and their embedding in the environment. 
Source: Lauwers and Allaert (2013). 
The governance of that mobility CAS, goes beyond just intervening in hard- and 
software of the separate markets. It aims at a co-evolutionary alignment of the 
interrelated components. Therefore, this research comes up with a twofold 
challenge: connecting the system’s components and creating the right context or 
thus the focussed conditions for that. To address that challenge we need to go in 
detail about the components of the CAS of mobility. As we started from the basic 
observation that present approaches do not meet the encountered complexity of the 
real world, our research adventure starts with embracing complexity.
Adopting a complexity perspective implies a considerable change of mind, as 
certainty and predictability are replaced by emergence and a-linearity, resulting 
from self-organising patterns, and co-evolutionary processes. “Complexity-proof” 
planning approaches are actor centred and require the emphasis to shift from 
the present, ad-hoc planning based on the here and now, towards planning for an 
“undefined becoming” (Boelens and De Roo 2014). The wicked problems generated 
by those dynamic interrelated parts and subsystems therefore cannot be answered 
by generic formulas. Hence, situational approaches gain attention over generic ones 
(De Roo 2012, Jessop 1997). A CAS is defined as a complex system that comprises 
87  Resources: both material (e.g. fuel, space, energy, etc. ) and immaterial (e.g. financial 
resources, knowhow,  economic welfare, etc.) 
88  Impacts: both material (e.g. exhaust emissions, appropriation of space for infrastructure, 
etc.) and immaterial (e.g. socio-economic impact of (reduced) accessibility, etc.)
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many subsystems and hyper-systems or environments at multiple (scale) levels, 
which are all continuously self-organising in the interaction with each other 
and with their setting. When zooming out, to see the bigger picture, the detail of 
the parts dissolves and the subsystems they shape become visible. From this 
perspective we can observe the co-evolution processes, as the aggregate of the 
self-organising actor networks. 
 b Who and/or what is at the basis of a mobility transition?
But, more precisely, what does this mean for mobility? How do mobility patterns 
arise? Who or what is at the basis of those patterns? To answer those questions, we 
took an actor-centred perspective that is built on the actor network theory (ANT) 
and the actor relational approach (ARA). The ANT theory presumes that actors 
should be perceived as parts of associations or actor networks. ANT is based on 
the idea that actors are continuously networking and by this acquiring meaning 
(within their network). Everything has to be considered as actor network; focusing 
on either the actors or the network is a matter of zooming in or out. Everything is 
considered as part of an actor network. In the quest to reach their goals, actors 
form dynamic alliances with other actors that strive for the same ideals, plans, 
objectives, etc. Actor network associations emerge from those continuous 
interactions, “self-organising processes”. ANT and ARA identify four phases in 
actor networking, the so-called “translations”: problematisation, interessement, 
enrolment, and mobilisation of allies or institutionalisation. The ARA approach 
specifically addresses the role of spatial planners in these translation phases. 
Therefore, the ARA refines those four steps into seven, and even formulates a 
step towards a future beyond the plan; including the development of a regime and 
shaping an “associative democracy”. Those steps reflect the importance of strategic 
partnerships (regime development), and of reconnecting with the citizens and the 
continuous search for legitimacy (associative democracy). ARA further stresses 
the importance of a mixed actor network association in which strategic partner-
ships between the civil, public, business, and knowledge sector are strived for. As 
actors eventually want to get their views or actions institutionalised, i.e. adopted 
and facilitated by formal and informal sets of rules, plans, etc. we conduct a brief 
inspection of the institutional theory perspectives.
Institutions were defined as ‘collections of rights, rules, principles, and decision-
making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants 
in these practices, and guide interactions among the participants’ (Young 2017: 27). 
Several perspectives conceived how institutions are formed: the path dependent, 
the sociological, and the institutional change perspective conceptualising windows 
of opportunities. From this review, we extracted that history matters for the future 
course of institutions (North 1990), but that history does not determine everything. 
Indeed, in correspondence with the proposed actor centred approach, in the 
institutional theories, the actors themselves are given a central place as well, for 
instance in the structuration theory provided by Giddens (1984) amongst others. 
Institutions can change, if the actors decide so. However, not all change necessarily 
implies a more effective outcome, as people only have bounded rationality, and 
cultural significance and habitual behaviour play a role as well. This central role 
for actors, stemming from their autopoietic, structurational, and self-organising 
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capacity, must be taken into account when looking for an appropriate governance in 
a complex real world. Moreover, those actors, factors and institutions do not make 
sense on their own, they are given meaning through the networks they interact in 
and with. As such, “governance” should focus on the actors, the actor networks, and 
the contexts. 
 c From “government” to “Governance”? Which governance strategies can  
  be distinguished?  
The interplay of the orgware components, of actors and institutions, is the object 
of governance. Some of the aforementioned governance definitions are resumed 
below, as they represent various perspectives on governance; ranging from a 
planner’s perspective of steering, towards the notion of governance as a result,  
an emerging process. The definitions align with the conceptualisation of mobility  
as a CAS. 
“Governance is understood as the result of the interaction of many actors 
who have their own particular problems, define goals and follow strategies to 
achieve them. Governance therefore also involves conflicting interests and 
struggle for dominance.”(Voss and Kemp 2006: 9) 
“[…] the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and  
systems that are both operationally autonomous from one another and 
structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal interdependence.” 
(Jessop 1997: 111).
“Governance is a social function centred on steering collective behaviour 
toward desired outcomes and away from undesirable outcomes.”  
(Young 2017: 26)
With respect to the position and role of governments in such governance, we 
observed that governance approaches ranged from a strongly top-down centred 
“government” in the public administration paradigm (70’s and 80’s), to a free 
market oriented new management paradigm (90’s). Since the top-down approach 
did not always deliver the desired results, governing inclined towards the other 
extreme; the free market principle. The associated co-production concept was 
seized as an opportunity for PPS. But, the predominant co-production concept of 
that era soon eroded to managerial contracting practices, and became a shadow 
of the strategic partnership between public and private it once had envisioned. 
From 2000 onwards, hopes were pinned on a combination of both in the new public 
governance paradigm. However, the interpretation and reputation of co-production 
was restored. But, as this approach appeared very time-consuming, it soon drifted 
off from real co-production to only involving the vested actors. In addition, those 
planning approaches still focus on working towards a fixed goal, though oriented 
on the longer term. This fixed goal is a concept difficult to materialise when 
acknowledging the complex nature of the real world. Striving for a fixed goal  
does not take into account the self-organising processes by actor networking 
associations. Those processes are at the basis of how actor networks come into 
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existence, and how actors influence and are influenced by their environment 
and institutional setting (cf. chapter 2.2). As an answer, affected by complexity 
theories, the reflexive governance, transition management, and evolutionary 
governance theory were developed, adding co-evolutionary aspects to governance. 
They conceptualised how governance arrangements could change or (co-)evolve 
over time. When combining those former perspectives with the new one, one can 
come up with a matrix of four governance approaches. They can be differentiated 
according to the way they perceive the actor field and setting cf. in Figure 95. That 
specific co-evolutionary approach is of interest for our complexity embracing 
orgware agenda for mobility. 
 
Figure 95  Four approaches on the governance of complexity with respect to actors and setting.
Source: based on Hertogh and Westerveld (2010: 228, figure 5.9) as in Boelens (2015: 201).
 d Governing the complex adaptive system of mobility: a two-tiers challenge
How did we merge the complexity perspective guided by self-organisation, 
co-evolution, and emergence of actor network associations and their institutionali- 
sations with governance? We adopted the concept of structural couplings (Luhmann 
1997). The actor networks may not allow to be steered directly, but their interplay, 
their coordination and alignment may leave room for indirect control. For this CAS 
context, we propose a co-evolutionary orgware agenda, which aims at realising 
or facilitating two main objectives. First, governance should intervene in the 
subsystems and its actor networks from the inside, so that structural couplings 
and alliances can be forged. Second, from an external perspective, governance 
can shape the necessary conditions to allow these structural couplings to happen, 
to broaden the solution space. We are not only interested in the actors or the 
conditions, but also in their interactions. Those interactions relate to the actor’s 
or subsystem’s governance paths. These two steps were covered in our case study 
analysis. Governance answers to mobility issues were screened and examined with 
respect to the rise of structural couplings within the dynamic translating actor 
networks. Afterwards, we tried to identify the conditions and where they opened up 
for co-evolutionary change. 
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 e What do real world governance case studies learn us about governing  
  complexity?
A multiple case study analysis was carried out, to see where mobility governance 
stands today with respect to acknowledging complexity and adapting the orgware. 
Evidence to answer this subquestion was gathered from mostly Flemish mobility 
governance case studies. Cases were selected from two major developing 
governance processes and formal institutional changes over the last decade: the 
upcoming regional intergovernmental mobility cooperation, and the planning and 
implementation of large infrastructure projects. Data sources for reconstructing the 
governance processes comprised source analysis, interviews, focus groups, and an 
ethnographic observation. 
  Regional mobility cooperation in the southeast of Antwerp and in the 
  region of Mechelen
In the chapter on regional mobility cooperation, two subcases were focused on: 
the SLUIZO/MOZO case in the southeast of Antwerp, and the intergovernmental 
cooperation in the region of Mechelen by the Cooperation Accessible Region (C-AR) 
and later by the transport region Mechelen. Those cases are connected in the 
sense that the initiative for the C-AR in Mechelen stemmed from interest in such 
intergovernmental cooperation or platform, that in turn instigated the selection of 
the region around Mechelen as pilot transport region. 
Unravelling the case specific orgware, and thus the actor networks of those cases, 
shows that both cases are raised from the bottom up, from the municipalities. 
They tell the actor network story of mostly vested public mobility actors involved in 
the transport and traffic market, including amongst others the municipalities, the 
Flemish administrations (AWV and MOW), the public transport providers (De Lijn and 
NMBS), the province, etc. 
In both cases, the actors associated because of a shared objective, tackling 
inter-municipal mobility problems, e.g. the perceived transit traffic in the southeast 
of Antwerp, or the call for a shared vision of mobility in the region of Mechelen. 
Those initiatives were answered by a top down intervention, shaping an inter- 
mediary platform to address the raised issues. 
In Antwerp, this top-down answer did not appeal to all of the participating municip-
alities, and the interest gradually dropped. Important to know is that the real 
mobility problem in the area was attributed to internal displacements, and not 
necessarily transit traffic. As a consequence, no infrastructure measures, but rather 
intergovernmental cooperation (a MOZO platform) was proposed as solution, to the 
discontent of many municipalities. As such, the actor network fell apart, and no 
further engagements were specified. 
In Mechelen, IGEMO the intercommunal in the region around Mechelen started the 
initiative for a regional collaboration for, amongst other fields, the field of mobility, 
after the idea arose on several consecutive conferences of mayors. The existence 
of this cooperative spirit played a major role in the later selection of the region 
of Mechelen as a pilot transport region. As the obligatory passage point to start 
cooperating was already dealt with in the C-AR. However, we could observe that 
the top-down answer, i.e. the transport region Mechelen, somewhat put or even 
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the dynamics of the bottom up initiative on hold, though both actor networks cover 
more or less the same actors. The C-AR was redefined to fit the arrangements of 
the transport region, but many aspects of the initial C-AR pillars therewith had lost 
attention or were postponed in anticipation of the necessary financial means (e.g. 
marketplace for mobility, participatory approach, etc.); those means went to the 
transport region. In the case of Mechelen, one had learned from the SLUIZO/MOZO 
experience, that with political support and institutional anchoring the chances 
of success increase. Indeed, in contrast to the case of SLUIZO/MOZO where the 
initiating municipalities did not have a further role in the decision-making process 
after the study process, in Mechelen, the municipalities stayed involved as they got 
a seat in the transport region council, the new mobility policy level (in the making cf. 
“pilot”). 
In the case of Mechelen, some lessons were learned from the SLUIZO/MOZO 
experience. For instance, it was acknowledged that by politically anchoring 
the actor network in the mobility decision-making process, and by expressing 
engagements and specifying financial contributions, the chances of success were 
increased. Although the political involvement can be beneficial, sometimes, when 
nearing elections, that political influence can interfere with the translation of the 
actor networks and their institutionalisation process. For instance, in the case of 
Mechelen, the transport region council postponed the final approval of the interre-
gional transport plan till after the elections. Even the final constellation of municip-
alities in this region can still change. As such, while the political support or backing 
proves to be important and is an enabling factor, adding the political layer can also 
be constraining, as by adding politics the cooperations can lose vigour. 
The transport region Mechelen adopted a rather adaptive governance approach as 
it started from exploring future options for a changing setting within a relatively 
stable actor field; different public transport scenarios were particularly focused on 
anwering the very specific travel demand in the future. 
In both cases the mediators that had to manoeuvre for the necessary structural 
couplings came from the public sphere. In the SLUIZO/MOZO case, after the study 
was carried out, the deputy Verhaert and F. Leys, an official from the DMOW, had to 
launch and sustain the platform, but the actor network was non-existing anymore. 
In the case of the C-AR, IGEMO functioned as the first mediator, but then it was 
taken over by the chairman of the transport region council G. Vaganée and F. Leys. 
  Regional mobility cooperation from an entrepreneurial perspective:  
  the VO in Rotterdam
The Verkeersonderneming in Rotterdam is a case that also deals with regional 
mobility governance but from an entrepreneurial perspective. Although this 
initiative also stemmed from the realm of public actors, the adopted governance 
approach is rather business-oriented. The approach gave rise to a new sector; it 
addressed mobility service providers to overcome the accessibility challenges in the 
region of Rotterdam. 
 The VO has been established to anticipate and counteract the traffic congestion 
that was expected during the planned major road works at the A15 in Rotterdam. 
As none of the existing authorities knew well how to keep the region accessible, 
a new cooperation, with a mix of external people and people from the authorities, 
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had to think of new ways to deal with these challenges. In addition, a political 
momentum, enabled the actual setup of the VO as a new cooperation. Soon, the 
focus was on targeting people and employers, and on activating a new third party: 
the marketplace for mobility was born. Though the VO was sometimes considered 
a new public party, the organisation can distinguish itself from ordinary public 
cooperations through its creativity, flexibility, and efficiency. Political interference 
was limited to the programme level (priorities and values for the region), while the 
elaboration of that programme and reaching the targets was left entirely to the VO 
itself. Furthermore, projects were frequently delegated back to the different parent 
organisations and officials were often exchanged from the VO to the parents, or the 
other way around. Dare and do what the other parties cannot or dare not do was the 
motto. 
The actor network diagrams display the VO in the middle of the network, placed next 
to its parents. The VO could integrate a diverse range of actors in its actor network, 
ranging from citizens and business actors, to knowledge institutions and other 
public actors. Specific programmes and projects were initiated to target specific 
actor networks (e.g. “Wild! van de spits” campaign to address car commuters and 
citizens, or the employers approaches targeting the business sector in the region. 
The latter nodes would represent actor networks themselves if we had more time 
and a more specific scope of analysis. 
Thanks to the successful “peak avoidances”- approach, the VO increasingly built 
legitimacy and got its orgware approach institutionalised. The popularity of an 
orgware approach and the implementation of “smart measures” (optimising 
capacity and creating alternatives) can be attributed to the economic climate at 
that time; an economic climate that did not allow for many costly infrastructural 
measures (neither hardware, nor software). As such, the VO could increasingly 
mobilise more means, not only from the parent organisations but also from the 
national level. After the first years, the VO was given the opportunity to carry out the 
national consecutive BB-programmes for the region Rotterdam, and this approach 
was anchored in the future spatial planning and mobility institutional framework 
(BO MIRT) for the region (between the national level and the provinces).
This institutionalisation changed the VO, as it had to adapt its working methods and 
its organisation to the needs of the various programmes to carry out. The hardware 
and software interventions carried out by the partners, were always combined with 
an orgware approach by the VO. With the VO as a cooperating partner, consistency 
was created in the mobility policy and all subsystems of the complex adaptive 
mobility system were utilised and addressed appropriately in search for a more 
sustainable and accessible region. 
The VO is the result of a co-evolutionary governance strategy followed by the parent 
organisations to adapt to a dynamic and volatile institutional setting and to address 
a dynamic actor field in a quest to keep the region accessible. 
The mediators that facilitated the establishment of the VO were the director of the 
Port Authority and the Minister. Though less known by the ordinary citizens, the 
managing director of the VO plays an important role as well, to navigate between 
politics and practice, and to pursue an innovative path that sometimes encounters 
opposition. Furthermore, the people I spoke with took a central role as well, as  
they ensured the necessary cross-overs with the parent organisations on a regular 
basis, they defended the orgware approach where necessary in their “home base”. 
242 CONCLUSIONS
They also manoeuvred the necessary structural couplings between the parents 
organisations. 
  Case study of the LIP Oosterweel Link 
During the LIP Oosterweel link, the orgware changed drastically, thanks to the 
interplay of diverse actors with each other and with their institutional framework. 
The adopted governance strategies ranged from a strongly top-down oriented 
technocratic planning approach in the first project years, to a collaborative 
approach in the last two years, and even towards the inclusion of a cautious 
co-evolutionary layer after the settlement of the Future Covenant.
Like in the other case studies, this case started as an infrastructure story too. 
The infrastructural solutions were already suggested, even before a broader 
problem definition and scope had been considered appropriately. This illustrates 
the prevailing path dependent planning approach at that time. Later, under the 
influence of various citizens movements and knowledge evolutions adapting the 
institutional framework, various additional themes were added to the project, such 
as liveability and impact on the city and air quality. By using the translation rounds 
to reconstruct the case story, we wanted to draw attention to the multi-layered and 
increasingly complex character of the case. Although the earlier citizen movements 
had already opted for a capping of the ring road, the capping story was brought 
to life by the Ringland movement a few years later. They mastered the various 
media channels, they adapted their communication strategy, and they provided 
the knowledge with crowdfunded scientific studies. As such, they increasingly 
gained support from citizens, academics, business actors, and politics. They have 
catalysed the new dynamics necessary to break free from the locked-in LIP planning 
process.
While the two main actor networks in the case, respectively the governmental 
side “versus” the citizens movements, both grew, it was only with the Ringland 
movement that interconnections were established between the two. This also 
characterises the process that went from a conflict model to a collaborative  
model. Later, the intendant adopted a central position between both “sides”  
and structurally coupled both actor networks, which was anchored in the  
Future Covenant.
The various governance approaches that were adopted over the years each had 
their own exponents or mediators. While Camiel Paulus was the mediator of the 
path-dependent strategy in the early years of the large infrastructure project, 
this role was taken over by Cathy Berx (Poort Oost) adopting a rather collaborative 
strategy in a later phase. But the process got even more collaborative by Ringland 
(informal collaborations), and later by the intendant (informal and formal). Perhaps, 
the intendant has touched upon a co-evolutionary strategy, as he could gradually 
gain the trust of all parties in the project and he could widen his mandate. The 
actors were on speaking terms again and a settlement could be reached between 
the protagonists (Future Covenant). Even the pending legal disputes were cleared, 
as the urgency to act was omnipresent. To connect with the ordinary citizen he 
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relied on the collaborative techniques of research by design and organised several 
intensive rounds of citizen engagement in the project on different moments in the 
planning of the capping projects (Ringdagen). This gave the citizens the tools they 
needed to become involved with the mobility and spatial planning matter in their 
region. 
In our opinion it is no coincidence that the most successful mediators in the story 
have an urban planning background (e.g. Ringland and the intendant); the inter- 
disciplinary character and the eye for the creation of an imaginary is something that 
is in the nature of spatial planners, more than in the nature of others.
  Insights were offered by the CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project
The CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project was launched by the Ringland Academy, 
a think tank within the Ringland movement to measure the traffic-related air quality 
in Antwerp. The project not only focused on collecting data of a high scientific 
quality, but also on involving citizens, and raising awareness in general, and on the 
adoption of the results by policy-makers. The project succeeded in mastering those 
objectives, and this brought the air quality issue to an even higher level on the policy 
agenda. 
How does the citizen science project relate to our dual challenge? On the one 
hand, the project created structural couplings between the city and the citizen 
movements, as the city even became a (financial) partner of the project in addition 
to other universities. On the other hand, it provided the necessary institutional 
anchoring for the project, but also from a general perspective, for the engagement 
of  citizens. It has further strengthened the legitimacy of the Ringland Academy and 
of the Ringland movement. CurieuzeNeuzen functioned as a stepping stone to a 
more co-evolutionary governance track within the larger mobility debate in Antwerp 
and in the LIP Oosterweel Link.
It is no coincidence that the CurieuzeNeuzen project focused on air quality, as the 
average citizen often only has an anecdotal knowledge of the subject. Participation 
in such a project can therefore not only increase the individual scientific knowledge, 
but also render the environmental sciences more democratic on a larger scale; air 
quality and the associated quality of life aspects and environmental quality thus 
become a matter for everyone. The project gives the average citizen the tools to 
form a more well-founded opinion about measures that the city or, by extension, 
other authorities are taking or want to take, while at the same time calling their own 
behaviour into question.
The Ringland Academy and the results of the CurieuzeNeuzen project provided the 
necessary means to have a proper debate on air quality. A debate that is strongly 
linked to the mobility and spatial planning debate in Antwerp. Furthermore, it 
brought the citizen movements, the city of Antwerp and the Flemish Government 
together to act now.
The practical added value is demonstrated first of all by the fact that the high-re-
solution CurieuzeNeuzen air quality data gave a more refined picture of the 
difference in air quality between the streets themselves, and that the air quality 
models that are generally used as a basis for policy decisions need to be refined 
or adjusted. After all, the air quality has been effectively measured, where policy 
has always been based on air quality values generated by models based on only a 
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few effectively measured values. Secondly, the CurieuzeNeuzen air quality data 
has been adopted by the city as its reference base for testing the impact of future 
measures, e.g. the effect of the introduction of the low emission zone in Antwerp. 
Thirdly, the participation in such a project also has an impact on the participants, 
e.g. a change of attitude towards policy measures, but also regarding the mobility 
behaviour, etc. As such, “planning” moves beyond the plan and comes closer to the 
citizens again, the people we are eventually planning for.
a) MOZO     b) C-AR Mechelen
c) Transport region Mechelen   d) The VO (Rotterdam)
e) OWL by BAM    f) by citizen movements
g) OWL after intendant
Figure 96  Summary of the cases’ orgware .
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9.2
The two-tiers challenge for the orgware 
To cope with the encountered complexity in the mobility transition our theoretical 
framework was centred around the challenge to connect the actor networks and the 
subsystems, and to create the necessary conditions that stimulate or activate those 
connections. We kept this twofold challenge in mind while reconstructing several 
mobility governance case studies to gather in-depth information on the specific 
governance solutions that were established. What were the outcomes? Did they 
succeed? Who were the mediators in the story? We have searched the cross-case 
patterns, similarities and dissimilarities, barriers and opportunities to formulate 
an orgware agenda for mobility governance. In this part of the conclusions we will 
elaborate on those findings and observations as stepping stone towards our policy 
reflections. Although we will first elaborate on the manoeuvring for structural 
couplings and afterwards on the institutions, there are many overlaps between the 
two. 
9.2.1
Manoeuvring for structural couplings
During this research, we observed that the traffic market is the engine of the 
complex adaptive mobility system (Figure 96); it is the arena from which many 
governance stories start. Hardware and software fixes, especially in the traffic 
market (traffic infrastructure and traffic management) are the most common 
and most popular solutions to mobility problems. Moreover, it is easier to find 
stakeholders and mobilise partnerships around hardware and software inter- 
ventions, than around less tangible orgware measures, the output of which is 
not directly visible in the field. The coordination and integration with other policy 
areas, or thus considering mobility as a CAS that comprises more than just the 
traffic market, remains rare in Flanders. This is often illustrated by a hasty problem 
definition phase in the planning process. 
Various cases show that an infrastructural solution was formulated and discussed 
even before an in-depth problem analysis had been conducted, revealing the 
structural basis of the problem and exploring possible synergies with other policy 
areas. This can lead to actors associating in partnerships for specific opportunistic 
reasons (cf. SLUIZO/MOZO), or can lead to a growing opposition to the project 
(cf. Oosterweel project). However, in the case of Rotterdam, the infrastructural 
bottlenecks served as the catalyst for a more structural orgware approach (the 
VO), that still exists and continues to grow, even after a decade. The orgware of 
the Oosterweel Link project also changed over the years. Especially during the last 
years, the dynamic actor field and opposition to the project was answered by the 
appointment of an intendant, as mediator to reconnect the actors and to look for 
convergence. Furthermore, the citizen movements became the protagonists of the 
planning scene. They got themselves into the decision-making process, and even 
changed the course of future mobility planning in the region of Antwerp; they were 
involved in the transport region Antwerp. 
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From the de- or reconstruction of the actor networks we could observe some 
patterns with respect to who the initiating actors were and which the resulting 
dynamics were from other actors in the network. 
Only in the case of the VO, the initiative for a fundamental orgware shift was 
launched by the “regime” public actors themselves. Because they saw challenges 
that fell outside their own field of competence (behavioural change campaigns, 
setting up an marketplace for mobility, etc.). In the other studied cases, the 
initiative for a governance change came from the bottom-up (“niches”). Both in the 
SLUIZO/MOZO case, and in the case of regional cooperation for mobility in Mechelen 
(C-AR/transport region Mechelen), the cooperation was instigated by the local 
authorities (public actors). In the case of the large infrastructure project (LIP) of the 
Oosterweel Link, the most important incentive for change was manoeuvred by the 
citizen movements (Ringland, Ademloos and stRaten-generaal). 
Often, in response to those bottom-up initiatives, a top-down answer was 
formulated by the regime actors (governments): the MOZO platform as a response 
to the SLUIZO study results, the transport region pilot Mechelen as response to the 
C-AR initiative, and the appointment of an intendant in the Oosterweel Link project 
as an answer to the opposing actor network of the citizen movements. This clearly 
shows that the path dependent, or at best adaptive and collaborative strategies 
prevail in mobility planning; there is no sign of adopting a co-evolutionary approach 
in general. It seems difficult for governmental actors to leave more autonomy to the 
planning process and the involved actors; they somehow want to keep control or be 
in charge. As such, initiatives that rose from the bottom-up were responded to or 
taken over by the top-down. This top-down story was not always fruitful, nor in line 
with the initiators’ proposal (cf. SLUIZO versus MOZO, and IGEMO and C-AR versus 
the transport region Mechelen). In the case studies, this is often the point where 
the stories hampered or even ended, except for the Oosterweel Link case, where 
the intendant ultimately fostered a strategy that can cautiously be considered as 
co-evolutionary.
For instance, the municipalities in the southeast of Antwerp were not awaiting extra 
studies or a governance platform. They engaged in the cooperation because they 
wanted infrastructural measures to tackle the perceived transit traffic problem. 
When the oversaturated road network and not the transit traffic appeared to be the 
actual mobility problem in the region (high car-dependency), the reason and the 
momentum to cooperate was lost. Moreover, the approaching elections also played 
to the detriment of the MOZO platform, that could not prove its usefulness with 
tangible results. But whereas the municipalities did not get the opportunity to  
get involved in the Masterplan of Antwerp before (cf. MOZO), they recently got 
incorporated in the transport region of Antwerp where they can take part in the 
decision-making process and in the mobility discussions. 
In Mechelen, the bottom-up C-AR partnership, that was at the basis of the selection 
of Mechelen as a pilot transport region, was redefined in correspondence with the 
transport region. But in fact, most of the initiatives and projects under the C-AR 
umbrella were simply put on hold or are awaiting subsidies: the marketplace for 
mobility, the communication and participation programme for the region, etc. 
Thanks to the input and cooperative climate in Mechelen, the transport region 
of Mechelen was able to take a quick start. But like most pilot transport regions, 
several actors mentioned that also the transport region Mechelen was held up 
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by election fever. The regional transport plan will not be approved until the next 
legislature, and so the regional mobility plan will have to wait. Moreover, many 
changes have occurred from the start of the pilot up until now, and the region has 
not yet taken its final shape, as various municipalities still have the opportunity to 
change to neighbouring transport regions. 
In our research we could identify the four governance extremes, each with their 
own specificities (recall the matrix of governance strategies): the path-de-
pendent, the adaptive, the collaborative and the co-evolutionary. In the chapter 
on regional cooperation an adaptive governance strategy was adopted, focusing 
on the challenges of a changing setting and thinking about future scenario’s to 
deal with those challenges within a relatively stable actor field. In the chapter 
on the entrepreneurial regional cooperation illustrated by the VO, we identified a 
co-evolutionary governance approach, as it accounted for a dynamic actor field and 
a dynamic institutional setting. In the case of the LIP Oosterweel Link, the identified 
strategies ranged from strongly path-dependent in the first years, with a focus on 
implementing the plan, not accounting for much dynamics regarding neither actor 
field, nor institutional setting, towards a collaborative strategy, focused on aligning 
the dynamic actor field within a relatively stable context, towards a co-evolutionary 
strategy focused on grasping the complexity offered by both the actor field and the 
institutional context. Those strategies do not exhibit a kind of ranking from inferior 
to best, but rather tell us something about the perceived main challenges the actors 
encounter or want to address. In the case of the Oosterweel link, several strategies 
were pursued, but none of the first did work out well, so the strategies changed 
during the project process. 
In the cases, the path dependent, adaptive, and collaborative governance strategies 
prevailed. They focused on adapting to a changing setting, and, in absence of 
engaged niche actors, often only involved the vested actors so that the vested 
interests were catered for. The actor network constellations thus consisted of 
public actors in most cases. Only in the case of the VO and in the later phases of the 
Oosterweel Link project, other actors joined the scene (business, civil, or knowledge 
actors). Since these other actors are often not merely situated in the traffic market, 
but usually in the travel market (citizen movement focusing on quality of life 
aspects) or transport market (such as new service providers generating alternatives 
for cars), the scope for finding solutions increased by involving them. The solutions 
also became more robust and more broadly supported than would have been the 
case if only established actors in the traffic market were to develop a solution. 
When overlooking all cases, many mediators or navigators could be identified who 
were all looking for structural couplings of actor networks to reach their objective. 
They ranged from public actors to citizen movements and knowledge actors and 
their approaches or manoeuvres did not all have the same result; some were  
more successful than others. We spend a few words on their similarities and 
dissimilarities. 
They were all considered more neutral to some extent than the other actors in the 
actor network; more neutral as in that they could transcend their own local interests 
and think about a programme for the whole region or project. In this respect, for 
instance, the provincial level has entered the planning scene as the in between 
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level; governors are considered more neutral and are often, also in fields other 
than mobility, consulted as neutral party between municipalities and the regional 
government. Moreover, the provincial deputies can sometimes mediate or bridge 
the gap between municipalities and higher authorities. Sometimes, other even more 
external people became navigators in the complex actor networks. 
In the Oosterweel Link project, governor Paulus is a good example of such mediator, 
he organised a States General to acquire the necessary support base and he was 
very devoted to the implementation of the project. Later, governor Berx was given 
the role as mediator (Poort Oost). Later in the process, an external intendant was 
the neutral person in between the actor networks, as the governments themselves 
were already too involved. 
In the SLUIZO/MOZO case the mediator was provincial deputy Verhaert. She got 
involved when the actor network was already gradually dissipating. In the case of 
Mechelen, the first mediators were part of the intercommunal IGEMO, but they 
missed this higher escalation level, as the municipalities are their main clients. 
This was identified as a challenging position in this research. Later, in the transport 
region Mechelen, the mediators and chairmen of the transport region council were  
a higher level official (DMOW) and a progressive mayor. 
In the case of Rotterdam, the first mediators were the port authority and the 
minister, who shared a connection on the higher scale level as well and made the 
VO come alife. Afterwards, the consecutive directors of the VO were appointed from 
the this higher scale level as well, they were top officials from Rijkswaterstaat; they 
always had a connection with the ministry, so they had some neutrality towards the 
other rather regional actors and parent organisations. But they kept their own focus 
and objectives, they each brought their own expertise and connections to the VO 
network. 
In the cases that showed most successful outcomes, the mediators actively 
changed the governance course and tried to create the right conditions to make the 
ultimate connections. They not only identified the opportunities, but also added 
value to the process, a value that specifically stemmed from their capacity, which 
they actively manoeuvred into the process. 
The VO used a co-evolutionary strategy to keep the region accessible, a challenge 
that the parent organisations by themselves did not know how to face. The VO 
created the conditions for new mobility suppliers to join the marketplace for 
mobility and seduce people to take other travel modes than the car. 
In the case of the Oosterweel Link, the intendant gained the trust of all parties  
and gradually broadened his mandate , and the institutional framework for the 
project and future projects. He shifted the approach from collaborative towards 
co-evolutionary and introduced research by design to materialise new solutions  
and gain a support base among the Antwerp citizens. The mediators in the other 
studied cases did not (yet) manoeuvre this kind of added value into the process,  
and could therefore rather be considered as intermediaries that facilitate the 
process rather than as mediators (Latour 2005).
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9.2.2
Situational condition planning to open up for structural couplings
In this part we focus on the influence of the institutional framework on the actors 
and governance possibilities or breakthroughs. Were there institutional changes 
that stimulated structural couplings between actors? Why could some actor 
networks institutionalise their objectives or programme, while others could not? We 
return to the major governance processes these cases embodied: inter-municipal 
and intergovernmental cooperation for mobility and coping with large infrastructure 
projects. 
What at first seemed situational governance initiatives, i.e. specific for a particular 
place and time, such as inter-municipal or regional cooperation for mobility, were 
suddenly referred to as “pilots”, implying the possible implementation elsewhere 
in Flanders. Illustrative of this are the SLUIZO/MOZO case story and the case of 
the pilot transport regions. As a result the outcomes increasingly resemble generic 
approaches, albeit with the possibility to make adjustments here and there. 
Except for the pilot transport region Antwerp, the pilot transport regions did not 
turn the generic basis into a mixed and integrated organisational structure and 
actor field. In Mechelen, for instance, hardly any citizen movements or civil society 
organisations were structurally involved in drawing the public transport policy. As 
such, though the institutional framework is adjusted to enable the involvement of 
citizen movements or business sector actors, the translation to the practice lags 
behind. 
Moreover, the final demarcation of the transport regions, regarding which municip-
alities participate in which transport regions, appears to be not that simple. As 
after two years of piloting, some municipalities have not yet made their final 
decision. When the pilot in Mechelen started, 18 municipalities participated in 
the transport region Mechelen. Whereas at the end of 2017, only 14 municipalities 
remained and even that is probably not the final constellation, as some further 
shifts are considered possible. One might wonder whether a new and fixed level of 
cooperation, i.e. that of the transport regions, allows to be applied everywhere; just 
think of the Dutch experience and abolition of the transport regions apart from the 
city regions Amsterdam and Rotterdam-The Hague. 
Although Mechelen demonstrated with the C-AR that the region desired to be and 
could be a pilot for inter-municipal mobility cooperation, the final demarcation 
seems to be a difficult task. Isn’t the search for the final, rigid demarcations fooling 
the transport regions? 
Besides, working towards a plan or vision is still central. For example, the transport 
regions are committing themselves to draw up a transport plan (considering public 
transport), which will later lead to the elaboration and approval of a mobility plan 
(considering all modes). However, many objectives other than drawing up these 
plans are not being put into practice. As such, the plan bears a serious weight: 
it is the crystallisation of the transport region approach for the coming years. 
Consequently, the political interference in the drawing up of the plan is high and 
nearing elections are slowing down the process; in most of the pilots the approval of 
the plan is postponed until after the elections. 
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The decree on complex projects focused on streamlining the various legal 
procedures and impact assessments, which used to run a separate course. It also 
shifted the emphasis from a path-dependent to a co-production or collaborative 
governance process. Although the Oosterweel project did not follow this much 
more recent complex project procedure, we could reflect on the strengths and 
weaknesses experienced in the Oosterweel Link project and refer to the answer 
proposed by the complex approach. The route planner provided a streamlined 
trajectory in which participation and communication are paramount throughout the 
process, both in formal and informal way.
First, as one of its basic principles, the decree mentioned the solution-oriented 
cooperation between all actors. However, it is not specified who these actors 
could be, which mix of actors is to be pursued, nor how structurally they should be 
involved in the story. Hence, the translation into the practice appeared difficult.
The Oosterweel Link case study shows that mainly the established public 
actors took control of the process management and the communication from 
the beginning. The project history was characterised by a technocratic shielded 
process, resulting in an ever-increasing opposition. The moment that the lead or 
process came into the hands of a third, more neutral party, the intendant, one could 
work towards an agreement in the dossier. 
Second, another important evolution in the complex approach is the emphasis on a 
transparent communication and participation from the beginning. This is crucial to 
gather support for the project and it is difficult to catch up with in the middle of the 
planning process. Third, the complex projects approach procedure does not allow to 
rush the problem definition phase. 
In the LIP Oosterweel Link, the infrastructural solution seemed to be sealed even 
before the problem had been properly analysed. The citizen movements demanded 
more transparency and a proper communication about the project. Since they did 
not get the impression that their claims were taken seriously in the process, time 
and again new issues such as quality of life or environmental aspects came up 
that generated new rounds of opposition, causing the actor networks to rearrange 
themselves in an increasingly complex project. Therefore, the complex approach 
calculated sufficient time to define the problem and to analyse the alternatives. The 
decision on the final project is postponed until the project has reached maturity in 
the development phase.
While several improvements have been made with the new approach, coping with 
the dynamic actor field remains a severe challenge in our opinion, as apart from the 
intensive participation trajectory, the translation into practice is not guaranteed. 
Therefore, we recommend the approach to look for the necessary structural 
couplings with other actor networks and policy domains, so that cross-mobility 
market strategic partnerships between public, business, civil and knowledge 
sectors arise that can answer future rounds of opposition and broaden the solution 
space. 
However, since most complex projects are only in the first and rather exploratory 
stage, in which final choices have yet to be made, not much of such resistance has 
yet been encountered. We will have to wait till the first projects reach the final stage 
to see how fruitful the complex projects approach really is. 
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Our research showed that some institutional adaptions have indeed evolved and 
made some improvements regarding the encountered complexity. But, it is not 
because the institutional framework is set, that the desired translation into practice 
is automatically made. This translation could benefit some further evaluation and 
reflection. This shows that both governance challenges are linked to one another: 
the conditions can be set, but you still need to activate the actors, get them 
interessed in the project or process, and that is where the mediator or navigator 
comes into play (Boonstra 2015). 
Furthermore, by reconstructing the actor networks and their translation phases, it 
became increasingly clear that governance does not end with the approval of a plan 
or by having the objectives institutionalised. A continuous renewal must be strived 
for to demonstrate the legitimacy of the orgware approach or governance time 
and again; the translation phases started over and over again. “Moving beyond the 
mobility or transport plan”, proved to be an important ingredient for success; the 
respective approaches gained legitimacy by building towards solutions from a much 
broader perspective, addressing all components of the CAS of mobility: the actors 
and their institutional framework (habits, behaviours, rules, etc.). 
The VO, for instance, concentrated on realising a specific target: generating peak 
avoidances in a creative way and experiment with Mobility as a Service; all kinds of 
activities which the parent organisations are not at all familiar with. The partnership 
statement has been rewritten several times in function of the changing needs posed 
by the parent organisations and by the changing mobility challenges in Rotterdam. 
Besides, the VO was even established to be a temporary organisation initially, so 
its longevity is far from guaranteed. As long as the VO remains a significant and 
creative party in tackling the mobility issues in the region, it will continue to exist. 
The parent organisations themselves, including the port authority, the municip-
ality, the transport region and Rijkswaterstaat, already covered the three mobility 
markets. As such, the scope for innovative and robust solutions was maximised 
by the VO. The behavioural pillar and the creation of more alternatives and more 
in-depth cooperation with the actors in the various markets was integrated by the 
VO. By setting up reward projects, an employer- and employee approach, starting 
a marketplace for mobility, etc. they went beyond drawing a plan. Instead, the 
VO reinvented itself time and again. They managed to include all the necessary 
subsystems of the entire mobility system, with only minimal adaptions to the parent 
organisations or institutional context. In fact, they did not want to replace any single 
entity that had proven its worth, they just added the necessary creativity to find 
new solutions. As they set specific quantitative and qualitative targets (numbers of 
persons reached, number of peak avoidances, etc.), they were able to monitor and 
illustrate their progress and silence the opposition to their approach. Especially for 
governance approaches, a lack of evidence or progress was often enough to start 
questioning the approach. 
Ringland also took a step beyond the plan (realising Ringland, i.e. the land on top 
of the ring road) and expanded its role. Apart from being a citizen movement they 
soon also incorporated the role of knowledge accumulator or knowledge exchange 
platform. Additionally, they even became a participant in the decision-making 
process (agreed upon in the ‘Future Covenant’) they rendered the air quality issue 
more democratic (CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project). From an actor relational 
approach perspective, we can say that the Ringland Academy, and thus the Ringland 
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actor network, went beyond institutionalising; beyond the Future Covenant. 
They took the initiative beyond the plan, and planted seeds for the development 
of a regime and even a democratic anchoring (ARA), by engaging in a strategic 
partnership with the public and knowledge actors, to let the citizens measure the 
ambient air quality in the city of Antwerp; a role that is perhaps more likely to be 
expected from the governmental sides. 
9.2.3
Policy suggestions and future avenues
At the end of this study, we would particularly like to point out that the adopted 
governance approaches have evolved, to fit the encountered complexity regarding 
the dynamic actor field or changing institutional context better. However, they 
are still rigid and often still oriented towards taming complexity, taking control, 
and looking for (relatively) generic solutions, rather than towards leaving more 
autonomy to the process and the actors themselves. Furthermore, involving a broad 
spectrum of diverse actors, aside from the vested ones, remains challenging but 
necessary. Only then coalitions can arise that seek solutions outside the hardware 
and software of the traffic market alone, and that find added value in many more 
domains. 
Planners can make the difference in our opinion, as their role lies in the 
manoeuvring for the structural couplings that shape the actor networks. The role 
of the governmental actors lies particularly in the art of creating consistency; 
consistency between subsystems, rules, incentives, translations of the actor 
networks, etc. That does however not at all imply the search for one-size-fits-all 
solution. Well, on the contrary, situational approaches are to be adopted; solutions 
that are relevant in a specific setting, that span all mobility markets and look for 
synergies. Those approaches must not necessarily be long-term, as the dynamic 
actor networks will decide about that. Consequently one makes sure that progress 
and efficiency are not hampered, because every part of the complex adaptive 
system of mobility is activated and faces the same direction. 
Another point we want to make is that it is difficult to measure governance 
outcomes. In response to that, it pays off to add a quantitative layer to the 
qualitative one again. This facilitates not only the monitoring of the made progress, 
but also helps to counter questions about efficiency and relevance of governance. 
Therefore, setting clear targets and communicating about them is a good way to 
overcome such problems.  
Last but not least, as informed people make smarter choices, we see the merits 
or even necessity of readdressing the (ordinary) citizens again. We can gradually 
build towards the mobility transition from the bottom-up and the top-down by 
re-engaging with the citizens and by activating them in some way. In this respect, a 
citizen science project can be a catalyst for change, not only regarding the scientific 
knowledge and experience, but also regarding attitudes towards certain policy 
measures and regarding their own mobility behaviour. Also participatory research by 
design can enable the actors that are more difficult to reach to be activated, as they 
materialise the various layers of complexity and provide the necessary tools or the 
vocabulary to enter the (mobility) planning discussion. 
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9.3
Applicability of the theoretical framework:  
some reflections
The proposed framework, a combination of the actor network theory with its 
translation phases and the actor relational approach proved suitable to reconstruct 
the case stories. The composed framework gave us certain clues on the reasons 
why some orgware constellations were more successful than others. We took those 
theories as a starting point, because they allowed us to embrace a complex reality 
and start from the actors themselves. We did not aim for a holistic perspective on 
the cases, because we are aware of the limits of us as the observers. We are rather 
working towards a composite image; from interviews and documents we collect the 
case’s actors, factors and their connections. Of course, by adding more interviews 
or documents, the resulting orgware diagrams could vary, they might become more 
stable and refine the previous diagrams89. 
The actor network theory, however, did not propose specific means or ways to 
visualise or materialise the actor networks. Something that we felt was necessary to 
make our orgware message clear. Especially for large and complex cases, in which 
the orgware is composed of many actors or factors and many interrelations, there 
was little guidance, nor was there previous work to take as starting point for our 
research. So, the moment we wanted to start gathering data in order to visualise 
the actor networks, we ran into several additional questions; not only issues 
regarding the necessary data, data sources, formats and software tools, but also 
regarding what these data would show us in the end. For instance, how large are 
actors displayed and what does that represent? What do the connections represent? 
Shouldn’t the connections reflect a kind of intensity for instance by differentiating 
the thickness of the lines in the diagrams? Those kind of smaller “struggles” were 
dealt with during the first phases of our research, but were afterwards replaced 
by issues on the reproducibility of the research. Although we can never fully grasp 
the truth, as there are always actors or connections that can be added, and as 
there is always some influence of the observer analysing the case, we still wanted 
to come up with relatively solid materialisations of the orgware. That is why we 
based the visualisations on coded interviews or documents and why we settled 
for a social network analysis approach, so that visualisations are not hand-drawn 
by the observer and therefore do not favour one actor over another. Instead, 
based on the coded input, the actor network diagrams were generated by a social 
network analysis software package. The observer can then only play with additional 
attributes and see what happens with the diagrams.
After having arrived at a certain readable visualisation method, we came across 
cases with many actors, too many to allow a straightforward reading of the diagram 
– so issues of selection to enhance readability arose. In the end, we tried to come up 
with solutions to all of the encountered questions, but it would be nice to know how 
other researchers would tackle or would have tackled those issues. 
89 Except in case the added interviews or documents strongly diverge from previous insights. 
But this is not very likely if interviewees and documents are selected carefully so that they already 
cover and account for different perspectives
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In the actor network visualisations the translation to the different arenas of the 
complex adaptive mobility system was less straightforward, as actors often engage 
in more than one arena and as we therefore did not see the added value of letting 
the arenas determine the place of actors in the network. But by looking at the 
kind of actors involved and the specific things in the institutional framework they 
addressed or wanted to change, the mobility CAS arenas that were targeted could 
still be distinguished. We found this translation necessary to keep the overview and 
to draw conclusions, because when visualising the actors networks, the overview 
is sometimes lost. Although the scheme might look a bit simplistic, it is not our 
intention to oversimplify the mobility system; the scheme enables us to keep the 
overview which is useful in combination with the more detailed reading of the cases 
that is offered by the actor network approach. 
The importance of this translation or materialisation of the complexity was 
acknowledged in the panel discussion/round table that we organised with respect 
to governing large infrastructure projects, in particular on the Oosterweel Link. 
At first, I was very sceptical about my task during that panel discussion, namely 
introducing the key actors to their own story from a complexity and actor network 
perspective. I was only a toddler when the Oosterweel story began after all. So what 
would I have to tell those big men and women around the table? But bringing the 
story from another angle, the complexity and actor network angle to be precise, was 
much appreciated and did not only recollect the whole process, but also offered 
tools to start the discussion between the parties; it gave them the possibility to 
rethink the planning process and identify the important moments of divergence 
and convergence. It turned out to be the start for a fruitful discussion. We were 
convinced of the possibilities and the added value of translating, visualising or 
materialising the orgware and bringing the actor network theory alive. 
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Appendix 1. Overview of the interviews and  
attended events per case
10.1
Case regional mobility cooperation
10.1.1 MOZO
Table 7  Overview of the interviews for the MOZO case
Frank Leys
Mobility coordinator for the Antwerp region, Department for Mobility and Public Works of  
the Flemish government
 – What is the MOZO platform with respect to origins, leading stakeholders, expectations,  
  specific assignments, outcomes, etc. ? 
 – Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Understanding the problems in the region
  > Shed light on the actors and their claims that have led to the MOZO project
  > Revealing opportunities and threats of the mobility platform
  > Estimating the impact of the study and platform
Inga Verhaert
Former deputy for Mobility, province of Antwerp, coordinator of MOZO platform
 – What is the MOZO platform with respect to origins, leading stakeholders, expectations, 
  specific assignments, outcomes, etc. ? 
 – What was/is the role of the province not only in this specific process, but also more 
  generally, with respect to regional cooperations?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Understanding the problems in the region
  > Shed light on the actors and their claims that have led to the MOZO project
  > Revealing opportunities and threats of the mobility platform
  > Estimating the impact of the study and platform
  > Lessons learned from MOZO – the start of a new cooperation Noorderkempen
D a t e N a me O r g a n iza t ion  &  F u n c t ion L oc a t ion  &  T ime
17/02/2015 F. Leys Mobility coordinator for the Antwerp region, Department for 
Mobility and Public Works of the Flemish Government
-- telephone interview (11h-12h)
24/03/2017 T. Wassenberg Cabinet member of the former Minister of Mobility, K. Van 
Brempt, and later on municipal councillor in Antwerp
Café Royal, Central Station Antwerp (10h-12h)
3/04/2017 I. Verhaert Former deputy for Mobility, Province of Antwerp, 
coordinator of MOZO-platform
Parkhuis, Koningin elisabethlei 18, 2018 
Antwerp (14h-15h)
r egular  
feedback
D. Lauwers Professor at the department of civil engineering, centre for 
mobility and spatial planning (Ghent University), mobility 
expert, quality manager and contact of the Arckus SLUIZO 
study assignment, co-supervising this dissertation
Afdeling Mobiliteit en Ruimtelijke Planning
Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41 B2, 9000 Gent
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Toon Wassenberg
Cabinet member of the former Minister of Mobility, K. Van Brempt, and later on municipal councillor 
in Antwerp
 – What is the MOZO platform with respect to origins, leading stakeholders, expectations, 
  specific assignments, outcomes, etc. ?
 – Can you elaborate on the political context of the SLUIZO/MOZO initiative? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Understanding the problems in the region
  > Shed light on the actors and their claims that have led to the MOZO project
  > Revealing opportunities and threats of the mobility platform
  > Estimating the impact of the study and platform
Dirk Lauwers
Expert, quality manager and contact of the Arckus SLUIZO study assignment,  co-supervising this 
dissertation
 – Regular feedback on the SLUIZO study process and establishing of the MOZO project 
  with regard to most important stakeholders, roles and influence, outcomes, etc.
10.1.2 Regional mobility cooperation in Mechelen
Table 8  Overview of interviews conducted for the case regional mobility cooperation in Mechelen
Willem Abels – Mobility consultant at intercommunal IGEMO
Werner Van Hoof – Project manager at IGEMO
Peter De Bruyne – Director IGEMO
 – What is the Cooperation Accessible Region (C-AR): origins, establishing process, leading 
  stakeholders, expectations, specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, 
  etc.? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins C-AR
  > Lessons learned from the MOZO case? 
  > Role of the intercommunal IGEMO
  > Organisational structure and financial support
  > How does C-AR relate to upcoming transport region in same area?
  > Current state of affairs
  > Challenges, commitment and perception of C-AR versus transport region Mechelen
  > Future perspective
D a t e N a me O r g a n iza t ion  &  F u n c t ion L oc a t ion  &  T ime
17/11/2016 W. Abels,
W. Van Hoof, and
P. De Bruyne
Mobility consultant at intercommunal IGEMO,
Project manager at  IGEMO, 
Director IGEMO
IGEMO, Schoutetstraat3, 2800 Mechelen 
(10h30-12h45)
r egular  
feedback
D. Lauwers Professor at the department of civil engineering, centre for 
mobility and spatial planning (Ghent University), mobility 
expert, supervisor of the scientific quality and ambitions of 
the C-AR project, co-supervising this dissertation
Afdeling Mobiliteit en Ruimtelijke Planning
Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41 B2, 9000 Gent
6/12/2016 G. Vaganée Mayor of Bonheiden and chairman of the transport region 
council Mechelen ( V er voer r egior aad)
Town Hall, Jacques Morrensplein 10, 2820 
Bonheiden (11h-12h30)
19/12/2016 F. Leys Mobility coordinator for the Antwerp region, Department for 
Mobility and Public Works of the Flemish Government, and co-
chair of the transport region council Mechelen 
(Vervoerregioraad)
Anna Bijnsgebouw, Lange Kievitstraat 111-113, 
2018 Antwerp (9h30-11h)
7/03/2018 F. Boelaert Secretary General Department for Mobility and Public 
Works of the Flemish Government, professor at the 
department of civil engineering, centre for mobility and 
spatial planning (Ghent University)
Afdeling Mobiliteit en Ruimtelijke Planning
Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41 B2, 9000 Gent (9h-
10h)
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Dirk Lauwers
Mobility expert, supervisor of the scientific quality and ambitions of the C-AR project,   
co-supervising this dissertation
  > Regular feedback on the IGEMO study process and the establishment of the C-AR 
   with regard to most important stakeholders, roles and influence, outcomes, etc.
Frank Leys
Mobility coordinator for the Antwerp region, Department for Mobility and Public Works of the 
Flemish government, and co-chair of the transport region council Mechelen (Vervoerregioraad)
 – What is the Cooperation Accessible Region (C-AR): origins, establishing process, leading 
  stakeholders, expectations, specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, 
  etc.? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins C-AR
  > Lessons learned from the MOZO case? 
  > Role of the intercommunal IGEMO
  > How does C-AR relate to upcoming transport region in same area?
 – Can you elaborate on the general context of Basic Accessibility and the transport regions?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Selection, setup and organisational structure of transport region Mechelen
  > Communication and streamlining of the different initiatives
  > Main focus and activities of the transport regions and the institutional adjustments
  > Difference between objectives and output C-AR versus Transport region Mechelen
  > Planned timing and evaluation of transport regions
  > Transport region Antwerp, Limburg and Turnhout?
  > Main challenges for the transport regions
Filip Boelaert
Secretary General Department for Mobility and Public Works of the Flemish Government, associate 
professor at the Department of Civil Engineering, Centre for Mobility and Spatial Planning, Ghent 
University
 – Can you elaborate on the general context of Basic Accessibility and the transport 
  region pilots?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > State of affairs, timing, evaluation, legal framework
  > Role of civic society actors and citizen movements
  > Main challenges and bottlenecks
  > Financial aspects of the transport regions
  > Alignment with regional development in spatial planning policy? 
  > Transport region Mechelen: state of affairs, organisational structure, timing, transport  
   plan
  > Transport region Antwerp: state of affairs, organisational structure, alignment and 
   collaboration, role of the civic society actors and citizen movements, role of the city of 
   Antwerp, transport region Antwerp in relation to the Slim Naar Antwerpen and 
   marketplace for mobility
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10.2
Case entrepreneurial mobility cooperation the VO
Table 9  Overview interviews case De Verkeersonderneming
Table 10  Overview of the interviews for the Marketplace for Mobility Antwerp
Aernoud Van der Bend – Former director of De Verkeersonderneming
Wijnand Veeneman – Associated professor at TU Delft
 – What is De Verkeersonderneming (VO): origins, establishing process, leading stakeholders, 
  expectations, specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, etc.? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Institutional context and changes for mobility
  > Organisational structure the VO and relation with parent organisations
  > Specific activities of the VO and the Beter Benutten programme
  > Challenges, opportunities and future perspective?
Frank Bus – Project manager Logistics at De Verkeersonderneming and the Port of Rotterdam
Nicolette Ammerlaan – Programme manager at Port of Rotterdam
 – What is De Verkeersonderneming (VO): origins, establishing process, leading stakeholders, 
  expectations, specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, etc.? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins, perspectives and share of the port authority in the VO
  > Organisational structure the VO and relation with parent organisations, from a port 
   authority perspective.
  > Specific activities and evolution of De Verkeersonderneming and the Beter Benutten 
   programmes
  > Challenges, opportunities and future perspective?
D a t e N a me O r g a n iza t ion  &  F u n c t ion L oc a t ion  &  T ime
11/05/2017 R. Boshouwers Consultant urban smart mobility, former project manager 
mobility services at De Verkeersonderneming, project 
manager Marketplace for Mobility Antwerp
Rebel Rotterdam, Wijnhaven 23,  3011 WH 
Rotterdam (10h-11h30)
2/06/2017 M. De roeck Director communication and participation and program 
manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’ at City of Antwerp, 
programme manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’, City of 
Antwerp, department for urban development 
(Stadsontwikkeling)
Francis Wellesplein 1, 2018 Antwerpen (13h-
14h)
D a t e N a me O r g a n iza t ion  &  F u n c t ion L oc a t ion  &  T ime
18/04/2017 A. Van der Bend, and
W. Veeneman
Former director of De Verkeersonderneming
Associated professor at TU Delft
De Bouwcampus, Van der Burghweg 1, 2628 CS 
Delft (14h-16h30)
20/04/2017 F. Bus, and
N. Ammerlaan
Project manager Logistics at De Verkeersonderneming and 
the Port of Rotterdam
Programme manager at Port of Rotterdam
World Port Center (WPC), Wilhelminakade 909, 
3072 AP Rotterdam (14h-15h30)
9/05/2017 M. Oosterbaan Advisor programme organisation Beter Benutten at the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
-- skype interview -- (10h-11h)
10/05/2017 B. Postma Former expert traffic and transport at the municipality of 
Rotterdam, former account holder in De 
Verkeersonderneming
Municipality of Rotterdam - 
Stadsontwikkeling, Wilhelminadade 179, 3072 
AP Rotterdam, 7th Floor (14h-15h30)
11/05/2017 R. Boshouwers Consultant urban smart mobility, former project manager 
mobility services at De Verkeersonderneming, project 
manager Marketplace for Mobility Antwerp
Rebel Rotterdam, Wijnhaven 23,  3011 WH 
Rotterdam (10h-11h30)
24/05/2017 H. Moors Project director Blankenburg Link Rijkswaterstaat, 
director ad interim de Verkeersonderneming
Rijkswaterstaat Rotterdam, Boompjes 200, 
3011 XD Rotterdam (10h30-11h30)
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Marsha Oosterbaan
Advisor programme organisation Beter Benutten at the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment
 – What is the Beter Benutten (BB) programme: origins, stakeholders, expectations,  
  specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, etc.?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins and institutional context of the BB programme
  > Content, organisation and focal points of the programme 
  > Programme implementation and regional differences
  > BB in relation to the region of Rotterdam and the VO
  > Future of BB
  > the VO from the ministry’s perspective
Bertus Postma
Former expert traffic and transport at the municipality of Rotterdam, former account holder in  
De Verkeersonderneming
 – What is De Verkeersonderneming (VO): origins, establishing process, leading stakeholders, 
  expectations, specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, etc.? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins and institutional context from the municipality’s perspective
  > Organisational structure the VO and relation with parent organisations
  > Specific activities and evolution of De Verkeersonderneming and the Beter Benutten 
   programmes
  > Opportunity for innovation: the marketplace for mobility?
  > Main challenges and future perspective
Robert Boshouwers
Consultant urban smart mobility, former project manager mobility services at  
De Verkeersonderneming, project manager Marketplace for Mobility Antwerp
 – What is De Verkeersonderneming (VO): origins, establishing process, leading stakeholders, 
  expectations, specific assignments, current outcomes, future perspective, etc.? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins and institutional context
  > Organisational structure, activities and expansion of the VO in response to the 
   BB-programme
  > Philosophy behind the Marketplace for Mobility in Rotterdam, in relation to 
   BB-programme
  > BB programme implementation and its regional differences
  > Evolution of the VO and BB-programmes, opportunities and threats
 – Elaborate on the Marketplace for Mobility in Rotterdam and how this is transferred 
  to Antwerp
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered
  > Image of the marketplace for mobility and the concept of peak avoidances by parent 
   organisations
  > Comparison of the institutional context, the financial support, etc. between Antwerp 
   and Rotterdam
  > Current, successful mobility services
  > Means of steering and conditions
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Helene Moors
Project director Blankenburg Link at Rijkswaterstaat, director ad interim de Verkeersonderneming
 – How does the process of the LIP Blankenburgverbinding looks like: origins, alternatives, 
  participation, process and progress, etc. 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Institutional context of infrastructure planning, procedures and instruments in 
   The Netherlands
  > Origins and framing of the LIP project
  > Participation trajectory, communication and transparency
  > Estimated realisation
  > Comparison of some of the aspect with the LIP Oosterweel Link
Marijke De Roeck
Director communication and participation and programme manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’ at city 
of Antwerp, programme manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’, city of Antwerp, department for urban 
development (Stadsontwikkeling)
 – What does the Slim Naar Antwerpen (SNA) project and the marketplace for mobility in  
  Antwerp include: origins, best-practices, stakeholders, organisation structure, role of  
  the city in this.
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Institutional and political context in which the marketplace for mobility arose
  > Relation to other actors and intergovernmental platforms
  > Slim Naar Antwerpen and its relation to the marketplace for mobility 
  > The role of the city of Antwerp
  > Link with future transport region Antwerp
  > Current, successful mobility services
  > Challenges and opportunities 
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10.3
Case LIP Oosterweel Link
10.3.1 Interviews
Table 11  Overview of the interviews for the case of the LIP Oosterweel Link
Sven Augusteyns
Architect – Urban designer at Stramien, urban researcher for and member of the citizen movement 
Ringland
 – How did Ringland evolve from a concept to the brand it almost is today: origins, 
  organisation, innovation, means of building support base, strategy, etc?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Origins, elaboration and communication of ‘capping’ the ring road 
  > Relation to other citizen movements
  > Building and sustaining a broad support base, Adopting strategies to spread the idea
  > Aspiring and anticipating policy adoption
  > Building expertise around the theme
  > Increasing professionalisation, organisation structure of Ringland
  > Future perspective
D a t e N a me O r g a n iza t ion  &  F u n c t ion L oc a t ion  &  T ime
9/06/2015 S. Augusteyns Architect – Urban designer at Stramien, urban researcher 
Ringland
Stramien, Broederminstraat 52, 2018 
Antwerp (11h30-12h30)
15/06/2015 L. Ploegaert Member of the citizen movement stRaten-generaal Ballaarstraat 6, 2018 Antwerp (13h30-
15h30)
12/01/2016 J. Verelst Former journalist for De Morgen, followed the Oosterweel 
Link project and authored a book about the project
Café Maurice, Cogels-Osylei 88, 2600 
Antwerpen (9h30-10h30)
10/02/2017 F. De Rynck Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Department of Public Governance, 
Management and Finance, Ghent University
Henleykaai 84, Campus Mercator G, 9000 
Gent (13h-14h)
16/02/2017 D. Stevens Advisor complex infrastructure projects, Department of 
Environment, Nature and Energy, Flemish Government
Graaf de Ferrarisgebouw, Ministerie van 
de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Koning Albert II -
laan 20, 1000 Brussel (9h30-11h30)
24/03/2017 T. Wassenberg Cabinet member of the former Minister of Mobility, K. Van 
Brempt, and later on municipal councillor in Antwerp
Café Royal, Central Station Antwerp (10h-
12h)
4/04/2017 I. Verhaert Former deputy for Mobility, Province of Antwerp, 
coordinator of MOZO-platform
Parkhuis, Koningin elisabethlei 18, 2018 
Antwerp (14h-15h)
1/06/2017 M. De Roeck Director communication and participation and program 
manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’ at City of Antwerp, 
programme manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’, City of Antwerp, 
department for urban development (Stadsontwikkeling)
Francis Wellesplein 1, 2018 Antwerpen (13h-
14h)
7/03/2018 F. Boelaert Secretary General Department for Mobility and Public Works 
of the Flemish Government, professor at the department of 
civil engineering, centre for mobility and spatial planning 
(Ghent University)
Afdeling Mobiliteit en Ruimtelijke Planning
Sint-Pietersnieuwstraat 41 B2, 9000 Gent 
(9h-10h)
r egular  
feedback
L. Boelens, D. 
Lauwers,
Professors at the department of civil engineering, centre for 
mobility and spatial planning (Ghent University), both 
involved in many workshops, public and private discussions 
on the Oosterweel Link project, supervising this dissertation
At dif fer ent locations , by dif fer ent means  
of  communication 
r egular  
feedback
H. Huyse Head of sustainable development research group (HIVA), 
University of Leuven, active member of the Ringland Academy, 
co-supervising the CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project 
in Antwerp, co-authoring a publication 
At dif fer ent locations , by dif fer ent means  
of  communication 
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Linda Ploegaert
Member of the citizen movement stRaten-generaal
 – Can you elaborate on the background of the citizen movement stRaten-generaal with 
  respect to origins, front runners, focal themes and levels of commitment, organisation, 
  projects, relation to the Oosterweel Link project, etc? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > How did stRaten-generaal arise; which urban (mobility or infrastructure) issues did it  
   address?
  > Involvement of the citizen movement in the Oosterweel Link project.
  > Building knowledge and support base around diverse themes
  > Engaged in the field of urban and infrastructure projects in the city of Antwerp and 
   elsewhere
  > Relation to other citizen movements or civil initiatives
  > Means to mobilise, organisation structure
Jeroen Verelst
Former journalist for De Morgen, followed the Oosterweel Link project and authored a book about 
the project
 – Why did you write a book about the Oosterweel Link process. 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Personal affinity with the Oosterweel Link project and planning process as journalist
  > Press coverage of the project process and evolution of the project
  > Specific sources for the book, interviews, press coverage, methodology
  > What should we learn from the project process?
Filip De Rynck
Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Public 
Governance, Management and Finance, Ghent University
 – Where does the Flemish policy (governance) stand today in terms of participation and 
  how to deal with complexity in complex infrastructure projects? 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Has ‘participation’ and governance evolved in Flanders/Belgium? (local level and 
   regional level)
  > Evolutions with respect to earlier contribution in the Parliamentary commission (and 
   report) on complex/investment projects (2009) and involvement of stakeholders
  > Decree on complex projects, procedures and evolutions in practice
  > Impact of intergovernmental cooperations such as transport regions
  > What further direction should governance take? (co-creation, area-specific, etc.) 
  > Good practices?
 – To what extent were you involved in Oosterweel? 
  > Related interview objectives and topics to be covered: 
  > Personal reflections on the case, with regard to participation, decision-making 
   strategies, etc. 
  > Citizen movements and their growing position in the debate
  > Leading actors in the project and their strategies
  > Role and impact of the intendant: unique opportunity?
  > Influence of political factors
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David Stevens
Advisor complex infrastructure projects, Department of Environment, Nature and Energy, Flemish 
government
 – Complex projects past versus present way of steering 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > Evolution of regulations concerning complex projects
  > Current state of affairs: numbers of projects following the new procedure
  > Reasons or reflections on why so few projects started in the new procedure
  > Link with future transport region Antwerp
  > Team complex projects, organisational structure, instruments (route planner)
  > Evolution of participation
 – To what extent are/were you involved in the Oosterweel Link project 
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered: 
  > Personal reflections on the case, with regard to participation, decision-making 
   strategies, etc. 
  > Role and impact of the intendant: unique opportunity?
  > Challenges with regard to the Oosterweel Link project and capping the ring road
  > What could his role mean for recent complex project?
Toon Wassenberg
Cabinet member of the former Minister of Mobility, K. Van Brempt, and later on municipal councillor 
in Antwerp
 – What was your position in the Oosterweel Link project from 2004-2009. 
 – Can you elaborate on the specific political context and the leading actors in the story?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > decisive moments in the LIP planning process
  > opportunities and threats
  > leading actors and their role
  > expectations for the future course of the Oosterweel Link project
Inga Verhaert
Former deputy for Mobility, province of Antwerp
 – What was the role of the province of Antwerp, and the governor, in the Oosterweel Link 
  project process?
Marijke De Roeck
Director communication and participation and programme manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’ at city 
of Antwerp, programme manager ‘Slim naar Antwerpen’, city of Antwerp, department for urban 
development (Stadsontwikkeling)
 – What was the role of the city of Antwerp in the LIP Oosterweel Link process? What has 
  this to do with Slim Naar Antwerpen project and the marketplace for mobility. 
  > Institutional and political context
  > Relation to other actors and intergovernmental platforms
  > Link with future transport region Antwerp
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Filip Boelaert
Secretary General Department for Mobility and Public Works of the Flemish Government,  
associate professor at the Department of Civil Engineering, Centre for Mobility and Spatial 
Planning, Ghent University
 – Can you elaborate on your perspective on and your relation with the Oosterweel Link  
  project and the capping of the Antwerp ring road?
  Related interview objectives and topics to be covered:
  > When did you become directly or indirectly involved. 
  > What were the decisive moments in the Oosterweel Link planning process that have 
   eventually led to the Future Covenant and cooperation between all involved actors 
   according to you?
  > Which bottlenecks still remain, will challenge the project in the (near) future? (financial 
   aspects, …?)
Huib Huyse
Head of sustainable development research group (HIVA), University of Leuven, active member of 
the Ringland Academy, co-supervising the CurieuzeNeuzen citizen science project in Antwerp, 
co-authoring a publication 
 – Regular feedback on the activities, strategies, knowledge accumulation by the Ringland 
  Academy.
 – Inside information on development and strategic partnerships to conduct a large-scale 
  citizen science project (CurieuzeNeuzen).
 – Co-authored a publication with me examining the effects of such citizen science project 
  with regard to scientifically rigorous data, policy adoption, and deep citizen engagement 
  and social learning.
10.3.2 Roundtable discussion
Roundtable Complex Infrastructure Projects – the Oosterweel Link Project
Greet Bernaers – Director infrastructure and environment, Port of Antwerp
David Stevens – Advisor complex infrastructure projects, Department of Environment, 
 Nature and Energy, Flemish government
Ilse Moeremans – Proces consultant complex projects, spatial development department, 
 Flemish government
Bert De Bondt – Policy advisor, Department of Mobility and Infrastructure, Flemish government
Jan Van Rensbergen – CEO Beheermaatschappij Antwerpen Mobiel (BAM)
Peter Vermeulen – Initiator Ringland
Manu Claeys – Initiator stRaten-generaal
 – Abstract  The current approach to govern or manage large infrastructure projects (LIPs)
is put under pressure by an increasing number of actors and ever changing conditions. 
How can planning deal with the inherent complexity of such LIP processes? We propose a 
more integrated approach in which co-evolution is paramount. We are applying this new 
approach to the already long term and complex Oosterweel project. By means of an expert 
workshop with a number of relevant stakeholders, we try to shape this approach. Do the 
stakeholders agree? How do they interpret the course of the Oosterweel project from a 
co-evolutionary perspective? What does it add to the LIP project?
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10.3.3 Ethnographic research Ringland – overview of internal   
   meetings and attended public events
Internal Feedback meetings with Ringland
 
Date  Attendees Location and time
24/09/2015 Sven Augusteyns and Pol Van Steenvoort  Stramien, Broederminstraat 52, 
   (Ringland), Luuk Boelens, Dirk Lauwers,  2018 Antwerp (14h30-16h)
   and Suzanne Van Brussel (Ghent University) 
3/12/2015 idem Stramien, Broederminstraat 52,  
   2018 Antwerp (14h30-15h30) 
22/02/2016 Veerle Janssens and Pol Van Steenvoort  Stramien, Broederminstraat 52,  
   (Ringland), Luuk Boelens, Dirk Lauwers, and 2018 Antwerp (15h30-16h30)  
   Suzanne Van Brussel (Ghent University) 
 
25/08/2016 idem Stramien, Broederminstraat 52,  
    2018 Antwerp (14h30-15h30) 
 
Attended Executive Committee meetings  
Date  Attendees Location and time
 
6/10/2015 Peter Vermeulen, Pol Van Steenvoort, Sven  Stramien, Broederminstraat 52,  
   Augusteyns, Joris Baeten, Mat Steyvers  2018 Antwerp (17h30-20h) 
   (Ringland) 
3/11/2015 Peter Vermeulen, Pol Van Steenvoort, Sven  Stramien, Broederminstraat 52,  
   Augusteyns, Joris Baeten (Ringland) 2018 Antwerp (17h30-20h)
1/12/2015 Peter Vermeulen, Pol Van Steenvoort, Joris  Stramien, Broederminstraat 52, 
   Baeten, Veerle Janssens, Sven Augusteyns,  2018 Antwerp (14h30-15h30) 
   Mat Steyvers, Wietse Vermeulen, Frans  
   Teuchies (Ringland)
 
Attended Steering Committee Meetings Ringland  
Date  Attendees Location and time
 
20/10/2015 Ringland Steering Committee Haringrokerij, Kronenbrugstraat  
    34, 2000 Antwerp (19h30-23h30)
19/11/2015 Ringland Steering Committee Haringrokerij, Kronenbrugstraat  
    34, 2000 Antwerp (19h30-23h30)
9/01/2016 Ringland Steering Committee Haringrokerij, Kronenbrugstraat  
    34, 2000 Antwerp (19h30-23h30)
2/02/2016 Ringland Steering Committee Haringrokerij, Kronenbrugstraat  
    34, 2000 Antwerp (19h30-23h30)
Attended workshops and events Ringland  
Date  Attendees Location and time
 
12/05/2015 Ringland Expert Colloquium – “Ringland  deSingel, Desguinlei 25, 2018 
   Het Plan” Antwerpen (13h30-17h) 
26/04/2016 Ringland in zicht? De Roma, Turnhoutsebaan 286,  
    2140 Borgerhout (20h-23h)
23/10/2016 CurieuzeNeuzen in de Roma De Roma, Turnhoutsebaan 286,  
    2140 Borgerhout (11h-14h30)
 
1/07/2017 Ringland citizen science doordenkdag Haringrokerij, Kronenbrugstraat  
    34, 2000 Antwerp (10h-15h)
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Appendix 2. Data acquisition, data analysis and  
visualisation
11.1
Case regional mobility cooperation
11.1.1 Mozo
The coded interviews in the MOZO case resulted in the identification of 109 actors. 
In order to optimise the visualisation of the actor network in the case a selection 
of this total number was applied. The following selection criteria were used. As the 
number of sources is rather limited, we decided that actors had to be mentioned at 
least 2 times (i.e. coded in 2 different paragraphs), or had to be mentioned by two 
different interviewees (i.e. show up in at least two source documents). As such the 
actor prove to be relevant for more than one involved person (interviewee). After 
selection, 54 (f)actors were included in the actor network visualisation. An overview 
of the (f)actors, their connections and the other attributes is provided in Table 12. 
11.1.2 Regional mobility cooperation Mechelen
The coded interviews in the case of the C-AR and the transport region Mechelen 
resulted in the identification of 248 actors and factors. In order to optimise the 
visualisation of the actor network in the case a selection of this total number was 
applied. The following selection criteria were used. The actors had to be mentioned 
at least 5 times (i.e. coded in 2 different paragraphs), or had to be mentioned by at 
least two different interviewees (i.e. show up in at least two source documents). 
After selection, 102 actors were included in the actor network visualisation. An 
overview of the (f)actors, their connections and the other attributes is provided in 
Table 7. 
11.2
Case entrepreneurial mobility cooperation the VO
The coded interviews in the case of the C-AR and the transport region Mechelen 
resulted in the identification of 144 actors and factors. In order to optimise the 
visualisation of the actor network in the case a selection of this total number was 
applied. By screening the data we noticed that many named actors were only 
mentioned once or twice over all the interviews. So, excluding the actors that were 
mentioned less than three times, already restricted the number of actors to about 
half of the initial amount. After selection, 72 actors were retained for the actor 
network visualisation. An overview of the (f)actors, their connections and the other 
attributes is provided in Table 14. 
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Table 12  Overview of the selected actors, their connections, and attributes in the
SLUIZO/MOZO case. 
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Table 13  Overview of the selected actors, their connections, and attributes in the development of
regional mobility cooperation in Mechelen. 
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Table 14  Overview of the selected actors, their connections, and attributes in the case of the VO. 
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11.3
Case LIP Oosterweel Link
11.3.1 Governmental side (BAM)
The coded documents resulted in the identification of 198 actors in the Oosterweel 
Link case. In order to optimise the visualisation of the actor network in the case a 
selection of this total number was applied. The following selection criteria were 
used. Actors had to be coded in at least 10 separate coding references, or had to 
show up in at least two source documents. This means in practice that within one 
document a certain actor should appear at least at ten pages, because coding 
happened more or less per page, but also took into account subdivisions of the 
parliamentary committee minutes. Or the actor should appear in at least two 
different parliamentary committee minute documents. As such the actor proofs to 
be relevant over the years and thus for the LIP-process. As such, a number of 110 (f)
actors was included in the actor network visualisations. Table 15 gives an overview 
of the coded parliamentary committee minutes. An overview of the (f)actors, their 
connections and the other attributes is provided in Table 16. 
 
Figure 97  Distribution of sources according to Oosterweel Link or Ringland over time.
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Table 15  Overview of the coded sources for the Oosterweel Link (governmental side).
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Table 16  Overview of the selected actors, their connections, and attributes in the case LIP
Oosterweel Link (governmental side)
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11.3.2 Ringland
For this dissertation Ringland granted us an almost complete access to the daily 
activities, decision-making strategies, formal and informal meeting minutes. We 
even obtained email conversations and meeting minutes from the very start of 
Ringland in the end of 2012. During the period September 2015– April 2016, we 
followed Ringland very closely and attended several executive committee meetings 
and steering group meetings. We also planned several feedback meetings with 
Ringland to discuss the possible synergy between our research and the citizen 
movement. In addition we attended several public and expert events organised by 
Ringland (cf. Appendix 1, Section 10.3.3). 
Coding the email conversations (clustered per month in one source document)  
in NVivo resulted in the identification of 461 actors. In order to optimise the  
visualisation of the actor network of the case, a selection of this total number 
was applied. The following selection criteria were used. Actors had to be coded in 
at least 10 separate coding references, or had to show up in at least two source 
documents. Where possible, we clustered actors in a logical entity they were part of 
(e.g. members of the parliamentary commission are clustered into one entity, and 
are not separately visible anymore). This means in practice that within one source, 
or thus, month, a certain actor should appear at least in ten different emails or 
paragraphs of meeting minutes. Or the actor should appear in at least two different 
source documents or months. This proofs that the actor is considered relevant for 
the citizen movements; that they stay at least a few times on the Ringland agenda. 
Applying those selection criteria results in a number of 92 (f)actors that becomes 
included in the actor network visualisations. Table 15 gives an overview of the coded 
parliamentary committee minutes. An overview of the (f)actors, their connections 
and the other attributes is provided in Table 17. 
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Table 17  Overview of selected actors, connections and attributes of Ringland.
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11.4
Ucinet Node Attributes
As NVIVO only allows for numeric values, except for the label of the nodes in the 
network, all attributes were converted into numeric values. The legends of which are 
listed. 
Table 18  Overview of the node attributes used in NVivo and their meaning
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Appendix 3. Initial route alternatives for the  
Oosterweel Link project
Figure 98  ABM Alternative variant 1,
black large dots: viaduct, black 
small dots: tunnel. Source: based 
on AWV and Limehome fig. 2.1 p. 2.4 
Overheidsstudie AWV Bestek/98C8, 
1/03/2000 (https://nl.wikipedia.org).
 
Figure 99  ABM Alternative variant 2,
black large dots: viaduct, black small 
dots. Source: based on AWV and 
Limehome fig. 2.2 p. 2.5 Overheids-
studie AWV Bestek/98C8, 1/03/2000 
(https://nl.wikipedia.org).
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Figure 100  ABM Alternative variant 3,
black large dots: viaduct, black 
small dots: tunnel. Source: based 
on AWV and Limehome fig. 2.3 p. 2.7 
Overheidsstudie AWV Bestek/98C8, 
1/03/2000 (https://nl.wikipedia.org).
 
Figure 101  ABM Alternative variant 4.
Source: based on AWV and Limehome 
fig. 2.4 p. 2.9 Overheidsstudie AWV 
Bestek/98C8, 1/03/2000  
(https://nl.wikipedia.org).
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Figure 102  ABM Alternative variant 5.
Source: based on AWV and Limehome 
fig. 2.5 p. 2.11 Overheidsstudie AWV 
Bestek/98C8, 1/03/2000  
(https://nl.wikipedia.org).
 
Figure 103  ABM Alternative variant 6.
Source: based on AWV and Limehome 
fig. 2.6 p. 2.13 Overheidsstudie AWV 
Bestek/98C8, 1/03/2000  
(https://nl.wikipedia.org).
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Figure 104  ABM Alternative variant 7.
Source: based on AWV and Limehome 
fig. 2.7 p. 2.15 Overheidsstudie AWV 
Bestek/98C8, 1/03/2000  
(https://nl.wikipedia.org).
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Appendix 4. CurieuzeNeuzen profile of participants 
and project outreach
Table 19  Age (n: 1,395) 
Age % of participants
16-20 0.2
21-25 1.8
26-30 12.5
31-35 16.3
36-40 15.2
41-45 14.6
46-50 9.1
51-55 8.5
56-60 8.1
61-65 8.1
66-70 3.7
more than 70 1.9
Table 20  Gender (n: 1,398) 
Gender  % of participants
Male 46
Female 54
Table 21  Highest diploma (n: 1,410) 
 
Highest diploma % of participants
Primary education 0.6
Secondary education 13.3
Higher education 80.6
No diploma or unknown 5.5
Table 22  Family situation (n: 732)
 
Family situation % of participants
Single, without children 15.3
Single parent, with children 9.2
Living together or married, without children 22.1
Living together or married, with children 50.5
Other 2.9
Table 23  How many other people did you talk with about the  
CurieuzeNeuzen research and or de results? (n: 663)  
 
People talked to  Total
Friends 3,489
Family members 2,706
Neighbours 4,200
colleagues at work 1,739
During other social activities (sportclub, school, ..) 1,648
Total (for 660 participants) 11,982
Total (estimate: 1950 participants) 35,400
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Mobility problems increasingly become complex, and in 
order to respond to them, the decision-making processes 
and proposed solutions must also become more complex; 
they should by no means ignore this complexity by creating 
standard solutions. Solutions are often strongly viewed and 
formulated from the infrastructural-technical (hardware) 
and technological and user-oriented (software) angle, while 
an appropriate organization or “orgware” to be able to 
cope with such complexity is lacking. Yet, mobility is much 
more than just the construction of infrastructure or the 
development of new vehicle technology; it is influenced by 
so many other policy areas and evolutions, and by individual 
and collective customs. Each of us can be held responsible 
in the mobility transition. There is general acceptance that, 
in order to initiate a mobility transition, our behaviour – the 
way we act and govern – must also change.
In this dissertation we reveal a necessary orgware agenda, 
based on real-world complex case studies that provide 
insight into some recent, important orgware innovations 
in mobility: developing a regional cooperation for mobility, 
the transport regions, and dealing with complexity in large 
infrastructure projects. By visualising the mobility orgware, 
we try to materialise the use and the added value of the 
orgware approach. We focus on mapping the actors and 
the institutional context and we analyse how these two 
influence each other. In order to play with complexity and 
progress towards a more sustainable mobility, we propose 
an orgware agenda that aims to structurally connect  
a variety of actors across the various related policy areas. 
Therefore, the necessary conditions or institutional changes 
should be introduced as well, so that there are no obstacles 
to the new partnerships. This research is a plea for  
a co-evolutionary orgware approach to mobility to 
complement the conventional hardware and software 
approaches.
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